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This thesis examines the post-war reconstruction process undertaken in the three 
South Western cities of Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth. The cities provide examples of 
the difference approaches taken to reconstruction and different political 
backgrounds, allowing for the testing of current reconstruction narratives. These 
narratives include the impact of different political ideologies on reconstruction plans, 
the influence of traders and ‘big business’, the ‘top-down’ nature of planning and the 
impact of the post-war economy on reconstruction. This thesis also examines the 
continuity between pre- and post-war planning in the three cities, and the influence 
of interwar plans on post-war reconstruction. The interwar period is demonstrated to 
have a greater influence on post-war reconstruction plans that previously credited, 
with interwar concerns such as traffic congestion and slum clearance informing the 
post-war reconstruction and housing plans. There is also a previously uncredited line 
of continuity between the pre- and post-war local authorities, with staff and 
councillors serving their cities throughout the period, further influencing plans. The 
wartime planning in the cities is demonstrated to have been more inclusive than 
previously suggested, with the three cities engaging with citizens and businesses to 
try to plan for all. The influence of economic and financial factors on these plans is 
examined and demonstrated to have been far more important than political factors, 
with changes and approaches coloured by the lack of materials, labour and finance 
rather than political ideology. It is also demonstrated that these factors were the root 
of dissent amongst traders and property owners, rather than any particular failing of 
the plans themselves, particularly the financial and land ownership clauses of the 
Town and Country Planning Acts 1944 and 1947. Finally, the successes of the 
planning and building process are assessed, along with the reception of the rebuilt 
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The subject of this thesis is the post-Second World War reconstruction of the South 
Western cities of Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth. The reconstruction and planning of 
Britain’s cities after the Second World War has attracted a significant body of 
research and literature across a number of disciplines, including architecture, 
planning, sociology and history. The last decade and a half in particular has seen a 
growing interest in the subject of reconstruction, especially as many of these cities 
have begun to redesign and replan again. However, this research has focussed on a 
small selection of the blitzed cities, with emphasis on the industrial centres, such as 
Coventry, and major port cities, such as Portsmouth.  Little consideration has been 
given to the smaller blitzed cities and what might be learnt about the reconstruction 
process as a whole from their experience. The research has also tended to split 
between housing provision and central areas reconstruction, with the two halves of 
reconstruction treated in isolation with very few attempts to consider the impact of 
each on the other. This thesis will re-examine the reconstruction of blitzed cities 
through the lens of the South Western cities in order to test the current reconstruction 
narratives and open up further the local and national history of post-war 
reconstruction.  
 
The period 1945 to 1955 was one of extraordinary urban change, rivalling even the 
massive city expansions of the Victorian era.1 Wartime bombing had left many cities 
with devastated central areas, damaged industries and a reduced housing stock. The 
cessation of house-building during the war had also created a more general housing 
                                                          
1 See Gordon E. Cherry, Cities and Plans: The Shaping of Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, (London; Edward Arnold, 1988); Asa Briggs, Victorian Cities, (Middlesex, Pelican, 1968) for 
overview of city expansion in these periods. 
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shortage which required urgent attention. Reconstruction therefore became a prime 
objective for local and national government and the general public, encompassing 
not just the rebuilding of war damaged areas but the more general redevelopment of 
all urban areas.2 During the war reconstruction became a key issue for increasing 
morale both on the home and fighting fronts, with discussions around the post-war 
creation of a ‘Brave New Britain’ acting as an incentive for wartime efforts. 
Reconstruction did not just cover the physical rebuilding of damaged buildings and 
new homes, it also encompassed education, social welfare, industry and 
employment. In this spirit, blitzed cities were encouraged to plan not just for the 
rebuilding of war damaged areas, but for the redevelopment and expansion of their 
city in all areas over the next two to three decades. Reconstruction plans therefore do 
not just feature the rebuilding of shops and factories but the building of schools, 
public buildings, cultural and leisure facilities, and transport infrastructure.3 Likewise, 
the public were encouraged to engage with and discuss issues around the 
reconstruction of the nation, in order that their views could be taken into account. The 
concept of town planning was not new, having gained credence and popularity during 
the interwar period, and it highlighted the problems of slum housing, traffic 
congestion and poor transport infrastructure. It became accepted that town 
development needed to be directed and carefully planned in order to avoid the 
nuisances and congestion of the past.  The passing of new legislation during the 
interwar period gave local authorities the power to create planning schemes, which 
                                                          
2 William Ashworth, The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning: A Study in economic and social 
history of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London: Routledge, 1954); Cherry, Cities and 
Plans; J.B Cullingworth, Town and Country Planning in England and Wales, (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1964).  
3 Cherry, Cities and Plans, pp.113-116 
 Nick Tiratsoo, Junichi Hasegawa, Tony Mason & Takao Matsumura, Urban Reconstruction in Britain 
and Japan 1945-1955: Dreams, plans, realities (Luton: University of Luton Press, 2002); Richard 
Sheppard,  Building for the People (London: Allen & Unwin, 1948). 
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allowed them to tackle urban problems head-on. These early planning schemes in 
turn helped to shape and refine planning concepts throughout the interwar era and 
during the war itself.  
 
A total of nineteen towns and cities were officially designated as blitzed cities, 
including the cities of Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth. These three cities will provide the 
case studies for this thesis, with some additional supporting material provided by the 
other blitzed cities. The three South Western cities offer examples of the different 
approaches to planning taken by local authorities, such as the use of consultant 
planners, the use of in-house staff and the influence of local politics and 
organisations on plans. The cities are broadly similar in terms of their economies and 
position within their region and all had compact urban areas pre-war. They also 
represent different political positions, which allows for the comparison of political 
approaches to reconstruction. This study will also cover a wider period of time than 
many of the existing reconstruction studies because it will also take into account the 
pre-war conditions and planning initiatives in each location, an essential context for 
understanding wartime and post-war developments.  
 
 
Themes in Reconstruction and the Current Literature  
 
The process of reconstruction is surprisingly poorly documented, with many 
published local histories of war damaged towns and cities tailing off with the coming 
of peace in 1945. The process of reconstruction tends to be skated over with little 
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indication of how the city’s recovery was designed and executed.4 The body of 
academic literature on reconstruction is more fully developed and has grown 
considerably over the last decade and a half, partially due to renewed interest in 
reconstruction being created by widespread urban regeneration. The existing 
literature is spread across a number of disciplines, encompassing geography, 
planning, sociology and architecture as well as work within a more traditional 
historical framework. Within the latter category, Junichi Hasegawa and Nick Tiratsoo 
have produced the most influential work with their studies on blitzed cities, including 
Coventry and Bristol, and the planning framework of the 1940s.5  
The bulk of current research has, however, come from the disciplines of 
geography and planning, such as Stephen Essex and Mark Brayshay’s work on 
Plymouth and Peter Larkham’s extensive output on postwar building.6 This can lend 
a technical bent to some existing work which results in the neglect of some of the 
historical context of reconstruction, such as the financial or political background of the 
era. In addition to this, much of the existing literature has concentrated on a small 
number of example cities, led by Coventry, and focused on a narrow set of research 
questions. As a result certain tropes and narratives have become prevalent, such as 
the role of the master planner, the influence of  local politics, the lack of consultation 
with local people and the influence of ‘big business’. These factors are important to 
                                                          
4 W.G Hoskins Two Thousand Years in Exeter, (1st edition, Exeter: James Townsend & Son, 1960); 
Peter Thomas, Fire on the Wind (S.P. 1992); H.P Twyford, Plymouth; It Came to Our Door: The story 
of Plymouth throughout the Second World War (Plymouth: Underhill, 1975); John Perry, Bristol at War 
(Derby: Breedon Books, 2002). 
5 Nick Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and Labour Politics: Coventry 1945-1960 (London:  
Routledge, 1990); Nick Tiratsoo, ‘The Reconstruction of British Blitzed Cities 1945-1955: Myths and 
realities’, Contemporary British History, 14/1 (2000), pp. 27-44; Junichi Hasegawa, Replanning the 
Blitzed City Centre, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992). 
6 Stephen Essex & Mark Brayshay, ‘Vistion, Vested Interests and Pragmatism: Who remade Britain’s 
Blitzed Cities?’, Planning Perspectives, 22/4 (2007), pp. 417-441; Stephen Essex and Mark Brayshay 
‘Planning the Reconstruction of War Damaged Plymouth 1941-1961: Devising and defending a 
Modernist agenda’ in Mark Clapson And Peter Larkham (eds.) The Blitz and its Legacy: Wartime 
Destruction to Post-War Reconstruction’ (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013)    
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the process of reconstruction, but the narrow focus on their role within the process 
has helped to produce a set of assumptions around reconstruction. For example, 
research into Coventry’s Labour-led council and radical reconstruction plan has 
helped create the perception that radical planning was a product of Socialist 
thinking7, while the exceptionally modest plan of Conservative-led Portsmouth is 
thought to demonstrate the thinking of Conservative councils everywhere.8  
.  
A number of themes are evident across the current body of reconstruction literature, 
such as the role of planners, the role of national and local politics, the economics and 
finance of reconstruction, constraints on building and planning and the social aspects 
of reconstruction. Many of these themes are intertwined, such as the political and 
financial aspects of reconstruction, and these often also require us to ask further 
questions about related subjects, such as the architecture of reconstruction. What is 
particularly interesting about these themes and the way they are tackled in much of 
the recent research into reconstruction is the negative connotations attached to them. 
Reconstruction as a whole has gained a very negative image, particularly in terms of 
the architecture and the supposed foisting of plans and building styles on an unwilling 
populace. This concept runs as an undercurrent through the majority of existing 
literature, and is occasionally explicit within the analysis of reconstruction by some 
researchers. Many of the most prominent researchers within reconstruction pitch their 
work against these negative views of reconstruction, such as Tiratsoo’s challenge to 
the idea of socialist ideas leading reconstruction, but it is often not clear where the 
                                                          
7 Nick Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and Labour Politics, is the best example of the Coventry 
literature. 
8 Junichi Hasegawa, ‘The Reconstruction of Portsmouth in the 1940’s’, Contemporary British History, 
14/1 (2000), pp.45-62. 
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negative view has come from.9 Some of the research reviewed here has aligned itself 
with the negative view of reconstruction, but much of it has set out to unpack and re-
evaluate these ideas. The best example is that of the role of professional planners in 
reconstruction. The concept of the master planner who was out of touch with ‘the 
public’ and imposed idealistic and sterile new plans onto blitzed cities has become 
embedded within popular culture.10 The role of these individuals has become over-
emphasised, with ‘the planners’ becoming an amorphous group of individuals who 
are attributed with considerable influence and control over what was to be built.   
Attitudes towards buildings which were constructed within the last sixty years 
tend to be equally negative and often reflect this idea of ‘the planners’ imposing their 
vision on an unwilling populace. What is unclear is how this idea, along with several 
of the other recurring themes within reconstruction, became embedded in the popular 
consciousness and therefore the literature. It has been suggested that the campaigns 
of the Conservative governments since the 1950s has helped to create the negative 
image of the planner and the modern building and embed it in the common 
knowledge.11 There was a definite shift in attitudes towards public building in the 
1970s which has also helped to instil the negative image of ‘the planners’ and public 
building and appears to be one of the platforms for much of the recent literature. The 
growing socio-economic problems of the decade, which often were reflected in 
increasing disorder and breakdown within social housing, led to the assertion that the 
                                                          
9 Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and Labour Politics, pp. 2-4 
10 See BBC ‘The Era of Radical Concrete’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-29082338 (accessed 
10/9/14) and ‘I loved/loathed my 1960’s high-rise block’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
29160925, (accessed 17/9/2014) for two recent examples.  
11 Nick Tiratsoo, ‘The Reconstruction of Blitzed British Cities 1945-1955: Myths and realities’, 
Contemporary British History, 14/1 (2000), pp.41-42; Robin Harris (ed.), The Collected Speeches of 
Margaret Thatcher, Speech at the Conservative Party Conference, Blackpool, 9th October 1987 
(London: Harper Collins, 1999), pp.286-287. 
10 
 
design of the estates and towns was the root cause.12 The increasingly obvious flaws 
in some types of housing, particularly high-rise blocks, and the revelations regarding 
financial corruption within local authorities which had marred the reputation of public 
building, added to the backlash against all public building.13 As the architectural style 
of the 1950s and 1960s began to be blamed as the cause of some social problems, it 
appears that all architecture of the era fell out of favour and dragged down all of the 
buildings of this era with it. The reconstruction literature of the last twenty-five years 
has aimed to rehabilitate the reputation of post-war reconstruction efforts and those 
who created the plans. 
 
The idea of the ‘master planner’ is one which is tackled frequently in the literature. 
Professional planners were brought in by some local authorities, such as Plymouth 
and Exeter, as consultants to oversee the development of a plan. The role of these 
individuals, as already described, is often stated to have been all-encompassing with 
the master planner credited with the creation and execution of reconstruction plans. 
Susanne Cowan’s contribution to The Blitz and its Legacy demonstrated this 
perspective very well, with Cowan arguing that the initial enthusiasm for 
reconstruction planning was exploited by ‘the planners’ for their own gain.14 Cowan 
refers to the “increasing complaints by citizens” about the “imposition and 
inefficiency” of planning, but does not engage with the constraints on planning or the 
reasons for introducing comprehensive planning legislation post-war.15 Planning 
                                                          
12 For example, see Alice Coleman, Utopia on Trial: Vision and reality in planned housing (London: 
Hilary Shipman, 1985). 
13 Keith Ross, Non-Traditional Housing in the UK: A brief review (Watford: Building Research 
Establishment, 2002) for an overview; John Grindrod, Concretopia: A journey through the rebuilding of 
post-war Britain (Brecon, Old Street, 2013) pp.323-345, 363-381. 
14 Susanne Cowan, ‘The People’s Peace: The myth of wartime unity and public consent for town 
planning’ in Mark Clapson And Peter Larkham (eds.) The Blitz and its Legacy: Wartime Destruction to 
Post-War Reconstruction’ (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) 
15 Cowan, ‘The People’s peace’, p.79. 
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legislation is painted as the product of pressure by ‘the planners’ on parliament to 
expand the influence of the profession. What Cowan overlooks is the lack of 
professional planners in this period and the fact that the majority of reconstruction 
plans were executed by local authorities, not professional planners. Both Exeter and 
Plymouth’s councils used two of the most respected consultant planners of the day, 
Patrick Abercrombie and Thomas Sharp, but neither Sharp nor Abercrombie had any 
control over what was eventually built. Instead, this was down to the councils’ 
themselves and their staffs.  In addition to this, the pressure applied to parliament for 
legislation was generated by the local authorities themselves, who in turn were 
reacting to pressure from traders and property owners who wanted to start 
rebuilding.16 Complaints regarding planning were frequently voiced by those who had 
a vested interest in rebuilding and feared a personal financial loss, which Cowan also 
fails to analyse fully.  
Not all cities used consultant planners with some instead choosing to replan 
their cities using existing in-house staff. This was the route that Bristol City Council 
chose to follow, as described by Junichi Hasegawa in his Replanning the Blitzed City 
Centre. Likewise, the decisions of the London County Council regarding its housing 
policy, as outlined by Nick Bullock, falls within this category, as many of the decisions 
were made by the District Valuer.17 Bristol’s plan was a comprehensive one covering 
all aspects of city development and was as radical in some respects as those 
produced by professional consultant planners.18  
 
                                                          
16 Plymouth and West Devon Record Office (PWDRO hereafter), 1495/43, ‘Lord Mayor’s Secretary: 
Reconstruction August 1943- January 1944 – Plymouth replanning and reconstruction’. 
17 Nick Bullock, ‘Ideals, Priorities and Harsh Realities: Reconstruction and the LCC 1945-1951’, 
Planning Perspectives, 9/1 (1994), pp.87-101. 
18 Hasegawa, Replanning the Blitzed City Centre pp.77-79. 
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The idea of the planner as sole creator of reconstruction plans tends to be tied to the 
idea that all plans were created in a top-down manner and that planners didn’t 
consult with or care about what ‘ordinary’ people wanted. This idea can be seen 
within popular works such as David Kynaston’s Austerity Britain which suggests that 
the vision of the planner and architect overruled the wants of the ‘ordinary’ person.19 
This idea is frequently reinforced within works on housing, where the image of the 
planner as social engineer is often invoked. The design of municipal estates tends to 
be characterised as an attempt to force socialist values or unrealistic concepts of how 
communities should function onto the population. Alice Coleman’s Utopia on Trial is 
written on this theme and condemns the design of many municipal estates as a 
‘planner’s eye view’ of how housing should be constructed.20 Coleman’s work and 
others, such as Lynsey Hanley’s Estates, assumes that the local authorities which 
built the estates did not consult with prospective tenants over the design or layout of 
dwellings and imposed their own values and ideas onto them.21  
Similar themes can be found in works concentrating on central areas 
reconstruction, such as Peter Larkham’s Remaking Cities and David Adams 
Everyday Experiences of the Modern City.22 Larkham states that the top-down nature 
of planning can be seen through the artists impressions of the new city centres in 
published plans as they do not show anything negative, such as poverty or anti-social 
behaviour. Larkham suggests that this demonstrates in a very direct way that 
planners and local authorities did not have room in their new cities for the poorest in 
                                                          
19 David Kynaston, Austerity Britain 1945-51 (London: Bloomsbury, 2007). 
20 Alice Coleman, Utopia on Trial (London: Hilary Shipman, 1985). 
21 Lyndsey Hanley, Estates: An intimate history, (London: Granta Books, 2007). The opposite view is 
espoused by Mark Clapson, ‘Destruction and Dispersal: The Blitz and the ‘break-up of working class 
London’ ‘The Blitz and its Legacy’, pp.99-112. 
22 Peter Larkham, ‘Remaking Cities: Images, control and post-war replanning in the United Kingdom’, 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 24/5 (1997), pp.741-760; David Adams, ‘Everyday 
Experiences of the Modern City: Remembering the post-war reconstruction of Birmingham’, Planning 
Perspectives, 26/2 (2011), pp.237-260. 
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society or those who challenged the social norm.23 This very literal interpretation of 
the drawings demonstrates a pattern of thought that is frequently present in the 
current literature; that the plans were intended to make the world in ‘the planners’ 
eyes. David Adams makes a similar claim with his work on Birmingham, stating that 
the city demonstrates the planner’s attempts to impose a specific ‘way of seeing’ onto 
the cityscape. Adams believes that the city’s replanning reflected the problem of the 
planners-eye gaze which was distanced from the ‘complexities and ambiguities of 
everyday life in the city’.24  
 
What is frequently missed, or at least not acknowledged, is that these plans involved 
the input of local people to a far greater degree than in any previous era and would 
be on a par with modern planning. Local groups were consulted directly with regard 
to what they would like to see in a reconstructed city and local people were 
encouraged to share their views with the local authority. Tiratsoo, Hasegawa and 
Tatsuya Tsubaki all highlight the work done by local authorities in this vein, with 
exhibitions, pamphlets and talks all common as ways of attempting to engage the 
population with the planning process.25 The three South Western cities all engaged in 
such consultation activities and all canvassed local traders and businesses with 
regard to how their city centres should be replanned. It is suggested by several 
writers that the problem was not a lack of consultation, but a lack of interest amongst 
local people instead. This concept is explored in some depth by Steve Fielding in his 
contribution to The Attlee Years and is touched upon by Tiratsoo in his discussions 
                                                          
23 Larkham ‘Remaking Cities: Images, control and post-war replanning in the United Kingdom’, 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 24/5 (1997), pp.742. 
24 Adams, ‘Everyday Experiences of the Modern City’, Planning Perspectives, 26/2 (2011), pp.238. 
25 Hasegawa, Replanning the Blitzed City Centre, pp.70-78; Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and 
Labour Politics, pp. 29-30; Tiratsoo et al, Urban Reconstruction in Britain and Japan 1945-1955, 
pp.10-12;Tatsuya Tsubaki, ‘Planners and the Public: British popular opinion on housing during the 
Second World War, Contemporary British History, 14/1 (2008), pp.81-98. 
14 
 
on Coventry and Cowan’s work on post-war consensus.26 As the local authorities in 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all used a variety of methods to canvass their 
populations, the three cities give the opportunity to test both the accusation of a lack 
of consultation and a lack of enthusiasm on the part of citizens for comprehensive 
reconstruction.  
 
Closely related to the themes of planners and their interaction with the wider 
population are the themes of architecture and conservation. It is a frequent feature of 
both reconstruction literature and recent public opinion that ‘good’ standing property 
was destroyed by reconstruction. Peter Larkham refers to this in his collaborative 
work with David Adam’s into the reconstruction of Birmingham. Their work used oral 
history to create a polyvocal history of the reconstruction and refers to the regret of 
some respondents regarding the loss of pre-war buildings which survived the blitz.27 
The same view is often expressed in popular histories of bombed cities, such as 
Peter Thomas and Jacqueline Warren’s Aspects of Exeter, and is frequently found in 
the discussion forums of local history websites.28 Stephen Essex and Mark Brayshay 
note in their work on Plymouth’s reconstruction the “arrogance” of Plymouth City 
Council in their dismissal of pre-war architecture as “not of a high standard” and 
therefore expendable.29 Likewise, the negative attitude of both Exeter City Council 
and Thomas Sharp towards Exeter’s Victorian architecture is noted by Todd Gray in 
his Exeter in the 1940’s, along with Sharp’s perceived lack of interest in restoring 
                                                          
26 Steve Fielding, ‘Don’t Know, Don’t Care’ in Nick Tiratsoo (ed.), The Attlee Years, (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1991), pp.106-125. 
27 David Adams and Peter Larkham, ‘Bold Planning, Mixed Experiences: The diverse fortunes of post-
war Birmingham’ in The Blitz and its Legacy, pp.137-150. It should be noted that the interviewee 
sample used in their work was very small with 22 participants. This would represent 0.006% of the 
city’s population in 2011 (year the research was done).  
28 Peter Thomas & Jacqueline Warren, Aspects of Exeter, (2nd edition, Tiverton: Halsgrove, 2006); See 
‘Demolition Exeter’ for an example of web forums - http://demolition-exeter.blogspot.co.uk/ 
29 Stephen Essex and Mark Brayshay, ‘Planning the Reconstruction of War Damaged Plymouth 1941-
1961: Devising and defending a Modernist agenda’ in The Blitz and its Legacy, p.156. 
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standing buildings.30 The perceptions around the architectural merit of pre-war 
buildings are mostly a matter of individual opinion and taste, but tend to be fuelled by 
the propensity today to assume that all older buildings are ‘good’ and should be 
preserved at any cost. The fact that many of the buildings earmarked for destruction 
would have been - age-wise and in opinion terms – on a par with the buildings of the 
1950s and 1960s is entirely missed. It appears that the optimum time for a building to 
be destroyed is when it is sixty to eighty years old.31 At this stage it is not considered 
old enough to be worth preserving and is considered both common-place and old 
fashioned enough to destroy without thought. The lost buildings which are lamented 
in the existing reconstruction literature were frequently of this age, a fact which is 
often entirely overlooked. The buildings of the Victorian and Edwardian era were 
essentially viewed as many 1960’s buildings are now – ugly, impractical and badly 
built.32 The current opinion of post-war buildings taints many writers view of both the 
reconstruction process and its results, and this is closely tied with the presentation of 
planners and local authorities as top-down and arrogant in their approaches. Instead 
of viewing the buildings of this era with modern eyes, it is important to understand 
why the architecture was chosen and what its impact was at the time of construction. 
This will help to unpick the question of whether the reconstruction of the blitzed cities 
was indeed top-down with no consideration of what local citizens wished to see.  
 
The political themes within reconstruction centre on the relationship between Labour 
and Socialism versus the Conservatives and the free market. The socialist aims of 
reconstruction and the idea of Labour over-reaching itself to achieve them are 
                                                          
30 Todd Gray, Exeter in the 1940’s: War, Destruction and Rebirth (Exeter: Mint Press, 2004) 
31 This hypothesis put forward by Gray in Exeter in the 1940’s, p.135 
32 For an exploration of conservation in planning, see John Pendlebury, ‘Planning the Historic City: 




common themes within reconstruction literature as a whole.33 It is always assumed 
that Labour councils drove the most ambitious plans and these had the most 
‘socialist’ aims. This idea is explored in some depth by Tiratsoo in his work on 
Coventry and is also touched upon by Hasegawa in his work. Tiratsoo notes that the 
city enjoyed extensive Labour support until the mid-1950s, at which point the lack of 
progress in building amenities resulted in a surge of support for the Conservatives 
who promised unhampered redevelopment. Tiratsoo suggests that Coventry’s 
progress in rebuilding was hampered by the Labour council’s social policies and their 
desire to create a ‘responsible’ community-orientated society, although he also notes 
that the changing financial position of the city was a major factor in its ability to 
build.34  
Conservative-led local authorities are also subject to the same reductive 
thinking as their Labour counterparts, with the Conservative areas painted as 
reactionary and over-cautious in their planning. Hasegawa explores this theme in his 
work on Portsmouth, pointing to the Labour-led councils of Coventry and Plymouth as 
‘ardent’ supporters of reconstruction compared to the more muted response of 
Portsmouth’s Conservative council. The city’s initial reconstruction plans were 
modest compared with many other blitzed cities, but were extensively scaled back 
due to concerns around the potential cost of the scheme. The City Council 
considered dropping the revised scheme altogether in 1949, which Hasegawa 
attributes to the Conservative council’s lack of political will toward reconstruction.35 
However, both of these depictions fail to recognise that many reconstruction plans 
were drawn up prior to 1945 under Conservative-led councils, including the plan for 
                                                          
33 For a particularly visceral representation of this, see Correlli Barnett, The Audit of War: The illusion 
and reality of Britain as a great nation, (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
34 Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluance and Labour Politics, pp. 48-50, 89-91, 106. 
35 Hasegawa, ‘The Reconstruction of Portsmouth in the 1940’s’, Contemporary British History, 14/1 
(2000),  pp. 46, 49, 57-59 
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Plymouth. The plan for Plymouth was one of several portrayed as examples of 
Socialist over-ambition and its origins with a Conservative-led council make it an 
excellent example for testing the prevailing political concepts around reconstruction.  
There is often a lot of rhetoric around the political aspects of the planning process, 
with the aforementioned  accusations of social engineering, of ignoring ‘ordinary’ 
people, of being ‘arrogant’ in wanting to re-zone city centres or change street plans 
and ignoring how this would disrupt the ‘lived’ spaces of the city. The political nature 
of the arguments around planning frequently ignore the  problems that city centres 
faced pre-war with narrow streets, traffic congestion, bad housing and poor placing of 
industry.  
  
The financial aspects of reconstruction are interconnected with the political questions, 
with particular reference to the use of private finance and development companies for 
central areas rebuilding. This particular aspect of reconstruction frequently reveals 
the conflicting thought present across the different strands of reconstruction literature, 
with the best use of private and public enterprise for rebuilding becoming muddled.  It 
is suggested that within central areas rebuilding local authorities were weak and 
bowed to trader pressure, which allowed private development companies to dominate 
the rebuilding of Britain’s city centres.36 This is frequently linked with the perceived 
substandard construction of buildings and the homogenisation of the High Street, as 
the rents charged by the development companies are thought to have pushed out the 
small trader and allowed the multiple store to flourish. At the same time it is 
suggested that local authorities were too rigid in their top-down plans and should 
                                                          
36 Essex & Brayshay, ‘Planning the Reconstruction of War Damaged Plymouth 1941-1961’, pp. 159; 
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have allowed private developers a free hand, as they could have rebuilt better, faster 
or more cheaply. What is often not fully explored is why private development 
companies were used in the first place, rather than local authorities or blitzed traders 
building themselves. The serious economic problems facing the UK in the late 1940s 
and the financial aspects of the 1944 and 1947 planning acts left both local 
authorities and property owners in fiscal difficulty. Local businesses and authorities 
alike found that the financial assistance offered by the government was inadequate 
for their needs, while the redirection of capital project finance into the export market 
starved reconstruction of both finance and materials. The role of the Investment 
Programmes Committee (IPC hereafter), a central government advisory body, in the 
allocation of both materials and finance for building projects has not been fully 
explored, but Catherine Flinn’s recent work has suggested that this might be the key 
reason for the lack of finance and therefore the slow pace of reconstruction. Flinn 
observed in Reconstruction Constraints that the IPC allocated resources by 
department, but the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, which was responsible 
for central areas reconstruction, was not represented on the committee. It therefore 
had little influence over the IPC’s decisions and was unable to put the case for 
reconstruction directly to the committee.  
The resultant lack of resources and finance left local authorities with little 
choice but to use private development companies and large businesses to undertake 
rebuilding, as they were the only people who had financial power to do so.37 This 
appears to be the single most influential factor in central areas reconstruction and the 
explanation behind many of the changes to plans. The lack of financial support from 
central government is noted by Tiratsoo in his work on Coventry and Hull, Hasegawa 
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on Portsmouth, Bristol and Southampton, Essex and Brayshay on Plymouth and 
Flinn on Exeter, demonstrating the widespread impact of the problem.38 The financial 
aspect may trump the political argument in terms of influence over what was built, as 
the political leadership of a local authority becomes irrelevant if the finance to build 
with is missing. Flinn also points to the unexplored nature of the exact relationship 
between private finance and local authorities and suggests that this would be a 
further area of research. This point will be investigated more thoroughly in this thesis 
using the archives of some of these companies.  
 
The financial and economic aspects of reconstruction also produce some interesting 
questions regarding the public perception of national finance and economy during the 
post-war years. Economic planning had become a familiar concept alongside town 
planning during the interwar years, with all political groups expressing ideas around 
increased state-control of industry and national economy. The experience of 
increased state control of industry during the First World War and Britain’s declining 
export production in the post-armistice years led to the concept of economic planning 
becoming embedded in the political and economic psyche of all political parties to 
difference degrees.39  This idea was most radically taken up by the Labour Party, 
who saw national economic planning and the planned economy as the natural 
successor to the laissez-faire capitalist systems, particularly after the economic 
slump of 1929. As noted by Daniel Ritschel, Labour’s vision of economic planning 
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included the state control and eventual ownership of land, transport and the 
distributive trades, heavy industry, including coal and steel, shipbuilding and the 
electricity network.40 The experience of the war economy and Labour’s vision for a 
planned economy both inter- and post-war has a bearing on wartime urban 
reconstruction. The vision for a reconstructed Britain post-war included the 
reconstruction of industry and society, with the nationalisation of some key industries, 
such as coal, and the implementation of a welfare state according to William 
Beveridge’s vision.  
These ideas and the concept of the planned economy may have left property 
owners with the impression that town planning was the first step towards land 
nationalisation and state-control of industry and the economy. The years of ‘austerity 
Britain’ after the war may have reinforced this idea, especially at a time when the 
nationalisation of some industries was underway. The work of Ina Zweiniger-
Bargielowska on austerity and rationing uncovers the discontent of the middle 
classes in these years, potentially giving another angle on the concept of ‘planners’ 
and the disconnect between planning and public.41 As ‘planners’ could also refer to 
the proponents of economic planning as well as urban planning, the work of 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska and Ritschel suggests that the supposed revolt against 
‘planners’ may refer to the  interference of the state in everyday life as much as the 
creation of new townscapes. The activism of middle-class housewives against 
rationing and a declining standard of life, as documented by Zweiniger-Bargielowska 
and  James Hinton,  suggest a fear of a socialist, classless future as much as a 
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protest against the inconvenience of queuing and shortages.42 This could translate to 
a similar fear amongst property owners and traders, who feared that the loss of 
control over private property brought by post-war plans was the first step towards the 
loss of private enterprise altogether. Ritschel’s work also suggests that the post-1945 
political ‘big five’ of Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Sir Richard Stafford Cripps, 
Ernest Bevin and Hugh Dalton may have added to the uneasiness of traders and 
property owners, as all five were interwar proponents of economic planning and the 
restriction of private enterprise.43 The declining support for reconstruction amongst 
traders and property owners during the late 1940s in the three South Western cities 
provides an opportunity to examine this idea further.   
 
The provision of housing encompasses many of the same problems and challenges 
which faced local authorities in rebuilding the central areas. The current literature 
frequently treats housing and central areas reconstruction as two separate issues, 
which appears a natural division but in fact succeeds in missing the close relationship 
between the two.44 The need for housing had a major impact on the ability of local 
authorities to start rebuilding the central areas, mostly owing to the way in which 
central government allocated resources. Housing itself became a political issue which 
could not be neglected, forcing both government and local authorities to prioritise 
house building over all other projects, as demonstrated by Harriet Jones and Peter 
Weiler in their investigations into housing policy between 1945 and 1955.45  The slow 
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pace of central areas reconstruction became a bone of contention as a result and 
was key to the loss of interest amongst the public in reconstruction and planning. It 
has also been suggested that the slow pace of building overall was the result of 
consultant planners insisting on ‘grand plans’ for the central areas, although this does 
not account for the slow pace of central areas building itself.46 This thesis will attempt 
to consider the twin reconstruction demands made on local authorities by the need 
for housing and the need for other types of building, and the impact each had on the 
other. This will also highlight the constraints faced by local authorities in terms of 
finance, materials and labour, all dictated by central government, and the 
predicament in terms of central areas reconstruction most towns and cities found 
themselves in. The impact this had on the reconstruction plans will be explored to 
see how far these constraints resulted in deviation away from the original planning 
documents.  
 
The relationship between local authorities and traders is highlighted by the financial 
aspects of reconstruction, with many traders in blitzed cities presented as being 
unhappy with reconstruction plans. It tends to be presented that the use of 
development companies and multiple stores to finance rebuilding gave these 
companies undue influence over the finished result, particularly in terms of the 
architectural styles used, to the detriment of local traders. It is also often suggested 
that traders of all types were the reason for changes to reconstruction plans.  While 
traders certainly did have an influence over reconstruction plans, as local authorities 
directly consulted with them in replanning, many of the changes seen were due to 
outside influences, such as the intervention of government departments. This aspect 
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of reconstruction requires further study and the three cities offer the opportunity to do 
so as some changes made to their plans are attributed to trader influence.47  Dissent 
amongst trade groups in blitzed cities appears to be common, but the root cause of 
this opposition to replanning is not always clear. Hasegawa’s work on Bristol 
suggests that traders were concerned that major changes to city centre layouts would 
be detrimental to trade.48  
 
The loss of freeholds under the reconstruction legislation also appears to have been 
a bone of contention for many. The latter was brought about by local authorities using 
compulsory purchase orders to bring all reconstruction areas under single ownership 
in order to be able to plan and build methodically.  It is suggested that this decision 
pushed central area rents and rates beyond the reach of local traders and allowed 
the multiple stores to take over. It is not always explicitly stated, but there is a certain 
assumption that multiple stores had serious influence over local authorities and drove 
out smaller local traders via reconstruction.49 This appears to be due to the role of 
large corporations in the physical rebuilding of city centres, as particularly explored 
by Flinn in her work, and the use of leasehold rather than freehold tenure for city 
centre property.50 However, changes in shopping patterns across the twentieth 
century demonstrate a more general shift toward the multiple store, with many of the 
multiple traders present in city centres during the interwar period. Ritschel and 
Zewiniger-Bargielowska’s work on economic planning and constraints during the 
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inter- and post-war years again illuminates another potential explanation for trader 
apathy with the possible equating of planning with a planned economy and the loss 
of free private enterprise.51 The complicated relationship between the trader and the 
local authority needs to be further examined to untangle all of these factors and 
determine which of them, if any, had an influence on how blitzed cities rebuilt.  
 
Finally, the interwar development of planning and the continuity between inter– and 
post-war planning must be considered. There is very little consideration given to this 
subject within the current literature. Instead there tends to be the assumption that the 
Second World War was the catalyst for comprehensive planning, while creating a 
window of opportunity for reconstruction at the same time. While this is accurate in 
some respects, such as the creation of new legislation which allowed for 
comprehensive redevelopment and closer control of building, it is not in many others. 
Much of the literature does not fully take into account the activity of many towns and 
cities in trying to replan during the interwar period. There are often references made 
to pre-war plans for roads, civic centres and replanning via slum clearance in many of 
the towns and cities, but their significance and influence on post-war planning is left 
unexplored.52 Local authorities had a statutory duty prior to the Second World War to 
survey their areas in terms of housing and future development and created a 
planning scheme accordingly. This resulted in both the building of local authority 
housing to address the slum problem virtually everywhere and the replanning of 
roads and civic amenities by many local authorities. The three South Western cities 
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all had plans in place prior to the outbreak of war and were therefore well aware of 
the problems which needed addressing in each city.  
In addition to this, many of the interwar councillors and committee members 
who made these decisions were still present in wartime and post-war, and could 
therefore bring with them the knowledge and expertise gained through interwar 
projects. Likewise, the interwar engineers and architects who designed and executed 
such projects were also still in-post, but this is also frequently unacknowledged and 
unexplored. This is particularly notable in David Adams’ work on Birmingham which 
does not acknowledge the role of the city’s engineer, Herbert Manzoni, in creating 
interwar plans for the city or the influence of the 1912 plan for the city on replanning 
in Birmingham as a whole.53 Likewise, Coventry’s plan was also based on an existing 
scheme for redevelopment drawn up by the city’s architect, Donald Gibson, during 
the late 1930s and completed in 1940 ahead of the blitz. This latter point has become 
better acknowledged in recent years, such as in John Grindrod’s Concretopia, but the 
acknowledgement of the influence of this plan is absent from earlier work such as 
Tiratsoo and Hasegawa.54  Reference is also occasionally made to the continuity of 
local authority staff between the inter- and post-war periods, such as that at 
Coventry, but again the potential impact of this on post-war reconstruction is not fully 
examined.55  
 
The continuity of council and committee members, who debated the plans and made 
the major decisions, is not considered at all in much of the literature. This can result 
in conclusions being draw about the nature of the plans and planners such as 
                                                          
53 Adams, ‘Everyday Experiences of the Modern City’, Planning Perspectives, 26/2 (2011), p.238. 
54 John Grindrod, Concretopia, pp.103-106. 
55 Alan Lewis, ‘Planning Through Conflict: Competing approaches to the preparation of Sheffield’s 
post-war plan’, Planning Perspectives, 28/1, 2013, pp.27-49; Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and 
Labour Politics, pp.8-9. 
26 
 
Larkham’s conjecture that many plans were civic ‘boosterism’ intended to focus 
attention on the towns and cities in question rather than being serious reconstruction 
blueprints.56 This fails to recognize that there may have been real urban nuisances to 
address. By studying the progress of planning as a profession during the interwar 
period and the growth of planning and housing legislation, we can better understand 
how local authorities and central government approached reconstruction, and how 
the general public may have understood planning as a subject. This thesis will 
therefore examine first the interwar progress of planning in the three South Western 
cities in order to assess what impact this may have had on their tackling of post-war 
reconstruction.   
 
Sources and Existing Research on the South Western Cities 
 
The towns and cities featured in this study have only a small body of existing 
research, with Plymouth’s reconstruction the best documented. Plymouth, along with 
Coventry, was considered a flagship reconstruction plan and its city centre is one of 
the most complete building projects based on a post-war plan. The use of Patrick 
Abercrombie as consultant planner in producing the plan sealed this position, as 
Abercrombie was one of the most prominent planners of the age and his Plymouth 
plan one of his most celebrated. The relationship between Abercrombie and the city’s 
Lord Mayor, Viscount Waldorf Astor, as the instigators of the Plymouth plan, has 
therefore become the main theme of the existing research into Plymouth’s 
reconstruction.57  
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It is suggested that Astor was the instigator of Abercrombie’s involvement with the 
city by insisting that he was the best person for the job and securing his services 
through a personal acquaintance with the planner. This suggestion appears to have 
originated with Crispin Gill’s Plymouth: A new history, which deals with reconstruction 
of the city in its last chapter. Gill gives a reasonable overview of the reconstruction of 
the city and it appears that his work has been widely used by other authors as an 
introduction to the city’s post-war fortunes. 
Gill’s work evidently influenced the planning historian and theorist Gordon 
Cherry, who makes reference to several ideas expressed by Gill in his 1989 article on 
the replanning of Plymouth. These include Astor’s importance in bringing 
Abercrombie into Plymouth’s planning framework and to Abercrombie’s influence on 
the replanning of the city. Gill’s work is also evident in Cherry’s description of 
Plymouth’s urban problems in the interwar period and the solutions that the Plan for 
Plymouth proposed, referring to the problems of overcrowding and congestion and 
the creation of a focused centre to the city.58 Cherry’s article is more concerned with 
the similarities and differences in the planning process of the late-1940s compared 
with that of forty years later than the actual creation and execution of the post-war 
reconstruction. As a result he gives no indication of how the planning process was 
undertaken beyond commenting that modern planners have to walk a finer line with 
public opinion compared to the 1940s.59 The major contribution of his article is 
therefore the idea of there being a small knot of influential ‘actors’ within the Plan for 
Plymouth. 
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The work of Stephen Essex and Mark Brayshay, both geographers with the 
University of Plymouth, focuses particularly on the idea of an ‘actor network’ driving 
Plymouth’s reconstruction planning. Essex and Brayshay suggest that Plan for 
Plymouth was the work and vision of a very small group of people, and this resulted 
in a plan which was “visionary and idealistic” rather than reflecting the needs of the 
city’s citizens. Their work looks at the key figures of Astor and Abercrombie and the 
network of influential individuals they had contact with, such as George Pepler, the 
geographer Dudley Stamp and the architect William Crabtree, and the influence this 
may have had on planning in the city.60 The assertion that the plan was the product 
of a few influential figures fits with the suggestion found within many works on 
reconstruction that the planning process was ‘top down’ and did not take into account 
the views of local people. Essex and Brayshay suggest that consultation with traders 
and the public was carefully managed and restricted, which resulted in the Plan for 
Plymouth being unpopular with traders and citizens. They state that the later 
compromises and changes to the plan were made to appease the voices of dissent.61 
However, Essex and Brayshay also refer to the objections of the Ministry of Town 
and Country planning to the Plymouth plan but do not explore what impact these 
objections may have had on the execution of the plan. They also state in their article 
within The Blitz and its Legacy that the Ministry felt unable to insist on dramatic 
changes to the plan, such as abandoning the new street layout, as they recognised 
the importance of the plan to the city as a whole, contradicting their assertion that the 
plan was not popular within the city.62 Essex and Brayshay make reference to the 
problems created by the Town and Country Planning Act 1944, which was meant to 
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provide a framework for reconstruction, but again do not fully explore the impact that 
these had on Plymouth’s plan or reconstruction.63 Their work is therefore useful as a 
starting point for identifying the key figures in designing the blueprint for post-war 
Plymouth and the roles they played. This immediately engages with the themes of 
the planner’s role and ‘top-down’ planning, which are important to the subject of 
reconstruction as a whole, and give a platform for testing the idea that the city’s 
citizens were not fully included in the planning process. Essex and Brayshay’s work 
also helps to identify areas which need further work, such as the role of central 
government, in shaping and changing the city’s plans.  
 
Bristol’s reconstruction has received some attention with its use as a case study in 
Junichi Hasegawa’s work on blitzed cities, but no extensive body of literature 
exists.64  Bristol’s decision not use a consultant planner in its reconstruction appears 
to be one of the reasons why little published work on Bristol exists, as many works 
focus on the work of consultant planners and their role in reconstruction. Hasegawa’s 
work centres on the lengthy consultation process undertaken by the Planning and 
Public Works Committee (later the Planning and Reconstruction Committee) and the 
conflicts which arose with the Bristol Chamber of Commerce and local traders. The 
replanning was undertaken by the City Engineer, who had been in-post during the 
interwar period and had helped to shape the city’s earlier planning schemes.65 The 
use of an existing member of local authority staff and the extensive consultation 
process undertaken by the committees overseeing planning and reconstruction make 
Bristol the antithesis of some reconstruction themes. It is often suggested that the 
use of outside planning consultants and a lack of consultation with local people led to 
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conflicts between corporation and citizen. Bristol’s approach should therefore allow 
for the testing of this theory, and Hasegawa’s findings suggest that it did not avoid 
the conflicts seen elsewhere. The same bitter fights with city traders are seen in 
Bristol as in other cities over the changing of land use and the redesigning of the 
shopping areas. 
 
The published literature for Exeter is minimal and approaches the subject from very 
specific viewpoints. The use of Thomas Sharp, a prominent town planner in the 
interwar and post-war periods, as the city’s consultant planner has resulted in Exeter 
being referred to in research focusing on Sharp’s work. However, the city tends to be 
referred to in passing and there is very little published material which deals with the 
city’s planning and reconstruction process. There are also a number of further 
unpublished studies, but these are written from a technical standpoint and again do 
not examine the reconstruction process.  
The architectural view is taken by Aiden While and Malcom Tait’s work 
regarding the legacy of Thomas Sharp.66 While and Tait aim to assess the 
architectural legacy left on the urban landscape by planners such as Sharp and use 
Exeter as a case study.  This article is one of the few which directly deals with 
Exeter’s reconstruction and Sharp’s plan. However, the focus is on Sharp’s ‘physical 
legacy’ in the cities he planned in contrast to his intellectual legacy in planning, which 
results in a focus on the architectural treatment of Exeter rather than the process 
which led to reconstruction. The point of architectural taste has already been referred 
to as a theme within reconstruction, as the buildings of this era are not appreciated 
today and the decision to use muted or Modern building styles is often viewed as a 
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mistake. While and Tait’s work builds on this theme and explores the changing tastes 
in architecture. They also attempt to examine the changes and compromises made to 
buildings and their impact.67  However, While and Tait relied entirely on secondary 
sources and therefore make a series of erroneous statements around architectural 
control and trader influence in Exeter. This lack of primary research and restricted 
number of secondary works, all written from very specific perspectives, results in the 
repetition of ideas and viewpoints which are not entirely reflective of the city’s actual 
experience, particularly with regard to changes in the design and architectural 
treatment for the city. 
 
The sources used by While and Tait include two unpublished works by former city 
engineers: John Brierley and Norman Venning.68 Venning and Brierley’s work 
concentrates on the technical challenges of rebuilding rather than the decisions 
behind it, therefore providing very narrow viewpoints on reconstruction. Neither work 
focuses on the economic constraints facing the city, dealing purely with the 
architectural and engineering challenges. In addition to these works, While and Tait 
used a series of reports written for Exeter City Council, English Heritage and Land 
Securities regarding recent redevelopment in Exeter, which again concentrate on the 
architectural value of the buildings rather than the process which produced them. 
While and Tait’s article serves as an example of how the accepted narrative for 
reconstruction can be perpetuated. It does, however, provide several points for 
further investigation as the lack of architectural control and the zoning of areas for 
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particular purposes are often cited as failings in reconstruction. Their work also ties in 
with the themes of ‘top down’ planning and the planner’s role in reconstruction.   
The work of Todd Gray on Exeter in the 1940s can further demonstrate this 
point, although the work was not designed to be a study of reconstruction in Exeter, 
and as such only a small portion is devoted to this subject.69 Gray made extensive 
use of the Town Clerk’s papers, which had not been exploited previously as a source 
and contain correspondence regarding the early stages of reconstruction planning 
and the clearing of bombed sites. These can produce a damning picture of the 
Council’s attitude towards the city’s remaining urban fabric and support the view that 
those in charge of reconstruction were little interested in preserving the old and 
familiar urban patterns. Gray also utilised the local newspapers to demonstrate the 
concern of some citizens regarding the clearance of damaged buildings. However, 
the same newspapers are also used to demonstrate that some portions of the 
population actively supported a ‘clean sweep’ approach. In this sense Gray is one of 
the few researchers to acknowledge that there was active support for redevelopment 
even though there was also some sentimentality for that which had been lost.  
 
The most interesting work on Exeter is the unpublished MA thesis of Catherine Flinn, 
‘Overlooked Constraints’, which explores the financial constraints and challenges 
facing blitzed cities. Flinn argues that blitzed cities were cut off from capital project 
finance by the Investment Programmes Committee and it was this that caused the 
majority of delays and challenges in reconstruction.70 The Investment Programme 
Committee decided the allocations of government spending for all investment and 
capital projects and Flinn argues that it deliberately starved blitzed cities of funding to 
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rebuild. The Committee directed spending instead toward industry and other projects 
which could improve the nation’s export market; central areas reconstruction was not 
considered profitable and was therefore neglected. In addition to this, the ministries 
responsible for central areas reconstruction were not represented on the Committee, 
and therefore had no influence on allocations of money and materials.71 Flinn uses 
Exeter as a case study to demonstrate the impact this had on local authorities in 
blitzed cities and the reconstruction plans they had prepared. Her main finding is that 
the use of development companies became increasingly important to blitzed cities, 
such as Exeter, as they were able to raise the finance to build new property.72 
Where Flinn’s work is important is the highlighting of financial constraints on 
building, as it appears that this was the principal factor in the delays and challenges 
of reconstruction. The lack of allocations of both finance and materials to blitzed cities 
in the first five years of peace resulted in exceedingly slow progress on central areas 
reconstruction in virtually all blitzed cities. The exceptions appear to have been 
Liverpool and London, where allocations were made as it was felt that these cities 
could contribute to the export market.73 Likewise, the majority of changes made to 
city plans were on financial grounds and the changes made by central government 
departments were generally made citing the same reasons. The constraints on 
finance are often referenced in reconstruction literature, but the impact has not been 
fully explored by anyone other than Flinn.  
 
The sources for this thesis proved plentiful, with a range of local and national records 
available. The records of the three local authorities have not been extensively used in 
the existing research and offered a local perspective on the reconstruction process. 
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72 Flinn, Overlooked Constraints, unpublished MA thesis, pp.48-50. 
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In particular, the surviving correspondence of Plymouth’s Lord Mayor, Viscount Astor, 
held by the Plymouth and West Devon Record Office provided an excellent insight 
into the local position on national legislation. Exeter’s city records have not be fully 
untilised in the existing literature, partially because they have not been fully 
catalogued, and therefore offered a unique perspective on the city’s experience of 
reconstruction.  
In addition to the local records, records were sought for the development and retail 
companies which actually built the new cities. Sadly the records of major retailers, 
such as Marks and Spencer, for the post-war period had not survived. A similar 
problem was encountered with the major insurance companies which financed 
reconstruction, such as Pearl Assurance and Norwich Union, mostly due to the 
constant restructuring and take-overs in the insurance sector. However, some 
records were found for the correct period in the archives of Lloyd’s Bank and Land 
Securities. The records of Lloyds did provide a little more detail into the 
reconstruction process, as the notes collected by J.R Winton for his history of Lloyds 
Bank had survived and provided some background to the rebuilding process in the 
provinces.74 Land Securities have archived a wide selection of their records from the 
early 1940s onwards, providing a number of sources. There was little surviving 
correspondence, but Land Securities was able to provide a range of minutes, cuttings 
and photographs about their involvement in reconstructing the three cities. While 
these records do not carry much detail about the relationship between the company 
and the local authorities they dealt with, they do provide a window into the workings 
of the various development companies which rebuilt blitzed cities.  
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Local newspapers provided a further window into the reconstruction process, offering 
the best window into the opinions and standpoints of local councillors, traders and 
citizens. Reports of council meetings proved particularly valuable, as these often 
contained detail that was missing from the official records. The three titles used 
extensively in this thesis were the Western Daily Press, the Western Morning News 
and the Western Times, with some supporting material from the Plymouth Herald, the 
Express and Echo, and the Bristol Evening Post. The three main titles were chosen 
as they were papers covering not just the cities in question, but the wider region, 
which allowed for a wider selection of opinions and contrasts with the plans and 
approaches of surrounding towns. The three papers were also similar in tone, being 
more centre-right than other local titles, and had wide circulations which reached 
across a wide spectrum of the local population. In this way, the papers could reflect a 
viewpoint that was not too biased toward a Labour viewpoint and would reflect the 
more Conservative elements of the local population better. They would also be the 
papers that reached the widest audience and would therefore have helped form the 
opinions of the greatest number of citizens across the local areas.  
 
It is the intention of this research to demonstrate not only the process of 
reconstruction, but also the continuity of planning development and its political 
impetus. In order to demonstrate this, this thesis will take a chronological format with 
each chapter examining a small period of time and the key issues and themes within 
that period.  
The first chapter will deal with the evolution of planning and urban change to 
1939, as an understanding of urban problems and the progress of planning is 
essential to understanding post-war reconstruction and planning. This chapter will 
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provide the background to the political and social change which shaped the progress 
of planning through the war years and the first stages of reconstruction. 
Comprehensive planning is often characterised as a product of the war and war 
damage, but many of the problems which post-war planning sought to solve, such as 
housing shortages and traffic congestion, were already under scrutiny in the interwar 
era. Issues such as public health and the impact of housing on health and education 
had been debated and confronted with a series of legislative measures from the mid-
Nineteenth century onwards. The interwar period saw an intensification of this 
process, as state control and intervention became more accepted post-First World 
War. The position and growth of planning during this period therefore led directly to 
the reconstruction plans of the post-war era. As well as the continuity of planning 
ideals and methods, there is a political continuity between the interwar and post-war 
eras at the local level which is also frequently overlooked. The current literature tends 
to assume that the victory of the Labour party in 1945 also significantly altered the 
make-up of local authorities and local authority staffs. A closer examination of the 
situation suggests that there was in fact far more overlap between the two periods 
than assumed. This chapter with therefore examine the continuity between the 
interwar and post-war periods and the impacts this may have had on post-war 
reconstruction in each city.  
The second and third chapters will both examine the years from 1940 to 1946, 
but from different perspectives.  The three case study cities all suffered severe war 
damage during the early years of the war and, along with other blitzed cities, were 
encouraged to start planning for reconstruction immediately. Reconstruction itself 
became part of the toolkit for encouraging the wartime morale of the nation, and the 
national interest in planning grew to an unprecedented level. The second chapter will 
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look specifically at the reconstruction plans and the people who made them, testing 
the concept of the master planner and the ‘top-down’ nature of planning.  The place 
of reconstruction and planning in local life will therefore be explored in this chapter, 
examining the process of consultation and the ideas of local people for 
reconstruction.  The content of the completed plans and their reception amongst local 
people will also be examined. This will give the opportunity to test some of the 
generalisations around reconstruction, such as the role of consultant planners, 
consultation with local people and organisations and the political nature of 
reconstruction. 
The third chapter will examine the same time period, but looking specifically at 
the legislative and financial elements of reconstruction.  At the political level, the role 
of national government in encouraging and constraining planning will be examined, 
with particular reference to the planning legislation of 1944. Pressure was brought on 
the government by local authorities to deliver new planning legislation under which 
the blitzed cities could deliver the ambitious schemes asked of them. The way in 
which central government prioritised such legislation will be examined, along with the 
economic and financial aspects of reconstruction.  
 
The fourth chapter covers the period 1947-1950. The national financial crisis 
experienced in these years and the decisions made by the Investment Programmes 
Committee led to long delays in the commencing of central areas reconstruction, 
while house-building progressed more slowly than anticipated. These legislative and 
financial aspects of reconstruction added to both the growing conflicts with land and 
property owners and the growing disillusionment with reconstruction in the late 
1940’s. This chapter will examine the impact of these factors on the progress of 
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reconstruction and public opinion. It will also examine the role of the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning in delaying reconstruction and altering the plans of the three 
cities.  
The fifth chapter will cover the years 1950 to 1955. In these years central 
areas reconstruction began to move slowly ahead, while house-building was 
increased via new subsidies and a relaxation of the restrictions on private building. 
The three cities finally began to rebuild their centres, but were still constrained by the 
small allocations of investment and materials allocated for this purpose. This chapter 
examines how the cities’ dealt with these constraints and the demands of the 
companies which undertook rebuilding. This chapter also reviews the other 




Chapter One – The Inter-War Period 
 
This chapter will examine the development of town planning and municipal housing 
to 1939, and the legislation and social change which fuelled this development. The 
contribution of the inter-war period to town planning, and therefore to post-war 
reconstruction, is not always fully acknowledged in the existing literature on post-war 
reconstruction. The impression is often given that town planning as a discipline 
sprung into existence fully formed in the 1940s. Little consideration is given to the 
interwar attempts by local authorities to improve the fabric of their towns and cities, 
sometimes resulting in surprise and puzzlement at the actions of municipal planners 
and engineers post-war as their plans appear to be a continuation of a previous 
project.75  Furthermore, it is also often implied, or assumed, that a new political force 
was driving reconstruction in the form of the Labour party, and as a result the 
councillors and local politicians of the interwar era had little influence on the new 
post-war world.76  This has the effect of making comprehensive town planning and 
municipal estate building appear as a distinct post-war bubble. In reality post-war 
planning was part of a long line of development in planning and urban change, 
stretching from the changes in fashion and taste which wrought huge changes on the 
faces of many towns and cities during the 17th and 18th centuries, through the rapid 
growth of urban centres during the Victorian era and the growing awareness of the 
urban problems which came with it.77  
The inter-war period saw the first serious, co-ordinated efforts to alleviate the 
problems of slum living and congestion in towns and cities.  Inter-war developments 
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in housing, planning and the laws relating to them are therefore crucial to 
understanding post-war reconstruction and planning. Many of the principles in 
housing and planning used in the post-war period were developed during the inter-
war period, while planning gained credence and respect as a profession. The neglect 
of inter-war developments also disregards the influences of the garden city 
movement, the long history of housing reform and the influence of the Modernist 
movement on both inter-war and post-war attitudes to housing and the built 
environment as a whole. This chapter will seek to uncover the line of continuity in 
planning which runs between the inter-war and post-war periods.  
 
The Roots of Planning  
 
The roots of modern town planning can be found in the massive urban growth of the 
nineteenth century. The rapid increase in urban populations throughout the century 
left local authorities with a legacy of overcrowded and unfit dwellings in the twentieth 
century. In addition to this, the original street patterns of towns and cities became 
increasingly inadequate for the needs of the twentieth century, particularly with the 
advent of the motor car. The cities of Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all follow these 
patterns of urban growth and change, and experienced similar problems in terms of 
slums and public health during this period.78  
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The first decades of the nineteenth century saw a population explosion, with the 
overall population growing by over 4.5 million between 1801 and 1831.79 At the same 
time agricultural depression and the growth of industry resulted in an unprecedented 
migration of rural populations to urban areas to seek employment and better wages. 
The consequence was the sudden expansion of towns and cities, with attendant 
pressures on housing and amenities. Development at this time was uncontrolled and 
unchecked, with private property sacrosanct and control over the built environment 
negligible. While towns and cities had grown slowly and steadily, this had been a 
manageable situation and nuisances, such as rubbish, foul water and overcrowding, 
had been considered controllable.  
However, the expanding urban population made the situation untenable, 
resulting in serious overcrowding and rising rates of infectious diseases such as 
typhus, typhoid and T.B.80 The demand for housing resulted in the building of small, 
cheap houses which often lacked basic features, such as proper foundations or 
sanitation. 81 Existing houses were subdivided, resulting in overcrowding as houses 
designed for one family began to house one family per room. Open spaces were 
infilled, creating narrow lanes and enclosed courts that combined with the lack of 
sanitation and drainage to create a breeding ground for infectious diseases.  
 
The legislation of the nineteenth century took the first steps towards tackling the 
problems of slums, overcrowding and sanitation, but shied away from large-scale 
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public intervention. The 1832 cholera epidemic prompted a number of investigations 
and surveys into conditions in towns and in particular the condition of working class 
housing.82 In addition to this, the introduction of civil registration for births, marriages 
and deaths had provided local authorities and central government with reliable 
statistics on birth and death rates for the first time.83 These exposed the impact of 
overcrowding, poverty and poor housing on public health. The Public Health Act of 
1848 was a response to the conditions revealed and sought to provide proper 
drainage, sewerage and water supplies and to tackle ‘nuisances’, which included 
unfit housing.84  
However, the act was permissive rather than compulsory and therefore 
ineffective. Comprehensive legislation which compelled local authorities to deal with 
sanitation and nuisances was not passed until 1875, with the Public Health Act of 
that year. This Act compelled municipal corporations to address nuisances and 
provide adequate water, sewerage and drainage services. The Act also made it 
compulsory for all new dwellings to be built with a water supply and proper drainage, 
which had been lacking in the many of the cheapest working class dwellings.  
 
The period between the 1848 and 1875 Public Health Acts saw a flurry of 
investigations into housing conditions which revealed the full extent of the housing 
problem. From 1875 the government passed a series of housing acts to tackle the 
problem. The Artisans and Labourers Dwellings Improvement Act 1875 gave local 
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authorities the power to buy and clear slum areas for rebuilding, but did not provide 
any financial framework to do so. Authorities had to raise the money for buying land 
themselves and it was expected that the building of new dwellings would be 
undertaken privately. Unsurprisingly, local authorities were reluctant to take on the 
high costs of acquiring and clearing land.85 The Housing of the Working Classes Act 
1885 partly corrected this by giving local authorities the power to raise loans against 
buying land for the construction of working class housing and the power to close 
dwellings unfit for habitation. The Act also made landlords responsible for the upkeep 
of their property and for the health of their tenants. This was the first of many acts 
relating to working class housing passed between 1885 and 1903, which slowly 
extended the powers available to local authorities.86 Under them local authorities 
could enforce landlord responsibilities for the repair and upkeep of properties and, if 
necessary, undertake repair work and charge the work to the landlord if they proved 
uncooperative. Local authorities were also empowered to close and demolish 
properties if landlords refused to make repairs, although this clause was not widely 
used as it often exacerbated housing shortages.87  
 
The significance of these acts was the increasing role played by local authorities in 
the provision and control of dwellings, and the responsibilities that authorities 
acquired in terms of the condition of towns. Improvements and phases of intense 
redevelopment had characterised earlier periods, such as the mid-eighteenth 
century, but this was the first time that there was a compulsion to ensure that urban 
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areas were well-maintained and healthy.88 It reflected the growing concern over the 
health and condition of the population, in particular the working classes, and the 
impact that this could have on the nation as a whole. This concern continued to 
characterise town planning and housing provision throughout the inter-war period.  
 
A New Model for Building 
 
The early legislation dealt solely with housing rather than wider urban planning. The 
idea of town planning began to gain credence from the 1890s onwards, particularly 
after the publication of Ebenezer Howard’s influential garden city concept.89 There 
had been growing interest in ‘model dwellings’ throughout the century and the 
creation of urban conditions that were the antithesis of the nineteenth century town 
became the foremost aim.90 Howard’s garden cities appeared to offer the perfect 
combination of green space, fresh air and small populations, and quickly became 
established as the blueprint for new housing. The planning of towns was also gaining 
credence internationally, with Germany in particular leading the way in rational 
planning.91  
A number of organisations emerged prior to the First World War which helped 
to spread and popularise the new planning ideas, such as the Garden City 
Association and the Town Planning Institute, while organisations such as the 
National Housing Reform Council and the Association of Municipal Corporations 
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lobbied for comprehensive planning powers. Planning conferences became a 
common feature of the years between 1900 and 1914 with the NHRC, the Royal 
Institute of British Architects and the Institute of Town Planning all hosting national 
and international town planning events. The growing interest in planning and housing 
is evident in both the frequency of these events and the increased pressure on 
government to produce national legislation and guidelines for future development.92 
 
A new architectural aesthetic also emerged at the turn of the century in the form of 
the Arts and Crafts movement. The movement’s emphasis on rational design and 
vernacular-inspired architecture offered a refreshing alternative to both the ubiquitous 
terrace house and the ornate public architecture which characterised the late-
Victorian era. The idea of using vernacular and traditional styles and materials was 
not unique to the Arts and Crafts movement, but could be found internationally. In 
countries as diverse as Spain, the USA and Sweden a rediscovering of the traditional 
could be found, and these in turn influenced British building styles.93 The Arts and 
Crafts and vernacular building styles became the template for model dwellings and 
for the new garden city-inspired suburban estates, particularly after the influential Arts 
and Crafts architectural practice of Unwin and Parker was selected to build the first 
garden city of Letchworth.94  The combination of rational planning and vernacular 
architecture became the blueprint for British urban development in the first half of the 
twentieth century.  
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The first town planning act was passed in 1909, giving local authorities some control 
over development for the first time. Exeter and Plymouth City Councils both 
embraced the new legislation and began to draw up plans to improve the built 
environment, demonstrating that the new powers were welcomed by local authorities. 
Plymouth’s plans were more modest than those of Exeter and were mostly aimed at 
providing more housing. However, the city did also plan a new museum, library and 
civic centre as part of their scheme.95 Exeter went a step further, employing one of 
the few professional planners of the era, Thomas Mawson, to produce a plan for 
rebuilding large parts of the city centre. The plan would have provided a new civic 
centre and would have involved knocking down most of the buildings in the centre of 
the city, including much of the existing High Street, and rebuilding them. Mawson’s 
plan also provided a new and improved Queen Street Station, improvements to the 
city centre parks and new educational facilities.96 The city was considering building a 
new library at this time, as the City Librarian had secured a grant from the Carnegie 
Trust, and this was factored into the plan.97 Mawson’s proposal were approved by 
the City Council just prior to the First World War and were as sweeping in their scope 
as the post-1945 reconstruction plan of Thomas Sharp.98 
Bristol, in contrast, was slow to make use of the new legislation and there is no 
evidence of any plans for city improvement prior to the First World War. The city had 
received a bequest of £50,000 from a local philanthropist in 1910 and the city’s 
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Liberal councillors proposed building a low-density estate of 400 houses for the 
working classes.99 The scheme was delayed by the council on grounds of cost, and 
with the outbreak of the War the proposal was quietly dropped. The outbreak of the 
First World War also interrupted the planning and building work in Exeter and 
Plymouth, forcing them to postpone their schemes.  
 
The Impact of War and the Legislation of the Interwar Era  
 
The First and Second World Wars both raised questions around the form of the post-
war world and the state of society. In both cases the wars caused all sectors of 
society to scrutinize the condition of the nation and how it served its citizens, 
particularly the poorest. Prior to the outbreak of the Great War, Britain had 
experienced social unrest, as expressed by the Suffragette movement and the Coal 
Crisis of 1909. These issues provided the backdrop for wartime consideration of 
societal reform and reconstruction. They were emphasized further by wartime wage 
strikes in a number of industries and the rent strikes seen in some cities. The latter 
were in protest at the spiralling rents caused by the increase in population in some 
industrial areas due to the influx of war-workers and a more general housing 
shortage. The rent strikes led to the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War 
Restrictions) Act of 1915 which fixed rents at the 1914 level, reinforcing the need for 
housing reform.100  
The increased role of the state during the war made the idea of state 
intervention in matters such as housing more acceptable to both the public and 
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government, paving the way for further legislation to ameliorate urban conditions.101 
The creation of the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1917, headed by Christopher 
Addison, to consider how Britain should plan for economic and social improvement 
post-war demonstrated this change in attitude.   
 
The provision of housing was quickly established as a high priority issue which 
affected a high proportion of British people. There had been a slow-down in building 
prior to the war and the hiatus of building during the war itself had left the nation with 
an estimated housing deficit of 800,000 dwellings.102 The housing shortage was so 
acute that it affected middle class as well as working class families, with newly-
married couples often unable to set up their own homes.  The estimated shortage of 
dwellings only represented the number of dwellings needed to give every family a 
separate home and did not include the need for slum clearance. A major programme 
of house building was therefore required post-Armistice and housing took on a key 
role in national reconstruction. This situation was repeated after the Second World 
War when war damage and the disruption of building created another shortage of 
homes. The experiences of the interwar period informed the housing policies of 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth during the 1940s, with their interwar estates providing 
examples of both good and bad practice.  
 
The housing issue also expressed the nineteenth-century concerns around housing 
and public health. The problems of overcrowding and slum dwellings and the 
attendant difficulties with health, education and other societal problems still remained. 
Many working class conscripts were found to be in poor health and unfit to serve, 
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something which had also been noted by medical officers during the Boer War, 
underlining again the need to tackle the perceived causes of this.103 There had been 
growing alarm from the turn of the century regarding the perceived decline of the 
nation and the perpetuation of physical and mental weaknesses, which resulted in 
education and health being the two major concerns of the reconstruction committees. 
The creation of the Ministry of Health in 1918 demonstrated the serious anxiety which 
the health of the nation produced. The Ministry became responsible for housing and 
town planning and oversaw the schemes produced by local authorities.104  
The result of these concerns around housing and the urban environment was 
the ‘homes fit for heroes’ campaign created by the wartime coalition government. 
‘Homes fit for heroes’ met the need for a campaign which could appeal to a wide 
range of voters and addressed more than just the issue of housing. The provision of 
housing tackled a real problem for many families while also dealing with an area of 
wartime unrest amongst the working classes. The campaign name also suggested a 
reward for war service and would therefore appeal to the newly enfranchised sectors 
of the population. The coalition was returned to power and embarked on the 
reconstruction policy as promised. The result was the Housing and Town Planning 
Act 1919, which gave local authorities their widest set of powers and obligations to 
date.105   
 
The 1919 Act brought the state fully into the process of town planning and housing 
provision. It was agreed that to provide the number of houses needed, and more 
importantly to provide them to all income groups, significant state intervention was 
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needed. The Act required urban district and borough councils covering populations of 
20,000 persons or more to survey their housing needs and produce a plan to meet 
these.106 Housing standards were laid down for local authority builds by the Tudor 
Walters Report, specifying floor space, ceiling heights and layouts for new homes. All 
domestic building was subject to density standards, with a density of twelve houses 
to the acre becoming the standard for most areas. In rural areas densities dropped to 
eight per acre and in inner-city areas up to twenty per acre were permitted to allow 
for the minimal movement of some urban populations.107  
The 1919 Act provided a financial framework for house building, making 
provision for local authorities to take loans and raise money via local rates for 
building. The Act did not provide subsidies for building but did make the exchequer 
responsible for any costs beyond the penny rate. However, the financial framework 
did apply to a range of property types in order to stimulate house building and 
address the general housing shortage.108 This was the first time government funding 
was made available for this purpose. 
 
The financial assistance offered by the 1919 Act was generous, with no upper limit to 
the monies provided by the exchequer to meet scheme expenses over the penny 
rate. However, after an initial post-Armistice boom, the economy went into recession 
as European markets recovered and the demand for British goods dropped. The 
effect of the recession on house building, coupled with shortages of materials, was to 
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triple the cost of building the average home.109 The government’s generous finance 
package for house building quickly became unaffordable and had to be altered with 
an amendment act in 1923. This Act provided a flat subsidy per house and building 
standards were also amended slightly to allow for marginally increased densities and 
a reduced floorspace in order to keep building costs to a minimum.110  
The subsidies for housing were changed again in 1924 when the first Labour 
government came to power. The Housing Act 1924, increased the subsidies for 
housing and introduced new standards for local authority housing. Under the Act, all 
local authority houses had to be built with a separate bathroom instead of providing a 
bath in the scullery. The latter had been a frequently employed method of providing 
bathing facilities as cheaply as possible in working class housing and had been found 
to be widely disliked. The provisions of the 1924 Act remained in place until 1930 and 
some 500,000 houses were built under it.111 The Acts of 1923 and 1924 also made 
the subsidies available to private developers building working-class housing in order 
to encourage house-building as much as possible.  
 
The South Western Response  
 
It has been suggested that local authorities were reluctant to build under the 1919 
Act, and where they did build the houses were aimed not at the working class, but the 
middle class.112 This view appears to be based on the way in which the 1919 Act was 
written, with its emphasis on new building rather than the amelioration of existing 
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slums areas, and the assumption that these ‘homes fit for heroes’ were aimed at 
returning servicemen rather than the working class in general. Yet the attitude of 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth’s councils suggests that this was not the case in the 
South West. The three cities built extensively during the interwar period and used the 
legislation in a number of innovative ways in order to meet the needs of their citizens.  
 
In the immediate years after the Armistice, the three cities all faced similar problems 
with overcrowding, housing shortages and unemployment. Bristol appears to have 
endured the most in terms of unemployment as a number of the city’s industries 
suffered in the post-Armistice years. The coal-fields on the city’s peripheries all felt 
the national downturn in the coal industry and all but one, Coalpit Heath Colliery, had 
closed by 1939.113 Other industries had boomed under wartime demand, but felt the 
contraction of trade in the early post-Armistice years keenly. Bristol’s burgeoning 
aircraft industry suffered a dearth of orders in these years and the shipyards saw a 
slowdown in work. The city had been a centre for munitions manufacture during the 
war and other civil industries, such as the boot and motor cycle factories, had 
switched to war production. The end of the war therefore saw a decline in orders in 
these industries.114  
Plymouth, like Bristol, experienced an initial downturn as the city was heavily 
reliant on the Naval dockyard and was host to both Army and RAF bases. The city 
had also moved extensively toward war production in some industries.115 Exeter 
appears to have been the most cushioned from unemployment as it had a mixed 
economy that did not rely extensively on any one industry. Exeter’s major foundry 
                                                          
113 Bryan Little, The City and County of Bristol (London: Werner Laurie, 1954), p.298. 
114 Ibid, pp. 295-299. 
115  Crispin Gill, Plymouth: A New History 1603 to the Present Day (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 
1979), pp.172-174, 182-185. 
53 
 
and engineering firm, Willey’s, had moved to war production, but its niche as a 
producer of coin-meters ensured it did not experience a downturn post-Armistice.116 
All three cities had housing problems, with shortages of accommodation and 
areas of unfit housing common to all three. Bristol and Plymouth had both 
experienced influxes of war-workers which exacerbated the existing housing 
shortages and overcrowding. Bristol was chosen during the war to be the site for one 
of the Ministry of Munitions experiments in housing provision with houses built at 
Avonmouth in 1915 for munitions workers.117 This provided an example of 
corporation housing in the city and demonstrated how such housing might solve the 
problems of overcrowding and the slums.   
 
The political situation in each city in 1919 was a Conservative majority council with 
the Liberal party as the second party; Labour representation was still minimal. The 
approach amongst these Conservative-led councils to reconstruction suggests that 
attitudes to housing and welfare had already swung towards a more state-orientated 
mindset by 1918. The rhetoric of the Ministry of Reconstruction was reflected by the 
local authorities in all three cities, with plans for large areas of municipal housing 
approved by the City Councils of Bristol and Exeter prior to January 1919.118  
 
The opinions expressed by the housing committees of the cities demonstrated 
awareness of the dire need for housing and its importance as both a social and 
political issue. The arguments put forward for building municipal housing included the 
health and economic benefits for society as a whole and the potential for unrest 
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amongst the working classes if the housing problem was not dealt with.  The 
Chairman of Bristol’s Housing Extension and Town Planning Committee, Mr E.W. 
Savory, spoke of the ‘thousands of unfit men...who would have been fit to serve their 
country...if they had been brought up under proper housing conditions’ when 
presenting the Committee’s housing proposals.119 He also stated that the ‘well-being 
of the worker is the well-being of the community’ as improved working class health 
would result in increased efficiency and greater prosperity across the whole of 
society. The cost of such a scheme was also touched upon via the sanitary reforms 
of the preceding century, with Savory noting that ratepayers who would have once 
griped at the cost of water and sanitation works now expected these to be provided 
as a matter of course. The inference was that once municipal housing was provided 
and the benefits observed, the same response would be seen.120 Exeter’s mayor, Sir 
James Owen, expressed the other main argument in favour of municipal housing, 
stating that poor housing was ‘at the bottom of Labour unrest’ as well as contributing 
to other ‘sanitary’ troubles.121  
 
Even if any individual council member doubted the need for municipal housing, the 
letters published in the local press demonstrated that there was indeed a severe 
housing shortage. Letters from demobilised servicemen began appearing in Bristol’s 
Western Daily Press in January 1919, discussing the problems of finding anywhere to 
live and the high rents being charged.122 Similar problems can be found in the letters 
pages of the Exeter-based Western Times, alongside articles detailing court cases 
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dealing with the eviction of tenants.123 Letters to the Plymouth-based Western 
Morning News demonstrated other problems in the housing market, with complaints 
at the high rents being asked for flats in Plymouth and the problem of second 
homes.124 Some of the correspondence regarding rents was evidently written by 
people of means, as the letters discussed the lack of facilities, such as a tradesman’s 
lift, and how tiring this will be for the servants.125  
These letters demonstrate that the housing shortage was affecting all sectors 
of society, not just the working class. The second homes issue also appeared, with 
one letter regarding the housing shortage in Cornwall highlighting the fact that many 
houses in the county were only occupied at weekends or during the summer.126 The 
Western Times correspondents also highlighted the rural housing problem, with high 
rents for agricultural workers frequently mentioned in the letters pages and details of 
housing schemes being undertaken by the more rural local authorities such as 
Crediton and Ashburton.127 This latter point demonstrates the widespread nature of 
the housing shortage as well as the effect of the 1919 Act. The Act required all urban 
councils with populations of twenty thousand persons or more survey their housing 
needs, and the actions of the district and town councils across the South West 
demonstrates the impact of this requirement. 
 
The enthusiasm expressed for the new discipline of town planning between 1900 and 
1914 continued, with conferences on housing being held in Plymouth, Exeter and 
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Bristol during 1918 to debate the best methods for providing new housing. These 
conferences saw extensive representation from local authorities across the region, 
from the County Councils to the smaller urban district councils, such as Yeovil and 
Crediton.128 The reports of the housing schemes under consideration also 
demonstrate that the ideals of the Garden City and Arts and Crafts movements had 
influenced ideas about housing within local authorities. Bristol’s Housing Committee 
put forward their plan in May 1918 for 2000 municipal houses arranged in five 
‘suburban villages...arranged on garden city lines’ around the edge of the city.129 The 
scheme was expanded to 5000 houses after it was decided that the City Council 
should build as many houses as possible using the financial provisions of the 1919 
Act. Exeter City Council initially proposed a scheme for 300 houses arranged on 
similar principles, with the land for one scheme of 47 houses already in the Council’s 
ownership.130 This scheme was increased to 1000 houses in 1919.131  
Plymouth City Council took longer than Bristol and Exeter to produce a 
definitive scheme owing to uncertainty over the future of the Naval dockyard.  A 
survey in 1917 suggested that around 3000 houses would be required, but the 
Council was divided over the validity of this number.132 The dockyard had expanded 
considerably under war conditions, with the workforce nearly doubling from just over 
ten thousand men in 1914 to nearly nineteen thousand in 1918.133 Similar influxes of 
workers had been seen in previous conflicts, but once the conflict was over the 
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dockyards tended to contract, leaving many unemployed and prompting a general 
slump in the local economy. It was feared that this would be seen again and the City 
Council could find itself liable for the costs of a large housing project they were 
unable to let. Therefore, the City Council felt it could not plan effectively until the 
Admiralty had decided whether to maintain the expanded dockyard.134 
 
As Exeter and Bristol had already considered their housing plans in 1918, they were 
able to produce the surveys required by the 1919 Act swiftly and to begin building 
quickly. Plymouth responded with an initial survey in 1919, but could only give a very 
broad outline of their intended plans owing to the problems with the dockyard.135  
Plymouth City Council also appears to have been very concerned about the financial 
package offered by the 1919 Act and evidently thought that the promise to meet 
costs above the penny rate would not be honoured.136 They were therefore reluctant 
to take on the financial responsibility of a large housing project, particularly as the 
city’s uncertain economic future could result in lower rate revenues.   
The city later submitted a more defined plan for 4,500 houses in January 1920 
as it became clear that the Admiralty would not maintain the wartime workforce.137 
However, the Ministry of Health was not particularly sympathetic to the position 
Plymouth City Council found itself in and accused the Council of vacillating over 
housing. This led to an enquiry being held in May 1920 which examined the problems 
and delays which Plymouth’s scheme had experienced. The Inspector found that 
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many of the delays in passing the city’s scheme were caused by the Ministry of 
Health taking many weeks to approve stages of the application process.138 The City 
Council was at fault in some instances, but even then it appears that it was the effect 
of outside forces which created delays. For example, the city had appointed 
Professor Stanley Adshead, one of the earliest professional town planners, to design 
the houses and layout for the scheme. However, Adshead’s services were in high 
demand and it appears that he took on more work than he had time for, which 
created delays in completing each project.139 The experience of Plymouth anticipated 
many of the problems faced by all cities when planning for post-Second World War 
reconstruction. Delays due to the slow processing of planning schemes, concerns 
over funding and slow progress due to the demands placed on consultant planners 
can all be found throughout the 1940s.  
 
The 1940s also saw concerns regarding the financial assistance for building and 
similar concerns can be found with the early municipal schemes. Plymouth’s City 
Council was apprehensive that the Government’s assurance that it would bear the 
costs of any scheme beyond the penny rate would not be honoured. This concern 
was echoed by some council members in Bristol and Exeter, although here the fears 
voiced were centred on the length of time the financial support would be available.140 
Bristol City Council expanded its initial plan for 2000 houses to 5000 as it was felt 
that full advantage of the assistance should be taken while it was on offer. The 1919 
Act also allowed councils to raise loans to purchase land and build houses and made 
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provision for funds to be raised via local housing bonds. These bonds were 
guaranteed by the Government at 6% interest and were designed to allow councils 
an alternative route for funding new housing.141 The bonds also had the advantage of 
offering investors, who were likely to be ratepayers, a stake in the new housing 
schemes and made the expenditure of local authorities appear at an advantage as 
an investment rather than a debt.   
 
However, there were concerns expressed in all three councils at the potential 
ongoing cost to ratepayers, particularly as it was assumed that the schemes would 
make a loss. Plymouth offered the bonds, but was very negative about their potential, 
much to the annoyance of the Ministry of Health. The Inquiry of 1920 revealed that 
the financing of housing was a major concern of the Council and the secondary 
reason why the city had proceeded so slowly with its scheme. The city had issued 
bonds, but had stated publicly that they were not likely to sell well and the required 
funds were unlikely to be raised, thus scuppering their success immediately.142 
However, this negativity was not entirely unfounded as the Government issued their 
own bonds at the higher rate of 7% in the weeks after the local housing bonds were 
launched, therefore making the local bonds less attractive.143  
Exeter initially chose not to use local bonds to raise funds, instead funding 
their building scheme entirely through loans.144 It is unclear exactly why they chose to 
do this, but it is possible that the launch of the Government bonds influenced the 
decision. The city also had a smaller number of houses to provide and did not have 
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high levels of unemployment, and thus had less assistance to pay, which may have 
made the servicing of loans more affordable than in Bristol and Plymouth. However, it 
appears that bonds were used in a limited fashion later in 1920, presumably as the 
general economic climate worsened and relying entirely on loans seemed less 
practical.145 Bristol appears to have embraced the bond system more fully than the 
other two cities and also encouraged private philanthropic schemes run along similar 
lines.146  
 
What is notable is that despite misgivings about funding the building, all three cities 
made housing provision their priority and the voices of dissent were lost amongst 
those who felt the issue could not be skirted.147 The cities also extended their 
schemes throughout the 1920s, despite the rising costs of house-building in the early 
part of the decade. The discussion of the early schemes clearly demonstrates the 
concerns around financial losses. It was noted by members of all three councils that 
the economic rent of the proposed houses would be beyond the means of many 
working class families, particularly those who were in the greatest need.148 Although 
the 1919 Act stated that the Government would meet costs beyond the penny rate, 
there was concern expressed that either those in need would not be housed or that 
the houses would be rented at a large loss. The reports of these council meetings 
show that initially in 1918 and 1919 all three cities assumed that the houses they 
were building would be for those of the artisan and lower middle classes, with 
particular emphasis on the ex-serviceman and his family, rather than the mass of the 
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working class.149 The idea of ‘filtering up’ is often expressed, suggesting that the 
rhetoric of the government housing policy was absorbed and accepted.150 This fits 
with the traditional reading of the ‘homes fit for heroes’ campaign and the 1919 Act; 
that it was designed to provide houses for the middle classes rather than the working 
classes.  
 
However, there was a distinct shift in ideas in the early 1920s, with the emphasis 
moving toward providing houses for anyone in need regardless of class. There is 
frequent mention within council reports of the rents for the early houses being beyond 
the means of the working class, and therefore the housing need remaining as great 
as ever.151 The expansion of schemes suggests that the aim was shifting to 
deliberately building for the working class with the aim of encouraging people to 
move from the slums to the new estates, rather than just relieving the general 
housing shortage. To underline the significance of this expansion of housing 
provision, it must be remembered that the early 1920s were a period of inflating 
building costs, with materials and labour both in short supply.152 Instead of 
retrenching, the three cities all continued building and looked for ways to reduce 
costs. All three cities appear to have investigated the use of non-traditional building 
methods, such as building with pre-cast concrete building systems.153 Exeter was the 
only city which used these methods in any great quantity, building 294 Laings ‘Easi-
                                                          
149 Western Morning News, ‘Plymouth Slums’, 13 December 1921; Western Daily Press, ‘The Bristol 
Housing Question’, 11 June 1918; ‘Bristol’s Housing Scheme’ 12 March 1919.  
150 Western Daily Press, ‘Bristol’s Housing Scheme: Debate by City Council’, 12 March 1919; ‘Bristol 
Housing Scheme’, 13th December 1920; Western Times, ‘Exeter City Council: Financial difficulties of 
housing’, 4 February 1920; Western Morning News, ‘Plymouth Slums: Gunpowder or fire as drastic 
remedy’, 13 December 1921. 
151 Western Daily Press, ‘Housing in Bristol: Slum area conditions’, 8 March 1922; Western Morning 
News, ‘Plymouth Housing Problems: Council in favour of lower rents’, 5 June 1923. 
152 Cherry, Cities and Plans, p.86; Burnett, A Social History of Housing, p.222. 
153 Western Daily Press, ‘Bristol Housing’, 21 October 1924; Western Morning News, ‘Plymouth 
Council Houses’ 7 January 1926 
62 
 
form’ concrete houses on its Buddle Lane estate between 1926 and 1928.154 Bristol 
examined the possibility of using private building bonds to build working class 
housing. The system allowed private firms to issue and invest in housing bonds, 
which would raise funds for organisations similar to the modern housing association 
to build working class dwellings. The city had some success with this method and 
used it to supplement the municipal building schemes.155  
Housing was also prioritised over other types of building, with projects for 
other types of municipal building put on hold during the early 1920s. Plymouth City 
Council delayed the building of new schools in 1921 owing to increased building 
costs and the need for economy.156 Likewise, Exeter City Council yet again vetoed 
the building of a new library, which had been under consideration since 1904, on the 
grounds of economy stating that houses should come ahead of books.157  
 
Planning and the local political position  
 
It is notable that the arguments for and against housing provision did not divide along 
the expected political lines. It was not unusual to find Labour councillors arguing the 
finer points of housing provision, such as whether all houses should be provided with 
parlours, but there was a surprising level of consensus over general standards.158 
The need for housing and planning was accepted by all political affiliations. The 
Garden City layout was accepted by all parties as the best method of building and it 
was accepted in all quarters that the terrace house had no real place in the modern 
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estate. The consensus becomes more striking when the debates around other 
projects, such as those outlined above, are considered. The debates on school 
provision in Plymouth did demonstrate a more conventional split between left and 
right, with the Conservative elements of the Council expressing concern regarding 
the potential cost of extending educational provision. Labour representatives, 
however, attacked this as a two-faced policy which damaged the education and 
prospects of working class children, as this would affect schools in working class 
wards but not those in wealthier wards.159 This position was also supported by a 
number of Liberal councillors.  Likewise in Exeter, the library argument faced similar 
accusations, as the poor library provision in the city was thought to disadvantage the 
working classes the most.160  The debates on the cost of the schemes also 
demonstrated the expected political divisions, as it was more likely that Conservative 
councillors would express concerns over rate levels.161 
 
The political landscape of the interwar years can help illuminate whether 1945 
signalled a complete break in the politics of the South Western cities or if it was the 
natural culmination of gradual changes throughout the interwar period. It has often 
been assumed that the 1945 election created a clean break with the politics of the 
interwar and wartime periods, but it is not unusual to find many of the same council 
personnel in-post during both the inter- and post-war periods. These individuals 
oversaw both the interwar planning and housing projects and the planning stages for 
post-war reconstruction. Their experiences of the interwar period and the challenges 
                                                          
159 Western Morning News, ‘Council Politics: Party leaders on pending change’, 8 January 1921; 
Western Morning News, ‘In Saving Mood: Plymouth Council’s economies’, 11 January 1921. 
160 DHC, Exeter newspaper cuttings, B/Exeter: Libraries – City Library pre-1944, Western Morning 
News, ‘New Exeter Library; Governors approve £30,000 scheme’, 12 June 1923. 
161 Western Morning News, ‘Council Politics’, 7 January 1921; Western Daily Press, ‘Letters to the 
Editor: Bristol Housing Scheme’, 5 February 1919; ‘Council Politics’ 8 January 1921.  
64 
 
and difficulties of interwar building projects could therefore affect and inform the 
reconstruction process.  Likewise, the level of change and continuity in terms of the 
political affiliation of Members of Parliament can also be used to test the assertion 
that 1945 signalled a change of political direction for many constituencies.  The 
importance of this question centres on the assertion that the swing towards the Left in 
1945 led to the creation of radical reconstruction plans in Labour-led areas and 
cleared the way for bold housing schemes. That there was a continuity of council 
personnel between interwar and post-war in the three cities suggests that this picture 
may be oversimplified and may overlook a process of political and social change 
between the two periods.  
 
The three cities all reflected the national trend across the interwar period of 
increasing Labour support and declining Liberal support. The national swell of 
support for Labour in the late 1920s and its collapse in 1931, leading to the formation 
of the National Government, is also traceable through the election of councillors and 
local MP’s in all three cities.  The growth of the Labour party was most marked in 
Bristol and was evidently seen as a serious threat by the Conservative and Liberal 
parties. From 1923 until the outbreak of war, the two parties worked together as the 
Citizen Party within the city council and fought all municipal elections under this 
umbrella, rather than as Conservative or Liberal candidates.162 The Labour party 
enjoyed growing success in the city throughout the period with steady gains in 
municipal elections, resulting in strong Labour representation on the City Council. 
The council was briefly Labour-led in 1937, but Labour lost the majority in the 
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municipal elections of 1938.163 The city’s five constituencies, Bristol North, East, 
South, West and Central, further reflected this trend, with Labour MPs returned at 
least once in four of the constituencies between 1918 and 1935. The constituency of 
Bristol East returned a Labour MP from 1923 onwards and was represented by Sir 
Richard Stafford Cripps from 1931 until 1950. The other constituencies tended to 
switch between parties, with the exception of Bristol West which remained staunchly 
Conservative from its creation in 1918 until 1997.164  
The Labour party did not enjoy the same level of success in Plymouth or 
Exeter, where Labour representation did grow but not to the same extent as in 
Bristol. Plymouth, rather surprisingly, was strongly Conservative in its political 
character during the interwar period. The city has been referred to as ‘working class 
with middle class politics’, which reflects accurately the working class wards which 
consistently returned Conservative councillors and MPs.165 The wellsprings of Labour 
support were not to be found in the poorest wards but in the more middling wards.  
The only exception was the ward of St Peters, one of the poorest in the city and the 
most overcrowded, which returned a Labour councillor in every election from 1925 
onwards. The rest of the city’s wards showed limited Labour support and tended to 
demonstrate strong attachment for individuals rather than parties.166 However, 
Crispin Gill suggests that the city’s Conservative and Liberal councillors saw Labour 
as more of a threat than this picture suggests, as he states that the two parties 
followed a model similar to that found in Bristol. Gill argues that the two parties 
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agreed not oppose each other in ward elections; however, they did not form the sort 
of alliance found in Bristol’s Citizen Party.167 As a result, the Council remained 
Conservative-led until 1945. Plymouth was almost exclusively represented by 
Conservative MPs throughout the interwar period. The city had three constituencies, 
Drake, Devonport and Sutton and returned a Labour MP only once, in the Drake 
constituency in 1929. The constituency returned to form with a Conservative 
candidate in the 1931 election. The Devonport and Sutton constituencies returned 
Conservative MPs throughout the period, although some contests were very close 
and produced small majorities.168  
Exeter was also generally Conservative in character in the interwar period, 
with a smattering of Liberal and Labour support. The city returned one MP to 
parliament and this seat had been dominated by the Conservative party since 1885 
(when the city had been reduced to one MP from its previous two).169 The council too 
was Conservative-led, although the city retained a loyal Liberal following in some 
wards. The Labour party made steady gains from the mid-1920s onwards, but never 
gained enough support to threaten the Conservative lead in the council. Like 
Plymouth, some wards showed particular loyalty to certain individuals, which meant 
that wards could be represented by councillors from all parties at any one time. There 
were also gains for independent candidates and the Ratepayers Association.170  
 
The economic depression of 1920-1921 saw both central government and the local 
authorities compelled to economise. Local authorities found themselves under 
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pressure from both central government and the public to cut spending, with the latter 
often expressing their views under the umbrella of ratepayers associations. These 
groups were common to towns and cities across the UK, and evolved into a political 
force later in the decade. Exeter in particular saw individuals representing the 
Ratepayers Association standing in local elections, and the Ratepayers were 
represented on the council regularly between 1921 and 1938. Ratepayer candidates 
were also returned in four wards in 1945 and 1946 demonstrating the long-standing 
appeal of this party in the city.171 The Ratepayers Association claimed to represent 
the views of those persons paying local authority rates and generally stood for 
economy and the protection of middle class interests.  
 
An examination of the national political stage presents a further influence on local 
attitudes towards economy, public spending and planning; that of economic planning. 
Alongside the concept of town planning, economic planning was gaining credence 
and acceptance as a method for tackling both economic and social problems. The 
dominate concepts of the ‘invisible hand of the market’ and laissez-faire were 
discredited by successive economic depressions from the 1870s onwards, with 
Britain’s slowing industrial and economic growth seen as a symptom of poor 
economic management.172 The experience of state intervention in economic matters 
during the First World War had demonstrated that state direction and control could be 
a positive force within the economy. This realisation reached its zenith with the 
creation of the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1917, which was charged with planning 
the reconstruction of industry and welfare post-armistice. Initially there was support 
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for state intervention in industry from the business world, but this dwindled after 1918 
with a return to individualistic, laissez-faire thinking about business and economy.  
 
However, the slump of 1920-21 reinvigorated the concept of economic planning 
within political circles and all parties embraced the idea to some extent. The Labour 
Party gradually worked towards a concept of a fully planned and state-controlled 
economy, while the Conservatives advocated a ‘self-rule’ economy planned by 
business for business with only light state control. The Liberals sought a middle 
ground between the two, while the creation of the New Party under Oswald Mosley at 
the end of the 1920s saw a vision for a planned economy based around high wages 
and increased home consumption.173  
These concepts were important as they extended the understanding of 
‘planning’ beyond urban planning to other sectors, which may have had a later 
bearing on the amorphous idea of ‘the planners’ during the 1940s. ‘Planners’ were 
not just those involved in remodelling towns, but were also those who sought to 
remodel the economy and ideas around industry and ownership. The Socialist vision 
of economic planning, with its state ownership of land and industry, was given form 
by the Labour party after the 1929 economic crash. At this point, the younger, more 
radical elements of the party saw that a bold policy towards economic planning was 
required, as the old model of capitalism seemed to be broken and worn out. This 
policy included the state acquisition of land, heavy industry, the electricity network 
and shipbuilding, while other industry and business would be directed according to a 
government economic plan.174 For the middle- and upper-classes, this would have 
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represented a threat to their status and values, and may have influenced their views 
on ‘planners’. The planning of both the interwar years, with its emphasis on the 
provision of working class housing, and the post-war years may have been viewed as 
the first step toward state-ownership of industry and the loss of private enterprise. 
The Ratepayers Associations of the interwar years are as much symptom of the 
growing unease amongst the wealthier parts of society at increased state intervention 
in public and private life as they are of the immediate concerns at increased public 
expenditure.  
 
In addition to the pressure being applied by both central government and groups 
such as the Ratepayers to economise, local authorities also found themselves under 
attack from property owners with regard to municipal housing. The local press for all 
three cities displays increasing correspondence from property owners, both those 
who rented out property and general owner-occupiers, with regard to rent levels, 
property prices and municipal housing. Landlords particularly resented both the 
clauses in the 1890 Housing Act which forced them to maintain and repair properties 
to an acceptable standard and the 1915 Rent Restrictions Act, which was still in 
operation. Landlords stated that the 1915 Act prevented them from charging a rent 
which would allow them to maintain and repair properties. Letters to the local papers 
frequently stated that tenants, and in particular working class tenants, should expect 
to pay far more rent if they wanted to see repairs and improvements carried out.175 
The suggestion was often made that the improvements demanded were excessive 
and the repairs minor, but costly when extended across a landlord’s entire portfolio of 
property.  
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However, the reports of the local housing inspectors demonstrated the poor 
condition of many houses. One report submitted to Plymouth’s Housing of the 
Working Classes Committee in February 1921 detailed 22 inspections and 596 re-
inspections of property. The defects most frequently recorded included leaking and 
broken roofs, broken windows, windows which would not open (leading to damp and 
rotten walls due to lack of ventilation), rotten floors, fallen ceilings and defective 
hearths. The majority of dwellings shared toilet and wash-house facilities, and 
virtually all of these were defective, with missing doors, broken roofs and broken 
plumbing.176 A hearing held in Bristol in 1926 regarding the closure orders for unfit 
houses revealed similar defects. One owner claimed that repairs had been 
undertaken and the houses rendered fit for habitation, but the Medical Officer stated 
that no essential repairs had been carried out and to render the houses fit would 
require almost complete reconstruction.177  Reports such as these suggest that even 
basic maintenance of many properties was neglected for long periods of time. The 
reports therefore make it clear why councils were prepared to withstand the pressure 
and complaints heaped on municipal building by property owners. 
 
The cost of building municipal houses attracted equal vitriol, particularly as the 
houses were seen as extravagant in terms of design and space. Some owner-
occupiers expressed resentment at such housing, stating that people should be 
prepared to ‘pay a fair price’ for their houses rather than having them provided by the 
local authority.178 It is evident that such individuals felt that municipal housing was 
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aimed firmly at the working classes rather than the middle classes or ex-servicemen, 
as the rhetoric was very much that the undeserving were being handed ‘something 
for nothing’. This is part of a wider expression of dismay at the rising prices of the 
early 1920s and the perceived cause of the rises – the ‘greed’ of the working man in 
demanding higher wages.179 Despite such pressures, and the rising costs of building, 
the three cities still pushed ahead with and expanded their building programmes, 
demonstrating their commitment to an issue they considered extremely important.  
 
The economic provisions of the 1919 Act put huge strain on government finances as 
the cost of building rose and extended those costs far beyond the limit of the penny 
rate. This led to a 1923 amendment act which changed the financial provisions for 
housing schemes to a flat subsidy for each house instead of meeting costs over the 
penny rate. The 1923 amendment also extended the subsidy to private developers in 
order to stimulate the housing market further. The subsidies were further amended by 
the Housing Act 1924, which slightly increased the money per house available. The 
majority of houses built in the three cities during the 1920s were built under the 1924 
subsidy, due to the improved availability of materials and labour after 1925.  
There was a further Housing Act in 1925, which provided subsidies for 
‘reconditioning’ existing housing stock, and a basic framework for tackling the 
unhealthy areas in the centre of cities.180 This Act reflected the awareness in central 
government that a further tool was needed to alleviate housing conditions beyond 
just building new houses. The slum problem still remained as the desired ‘filtering up’ 
effect had not materialised, partly due to the 1915 Rent Restrictions act.  
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The Act had been extended in 1919 and 1920 to give further protections to tenants 
and had brought virtually all private rented property under its jurisdiction. The Act 
restricted rent rises, but only while existing tenants remained in occupation. Once the 
tenancy changed hands, the landlord was free to set a new rent level.181 With people 
moving to the newly built houses, there were more frequent changes of tenants, 
which in turn allowed landlords to reset rents at a higher level. As demand for 
accommodation was still high, there was no incentive or market force to keep rents 
low, which resulted in those who were supposed to ‘filter up’ out of the slums being 
priced out of the market in both private and municipal accommodation. 
 
 The need to deal with the slums had been acknowledged by central government 
prior to the 1919 Act and had been underlined by the report of the Unhealthy Areas 
Committee in 1921.182 However, this report also recognised that the cost of replacing 
the slums was beyond the current means of both national and local government, and 
was not a desirable prospect for private developers. Instead a programme of 
amelioration was recommended in the short term, with slum clearance being the 
eventual aim.183 Interestingly, the report also noted that time was needed for public 
opinion to recognised and embrace both the need for slum clearance and town 
planning, with the suggestion that the education of the public should be a priority; this 
opinion was also expressed in relation to post-war reconstruction.184  
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The 1925 Act was designed to tackle the problem of slums and ‘unhealthy areas’ by 
reconditioning the houses at the bottom of rental market. There were also basic 
guidelines for clearing and rebuilding slum areas, but the guidelines and subsidies for 
doing this were, and are, unclear. Bristol City Council certainly considered using 
these powers in 1926-27, comparing the cost of clearing and replacing the dwellings 
in slum areas to providing new suburban housing without clearing the slums.185 The 
Council did use the Act for improvement schemes in 1929 and it also appears to be 
the act used by Exeter City Council for improvement schemes for city centre areas in 
1925-27.186 The 1930 Housing Act introduced a proper framework for slum 
clearances, partly prompted by the building work already undertaken by local 
authorities and private developers throughout the 1920s. The increasing numbers of 
new suburban houses had reduced the general shortage of houses but the problems 
of the slums still remained. The 1930 Act redirected local authority building to slum 
clearance work.  
 
The 1930 Housing Act heralded a second wave of local authority building, as the 
subsidies available for slum clearance work allowed councils to begin tackling the 
heart of their housing problems. The 1930 Act not only gave the framework for slum 
clearances, but gave local authorities more flexibility over rents to allow for the 
accommodation of all income levels. The city councils could now grant rent relief, a 
little like the modern housing benefit, which assessed the family’s income and ability 
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to pay rent and set a rent level accordingly. Exeter City Council set a minimum rate of 
one shilling per week, which allowed them to make rent agreements with the ‘really 
necessitous cases’ and ensure all those in need could afford the rent for a municipal 
house.187 Bristol and Plymouth followed similar models, allowing them to also house 
the poorest.188 Under the 1930 Act, Bristol further expanded its new estates at 
Fishponds, Knowle, Filton and Shirehampton and Plymouth added to the North 
Prospect estate.189 Exeter bought further land adjoining its Burnthouse Lane estate 
and earmarked land at Whipton and Stoke Hill for further housing schemes.190  
 
The Practice of Building in the South Western Cities 1918-1939 
 
The houses built in all three cities between the wars reflect the influence of the 
Garden City movement and the shift in aesthetic taste toward simpler and starker 
building design. The early estates built in all three cities use the type of vernacular-
inspired design made popular by the Arts and Crafts movement. This is particularly 
evident in the houses at Fishponds and Knowle in Bristol, which employ a variety of 
designs and architectural features and use green spaces to great effect, with houses 
frequently grouped around a central green to evoke the village green. This is 
remarkably effective to the modern eye, as the planting used on the estates has now 
reached maturity and reinforces the idea of the village in the city. The layout of the 
streets is a nod to another major influence on the building of the era: the Georgian 
town. Georgian architecture enjoyed a revival during the first half of the Twentieth 
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Century, having previously been dismissed by the Victorians as too dull and regular 
in layout and design.191  The elements of Georgian building which made it so 
appealing - the clean lines, lack of decoration and emphasis on materials - were the 
principles central to the Arts and Crafts and the Modern movements. The influence of 
these and other related architectural styles, such as Art Deco, can be seen not just in 
housing but in public buildings throughout both the interwar and post-war periods. 
Bristol’s interwar estates with their Georgian and vernacular-Arts-and-Crafts 
influences are a strong reflection of these two principle architectural influences and 
similar expressions can be found in the estates at Exeter and Plymouth.  
Exeter’s early estates were vernacular in flavour, but the Buddle Lane and 
later Burnthouse Lane estates are distinctly Neo-Georgian in both building style and 
layout. The earliest parts of Plymouth’s estates reflect the Arts and Crafts influence, 
with vernacular-type buildings and the use of country-lane layouts and planting. As 
the Plymouth estates developed, there was a noticeable change of style to a 
distinctly Neo-Georgian type of architecture in the 1930s, although the country-lane 
layouts remain.  
 
The private speculative building of the era also took its cue from the vernacular and 
Arts and Crafts styles, but tended to add more detailing and decoration. The use of 
Tudor-inspired details in speculative housing led to the monikers ‘Tudorbethan’ and 
‘Stockbroker Tudor’.192 These houses, common to virtually every town and city in 
Britain, were strangely and spectacularly reviled by planners, architects and social 
commentators. Their views were summed up by the architect Bertram Clough 
Williams-Ellis, who described them as ‘mean and perky little houses that surely 
                                                          
191 Briggs, Victorian Cities, p. 44. 
192 Bowdler, ‘Between the Wars’ in London Suburbs, p.117. 
76 
 
none...should inhabit with satisfaction’.193 It is possible that local authorities therefore 
chose the starker Arts and Craft and Neo-Georgian styles as a demonstration of 
‘good’ design in an attempt to educate the ‘average’ person in such architectural 
styles.  
 
The use of plain building styles could also be interpreted as an expression of thrift 
and economy. Municipal houses were being built with public money and in an age of 
economic hardship and ‘anti-waste’ campaigns it was important for local authorities to 
demonstrate that this money was being spent wisely. Thus the undecorated and solid 
municipal houses were a physical interpretation of this atmosphere of austerity and 
could attract little criticism of extravagant spending. This argument was certainly 
being used in 1930 to defend the style of Bristol’s municipal houses and concerns 
expressed more generally about the cost of municipal housing would support this 
view.194 The style of the houses appears to have attracted little contemporary 
criticism but the use of land and the provision of amenities on estates did provoke 
more dissent. 
 
The lack of amenities, such as shops, on inter-war estates was a frequent criticism 
throughout the era and informed the way post-war estates were designed. It is 
sometimes unclear whether the concept of the huge inter-war estate filled with 
endless semi-detached houses sprang from the municipal or private building of the 
era. Estates began to be styled as soulless places with no sense of character, culture 
or sociability attached to them. The preference for semi-detached houses started to 
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be reviled as the root of a selfish culture as they allowed people to shut themselves 
away and not engage with society.195 However, owners and tenants alike valued the 
privacy that the new estate layouts provided.  
 
The concept of the inter-war estate as a wasteland built without regard for amenity is 
misleading, as the original plans for many of these estates demonstrate that these 
facilities had been planned in from the start. The plans for Bristol’s Sea Mills estate at 
Avonmouth shows areas set aside for shopping parades, churches, parks as well as 
leisure buildings such as cinemas and restaurants.196 Exeter’s Buddle Lane and 
Burnthouse Lane estates had areas for shops, pubs, health centres and churches 
designated from the start.197 Sadly the plans for Plymouth’s estates do not appear to 
have survived, but the design of the estates suggests that this city too had planned in 
amenities from the start. All of the three cities put particular emphasis on open space 
and the estates were all well supplied with parks and playing fields.  
However, it took time for these amenities to materialise and it was this delay 
that led to the criticisms of the estates. The subsidies provided by the government for 
housing schemes only covered the houses themselves, which meant that additional 
funding had to be found to build other facilities. Although there was evidently some 
funding available to aid this, particularly for schools, the lack of a distinct subsidy to 
allow for amenities to be built led to delays in building.198 The same situation 
appeared post-war, with applications for shops and leisure buildings on the post-war 
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estates all refused initially on grounds of economy, despite the inconvenience this 
created for the new tenants.  
 
There is also some evidence of opposition from private developers to amenities being 
built. Bristol City Council received at least one objection to a proposed shopping area 
at the Filton estate on the grounds that ‘the land was not suitable for the development 
of shops’ owing to its development as a ‘high class residential estate’ prior to the area 
being put under a planning scheme. The land-developer, Mr Moore, believed that the 
provision of shops would damage the value of the new private houses and ‘check 
development of this valuable and rapidly expanding section of the Estate’, thus 
damaging his investment.199  
Expressions of anxiety over the loss of site values due to planning schemes 
appear frequently in the records of all three cities, and this particular objection in 
Bristol may shed some light on the lack of amenities on private estates as well as the 
difficulties with municipal estates.200 The private estates of the era are often entirely 
lacking in any kind of amenity, but Moore’s concerns suggest that the lack of 
provision may have been due to builders responding to buyer demands and opinions. 
Private building was generally aimed at the middle classes, and it is fairly likely that 
this group would have seen it a sign of status that the corner shop was not required 
on their estate. This would have indicated that the residents were well-off enough to 
have an account with their tradesmen and have all their goods delivered, rather than 
having to shop on a daily basis. It was not unusual for municipal and private estates 
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to be side by side, adding to the concerns about reduced value for the private 
developments.201 In this situation, it is easy to see that the presence of amenities on 
the municipal estate could have been seen as ‘lowering the tone’, and therefore 
property values, of neighbouring private estates.  
 
The town planning provisions of the 1919 Act were minimal compared to the 
elements dealing with housing. The Act allowed local authorities to ‘zone’ land for 
particular uses, such as housing, industry and business, but did not allow for precise 
control. In practice this meant that once land was designated for a particular use, 
local authorities had no control over what was actually built as long as it didn’t 
contradict the zoning.202 The Act was only applicable to land which had not yet been 
developed, but was likely to be in the near future, which meant that no provision was 
made for tackling blight in central areas.203 The Act also contained clauses for the 
compensation of land-owners that proved particularly onerous for local authorities. 
Land-owners were entitled to claim compensation if they were adversely affected by 
a planning scheme, and could claim compensation at the maximum possible value of 
the land. This was defined as what the land would be worth if it was developed in the 
most profitable way, regardless of whether the land was likely ever to be developed 
in such a way.204 The prospect of being liable for such compensation did discourage 
some local authorities from developing planning schemes. There was also a lengthy 
consultation process for any proposed scheme, which was designed to allow anyone 
affected by a scheme to object at any stage. In theory it promoted an open and co-
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operative system, but in reality local authorities could become mired in objections and 
inquiries which could add many years to developing a scheme.205   
 
 As housing was the most pressing issue, the early planning schemes created by the 
three cities were for new areas of housing with some minimal zoning for other 
activities, such as industry. Initially town planning was parcelled into the 
responsibilities of the housing committees but this was gradually changed, with 
Bristol leading the way. In 1923 Bristol City Council created an entirely separate 
Town Planning Committee, which took on the wider responsibilities of overseeing 
development other than housing in the city. The Committee worked on the Joint 
Town Planning Committee scheme for the wider Bristol area with nine other local 
councils, as well as overseeing Bristol’s schemes. The Joint Town Planning Scheme 
was produced in 1930, under the guidance of Patrick Abercrombie, and outlined the 
development of the whole Bristol area in terms of housing, industry and transport.206  
Exeter also created a Town Planning Committee in 1923 and outlined its 
intentions in December 1923, designating areas for open space, new roads and 
industrial use.207 A full scheme was created by 1924 under the guidance of the City 
Engineer and Surveyor, Thomas Moulding, and was followed by two further schemes 
in 1928 and 1929. The latter two schemes are particularly interesting as they 
demonstrate an innovative use of the available planning legislation. The 1928 
scheme did not provide a plan for new building, but sought to protect the existing 
fabric of the central part of the city. The scheme put the historic heart of the city 
under a scheme akin to the modern conservation zone, preventing any further 
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development or alteration of buildings without the permission of the City Council ‘on 
account of the special architectural, historic and artistic interest attached to the 
area’.208  
 
The 1929 scheme used the legislation in a similar way, but this time it was applied to 
a piece of open land which ‘was not included in the previous Town Planning 
Schemes as until lately almost the whole area was...in the ownership of a body of 
Charity Trustees’ who had not shown any intention of developing the land. However, 
the new owners ‘have intimated their intention to erect dwelling houses and an 
industrial building therein’.209 The parcel of land was just outside the former city walls 
and formed a large open space in the centre of the city, which the council were 
evidently anxious not to see built upon. The two schemes were approved and 
demonstrate that the legislation was not as restrictive as is sometimes painted.  
The early planning legislation, until the Town Planning Act of 1932, applied to 
undeveloped land only, which in theory meant that local authorities had no control 
over existing built up areas. This is often cited in the existing planning literature, but 
Exeter’s use of this legislation to apply planning permission to an existing built up 
area and a piece of open ground within that area suggests that local authorities found 
ways around the restrictions.210 The application of a planning scheme to the central 
areas of the city also demonstrates that the City Council was highly aware of the 
architectural value of many of the buildings within the centre. The character and 
aesthetic nature of the city centre was well understood as a tourist attraction even 
inter-war and by applying such a scheme the City Council could protect this asset 
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from unsuitable and reckless development. This also debunks the idea that local 
authorities had no interest in preserving and protecting historic buildings.211  
 
The planning schemes of the 1920s frequently outlined plans for new roads, 
particularly ring-roads and bypasses to carry through traffic around city centres. The 
increase in motor traffic had led to serious congestion in all three South Western 
cities, particularly as the main trunk roads tended to come right through the city 
centre.212 Exeter had a particular problem in this respect as the two major routes 
through the South West, the A30 and the A38, both came through the city’s High 
Street. By-passes to carry the traffic around the edge of the city were proposed to 
alleviate this problem and construction began in the late 1920s. Bristol and Plymouth 
both planned ring-roads around the cities to help with similar problems.213 Plymouth’s 
ring-road failed to materialise, but Bristol started by building Temple Way just prior to 
the outbreak of the Second World War.214 Road widening projects were also written 
into the plans and often provided unemployment relief schemes as they did not 
require skilled labour.215  
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Town planning legislation was revised by the Town Planning Act 1932 and gave local 
authorities the power to apply schemes to existing built-up areas as well as 
undeveloped land. The Act was originally intended to complement the Housing Act 
1930 and should have been passed in the same year. However, the collapse of the 
Labour government in August 1931 led to the Act being shelved.216 The bill 
introduced in 1930 had deliberately made minimal financial provisions for the new 
act, leaving out elements such as betterment charges, as the Labour government 
was also tabling legislation for land taxes, which would deal with this element of 
planning. It was reintroduced in almost the same format in early 1932 by the 
succeeding Minister, Edward Hilton-Young, for the National Government and came 
into force in the same year. The issue of land ownership was still a sensitive one and 
any act which appeared to be restricting property rights was still likely to be 
unpopular. The relaunched bill of 1932 therefore deliberately left the financial clauses 
in their weak state to reassure property and land owners that nationalisation and 
confiscation were not part of the National Government’s policy. It has been 
suggested that this decision made it difficult for local authorities to discover the full 
range of planning tools available to them, which impacted on the type of plans 
submitted to the Ministry.217  
 
The extension of planning powers to existing developed areas allowed Bristol, Exeter 
and Plymouth to tackle problems such as traffic congestion and slum areas in a 
comprehensive fashion for the first time. Although the previous town planning 
legislation had allowed for development zoning, the provisions for dealing with 
existing nuisances, particularly in terms of roads, had been minimal. The ability to 
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now plan in a joined-up fashion was evidently appreciated, as Exeter’s supporting 
statement for its Scheme No.4 demonstrates.  Scheme No.4 was submitted in 1934 
and explicitly states that the greatest advantage to the city would be gained from 
dealing with road plans and general development under this one scheme, rather than 
in a piecemeal fashion. Exeter’s statement also stressed that bringing all areas of the 
city, both developed and undeveloped, under the Scheme would make planning 
restrictions uniform across the city. The previous legislation had led to a situation 
which was felt to be inequitable as it acted ‘unfairly on those persons developing in a 
planned area’ compared to those outside the boundaries of existing schemes.218 This 
reflects one of the reasons Bristol chose to work with neighbouring authorities to 
create the 1930 Joint Town Planning Scheme, where problems of a similar nature 
were also envisaged with only some areas being under a planning scheme.219 The 
benefits of uniform planning regulations were therefore already recognised by local 
authorities as a way of avoiding disputes and unsuitable development. The calls for 
more comprehensive legislation in the 1940s, which ironed out the problems with the 
financial and property clauses in the interwar legislation, have their roots within these 
experiences of planning.  
 
The 1932 Act obviously did give local authorities wide-ranging powers, as Plymouth’s 
Scheme No.1 of 1937 demonstrates. The scheme covered all aspects of building and 
planning, from the widths of streets to the height of new buildings and the siting of 
different types of industry. It is also notable that Scheme No.1 also gave the City 
Council the power to enforce the maintenance of private open spaces and gardens, if 
they were deemed a nuisance, and to prevent the extension or replacement of 
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existing buildings.220 The latter clause was similar in nature to Exeter’s Scheme No.2 
which restricted development in the city centre, as it was evidently intended to protect 
buildings of architectural or historical merit. As Plymouth City Council had come 
under fire in previous years for including a number of significant buildings in the 
Barbican area in clearance schemes, this clause also demonstrates the changing 
view of historical buildings in the city. There were several instances of buildings 
dating from the sixteenth century being scheduled for demolition, by private owners 
as well as part of wider clearance schemes, which attracted much attention.221 This 
appears to have led to a more measured approach to older buildings in Plymouth, 
with more consideration being given to their architectural value rather than just their 
value as dwellings or business premises. The same phenomenon can be found in 
Exeter, with a number of similar-aged buildings in the West Gate area of the city 
becoming the centre of a comparable campaign to preserve and renovate rather than 
demolish them.222  
  
Bristol and Exeter also submitted schemes for new civic centres under the 1932 Act, 
which would have drawn together a number of civic buildings into one part of the city 
centre. This type of civic centre became fashionable at the end of the nineteenth 
century and retained its popularity until post-1945. Bristol began work on a new 
Council House in 1938 and planned the surrounding area as a civic centre, 
combining facilities such as the nearby university and museum buildings as part of 
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the scheme.223 Exeter partially revived the Thomas Mawson plan of 1913, proposing 
a new civic centre on the site of the existing Higher Market and area behind the 
Guildhall in 1934.224 This area was deemed as ‘outworn’ and had not been included 
in the 1928 planning scheme which prevented further development in the city 
centre.225  
The debates over the site for the new civic hall further emphasis the 
arguments regarding attitudes towards existing buildings and their conservation 
during the inter-war and post-war periods. The Higher Market opened in 1838 and 
had been partially designed by John Fowler, who also designed Covent Garden. The 
Market facade is currently Grade-II listed and is an excellent example of late-Neo 
Classical design in the city, built in Bath stone and fronted with Doric columns. 
However, nineteenth-century buildings were frequently undervalued in the interwar 
era, and opinions on the Higher Market’s value were varied, with some suggesting 
that it should be ‘burnt down and shops placed there’.226 This view was very much as 
the extreme end, with others speaking in support of retaining the Market as it was 
deemed a ‘fine asset to the city’.227 It seems that the motion to retain the building and 
find a different site for the proposed hall was, however, defeated and the plan for the 
hall approved.  
The recognition of the building’s value from an aesthetic perspective and as an 
attraction for the city does underline the changing attitude towards older buildings 
and conservation, as the matter was considered worthy of debate. The discussions 
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over the fate of the Higher Market are also revealing in terms of consultation with the 
public over planning and development. It is suggested by one councillor, a Mr 
Crosse, that the matter should have been put to a ‘postcard vote’ at an early stage. 
This suggests a poll of citizen opinion on the matter, which was not unprecedented in 
the South West at this time. Four years earlier, Bristol City Council had held a city-
wide poll on the proposed new arterial roads in the city and plans for new civic 
buildings around College Green. The latter appears to be the early form of the 
planning schemes later submitted under the 1932 Act for a new civic centre. The poll 
was held on 7 February 1930 and all citizens on the electoral role were entitled to 
vote on the plans.228 Disappointingly for the Council, the poll was greeted with apathy 
on the part of citizens and the turnout was low.229 Those who did vote polled against 
the College Green scheme, but in favour of the road scheme, leaving the civic centre 
idea to be revived at a later and more economically favourable date. 
 
 It is frequently stated in literature on both inter-war and post-war building that 
planners and local authorities did not seek the views of citizens and actively ignored 
any views expressed.230 It is not clear whether Bristol City Council had used a city-
wide poll before to gauge the opinion of citizens, or if the method was used again 
after the disappointing turn-out, but it demonstrates that local authorities did attempt 
to engage with citizens over schemes. The suggestion that Exeter also considered 
such methods, although they do not appear to have used them, indicates that this 
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may have been a more common occurrence than previously thought. It is also 
frequently suggested that citizens had little opportunity to register objections or 
grievances over planning schemes, but the records of all three South Western cities 
reveal that objections and complaints were frequently lodged over schemes.231 
Evidently public inquiries into schemes could also be triggered via the objection 
process, as reports on inquiries do appear in the local press and in local authority 
records.232 It is more debatable how successful objectors were in having their 
complaints upheld, but this may reflect the financial nature of many of the complaints. 
Objections relating to compensation and other financial clauses within the legislation 
were beyond the jurisdiction of local authorities, as these aspects were controlled by 




At the outbreak of war in 1939, the three cities all had plans in place for civic 
redevelopment, new roads and further housing schemes. The cities had already 
accomplished significant progress in housing since 1918; Exeter had built over 2,000 
new dwellings, Bristol over 13,000 and Plymouth over 5,000.233 Programmes of slum 
clearance and rehousing were well underway and it was hoped that the worst types 
of dwelling would be eradicated in the near future. Progress had also been made in 
the provision of open spaces, roads and facilities such as new schools and health 
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centres. The building projects had gone ahead despite objections from private 
property owners, which were still being heard in the late 1930s, with councillors of all 
political persuasions holding firm in their missions to alleviate housing conditions.234  
The political landscape had not altered drastically during this time; all three 
cities still had Conservative-led councils in 1939. However, there had been a change 
in the second party for each city, with the Labour Party steadily gaining seats 
throughout the period, generally at the expense of the Liberal Party. Exeter’s political 
landscape altered the least, with support in municipal elections still centred on the 
Conservative Party and other conservative elements, such as the Ratepayers Party. 
Great loyalty was show to some Labour councillors, such as Alfred Browning who 
was returned consistently between 1921 and 1936 for the St Johns ward, but Labour 
support was sporadic and patchy across the city as a whole. The city retained the 
greatest level of support for the Liberal party out of the three cities, again with great 
loyalty being show to some Liberal councillors.235 Plymouth’s Conservatives also saw 
consistent support across the city, but Labour made greater gains than in Exeter. Of 
the city’s twenty wards, thirteen returned a Labour councillor at least once, with the 
wards of Molesworth, Sutton and St Peters becoming strongly Labour during the 
period. The Liberals retained loyal support in some wards, such as Laira and St 
Aubyn, but were generally a waning influence. Unlike Exeter, the Ratepayers 
Association did not become a political force.236  
Bristol saw the greatest change, with Labour heavily supported in twelve of the 
city’s twenty-eight wards by 1939. However, the spread of Labour’s political power 
across the city was aided by the creation of five new wards in 1936. These wards 
were created to provide better representation for the newly built areas of the city, 
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most of which were the new Council estates. Unsurprisingly, these areas tended to 
demonstrate strong Labour support. Labour support did not mushroom suddenly in 
Bristol, there was steady growth from the early 1920s onwards and those wards 
which were showing strong support in 1939 were generally demonstrating the same 
affiliation in 1929. As referred to at the beginning of the chapter, the Liberal and 
Conservative parties joined forces as the Citizen Party, so it is not possible to 
extrapolate the fortunes of the individual parties in the city. As in Plymouth, the 
Ratepayers Association did not become a political force.237  
 
The result was that going into the Second World War the cities were represented by 
only marginally changed councils compared with 1918. The loyalty shown to some 
individuals meant that some councillors who served during the Second World War 
had been in local government since the 1920s. Many of them had sat on the 
committees for housing and planning and had overseen the new building projects as 
a result. These were often the same people who sat on the committees for housing 
and reconstruction during the war years and oversaw the initial stages of the 
rebuilding. For example, Bristol’s Henry Hennessey was particularly prominent on the 
housing committees both pre and post-Second World War, as was Frederick Cottey 
in Exeter.238 In Plymouth, Waldorf Astor played a prominent role in the city’s affairs 
as Lord Mayor and used his position to press for new planning legislation during the 
Second World War.  
The continuity of staffs extended beyond individual councillors. The posts of 
City Engineer, City Architect and Town Clerk, and their associated departments, were 
all instrumental to reconstruction and were all led by individuals who had been in-post 
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prior to 1939.239 Again these individuals had overseen the planning and housing 
schemes prepared under the legislation of the 1930s and therefore understood the 
needs of their respective cities, as well as the limitations of the existing legislation. It 
was these personnel who were responsible for reconstruction planning in all three 
cities and they undoubtedly drew on their interwar experiences to do this. They 
understood the problems facing each city as they had seen and lived them 
themselves.  This contrasts sharply with the view presented in some of the current 
literature that 1945 saw a complete change of leadership and personnel within local 
authorities. 
 
The interwar period paved the way for the reconstruction policies of the post-war era. 
The legislation produced throughout the interwar period laid the ground work for the 
comprehensive Town and Country Planning Act 1947 by demonstrating where the 
weaknesses in planning law lay, and the steps which would be required to alleviate 
them. The experiences of local authorities in building and planning interwar clearly 
demonstrated what worked and what needed further improvements in terms of the 
planning frameworks. Local authorities also gained experience in planning and 
constantly developed their ideas regarding municipal housing and the redevelopment 
of urban areas. Estate design in particular was shaped in this way as the housing of 
the interwar period became a working experiment in good design. The perceived 
failings of both municipal and private estates fed into improved urban design and the 
development of ‘neighbourhood unit’ planning, which treated each new development 
as a separate community in its own right. This latter idea became the standard way of 
building new housing areas post-war, with virtually all municipal and most private 
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developments following the principles of ‘neighbourhood unit’ design. This was born 
directly from the problems seen in interwar estates, such as a lack of amenities and a 
homogenous socio-economic mix. The examples of the estates built in Bristol, Exeter 
and Plymouth demonstrate that the local authorities in the South Western cities were 
certainly aware of these potential failings and did attempt to build amenities into their 
estates. There appears to have been a lack of central government support for some 
types of facility, such as retail units on estates, which hampered these attempts while 
finance was not always available to execute other schemes, such as health centres, 
to the desired standard.  
 
The experience of municipal building also highlighted the condition of many working 
class dwellings and the need for improved housing. The dedication with which the 
three cities tackled this problem and the ways in which they attempted to use the 
existing legislation in order to alleviate slum conditions demonstrates the importance 
they attached to this problem. The more general acceptance of the need for action 
also demonstrates that the housing problem was recognized by the public. The main 
body of objections appears to have come from those with vested interests, such as 
land and property owners, rather than the wider public. This continued to be the case 
in the post-war period, with objections to reconstruction coming principally from those 
who stood to lose financially. The wide discussions of housing need, and to some 
extent the need for planning in general, in the press also appears to have opened up 
ideas around planning and housing to a wider audience. It is certainly evident from 
the correspondence with the papers during the Second World War with regard to 
reconstruction that many citizens had a well-developed grasp of planning and 
housing issues. The discussions seen in the local press regarding housing and 
93 
 
planning in the interwar period may well have provided the gateway to the subject for 
many people and helped embed the need for comprehensive planning in the public 
consciousness.  
 The concerns of the wealthier classes also demonstrate the uneasiness felt by 
this group as the broader concept of ‘planning’ in economic and industrial terms grew 
and gained acceptance. The Labour Party aims of state ownership of land and 
industry were a direct threat to this group’s status and lifestyle. The possibility of 
property and industry being taken into public ownership represented the loss of 
everything that many people in the middle-classes felt they had worked hard for and 
built up. At the same time, the dissolving of class boundaries through such economic 
concepts was a further threat to this group, potentially creating a distrust of ‘planning’ 
of all types. This manifested itself in the objections and concerns of property owners 
and traders in the post-war years, as town planning began to represent the fall of 
private enterprise and intrusion of Socialism.  
 
On a practical level, the experience of building and managing large numbers of 
municipal houses equipped local authorities with the tools they needed to execute 
larger schemes in the wake of the Second World War. The three cities all gave 
consideration to non-traditional building methods as a way to overcome shortages of 
materials, labour and finance during the interwar period which would have 
undoubtedly helped them understand the systems available post-1945. The houses 
which were built interwar also informed the local authorities of the preferred designs 
amongst tenants and what worked well. It is notable that the parlour house became 
far more common as the period wore on owing to the acceptance by councillors that 
parlours were useful and well used, rather than an unnecessary luxury. The move to 
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houses with bathrooms, rather than the ‘bath in the scullery’ plan often found in the 
earliest houses, further demonstrates the shift in attitudes towards housing provision. 
Experience demonstrated that proper bathrooms were appreciated by tenants and 
were used appropriately. The idea of tenants misusing them and keeping coal in the 
bath was quickly dismissed and housing design amended accordingly. The houses 
built post-war all automatically had separate bathrooms and toilets as well as a 
parlour and kitchen, rather than a scullery and living room, based on the experiences 
of the interwar years.  
 
At the outbreak of war in 1939, the three South Western cities were in the process of 
implementing new civic plans to address their urban shortcomings. Housing in the 
three cities had been greatly improved by the building of both municipal and private 
estates, with plans being outlined to tackle the remaining slum areas in each city. The 
role of town planning in creating urban environments fit for the modern age had been 
firmly established, as was the need for municipal housing. The interwar years had 
seen a transformation in the way poverty and welfare were viewed, with the 
acknowledgement that the state had a role to play in alleviating the worst conditions. 
The emergence of mass and structural unemployment had demonstrated that poverty 
could have causes beyond the control of the individual, rather than being product of 
fecklessness or profligacy amongst the working classes. As such, the state had a 
responsibility to aid those in need. At the same time, the benefits of better-designed 
houses and towns for the health of the population had come to be recognised, along 






Chapter 2: Planning for a ‘Brave New Britain’ 1940-1946 
 
The outbreak of war in 1939 put the redevelopment and slum clearance plans of 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth on hold. The bomb damage sustained by the cities 
from late 1940 onwards changed the focus of planning to reconstruction, as large 
areas of each city required complete rebuilding. Planning as a discipline continued to 
evolve, with the experiences of the interwar years informing the design of houses 
and housing estates, and contributing to new ideas about urban layouts and 
planning. The reconstruction plans drawn up by the three cities would draw heavily 
on these new ideas in order to create cities for the future.  
 
This chapter will critically re-examine the concepts of the ‘master planner’ and ‘top-
down’ planning within reconstruction. The three cities took different approaches to 
planning, with Exeter and Plymouth employing consultant planners while Bristol 
chose an in-house approach. This will allow for the examination of the different 
approaches and outcomes in order to test the idea of the ‘master planner’. At the 
same time, the consultation processes undertaken in each city and the general 
dissemination of planning ideas can be examined in order to assess the involvement 
and understanding of citizens in reconstruction.  
 
The state of planning at the outbreak of war  
 
The developments in town planning at the end of the 1930s coalesced around 
housing and estate design. The suburban estate which came to characterise the 
housing of the interwar era, both in the private and municipal sectors, was 
considered to have a number of failings in terms of amenities and social cohesion. 
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All types of estate suffered from a lack of facilities and amenities which were thought 
to create a sense of isolation, as well as being inconvenient for residents. Municipal 
estates had ameliorated working class housing conditions, but the social ties and 
community spirit thought to characterise working class districts were considered to 
have been weakened by the new housing estates as social groups were broken up 
by the move to new areas; indeed this belief can be found in both contemporary 
town planning texts and more recent literature on municipal housing.240 The new 
estates were thought to foster a more selfish and inward looking population, 
although research into housing ideals revealed that residents saw the greater 
privacy provided by the estate designs as a positive thing.241 Private estates were 
considered to be just as insular and dulling in terms of community spirit, particularly 
as these rarely had any kind of amenities to make them communities rather than 
dormitory estates.242 
The concept of ‘neighbourhood planning’ began to emerge at the end of the 
1930s as a solution for these failings. The concept envisaged estates as self-
contained communities built around amenities such as schools and shopping 
districts. In addition to these basic amenities, each of these ‘neighbourhood units’ 
would also have its own leisure facilities, such as pubs, cinemas, playgrounds and 
community centres. The optimal population for each unit would be between 5000 
and 10,000 persons to ensure good access to amenities. Neighbourhood planning 
also advocated mixed class estates to avoid the perceived problems with 
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homogenous estates.243  It was also intended that each unit should be within easy 
reach of places of work, with industrial planning complementing neighbourhood 
planning. The emphasis of neighbourhood planning, however, was to create better 
social cohesion and the sense of community which was thought to be lacking in 
modern life. The new ideas emerging in town planning and housing, such as 
neighbourhood planning, were intended to counter this problem and foster a greater 
sense of community and social responsibility. It was later hoped that the ‘all in it 
together’ spirit of the war could be retained and nurtured through these ideas.244 
These concepts underpinned the planning of the 1940s and can be seen in the 
estate design of all three South Western cities.  
 
As these new planning concepts emerged, it was realised that planning had potential 
uses in sectors beyond housing and town redevelopment. Planning legislation could 
be revised to control industrial development and distribution as well. The 1930s had 
seen the collapse of the heavy industries, such as shipbuilding and steel, with 
devastating effects on the communities reliant on them. Meanwhile new light 
industries, such as the manufacturing of electrical goods and cars, had boomed. 
However, the new industries had not sited themselves in the depressed areas, 
instead clustering around the South East and the southern edge of the Midlands.  
Central government began to look at the potential for planning legislation to control 
the location of industry in order to prevent structural unemployment.245 In 1937 the 
Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, more commonly 
known as the Barlow Commission after its chairman Sir Montague Barlow, was 
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convened to consider the problems of the distribution of industry and the depressed 
areas, which had been highlighted in 1936 by the Third Report of the Commissioner 
for the Special Areas. A better balance of industry would make local employment 
markets more resilient to economic changes as there would not be the reliance on 
one industry for all local employment and prosperity. The Barlow Commission was to 
consider how this might be achieved.  
 
The findings of the Barlow Commission built upon the interwar reshaping of 
residential planning, with its aim of creating balanced communities with amenities 
and industry built into their infrastructure. The main recommendation of the 
Commission, laid out in its report of 1940, was that the location of industry should be 
directed by central government in order to achieve a more even distribution around 
the country.246 This would help avoid the problems of structural unemployment and 
depressed areas which had been seen in the interwar period, as it would ensure that 
no area was solely reliant on one industry for the majority of local employment. The 
Barlow Commission demonstrated how planning was moving from a niche 
specialism, mostly concerned with housing, to a profession which could also aid 
economic prosperity. This is reflected in the plans of blitzed cities which presented 
plans for industrial and economic development as well as housing and the rebuilding 




                                                          
246 Lee S Green, ‘Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, Report, cmd 
6153’, The Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics, 16/2, 1940, pp.248-247; Royal Commission 
on the Distribution of the Industrial Population Report: Presented to parliament by command of His 
Majesty January 1940 (London: HMSO, 1940). 
99 
 
Bomb damage and the need for reconstruction plans  
 
Local authorities had been alive to the possibility of air attacks since the mid-1930s, 
when they had been instructed by government to produce air raid precaution 
plans.247 The main concern had been gas attacks, but the potential destructive 
powers of high explosives and incendiary bombs were also acknowledged. As such, 
at the outbreak of war in 1939 air attacks were expected and from July 1940 all three 
South Western cities suffered repeated air raids. The South West in general suffered 
a surprisingly high number of air raids during the war, with the majority of larger 
towns suffering bomb damage. This was mostly due to ‘tip and run’ raids where the 
towns were unlucky rather than specific targets. Exeter suffered a number of such 
raids during 1940 and 1941, but later became a specific target in 1942 as part of the 
‘Baedeker’ campaign directed at cities of historical or architectural importance. 
Plymouth and Bristol, however, had strategic importance and were specifically 
targeted as a result.  
Bristol’s commercial port and harbour made it a prime target and the city 
endured a sustained campaign of attacks between November1940 and April 1941. 
These resulted in serious and widespread damage across the city centre and some 
outlying residential districts, with a total of 89,080 buildings damaged or destroyed 
and over 3000 dwellings entirely destroyed.248 The main shopping district, in the 
oldest part of the city, was severely damaged and a number of churches and 
buildings of architectural importance were destroyed. 
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Likewise, Plymouth’s importance as a naval dockyard ensured its presence 
on the list of target cities. The city was an early casualty of the bombing campaigns, 
with the first raid occurring in July 1940, but didn’t experience quite the same level of 
sustained attacks as Bristol. However, Plymouth instead suffered seven consecutive 
nights of bombing in April 1941 which obliterated much of the city centre. The city 
also lost over 3000 dwellings, with a further 18,389 seriously damaged.249  
Exeter had no strategic importance and only suffered due to its reputation as 
an historic city. The worst raid was on the night of the 3/4 May 1942, which 
decimated the city centre and destroyed 1,500 dwellings.250 Although the number of 
dwellings damaged or destroyed in Exeter was lower than in Plymouth or Bristol, the 
compact nature of the city meant that it represented a greater overall percentage of 
the city’s housing stock.  
 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth were left with severe housing shortages and crippled 
retail and business districts. The level of destruction required the rebuilding of city 
centres virtually from scratch, but also presented the opportunity of addressing the 
nuisances of the past. It was now possible to replan entirely new road systems and 
to make changes, such as the re-siting of industry, which had not been feasible prior 
to the war.  At the same time, social changes were on the horizon, with the rhetoric 
around creating a ‘brave new Britain’ after the war raising questions about the 
provision of education, healthcare and employment for all.  
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The cities were also left with serious financial difficulties as the damage and loss of 
properties resulted in a loss of rate income. Plymouth was particularly badly affected 
in this respect, losing 17% of its total rateable value, while Exeter lost 14.7% and 
Bristol 3%.251 To put this in context, Coventry, widely regarded as one of the worst-
damaged cities, lost 3.4% of its rateable value.252 This pattern of bomb damage and 
financial loss was repeated across Britain, with a total of 19 cities eventually being 
designated as ‘blitzed cities’ to underscore the severity of the damage sustained. 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth were all included in this list, along with industrial 
centres such as Manchester and Birmingham.253  
Business and property owners were anxious to rebuild as quickly as possible 
in order to maintain trade, as were local authorities as it would restore rateable 
value. As such, all three South Western cities applied to build temporary shops in 
the wake of bombing, but were refused permission by the Board of Trade.254 The 
government’s position was that all resources should be directed to the war effort, 
with building licences required for any work over the value of £100 from May 1941 to 
aid this.255  Rebuilding during the war itself was also impractical as there was no 
guarantee that the air war was over, a stance underscored by the continued attacks 
on Bristol and Plymouth until 1944.256 
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 Building was therefore strictly controlled throughout the war and the 
rebuilding of war-damaged property, beyond ‘first aid’ repairs to make buildings 
habitable, was prohibited. These repairs were in themselves extremely important as 
they kept housing stock and businesses in use and helped to maintain morale. 
However, they could not tackle the scale of damage seen in the central areas of the 
many blitzed cities. Instead, blitzed cities were advised to begin planning so that 
rebuilding could begin immediately once the war was over. The consideration of and 
discussion about physical reconstruction was encouraged by both central 
government and various professional bodies, such as the Town and Country 
Planning Association. The creation of the Ministry of Works and Buildings under 
Lord Reith in 1940 helped to bolster such discussion, as it suggested that physical 
reconstruction was being taken seriously by the government.257 Reith himself 
encouraged local authorities to begin planning for reconstruction, advising them to 
plan ‘boldly and comprehensively’ for the future, looking to the city of twenty or thirty 
years hence.258 
 
The sustained bombing campaign into mid-1941 saw reconstruction become a 
popular topic of debate and discussion as it became evident that extensive 
rebuilding would be required in many towns and cities.259 The discussion of a world 
after the war was to be encouraged, as it helped citizens to look ahead and imagine 
a new world created out of the ashes of the war. It gave a personal purpose to the 
sacrifice and hardship of the war itself, beyond the notions of international politics 
and intervention for the greater good. Reconstruction was seen as a safe subject for 
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this type of motivation, as physical rebuilding would be required regardless and the 
urban and economic problems of the interwar years could be tackled at the same 
time. It was also hoped that reconstruction would encourage greater civic 
responsibility and engagement amongst the public, and publications and broadcasts 
on the subject of reconstruction were produced to support this. The Town and 
Country Planning Association published a series of pamphlets entitled The 
Rebuilding Britain Series which discussed building and reform ideas.  The BBC also 
helped to encourage debate via a radio series called ‘Making Plans’.260 Discussions 
around the nature of rebuilding were also encouraged within the armed forces and 
civilian societies. The Army Bureau of Current Affairs had within its discussion series 
a number of reconstruction subjects, including the homes of the future and the 
execution of city centre reconstruction.261  
Outlets such as these built on the knowledge that people had acquired in the 
inter-war period and ensured that reconstruction and planning ideas were widely 
disseminated and discussed.262 Local newspapers reveal that talks about physical 
reconstruction were common amongst local societies and groups, with professional 
planners and architects frequently engaged to offer their opinions on such 
subjects.263 This spread of ideas became evident during the wartime debates around 
reconstruction, as the ideas expressed by the public in newspaper correspondence 
demonstrated quite a sophisticated grasp of planning.264  
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It is notable that the discussions held by local organisations display a remarkable 
consensus in reconstruction ideas, reflecting the prevailing planning ideals and an 
understanding of the problems which local authorities wished to tackle. Local 
newspapers for the three cities frequently reported the meetings of local trade and 
social organisations, giving an insight into the opinions of their members on 
reconstruction matters. The general consensus was that the cities should be rebuilt 
anew as a symbol of triumph over adversity and that the need for reconstruction 
presented an opportunity to correct the problems of the past.265 The need to replan 
roads in order to alleviate the traffic problems of the interwar era was recognised, 
especially in Plymouth where the tangled street pattern had caused particular 
problems. The idea of spacious, wide streets with ample planting to create a 
pleasant shopping atmosphere was also a frequent suggestion from groups in Bristol 
and Plymouth, although in Exeter there was slightly more desire to retain the existing 
street layout, which was felt to create a more ‘artistic’ atmosphere.266  
Letters to the papers often express a desire for the new buildings of the post-
war era to take on modern ‘clean faced’ designs, rather than trying to create replicas 
of destroyed buildings.267 It was felt that replicas could never replace what had been 
lost, being only simulacrums of the original buildings. Thomas Sharp, Exeter’s 
consultant planner, was a proponent of this view and recommended building anew in 
order to avoid ‘a dead museum’ of a city.268 In addition to this, there was a good 
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understanding of the wider social and economic reconstruction which would be 
needed post-war, again with support for such changes.269  
 
These opinions are notable as the idea of consensus in favour of planning has been 
challenged within the existing literature. Susanne Cowan suggests in her work  that 
it was planning professionals rather than the public who saw war damage as an 
opportunity, citing Julian Huxley’s comment that ‘the blitz has been a planners 
windfall’.270 The presence of reports which give the opinions of local groups 
suggests that the idea of war damage representing an opportunity to address the 
problems of the past was not limited to planners, but was widespread amongst the 
citizenry of the South Western cities. The greatest proponents of this approach were 
generally those directly involved, such as the blitzed traders and property owners, 
but letters to the local papers also suggest that the wider public supported such 
ideas.  Nick Tiratsoo’s work on blitzed cities supports this view, noting the 
consensus in both the failings of cities and the proposed remedies in contemporary 
reports and plans.271 In particular there was the feeling that cities had failed in their 
purpose, with people and traffic not circulating freely, inadequate housing and social 
inequality in terms of lifestyle and facilities; all opinions present in the South Western 
newspaper reports. Comprehensive planning was thought to be the remedy, as the 
piecemeal solutions of the past had not worked and the future of the whole 
population, not just the interests of the influential, needed to be taken into 
                                                          
269 Western Morning News, ‘Torquay Debaters; World reconstruction after the war’, 10 October 1941; 
‘Build Up Anew’, 22 November 1941. 
270 Susanne Cowan, ‘The People’s Peace: The myth of wartime unity and public consent for town 
planning’ in Mark Clapson and Peter Larkham (eds.), The Blitz and its Legacy (London; 
Routledge,2013), pp.77-78. 
271 Nick Tiratsoo, Junichi Hasegawa, Tony Mason and Takao Matsumura, Urban Reconstruction in 
Britain and Japan 1945-1955: Dreams, plans and realities (Luton: University of Luton Press, 2002), 
pp.1-2; Nick Tiratsoo, ‘The Reconstruction of Blitzed British Cities 1945-1955: Myths and realities’, 
Contemporary British History, 4/1, (2000), pp.27-44. 
106 
 
account.272 This very much reflects the opinions of local organisations in the South 
West, demonstrating that there was support and enthusiasm for replanning from 
traders and property owners. 
 
Traders and property owners also recognised that such rebuilding would require a 
new approach to planning and building, supporting the idea of a ‘master plan’ to 
direct reconstruction. As such, they were supportive of radical methods to make 
replanning swifter and simpler, such as putting all of the blitzed land under single 
ownership. Doing this would mean that roads could be relaid and sites repositioned 
without having to negotiate the changes with each individual owner or lease, making 
the replanning quicker. At the end of the process traders and owners would be 
offered sites within the new layout, with the assumption that sites could be bought 
back. This approach was supported by trade groups in all three cities, with the local 
authority generally accepted as the most appropriate body to vest the land in.273 It 
was assumed that new planning legislation would be forthcoming which would make 
this possible and would also allow local authorities greater control over planning than 
previous acts had. The presence of these opinions demonstrates that there was 
consensus for planning in the early years of the war, with traders and the public alike 
recognising that replanning was essential for post-war reconstruction.  
 
Support for reconstruction came not only from local organisations, but also from 
local authorities and central government. Local authorities did view the destruction 
as a ‘planners’ windfall’ to some extent, as the damage did offer an opportunity to 
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tackle many of their urban problems in one stroke. The need for better roads and 
purpose-built buildings for retail, civic and leisure provision had been acknowledged 
pre-war, with some efforts made towards tackling the problems. However, it had 
been almost impossible to mount a proper attack on nuisances as it would require 
the purchase and rebuilding of large swathes of standing property; something 
beyond the powers and finances of most local authorities. The war damage provided 
an opportunity to replan, as the building work would need to be undertaken 
regardless.  
 
The enthusiasm at the local level for reconstruction plans was encouraged by the 
attitude of central government, which displayed a similar level of enthusiasm and 
support for reconstruction in the early years of the war. The creation of the 
Reconstruction Problems Committee and the Ministry of Works and Buildings 
demonstrated the commitment of central government to the concept of 
reconstruction. Reconstruction matters were discussed at Cabinet level from 1940 
onwards, although the emphasis was often more on the economic and social 
aspects of reconstruction rather than physical rebuilding.274 However, the creation of 
the Ministry of Works and Buildings and the appointment of Sir John Reith as 
Minister suggested the support of central government for urban replanning and 
reconstruction. Reith’s pronouncements that blitzed cities should plan ‘boldly and 
comprehensively’ and ‘not worry too much about the cost’ reinforced this point, 
adding to the confidence and enthusiasm of local organisations and authorities in 
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replanning their shattered cities.275 This initial support was partly due to the interwar 
experiences of urban problems and partly a way of bolstering morale on the home 
front. The Barlow Report had also underscored the importance of both urban and 
industrial planning in securing the best possible environments and economic 
structures. This coupled with the need for rebuilding work led to the initial 
enthusiasm for reconstruction and planning seen in central government between 
1940 and 1942.  
The government was also keen to ensure that the problems seen after the 
First World War, in terms of economic recession and a disordered demobilisation 
programme, were not repeated.276 The housing shortage which followed the 
Armistice was also still fresh in the political memory, and it was recognised that 
planning could help to avoid a similar situation. It was sensed that the increased 
state intervention necessitated by the war could led to an acceptance of greater 
state intervention in economic and public life after the war, and that this could be 
used for the public good.277 This was a direct echo of the First World War, when the 
building of municipal housing was accepted as necessary rather than representing 
interference in market forces by the government. As such, local authorities were 
promised fresh planning legislation which would provide a framework for 
reconstruction, allowing them greater control over urban development as well as 
dealing with war damage.  
 
                                                          
275  TNA, HLG71/1254,  Lord Reith’s Press Conference on Post-War Planning, 8 April 1941, p.4; 
Western Morning News, ‘Begin Planning New Plymouth’, 5 July 1941.  
276 TNA, CAB 66/27/27, ‘Reconstruction Problems: Report by the Paymaster General’, 1 August 1942, 
pp.6-8. 
277 TNA, CAB 67/8/121, ‘Reconstruction of Town and Country: Memorandum by Minister of Works and 
Buildings’, 7 December 1940, p.1; TNA, CAB 66/27/27, ‘Reconstruction Problems: Report by the 
Paymaster General’, 1 August 1942.  
109 
 
However, from 1943 there was retrenchment within central government regarding 
reconstruction and planning. Churchill in particular deemed the consideration of the 
post-war world detrimental to the war effort as it acted as a distraction. He felt that 
decisions about the shape of the post-war world should be paused until the war had 
been won and the public should concentrate on the job in hand.278 The release of 
the Beveridge Report in 1942 had helped to push reconstruction as a concept into 
the social realm and firmly planted it in the public mind, adding to concerns about 
reconstruction becoming a distraction rather than an encouragement.279 Reith was 
removed as Minister of Works and Planning in 1943, taking with him the 
pronouncements in favour of radical planning for city reconstruction. New planning 
legislation, promised as part of the toolkit for reconstruction, was slow to appear, and 
the general disinclination for radical reconstruction emanating from central 
government slowly trickled down to local authorities and blitzed traders. However, 
this took time, and it is notable that the plans of the three cities were shaped and 
formed even as this retrenchment was underway.  
 
 Planning, Consultation and the Role of the ‘Master Planner’  
 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all took slightly different approaches to replanning, with 
Exeter and Plymouth opting to employ a consultant planner, while Bristol chose an 
in-house approach. The extensive nature of reconstruction saw local authorities 
encouraged to employ professional planners to oversee their plans. There was 
concern within central government that without professional guidance blitzed cities 
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would find the task of reconstruction beyond their ‘ability and imagination’.280 
However, the use of consultant planners tended to depend on the availability of staff 
and expertise in planning within the local authority. Some had large engineering or 
architectural departments with extensive planning experience which could create 
and execute large-scale plans successfully without recourse to consultants. This 
was the case at Birmingham, which had the experienced and respected planner and 
engineer Herbert Manzoni, who sat on several government panels during the war, 
and at Coventry in the form of city architect Donald Gibson.281 All three of the South 
Western cities could claim such expertise within their staffs, with city engineers and 
architects who had been in post prior to the war and had overseen the interwar 
development projects.  
However, all three cities had also used outside consultants at various times to 
provide a fresh perspective on city development. Exeter had employed Thomas 
Mawson to create a civic centre plan prior to the First World War and had also 
employed a firm of consultants in the late 1930s to revive the scheme.282 Mawson 
had also been employed by Plymouth City Council in 1928 for their Central Park 
scheme.283 Bristol City Council had employed Patrick Abercrombie to create the 
Bristol regional plan in 1930 for the joint planning committee of local authorities in 
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the area.284 This use of planners prior to 1939 demonstrated that local authorities 
understood the value of asking for expert, outside  views on planning matters and 
that they had experience of dealing with such experts.  
 
It was not just central government which felt that local authorities should make use 
of consultant planners for drawing up reconstruction plans. Calls quickly came from 
trader organisations for consultants to be employed. In Plymouth it was obvious that 
the level of destruction meant that rebuilding would be extensive, and there were 
calls for the appointment of an expert to oversee the work from both individuals and 
traders groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce.285  
A similar situation could be found in both Bristol and Exeter, again driven by 
trader groups who felt that expert opinion was required.286 This is particularly striking 
in the case of Bristol, where calls for a consultant to be brought in were made up 
until 1944, when the replanning was already well underway under the guidance of 
the City Engineer.287 This example challenge the view forwarded in the existing 
literature that the use of consultants was imposed from above. The role of consultant 
planners has come under considerable scrutiny, with a trend toward viewing 
consultant planners as ‘master planners’ who controlled the whole of reconstruction 
planning in blitzed cities and imposed their views on an unwilling populace. The idea 
of the ‘planners eye view’ can be found in the work of Peter Larkham, David Adams 
and Alice Coleman, with planning consultants viewed as out-of-touch idealists intent 
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on social reconstruction via their plans.288 This theme can also be found in studies 
on Plymouth and Exeter, with Stephen Essex and Mark Brayshay, and Malcolm Tait 
and Aiden While, making reference to it in their work on the plans for the two 
cities.289 However, the presence of trader opinions demonstrates that the use of 
consultants was not imposed from above, but was often actively encouraged by local 
organisations to ensure high quality plans.  
 
Bristol’s decision to plan in-house reflected the City Council’s interwar planning 
experience, having undertaken extensive housing and slum clearance programmes 
alongside their collaboration on a joint regional plan with the surrounding district 
councils. Bristol City Council were considered by central government to have been 
‘at the fore’ of interwar planning as a result.290 The Chief Planning Officer, Burtrand 
Brueton, had been in-post since 1923 and had overseen the 1930 Bristol and Bath 
regional planning scheme in tandem with Patrick Abercrombie. Brueton worked 
under the City Engineer, Marston Webb, who had been in post since 1932, and the 
City Architect, J.Nelson Meredith – in post since 1938.291 The experience of both 
Brueton and Webb gave the Council confidence in them to design and execute a 
reconstruction scheme. Junichi Hasegawa suggests that the decision to plan in-
house reflected this specific planning expertise, but also reflected a lack of a 
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planning enthusiast amongst the councillors themselves to push for outside 
expertise and ideas.292  
The combination of Brueton and Webb may have been seen as a safe choice, 
as they were both known quantities who could be relied upon to make cautious 
progress rather than a radical plan. Initially reconstruction was under the existing 
Planning and Public Works Committee, but a separate Planning and Reconstruction 
Committee was formed in 1942. This committee debated whether to use an outside 
consultant for the replanning, but eventually voted to appoint the City Engineer to act 
as chief planning officer.293 Brueton was appointed to the role of Executive Planning 
Officer, working under the direction of the City Engineer.294 It is clear, however, that 
the blitzed traders were not as confident in Brueton’s abilities as they repeatedly 
called for the appointment of an outside consultant.295 Max Lock did offer his 
services as a consultant to Bristol City Council in 1943, which traders urged the 
Council to accept. The Council would only accept Lock if he became a full, salaried 
member of staff, rather than acting as an independent consultant on a short-term 
contract, something which Lock was not prepared to accept.296  
 
The approach to reconstruction was tentative compared with Plymouth and Exeter, 
reflecting Bristol’s reluctance to create a comprehensive plan prior to the passing of 
fresh planning legislation. The City Council were also reluctant to proceed too far 
with a plan without any indication of the financial aid available to blitzed cities, as this 
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would affect how radical rebuilding could be. The advantage of this cautious 
approach was that the Council consulted very widely and extensively with interested 
parties ahead of producing a plan.297 This process of consultation later won the 
Council praise from central government, even though the resultant plan was not in 
fact welcomed by local traders.298 Both the Planning and Public Works Committee 
(PPWC hereafter) and the Reconstruction and Planning Committee (PRC hereafter) 
consulted with traders and the Chamber of Commerce throughout the planning 
stages. Trader needs were surveyed and the minutes suggest that proposals for 
replanning were sought and welcomed by the PWCC, with numerous letters from 
traders and citizens minuted and responded to throughout 1941 and early 1942.299 
The PWCC also worked closely with the Chamber of Commerce and other local 
groups via the Special Advisory Committee set up by the Chamber of Commerce in 
February 1941. The Advisory Committee appointed representatives from 118 
different organisations, covering the arts, entertainment, industry, education, health, 
religion, social services and retail sectors of the city to ensure that all voices were 
heard by the PWCC.300  
The Committee’s interests were not restricted to city centre reconstruction, 
but also covered the building of new housing, industry and satellite towns. The 
Advisory Committee was extremely active, setting up at least one meeting with 
George Pepler, the town planning advisor to the Ministry of Health, in order to 
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discuss the challenges facing Bristol.301 They evidently did this with the PPWCs 
blessing and consulted with them about what PPWC would like discussed at the 
meeting. This suggests a close working relationship and a good level of consultation 
between the PPWC and the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee did not 
have such a close working relationship with the RPC. The relationship soured after 
the Advisory Committee repeatedly requested to have members of the Committee 
co-opted onto the RPC following its creation in June 1942. The RPC resisted this 
idea, as they were concerned that the involvement of the Committee at this level 
could result in those with a vested interest in reconstruction having too much 
influence.302 However, the views of these groups were considered important and the 
proposed relocation of the city’s shopping area was based on the stated needs of 
traders. Bristol was also the only city to put a draft plan on public display for 
consideration and criticism by the public at large.303 This wide consultation was 
reflected in Plymouth and Exeter, where the Councils also sought ideas and 
opinions from interested groups and individuals.  
 
Plymouth City Council chose to approach Patrick Abercrombie, one of the foremost 
planners in Britain, as their consultant. It has become accepted that Abercrombie 
was the choice of the city’s Lord Mayor, Viscount Waldorf Astor, rather than the City 
Council. Astor and Abercrombie were personally acquainted and it has been 
suggested by Essex and Brayshay in particular that Abercrombie worked on 
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Plymouth’s plan as a personal favour to Astor.304 The inference from Essex and 
Brayshay’s work has been that Abercrombie’s involvement therefore represented the 
workings of a small city elite who orchestrated the reconstruction process, rather 
than reconstruction planning being a collaborative process across local 
organisations.305 However, this idea appears to stem from the earlier work of Crispin 
Gill in his Plymouth: A New History, as the city records and the reports of the Council 
meetings in the local press make it clear that the City Council itself wanted 
Abercrombie as a consultant because he was considered the best planner in the 
country. Letters from the Plymouth Chamber of Commerce also make it clear that 
the use of a consultant planner was encouraged and supported by the Chamber as 
well.306 The personal connection between Astor and Abercrombie did, however, help 
to secure Abercrombie’s services. Abercrombie was already involved with the plans 
for Hull and London, and the city had been warned that he might not be prepared to 
take on another project.307 Astor’s personal approach to Abercrombie with the 
Plymouth contract secured the latter’s services where an approach from the Town 
Clerk might have been unsuccessful.  
 
Abercrombie was not the sole creator of the Plymouth plan. It was instead a joint 
endeavour with the City Engineer and Surveyor, James Paton Watson, who 
provided local knowledge and expertise. The input of local traders and organisations 
was actively encouraged, with Plymouth’s Chamber of Commerce and the 
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Mercantile Associations being immensely active in the consultation stages of 
planning. As in Bristol, the Chamber of Commerce set up an Advisory Committee to 
work with the council, although they stopped short of wanting a direct voice on the 
Council committee.308 Public meetings were held with Abercrombie in attendance 
which acted as a forum for these and other local groups, including religious and 
welfare organisations, to put their ideas and needs directly to the Council and their 
consultant.309  In addition to this the views of individuals were sought. In particular, a 
call for women to put forward their views was made via the Western Morning News 
‘Femina’ column in 1942.310 Paton Watson himself made a plea for local people to 
submit their ideas and opinions on replanning to the Council, stating that ‘It was the 
not duty of planners to force their plans upon the community’.311 Admittedly this plea 
was made just as Paton Watson and Abercrombie were awaiting the publication of 
their plan, but evidently Paton Watson wanted feedback from those who would 
actually live and work in the proposed new estates and city centre.   
 
Exeter City Council considered both the in-house and consultant methods for 
reconstruction planning. The Council initially decided to use a consultant planner for 
reconstruction and a list of potential planners was drawn up. The City Council had 
engaged the services of a planner prior to the outbreak of war to draw up plans for 
city centre redevelopment, and there were discussions as to whether this contract 
had to be honoured.312 Evidently it was decided that it did not as interviews with the 
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preferred candidates were organised in February 1943. However, after short-listing 
the candidates and even selecting a favourite, the Council decided to postpone the 
appointment while survey work and consultations with traders were undertaken. By 
June 1943 the Ministry of Town and Country Planning was urging the council to 
make a decision either in favour of using in-house staff or to appoint a consultant.313 
The City Architect’s and City Engineer’s departments were approached, but the 
response of both departments was swift and negative. Both felt they were already 
overstretched by their current workloads, particularly with the minimal wartime 
staffing in each department.314 Thomas Sharp was eventually selected as consultant 
planner in October 1943.315 Sharp was solely responsible for Exeter’s plan, although 
he did work closely with the City Architect and City Engineer and made use of the 
survey work already undertaken by various City departments.  
 
Exeter City Council surveyed blitzed traders and called for citizens to give their ideas 
and views about reconstruction in 1942 and early 1943.316  A wide range of local 
organisations were approached for ideas, from the expected traders groups, such as 
the Chamber of Commerce, to architectural groups, the Women’s Institute, the 
Exeter Gardener’s Society and the English Folk Dance and Song Society. 
Individuals were also encouraged to submit ideas and plans, with calls for citizens to 
submit their views on rebuilding made via the local press.317 A special meeting of the 
Replanning Committee was held in May 1943 so that these ideas could be examined 
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in more detail. Representatives of nine local organisations who had submitted ideas 
were invited to present them in person, as well as one representative from a firm of 
city architects and one individual with no organisational affiliation who had submitted 
his own city plan.318 This consultation process was part of a range of preliminary 
work undertaken by the Council, with industrial and land use surveys produced as 
well. 
 
This pattern of consultation demonstrates that the idea that all city plans were 
imposed from above by remote planners who had little interest in local people or 
their lives has been overstated. While the consultation processes were not quite as 
sophisticated as those used in modern planning, they were far more advanced than 
they have been given credit for. All three of the South Western cities deliberately 
sought the views both of those directly affected by central areas reconstruction, such 
as traders and property owners, and of other interested parties. Individual citizens 
were also encouraged to submit their own views about how their cities should be 
rebuilt to their councils. In addition to this type of consultation before and during the 
planning process, the finished plans for each city were also opened up to comment, 
criticism and amendment from interested parties and citizens.319  
A further strand to the consultation process also existed in the form of the 
public enquiry, as all plans were subject to such enquiries once completed. The 
enquiry process was designed to ensure that all affected parties had the chance to 
raise objections or concerns, have them heard in a public arena and have them 
addressed by a body independent of the local authority. The public enquiries for the 
three cities took place in 1946 and are dealt with in detail in the next chapter.  
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New city concepts and the completed plans 
 
The plans of the three cities were completed and presented to the public between 
1943 and 1945. Plymouth’s plan, entitled A Plan for Plymouth, was the first to be 
completed and was presented to the City Council in August 1943, with a public 
exhibition following in April 1944. Bristol’s plan was also released in April 1944, but 
in a draft form only. At this stage blitzed cities still did not know what kind of 
legislative framework they would be working under, as the 1944 Town and Country 
Planning Act was not passed until November 1944. Bristol City Council had been 
reluctant to plan without new legislation and the decision to present a draft plan 
reflected this. The draft plan allowed them to gauge enthusiasm and approval for the 
proposals within it and to ask for feedback from traders and the public.320 It appears 
to be the only time a city was presented with a draft plan.  
Unlike the plans for Exeter and Plymouth, Bristol’s plan did not have an 
identifying title and was produced in a more piecemeal fashion. The City Engineer 
initially presented the council with plans for the city’s roads in 1943, with a complete 
planning report following in February 1944.321 This report was made public in April 
1944, with the report and plans put on display in the city art gallery.322  
 
All three cities held public exhibitions of the plans to give citizens the opportunity to 
examine them and give comments and feedback.  The exhibitions were extremely 
popular, with all three running for longer than originally planned. The Plan for 
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Plymouth exhibition was originally intended to run for three weeks until from 27 April 
to 20 May 1944 in the Plymouth Museum and Art Gallery, but its popularity was so 
great that the exhibition was kept open for a further week until 27 May 1944; it 
eventually attracted over 26,000 visitors.323 Likewise, Bristol’s exhibition, which was 
originally scheduled to run for a fortnight from 1 April to 15 April 1944, was extended 
for an additional two weeks until 29 April 1944.324 Exeter’s plan, entitled Exeter 
Phoenix, was initially presented to the public and City Council in May 1945, with the 
completed plan presented in December 1945.325  An exhibition was held between 29 
December 1945 and 19 January 1946, which attracted 28, 035 visitors. This 
amounted to nearly half of the city’s population, possibly making the Exeter Phoenix 
the most visited reconstruction exhibition in Britain. 326  
 
The plans all followed the prevailing planning trends, particularly in terms of housing 
and road design, and presented ideas for solving the problems found in the pre-war 
city centres. In this sense the plans represent a continuation of the interwar 
development of the cities. The encouragement to ‘plan boldly’ saw the finished plans 
removing interwar street patterns in order to produce more efficient traffic systems 
and shopping areas better suited to the busy modern city. The problems of the 
remaining slum areas were tackled through the demand from central government for 
new housing schemes, with the most up-to-date thinking in neighbourhood planning 
put to use to improve living conditions. The need for rebuilding also allowed for new 
public buildings and facilities, with each city producing plans which included 
theatres, public halls and art galleries.  
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Abercrombie and Paton Watson’s Plan for Plymouth demonstrated this bold 
approach, as it entirely swept away the old street pattern of the city centre and 
replaced it with a new layout.327 The centre piece of the new central area was a 
north-south axis road, later called Armada Way, which would create a new city vista 
from the railway station at North Road to the Hoe and the sea beyond. Running east 
to west would be another wide boulevard, Royal Parade, which formed part of a 
gyratory traffic system around the city centre. This system would carry traffic around 
the city centre rather than through it and would link the other major roads into and 
out of the city, alleviating the traffic congestions which had plagued the city pre-war. 
New open spaces would also be created by the road system, with a series of ‘traffic 
circuses’ forming rest gardens, while the centre of Armada Way would be planted as 
a garden walk. The centre itself would be pedestrianised, with further rest garden 
squares at major intersections.328  The central area was heavily zoned for use, with 
retail, business and leisure districts all strictly separated. The central area had also 
been expanded to create a larger shopping district. This latter step had been taken 
because the Naval dockyard had indicated their intention to expand, and in doing so 
would swallow much of the existing shopping district in the Devonport area of the 
city.329 The city centre was therefore enlarged to take the businesses displaced by 
this.  
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Plymouth had suffered from extensive overcrowding in the central districts prior to 
the war, which the interwar estates had only partially relieved.330 The damage to 
these districts meant that a detailed housing plan was required to both replace 
damaged dwellings and solve the overcrowding problems. The plan therefore 
contained proposals for new suburban housing estates, located around existing 
small hamlets and areas of agricultural land on the edge of the city.  
Abercrombie and Paton Watson’s use of existing hamlets was intended to 
give each of the new neighbourhoods a distinctive identity, and hopefully a sense of 
community as a result. Areas of agricultural land were to be retained in-between the 
new estates, a feature which is attributed to Abercrombie’s influence. The concept of 
having green ‘wedges’ or a green belt around urban areas had been in use since the 
early 1920’s, but Abercrombie had something very distinct in mind for the new 
Plymouth.  Abercrombie wanted working farmland to separate the new estates, 
stating that this would bring farmers into closer contact with the town and their 
markets while helping city residents retain links with the land.331 This aspect of 
Abercrombie’s planning is often overlooked against the ‘clean sweep’ approach of 
city-centre planning, but it has been suggested that this in fact was the most radical 
aspect of the Plan for Plymouth, particularly when viewed against modern ideas 
about sustainability and traceability in the food chain.332  
 
Surprisingly, the Plan for Plymouth did not make much provision for or 
recommendation about the future of industry in the city. Plymouth relied heavily on 
the dockyards for employment, and it seems that the intention of the Admiralty to 
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expand its dockyards was felt by Abercrombie and Paton Watson to be all the 
industrial expansion the city needed. However, the reliance on one industry or major 
employer had become undesirable after the experience of structural unemployment 
in many towns and cities during the 1930s. This was highlighted by the Barlow 
Report which recommended the development of a diverse industrial base, making 
this lack of industrial planning surprising. The plan simply recommended several 
areas suitable for industrial and warehouse buildings at Millbay, Prince Rock and 
Cattedown, all of which were existing industrial areas, and one new area for 
‘overspill’ industrial building at Marsh Mills.333  
It was common for post-war plans to recommend dedicated industrial areas in 
order to segregate industrial and warehouse buildings from other city functions. 
However, in Exeter and Bristol, the new industrial areas were also designed with an 
eye to future industrial expansion and diversification, something which was absent 
from the Plymouth recommendations for industry. This decision did become a 
source of anxiety throughout the 1950s and 1960s as there were sustained 
campaigns by the City Council to attract new industry to the city and land was 
earmarked for new industrial sites.334  
 
The plan met with general praise on its release to the public in April 1944, 
particularly for the city centre layout and residential areas.335 It was praised as being 
‘bold and practical’ in its proposals to deal with the city centre and the old problems 
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of traffic congestion and narrow streets.336 Representatives of the Municipal and 
County Engineers Association concurred with this opinion and further praised the 
Plan for Plymouth for its comprehensive approach to planning, including not only the 
issue of war damage but the future development of the city. It was felt that this would 
prevent the interwar scourge of urban sprawl by planning for population increases 
and ways to accommodate them.337 The new Armada Way was praised by a number 
of correspondents and interviewees who felt that it would provide a fine new vista in 
the city.338  
There were some minor criticisms, such as one citizen who felt that Armada 
Way should have a better focal point than the existing war memorial on the Hoe, 
which was dismissed as ‘vulgar’.339 This opinion seems strange today, because 
Plymouth’s war memorial is now considered a particularly fine example. A further 
minor criticism was Abercrombie’s suggested use of sub-tropical planting for the new 
squares and rest-gardens around the centre, as it was felt that native planting would 
be more sensible and pleasing.340 Concern was also expressed at the potential cost 
of executing the plan and the need for new legislation to do it, particularly in terms of 
redistributing city centre sites on the new plan. However, it is evident that both 
problems were expected to be dealt with by central government in the near future via 
new legislation.341 
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Bristol City Council took a similarly radical approach to replanning with the relocation 
of the main shopping district from the Wine Street/Castle Street area to Broadmead, 
an area just north of the old shopping district. The Wine Street area itself would 
become a new park to provide open space in the heart of the city.342  The City 
Council proposed the move in order to create a more spacious centre which could 
accommodate larger sites, which many traders had indicated they wanted during the 
initial consultation. Additionally, the fire service had advised that buildings should be 
better spaced to provide proper fire breaks, as the fires caused by the blitz had 
spread quickly due to the congested nature of the old streets.343 The net effect of the 
fire breaks and requested larger sites was that it was impossible to re-site all existing 
traders within the old Wine Street site. The new central area would be zoned for 
retail, business and leisure, and industry would be moved out of the city centre, a 
method also used in the Plymouth plan.  
The whole of the new centre would be traffic-free and pedestrianised, with a 
new inner-ring road carrying traffic around the whole area. Further ring roads would 
carry through-traffic around the city rather than through it, easing congestion. A new 
civic centre would be created at College Green and a new market district at Victoria 
Road. There were also proposed extensions for the University and medical districts 
and a new ‘education district’ for the establishment of technical and industrial 
training facilities and youth centres.344 Plans for additional industrial zones were 
included to house the small city-centre based industries which would be displaced 
by zoning and reconstruction. It was also intended that they would attract new 
industry to the city. The proposed new industrial sites were situated at Avonmouth, 
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Bedminster and Brislington, close to existing industrial areas and working class 
housing districts.345  
 
The plan did not include housing proposals, as the Council treated these as a 
separate concern and had begun plans for new housing ahead of city centre 
planning. Housing was recognised as an urgent concern for the city and by 1942 
sites were already under discussion for new estates.346 The Council was keen to 
learn from the interwar experience of housing provision and, as in Plymouth, the 
concepts of neighbourhood planning were firmly embraced as cure for the perceived 
ills of their interwar estates. As seen in both Plymouth and Exeter, the city was keen 
to reduce housing densities in the city centre and therefore the majority of new 
housing was to be located in new suburban estates. Areas were earmarked close to 
the interwar estates for further housing expansion, but unlike Plymouth or Exeter, 
Bristol also planned for some new city centre housing. It was recognised that some 
jobs, such as those connected to the docks, could not be moved out of the central 
area and therefore housing in the city centre would be required for these workers.347 
This eventually led to Bristol embracing flat schemes in a way that neither of the 
other South Western cities did.  
 
Despite the long process of consultation undertaken by Bristol City Council, the 
Bristol plan was badly received by both traders and the wider public. The 
Broadmead proposal was unpopular, as was the plan to turn the Wine Street area 
into a new park. Traders were concerned that the removal from their old established 
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site would result in a permanent loss of trade.348 This particular concern is echoed 
later by traders in Exeter and Plymouth and appears to have been widespread 
amongst blitzed traders. There was a very real concern that any disruption in 
location would result in shoppers abandoning the relocated businesses 
altogether.349 The Bristol traders were the most vocal on this point from an early 
date, presumably due to the wholesale removal of the shopping area to a new 
location. Although the street plans in Plymouth and Exeter were radically altered, the 
shopping district remained in the same area as pre-war, albeit on a different layout.  
There were also concerns that the Broadmead site would be flood-prone.350 
Broadmead had flooded badly during the nineteenth century, due to its proximity to 
the River Frome. This problem had been tackled in the interwar period with a new 
drainage scheme and had not flooded since. However, it was felt that there was still 
a flood risk and the subsoil would not be stable enough to build upon.351 Flooding 
was also a concern amongst the wider public, who also felt the park plan to be 
unnecessary and a waste of valuable land. 352    
 
To the Council’s credit, they announced that they were open to suggestions and 
alternative plans once the scheme had been unveiled.353 The Council received a 
total of 340 suggestions and comments on the plan and a number of alternative 
plans for the city centre, including several from city organisations such as the Bristol 
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Retail Trade Association and the Rotary Club.354 An exhibition of 27 of these plans 
was held in the City Museum and Art Gallery in July 1945 with the aim of putting all 
suggestions to the public and gathering opinions on them.355 In addition to this, a 
model of the official City Council plan was made and exhibited three months later.356 
Bristol therefore continued to collect opinions and ideas for reconstruction long after 
the other South Western cities and demonstrates a much less ‘top down’ attitude to 
planning than is often attributed to post-war planning.  
 
The objections to the Broadmead plan were taken seriously, but the Reconstruction 
Committee could not see a viable alternative. The continued consultation with city 
trade organisations and the wider public was an attempt to find an alternative which 
would suit everyone. Some compromises were found, such as the abandonment of 
the park proposal for the Wine Street area in favour of a civic centre. This idea was 
first mooted in September 1944, when the initial park plan was reviewed and 
opposed by trader groups, reinforcing City Councils concern for creating plans that 
were acceptable to all.357 The civic centre would utilize the land for a selection of 
public buildings, including a new museum, swimming pool, library and public halls.358 
This proposal also placed a new Council House and Guildhall on the site instead of 
College Green, as proposed in the original plan. The council buildings met 
opposition as a new Council House had only just been completed at College Green 
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and it was considered wasteful to immediately move the Council’s headquarters. 
The council buildings were eventually removed from the scheme and a youth centre, 
which had been proposed for the extended educational district, was moved to the 
Castle Street site instead.359 This plan was cautiously welcomed by traders who saw 
this as an improvement on the abandonment of a valuable site, but they continued to 
campaign for the area to be preserved as a shopping district throughout the 
1940’s.360  
 
Thomas Sharp did not take quite such a radical ‘clean sweep’ approach in his plan 
for Exeter as Abercrombie and Paton Watson did, nor did he make the far-reaching 
changes seen in Bristol’s plan. However, the Exeter Phoenix did heavily redesign 
the city centre, removing the tiny residential backstreets and courts behind the main 
streets and remodelling the existing street pattern.361 The major shopping streets 
were to be widened and straightened while new bypass roads would carry through-
traffic around the city rather than through it, relieving traffic congestion. The new 
bypass would also create a ‘transport interchange’ by building a new bus station 
adjacent to the road and opposite the Central Station. A new industrial district would 
provide for the growth of light manufacturing and would have the added benefit of 
allowing the riverside area, historically Exeter’s industrial district, to be cleared for 
parkland and leisure. A further industrial area was created on the eastern side of the 
city to spread industry and jobs evenly across the city.  
The new riverside park was one of several proposed open spaces with small 
rest gardens provided in the plan, along with a new city square. The city centre 
                                                          
359 BRO, M/BCC/PREC/1/2, Planning and Reconstruction Committee Minutes 1944-1946, Minute no. 
258, 6 June 1945. 
360  Western Daily Press, ‘Should Bristol Shopping Centre Be On Old Site?’ 15 June 1946; ‘An 
Instructive Enquiry’, 28 June 1946;  
361 See Appendix F, fig.57  
131 
 
bypass was also designed to create a continuous garden around the city centre and 
open up the city walls to view.  This ‘green moat’ is a feature found in other 
replanned walled cities and was a way of creating open space and preserving 
ancient features.362 Provision was made for many new public buildings, including a 
new museum and art gallery, public halls and council buildings. As with Plymouth, 
Sharp had suggested residential plans that would reduce the city centre population, 
with suburban estates based on the ‘neighbourhood unit’ principal.363  
 
On its initial presentation in May 1945, the Exeter Phoenix was generally met with 
praise, but attracted some criticism from traders regarding the design for the main 
shopping streets. The illustrations released with the plan outline showed arcaded 
shop fronts for the High Street, which were opposed by some city traders who felt 
that they would obscure window displays and reduce passing trade.364 However, 
others saw the plan as potentially creating the best shopping centre in the West, 
which would be ‘the envy of all neighbouring towns’.365 On its formal release, the 
Exeter Phoenix was praised as a bold but well measured response to the war-
damage.366  This initial praise came from professional bodies, such as the 
Association of Surveyors, as well as councillors from across the region.367 The 
opinions of trader groups and other parties with vested interests, such as the 
building federations, were also generally positive at the outset. Groups were invited 
to special viewings of the exhibition between 31 December 1945 and 8 January 1946 
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with Sharp himself present to explain the plan and answer questions. Traders and 
retailers approved the city centre plan and ‘no destructive criticism was offered at 
this stage, but it was evident that this and other critical points for the business 
community would be carefully watched’.368 Other groups such as the Rotary Club, 
the Townswomen’s Guild and the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers 
also approved the plans and questioned Sharp closely on issues which were of 
importance to them, such as house building and the provision of parks and open 
spaces.369  
 
 The reaction of ordinary Exonians is a little more difficult to judge in the 
period immediately after the plan was released, as much of the correspondence with 
the local press appeared either before the plan’s release or much later in 1946. 
However, the earlier correspondence with the Express and Echo during 1944 and 
1945 suggests that there was support for a more radical remodelling of the city than 
Sharp presented.  Several letters suggested the demolition of much of the remaining 
city centre in order to rebuild in a modern boulevard style; one such proposal 
suggested the creation of a city-centre by-pass road which would have left the 
Cathedral a traffic island surrounded by car parking.370 The Exeter Gardeners’ 
Society also expressed a wish for a more radical approach. In contrast to the 
rejection of the proposed city park in Bristol, the Society suggested that standing 
property should be cleared to create a city garden extending the length of the High 
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Street, with the Cathedral and some surrounding buildings at its centre.371 It is 
unclear how much support these suggestions garnered, but they demonstrate that 
Exeter’s population was both engaged and imaginative in terms of planning ideas.  
There were objections to some elements of the Exeter Phoenix but they 
appeared in small numbers. There were those who wished to see the city rebuilt as it 
was before the war, while others objected to specific aspects of the plan, such as the 
proposed industrial estate south of the river at Marsh Barton.372 Marsh Barton was 
felt to present an inconvenient commute for workers, while the prevailing wind 
direction would blow smoke, fumes and smells from factories into the city.373 The 
writer recommended that the proposed Pinhoe industrial estate should be the main 
industrial site instead of Marsh Barton to avoid these problems.374  
 
It is notable that Exeter’s blitzed traders and the City Council were generally 
supportive of the Exeter Phoenix on its release. There were some rumblings of 
alarm amongst councillors with regard to the potential cost of rebuilding and how it 
would be financed, but reassurances were made that the financial aspects of 
reconstruction would be addressed by government in the future.375 It is interesting 
that this is the case, as the Exeter Phoenix, unlike Bristol’s plan or the Plan for 
Plymouth, was released after the Town and Country Planning Act 1944 had been 
passed and the financial package for reconstruction presented. This would have 
made it clear that no specific aid for the reconstruction of buildings would be 
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forthcoming beyond the war damage compensation, which was widely thought to be 
inadequate for providing new buildings.  
However, blitzed cities had pledged to petition government for a better 
financial settlement, while it was known that a more comprehensive town planning 
bill would be forthcoming in the future that might revise the financial situation.376 The 
assurances of some of Exeter’s councillors that further financial assistance for 
blitzed city reconstruction evidently stemmed from the hope offered by these two 
things.  
 
The financial and legislative framework for reconstruction was of great concern to 
blitzed traders and local authorities alike. Reith’s initial pronouncements for 
reconstruction had reassured blitzed cities that both new planning legislation and 
financial aid would be made available to enable comprehensive reconstruction and 
are often cited in the early years of planning. However, all of the blitzed cities 
became increasingly anxious about these two elements since there appeared to be 
little movement by central government on either of them. The financial basis for 
reconstruction is particularly important as it dictated who rebuilt the blitzed cities and 
as such requires full consideration. The complexities of drawing up legislation and 
the debates on financial aid to blitzed cities are dealt with in full in the next chapter.  
What follows is a brief an outline of the legislative and financial framework in order to 
put the concerns about the reconstruction plans of the three cities in their immediate 
context.  
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Despite the appearance of slow progress, central government had been developing 
legislation for dealing with post-war reconstruction since 1940. However, the 
extensive nature of post-war reconstruction, which covered not just the rebuilding of 
war damage but areas such as industry, welfare and demobilisation, meant that the 
creation of a new town planning act took some time. The Town and Country 
Planning Act 1944 finally passed into statute in November 1944. 377  
 It was more popularly known as the ‘blitz and blight’ act as it allowed local 
councils to buy blitzed land and any adjacent areas considered to be ‘blighted’ and 
in need of regeneration in order to create a cohesive plan. The land would then be 
under single ownership and therefore could be replanned without having to negotiate 
the changes with each individual owner or lessee. All of the owners and lessees 
would be offered new sites within the new layout at the end of the process, but on a 
leasehold rather than freehold basis. Government loans were to be made available 
for the purchase of land, with reduced rates of interest and repayment for the first 
ten years of the loan. The act also offered assistance against the loss of rate 
revenue for local authorities during the initial period of reconstruction.378 
 
However, there were no financial provisions for actual rebuilding, as the government 
was not offering any assistance for owners of damaged or destroyed property. 
Instead the war damage compensation scheme for property owners would be the 
only source of building finance. The government had also followed the Treasury 
recommendation to make some types of compensation payment unavailable if 
property owners moved from their original site, something which was often required 
under reconstruction schemes. It was this lack of financial support for reconstruction 
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which created a swell of opposition to city reconstruction plans amongst traders. 
Without any further financial assistance traders and property owners were reliant on 
their war damage compensation claims meeting the cost of rebuilding. However, the 
decision not to make compensation payments mobile in cases of replanning left 
many with a payment which was widely acknowledged as inadequate to meet 
current building costs.379 It was these issues which began to erode general support 
for the reconstruction plans, as property owners and traders found that they were 
unable, or unwilling, to build under the new framework.  
 
The Place of Housing in Reconstruction Policy 
 
Housing was given a high priority by both local authorities and central government. 
The combination of war damage, the cessation of house-building and a higher than 
expected rate of family-creation during the war combined to create a post-war 
housing shortage which rivalled that seen after the First World War.380 Both local 
authorities and central government also recognised the on-going need for slum 
clearance and the re-housing of slum dwellers. As a result, planning for housing 
began before many city reconstruction schemes had been completed.  
In 1944 the government began an Advanced Preparation of Housing Sites 
programme (APHS hereafter) to allocate sites for housing and begin the groundwork 
prior to the end of the war. Labour was due to be released from the completed 
programme of airfield construction, and the resources diverted into the preparation 
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of sites.381 In March 1944 the government instructed local authorities to begin 
identifying land in their ownership which could provide sites for up to two thousand 
houses and start planning a programme of house-building.382 Bristol, Exeter and 
Plymouth had all bought land prior to the outbreak of war for extending their housing 
programmes, allowing them to quickly identify suitable sites. However, the approach 
to housing demonstrates how housing and city centre planning became separate 
strands of the reconstruction programme, cutting across each other and occasionally 
causing conflict.  
 
Within the South West, the approach to planning dictated how much of a divergence 
there was between housing plans and reconstruction plans. The Plan for Plymouth 
was completed ahead of the APHS scheme, while the Exeter Phoenix was 
completed afterwards. In both cases parts of the plans had to be changed to fit the 
demands of the APHS programme. Bristol was more successful with its housing 
plans, possibly because all of the planning was undertaken by in-house staff. Bristol 
City Council was also considerably more dynamic in its planning for housing than for 
city centre reconstruction, submitting proposals to the Ministry of Health in January 
1943 for 35,000 post-war homes to be built over ten years.383 The housing 
application was submitted ahead of the Government’s implementation of the APHS 
programme and the Council was therefore well advanced in its planning for housing 
by the time this scheme came into operation. It had already identified 4,000 plots 
which were available for house building in January 1943, 1,377 of which were 
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already served with sewers and services.384 Bristol therefore had little trouble in 
fulfilling the APHS requirement for space to build 2,000 houses immediately the war 
ended. The advantage of both this early planning and Bristol’s in-house approach to 
planning was that its housing and wider town planning aims could be developed in 
conjunction with each other. This did not always happen in other blitzed cities, with 
the two sets of plans sometimes cutting across each other, as demonstrated by 
Exeter and Plymouth.  
 
Plymouth, like Bristol, had a large housing problem to tackle, particularly as it 
still had the overcrowding problem of the interwar era to deal with. A programme for 
10,000 dwellings was settled on in 1944 in order to deal with the immediate housing 
problems and land was earmarked for the required 2,000 houses for the APHS 
programme. Sites for 358 dwellings were immediately available using land already in 
the Councils ownership.385 The Plan for Plymouth earmarked further sites around 
the city for housing, most of which did indeed become housing estates post-war.  
However, as the Plan for Plymouth predated the APHS programme, there 
were some conflicts between the two over housing sites. In one case, the Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning intervened, which led to parts of a proposed ‘reserved 
agricultural zone’, designed to separate estates, being used to extend the North 
Prospect and Swilly estates as they could be easily and quickly developed. The 
proposed reservation had also been designed to protect some existing features of 
the landscape, as well as ensuring that the residents of the estates would have 
access to open countryside. In particular Abercrombie and Paton Watson were keen 
to preserve the existing lanes within the area, as they felt that ‘the widening or 
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development of either of these....would be sheer vandalism’.386 One of the lanes 
which Abercrombie and Paton Watson wanted to preserve became one of the main 
roads through the resulting estate.  
 
Exeter presents a further example of the APHS programme and reconstruction plans 
cutting across each other, as the housing plan had to be formed before Sharp had 
completed his plan. Sharp did have some input in the choice of housing sites, and 
objected strongly to some of the proposed sites as he felt they were too far from the 
city centre. Land already in the Council’s ownership formed the basis of their 
housing plans, but large new areas were required to fulfil the housing need. Exeter 
City Council selected two new sites for large estates at Countess Wear and Hollow 
Lane, with which Sharp strongly disagreed because he considered that they were 
too far from the city centre, would contribute to urban sprawl and were outside the 
urban fence.387 However, the City Council had to respond to the governments 
demands to earmark residential sites before Sharp’s plan was completed, which led 
to parts of Sharp’s plan being superseded before it was published. Some of his 
proposed roads around the periphery of the city became impossible to execute, as 
they would now cut right through a residential area, and as such had to be 
scrapped.388  
 
The APHS programme and the subsequent need to identify housing sites marks the 
divergence of two strands of reconstruction. Cities had been planning their housing 
needs as part of the wider reconstruction plans, but the pressure to find sites and 
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prepare them quickly meant that housing plans often overtook central areas 
planning. As seen in Exeter and Plymouth, this meant that housing had to be 
planned and undertaken separately from other planning. This separation of housing 
and city centre planning meant that the two strands began to be thought of as 
entirely separate programmes, rather than both being part of the wider post-war 
reconstruction of Britain. Blitzed traders complained in all three cities that materials 
and labour were available for building and were being deliberately denied to traders 
by the local authorities. The basis for this accusation appears to be the progress 
being made in other areas, such as housing, industrial building and educational 
building. The progress in other building gave the impression that materials and 
labour were plentiful and added to grievances of the blitzed traders who believed 
that the lack of progress was entirely due to the actions of local authorities.389  
 
The separation of housing from the wider planning strategy in each city became 
significant because if reconstruction planning had remained as a more holistic 
concept, encompassing housing, industry, central areas and services as it had done 
originally, the battles between blitzed traders and local authorities might have been 
eased. It is also significant in that reconstruction and post-war housing tend to be 
studied as separate entities rather than as two parts of a whole, with the result that 
the impact of having to prioritise one type of rebuilding over another is not always 
acknowledged.  
Housing was prioritised within reconstruction since the need for shelter far 
outweighed the need for rebuilt retail or leisure premises, both in terms of war 
damage and slum clearance. Surveys undertaken by groups such as Mass 
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Observation revealed housing as the most important post-war concern for the 
majority of people and was considered more important to morale than rebuilding city 
centres.390 As such, materials and labour were directed towards this urgent concern 
both in terms of building new houses, providing temporary homes and completing 
first aid repairs on damaged homes to make them habitable again. Certainly this 
prioritising of housing was initially understood by blitzed traders who acknowledged 
that housing was the priority in the first years after the war, particularly as planning 
for central areas work was still underway. However, the divergence of housing and 
other types of planning away from a comprehensive plan to what appeared to be a 
series of separate schemes led blitzed traders to the conclusion that local authorities 
were putting too much emphasis, and by extension resources, into housing and 




The plans produced by Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all drew on the developments in 
urban planning seen during the interwar period and the continuing 
professionalization of planning as a discipline. Exeter and Plymouth benefited from 
the expertise of two of the country’s foremost planners, Patrick Abercrombie and 
Thomas Sharp, who were at the cutting edge of planning for the period. The two 
planners produced plans which covered not just the rebuilding of war damaged 
areas, but provided solutions for ongoing urban problems such as traffic congestion 
as well as applying new housing ideals. However, the role of the consultant planner 
as ‘master planner’ does not stand up to scrutiny when the experiences of all three 
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cities are examined. Although Exeter and Plymouth employed professional 
consultants, they did not work in isolation in producing their plans. In Plymouth, the 
City Engineer, James Paton Watson, provided the local insight which was essential 
to replanning the city. The plans to extend the central shopping area in order to 
house businesses displaced by the expansion of the dockyard are an example of 
this. Paton Watson had dealt with the Admiralty prior to 1939 and had been aware of 
previous plans to expand the dockyard, giving him an insight into the potential for 
post-war expansion. Likewise in Exeter, the City Architect and City Engineer both 
had input into Sharp’s plan, although they did not work in partnership with Sharp as 
Paton Watson did with Abercrombie.  
It must also be noted that neither Sharp nor Abercrombie were employed by 
the respective councils to execute their plans. Sharp was only employed to draft the 
plan, with his contract ending once the plan was completed and presented to the 
Council; after 1946 Sharp was occasionally asked for advice, but had no direct input 
into reconstruction. Abercrombie was retained until 1947 by Plymouth City Council, 
but as rebuilding did not begin in earnest until after 1948, he too had little direct 
influence on the rebuilding work.391 Neither planner directed the architectural 
treatment for the cities either, making suggestions for the architectural style of the 
new buildings but not imposing their ideas on the cities.392 As such, it was the 
council staffs who directed the final rebuilding process. Bristol’s planning process 
was done entirely in-house, using only staff which had direct experience of both 
Bristol’s needs and the interwar problems that the city had faced.  
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The consultation process in Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth demonstrates further that 
the idea of the ‘master planner’ is flawed, as the respective councils and chief 
planning officers sought the views of an extensive range of groups throughout the 
planning process. All three cities also encouraged their citizens to put forward ideas 
and suggestions, a process which was continued after the plans were completed. 
Bristol in particular demonstrated the ongoing process of consultation with the 
attention the Council gave to the suggestions and amendments on the draft plan. 
Exeter presents an excellent example of the early consultations undertaken prior to 
a plan being drafted, with its calls for ideas and suggestions for rebuilding ahead of 
Sharp’s appointment. The records suggest that the postponement of Sharp’s 
appointment may have been deliberate in order to collect the opinions of citizens.393 
The material was made available to Sharp along with the surveys into pre-war land 
use and property, giving them equal weight with technical data. The processes for 
consultation may not be considered as sophisticated as those of modern planning 
schemes, but it is notable that they involved local people from the start rather than 
just asking for opinions once the plans were complete. In this sense the planning 
process was not as ‘top-down’ as is often suggested. 
 
The issue of consensus in planning is brought sharply to the fore with the erosion of 
support for reconstruction after 1944. However, the decline of support amongst 
traders and property owners has a very definite focus in the form of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1944. The initial support for both the reconstruction plans and 
proposed method for rebuilding via pooling land ownership is striking when 
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compared to more critical views about consensus, such as Susanne Cowan’s.394 It is 
particularly notable that the professional bodies, such as the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Association of Multiple Traders, were supportive of comprehensive 
reconstruction on this basis, as in theory the members of these groups would stand 
to lose if ownership of land was pooled. That this support remained firm in Exeter 
and Plymouth on the release of the plans reinforces the idea that consensus for 
planning was more widespread than has been given credit for. Bristol is the 
exception to this, although the lack of support is based on the same reasons which 
saw support decline in the other cities; namely money. Bristol traders were anxious 
that the wholesale removal of the shopping district to another site would damage 
trade and deprive them of the finance to build. The latter fear was well founded, as 
the 1944 act did not allow for any additional finance for rebuilding beyond war 
damage compensation payments, and did not allow for these to move with their 
owners. It was these clauses which began the shift of opinion amongst traders in 
Exeter and Plymouth.  
 
Amongst the wider public, planning attracted varying levels of support. Although 
planning was a popular topic in discussion groups, it is notable that the majority of 
reported talks were given by those connected with the planning profession.395 It is 
not clear how enthused the public were by these ideas, only that they were widely 
discussed and considered. The opinions of individuals also appear to wax and wane 
according to how prominent planning and reconstruction were. The announcement 
of new initiatives and ideas in reconstruction, both in terms of physical replanning 
and social reconstruction, prompted fresh waves of correspondence with the local 
                                                          
394 Cowan, ‘The People’s Peace’, in The Blitz and its Legacy, pp. 73-86 




papers, suggesting that the public needed a specific object to pique their interest in 
the subject. As more elements were added to reconstruction, away from just the 
rebuilding of bombed towns, the interest became more dispersed, with individuals 
beginning to concentrate on the elements which would affect them directly, such as 
housing. The release of the Beveridge Report accelerated this process, as 
reconstruction now promised not only rebuilding, but also social transformation. As 
such, consensus for planning did not so much fade away as dissipate into different 
areas.  
 
The plans of Exeter and Plymouth were initially well received, but underwent many 
changes in the years after their release. Bristol’s plan, in contrast, was criticised from 
the beginning, with the Council having to make changes and concessions 
immediately. This process of change and dissent will be considered in the next 
chapter, along with the growing financial and practical obstacles that the three South 




Chapter Three: Ownership and Objections 1940-1946 
 
As blitzed cities began to work on reconstruction plans, the question of a legislative 
and financial toolkit for executing reconstruction was considered by central 
government. It was recognised from 1940 that blitzed cities would require fresh 
planning legislation to enable them to replan and rebuild. The question of finance for 
reconstruction also had to be addressed, along with the wider issues of national 
reconstruction affecting public and social services, and industry. These broad 
demands in building a post-war nation created divergence in the definition of 
reconstruction, with the term being interchangeable between war damage 
reconstruction and national reconstruction. This in itself created different 
expectations between blitzed cities and the central government departments dealing 
with reconstruction in terms of legislative powers and funding for reconstruction. This 
divergence and the process of creating planning legislation will be examined in this 
chapter as factors in the decline of planning enthusiasm and consensus.  
 
Within the current body of reconstruction literature, the theme of consensus for 
planning is heavily linked to the concept of ‘top-down’ planning. In the previous 
chapter, this latter theme was examined and found to have been overstated, with 
consultation in planning proving to have been more extensive than is usually argued. 
It is clear, however, that enthusiasm and consensus for planning did decline after the 
three South Western cities produced their plans. This phenomenon is common to all 
blitzed cities, with consensus for planning steadily waning from around 1944. This 
trend is often conjoined with the theme of ‘top-down’ planning, as it is frequently 
suggested that the imposition of plans was the cause of dissent for replanning and 
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reconstruction.396 However, the decline in enthusiasm is most clearly seen amongst 
property owners and traders, rather than the general public, and occured in the wake 
of the passing of the Town and Country Planning Act 1944. This decline in 
enthusiasm and consensus transmitted itself to the public as a whole as traders and 
property owners expressed their objections. Within this chapter we will examine the 
provisions of the Act and its impact on reconstruction. This impact can be most 
clearly seen through the public enquiries held into the plan of each city, which laid 
out the objections of property owners and traders for scrutiny. It becomes clear from 
this process that the decline of support for reconstruction stems directly from two 
clauses within the 1944 Act which changed land tenure and the basis of 
compensation to blitzed property owners. 
 
Legislation, Local protest and Agitation  
 
It had been understood by both local authorities and central government that to 
undertake effective replanning and rebuilding new legislation would be required. The 
planning acts of the interwar years had not proved effective in dealing with urban 
problems such as building congestion and transport infrastructure as they left 
property rights almost entirely intact. In addition to this, urban sprawl could not be 
effectively combated as the development rights of property owners could not be 
overridden without difficulty or expense on the part of the local authority. In order to 
rebuild anew, rather than just rebuilding on old lines, local authorities required new 
powers to allow them to direct rebuilding. There was also the question of financing 
reconstruction, either through compensation to individual property owners or as 
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block grants to cities. Central government was alive to both of these problems from 
1940 and indicated to blitzed cities that both new legislation and a financial package 
would be in place before the end of the war.  However, the drafting of legislation was 
protracted and complicated, involving a large number of committees and ministerial 
departments, with the problems of land ownership and compensation proving 
particularly acute. Reith’s Ministry of Works and Buildings main role after its creation 
in October 1940 was finding a legislative solution for reconstruction.397 The lengthy 
process of drafting legislation made blitzed cities uneasy, as they feared that the 
legislative and financial frameworks they required would be neglected. 
 
Initially, the government concept of post-war reconstruction was the urban and 
industrial development of Britain rather than the rebuilding of bomb damaged areas. 
The release of the Barlow Report on land use in May 1940 had highlighted the 
problems which the poor location of industry could create, such as structural 
unemployment. The clustering of new industries around the South East presented 
further problems as the growth of towns, and of London in particular, was 
exacerbating the housing problems and furthering the problem of urban sprawl. The 
initial proposals for reconstruction were therefore all based around these problems 
rather than the issue of war damage.  
The concept of reconstruction as an industrial and economic issue rather than 
one of bomb damage is evident in all of the early discussions about reconstruction. 
Reith’s outline of reconstruction and what would be required does not make mention 
of bomb damage and it makes up only one line in a more detailed outline of 
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reconstruction needs in February 1941.398 This concept of reconstruction can be 
found in local newspaper reports and editorials on the post-war world up until the 
end of 1940, with the recommendations of the Barlow Report very much at the fore 
of reconstruction ideas.399  
 
The importance of this emphasis is that reconstruction as a concept was not the 
product of bomb damage, but had been in place prior to this as a method for 
developing industry and re-establishing the economy post-war. When blitzed cities 
were later told by Reith to ‘plan boldly and comprehensively’, it was in this 
context.400 The bomb damage made it necessary to rebuild blitzed cities regardless, 
but it was by planning that the cities would be improved rather than just rebuilt. It 
also partially explains the later disconnect between the expectations of blitzed 
traders and local authorities compared with those of the Treasury in terms of finance 
for reconstruction.  
The Treasury was more concerned with funding reconstruction work which 
was directly associated with economic and industrial reconstruction, such as 
infrastructure projects and industrial building, rather than repairing bomb damage. 
Blitzed cities provided an opportunity for experiment and research in terms of how 
local authorities might go about applying the recommendations of the Barlow Report 
and the new planning ideals.401 By encouraging blitzed cities to plan ‘boldly and 
comprehensively’, Reith and the various planning committees could assess what 
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would be required from new legislation in order to allow all local authorities to deliver 
reconstruction plans. Reith set this out in his 1941 press conference on the subject 
of reconstruction, explaining how his Ministry had conducted a number of test 
surveys with Coventry, Birmingham and Bristol to assess the needs of 
reconstruction legislation. Reith stated that ‘We told them to do it boldly and 
comprehensively and not to bother too much about this or that, certainly not to 
bother about private ownership of property’, instead telling the test cities to plan as if 
they had the necessary powers and circumstances to execute the plan they wanted, 
not the plan that would be possible under current legislation.402  
 
The advice to ‘plan boldly’ and the use of test surveys in a number of medium-sized 
blitzed cities firmly turned the concept of reconstruction to one of rebuilding bomb-
damaged areas rather than economic reconstruction in the minds of blitzed traders 
and local authorities alike. The intimation that exchequer assistance would be 
available to execute reconstruction schemes in full reinforced this association. 
Blitzed cities were also given to believe that new legislation to allow this would also 
be in place swiftly, something which the test surveys only reinforced, despite Reith’s 
efforts to dispel this idea.403  
 
It was recognised from the outset that the automatic right of property owners to 
develop their land as they saw fit needed to be curtailed. Prior to the war, local 
authorities had been powerless to prevent unsuitable development owing to these 
rights and the compensation clauses contained with the planning legislation. 
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Development could be prevented but local authorities were liable to pay 
compensation against the loss of value for the land owner. This was paid against the 
most profitable potential use of the land, even if the land was not to be developed in 
that way. It was therefore decided early on in the reconstruction debates that the 
automatic right of property owners to develop must be removed.404 It was also 
recognised that the simplest way to effect comprehensive redevelopment in towns 
would be to put all the land under single ownership, which would remove the 
problems of negotiating with multiple owners and lessees.405 This idea was evidently 
widely disseminated, as trade groups in all three South Western cities referred to it 
during 1940 and 1941, and supported it as a tool for effective rebuilding.406  
Removing development rights and putting blitzed city centre land under single 
ownership raised questions about land ownership and compensation, leading Reith 
to commission a study in 1941 to examine these questions. Reith favoured the 
creation of a national land board to administer all planning and development, which 
would also hold the development rights of all land. Likewise, if land in city centres 
was to be acquired for reconstruction an appropriate body to hold the land was 
required, and in all cases compensation would have to be paid. In addition to Reith’s 
commission, the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, better known 
as the Uthwatt Report after the Committee’s chairman, Sir Augustus Andrewes 
Uthwatt, was considering these questions.407 The Committee recommended the 
setting up of a central planning authority and the sterilizing of land in ‘reconstruction 
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areas’ in its interim report in June 1941. The sterilization of land would allow local 
authorities in war-damaged areas to prohibit building until a reconstruction plan had 
been produced, preventing land speculation through the buying and selling of bomb-
damaged sites prior to reconstruction. The Uthwatt Committee also recommended 
the adoption of a ceiling price for public land acquisition based on the property 
values at 31 March 1939.408 
 
The question of finance for reconstruction was initially addressed via the War 
Damage Acts 1941 and 1943, which provided compensation to property owners for 
war damage. The roots of the two acts could be found in the pre-war development of 
town planning and the defence preparation work of the late 1930s. The destructive 
potential of modern warfare had been recognised by both the insurance industry and 
local authorities by the mid-1930s. The Association of Municipal Corporations (AMC 
hereafter) had first raised concerns about aerial bombardment and financial 
provisions to repair such damage in 1936.409 By 1936 all of the major insurance 
companies had stated that they were not willing to underwrite war damage in the 
event of another war, suggesting that the AMC was reacting to wider concerns about 
future wars. The threat of aerial bombardment meant that war damage claims could 
potentially run into the hundreds of millions of pounds and the underwriters were not 
prepared to cover this.410  
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In 1937 the government considered whether a national war damage insurance 
scheme could be undertaken by the government instead, but the costs were quickly 
deemed too high. Even with a high premium being charged to property and business 
owners, the largest amount they could hope to raise per year was five million 
pounds. The projected potential claims came to five million pounds per day of 
bombardment.411  
Instead a scheme of war damage compensation was proposed that would 
ensure that property owners did not end a war with less than they started it with in 
terms of the value of property or possessions. Lord Uthwatt had also reported to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1939 and early 1940 on the assessment of war 
damage and compensation, and the 1939 value was later adopted as the ceiling 
price for war damage compensation as well as land acquisition.412 The 1939 value 
was therefore already well established as the likely basis for compensation by the 
time the Uthwatt Committee made its interim report in 1941, and had additional 
support from Reith who had also recommended the use of the 1939 value in May 
1941.413 The adoption of the 1939 value was designed to prevent wartime land and 
property speculation but later became a source of resentment amongst blitzed 
traders and property owners. These proposals eventually became the War Damage 
Acts 1941 and 1943, which formed the basis of finance for reconstruction. 
 
It is evident that the activity within central government regarding new legislation was 
not apparent to local authorities or trade organisations, as there was growing 
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discontent and impatience with the perceived lack of action. The problems which the 
ongoing lack of legislation created were clearly demonstrated by Bristol’s attitude to 
replanning. The city felt that without any indication of the powers which would be 
available to local authorities or financial aid, any plan it produced would be flawed.414 
This fear was replicated in other cities, particularly in terms of the financial aid which 
might be available to blitzed cities, but Bristol was the most reluctant to plan without 
new legislation.415 The decision to present a draft plan to the city was the product of 
this reluctance, as it allowed the Council room for manoeuvre once the planning 
legislation was in place.  
Although Bristol was one of only a few local authorities which actively resisted 
planning in-depth until the state of the legislative landscape was clear, the majority 
of blitzed cities grew increasingly restless and began to demand action from 
government from the end of 1942. A key figure in this agitation was Viscount Waldorf 
Astor, Lord Mayor of Plymouth. Astor worked with the leaders of other blitzed cities 
and the Association of Municipal Corporations, which represented the interests of 
local authorities, to put their concerns to government and led a press campaign for 
action on legislation. Although Astor was the most prominent of those who agitated 
for action from central government, there is evidence that others undertook similar 
action, such as Henry Michelmore, an Exeter solicitor, who put forward proposals for 
a planning bill and methods for calculating compensation.416  
 
Waldorf Astor was well connected in both the political and media worlds, giving him 
a unique position for a city mayor and an ideal campaigning platform. Astor had sat 
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in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, representing the Plymouth 
Sutton constituency between 1910 and 1919, when the death of his father led to 
Waldorf resigning his Commons seat to take his place in the House of Lords. Astor 
was a Conservative, but was well known as a reformer, supporting the 1911 National 
Insurance Act and agricultural and housing reform. His interest in the latter led Astor 
to sponsor the building of a model housing development at Mount Gould in Plymouth 
in the late 1920s. Astor acted as advisor to Lloyd George and was well acquainted 
with many of the political elite of the interwar years, including Churchill, Chamberlain 
and Eden. In addition to this, Astor’s wife, Lady Nancy Astor, became the MP for 
Plymouth’s Sutton constituency after Waldorf stood down in 1919 and was 
consistently returned to the seat until 1945.  
The Astors’ were therefore a respected political force in the city, adding 
weight and credibility to Waldorf Astor’s campaign. In addition, Astor had influence 
and connections in the media world, as in 1911 his father had bought the Observer 
newspaper from Lord Northcliffe on his behalf.417 These political and media 
connections become apparent in Astor’s campaign for reconstruction legislation and 
financial aid for blitzed cities.  
 
Astor was evidently in correspondence with Reith with regard to planning matters by 
September 1941, although at this stage it seems that Astor was merely looking for 
guidance on the subject. Astor’s correspondence with both Reith and George Pepler 
(then town planning advisor to the Minister of Health) in 1941 demonstrated a keen 
interest in planning matters and securing the best advice and guidance on 
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reconstruction for Plymouth.418 His correspondence with both Abercrombie and 
Paton Watson corroborates this.  
By March 1942, however, the tone of Astor’s correspondence with the 
Ministry of Works and Planning, now with Sir William Jowitt as Minister, had 
changed from requests for guidance to calls for the swift passing of new legislation. 
Astor highlighted the problems that the delays to legislation were causing for blitzed 
cities, citing in particular the potential problems of interim development and site 
speculation and their effect on replanning and physical reconstruction.419 
Correspondence between Paton Watson and Astor on the subjects of interim 
development and site speculation from the same month demonstrates that Astor 
was reacting to concerns raised by the City Engineer.420 The same concerns were 
later raised with Lord Portal, then Minister of Supply, in April 1942, again with pleas 
for the swift passing of legislation to prevent speculation and allow for proper 
replanning.421 Astor’s personal acquaintance with many of the individuals within the 
various ministries gave him far more influence than other municipal representatives, 
something which he later used to represent the views of local authorities to 
ministers.  
 
In 1943 Astor drew together a group of blitzed cities with the aim of collectively 
lobbying central government for new planning legislation.422 Astor wrote to the 
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Mayors of the other eighteen blitzed cities to suggest co-ordinated action to press for 
the required legislation and received positive replies from all but Manchester, 
Liverpool and Birmingham. A co-signed letter to the Times to request that the 
government push through the necessary planning legislation as quickly as possible 
was suggested, as well as a deputation to government.423  
At the same time, Astor was also working closely with the Association of 
Municipal Corporations to co-ordinate their actions with Astor’s group of blitzed 
cities. As such, the planned deputation was to be a co-ordinated effort with the AMC 
to ensure that the local authority view was forcefully heard. Astor himself wrote 
letters to the Times prior to the joint letter with other blitzed cities in order to raise the 
profile of the blitzed cities’ plight.  
 
The joint letter was published on 21 October 1943 and was signed by fourteen of the 
nineteen blitzed cities.424 Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham maintained their 
position on co-ordinated action, feeling that it was either unnecessary or premature. 
The head of London County Council, Lord Charles Latham, was sympathetic and 
supportive of Astor’s stance, but felt unable to lend his signature to the letter. He felt 
that Astor’s suggestions for legislative reform were too piecemeal and ran against 
his own public proclamations on the subject.425 Despite this, Latham wrote to the 
Times to lend his support to Astor’s campaign, stressing the urgent need for fresh 
legislation to allow the blitzed cities to progress with planning.426 The Welsh cities of 
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Swansea and Cardiff are also missing, although it is unclear why they did not sign 
the Times letter.  
 
Astor evidently used his influence in both political and media circles to ensure that 
the voices of the blitzed cities were heard. The head of the AMC, Harry Pritchard, 
wrote to Astor at the beginning of October 1943 to say that he was prepared to write 
to the press himself, but ‘they do not take much notice of me and a communication 
from you is likely to be helpful’.427 In addition to his personal letters to the Times, 
Astor also wrote pieces for the local press, including the regional Western Morning 
News.428   
Correspondence with his editor at the Observer suggests that Astor was also 
instrumental in the publication of reconstruction pieces in the paper.429  More 
interestingly, Astor also asked his Observer staff if they might be able to persuade 
‘the Daily Herald...or any of the left-wing papers to agitate’ as ‘It is ridiculous that it 
should be left to the right-wing Tories to try and tackle the land question’.430  Astor’s 
general correspondence on the reconstruction question demonstrates that he 
considered it too important an issue for it to get caught up in political divisions 
between left and right.  
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Astor wrote to MPs and councillors on both sides of the political divide to seek 
support and advice on the reconstruction question. Most notably in June 1943 he 
wrote to Arthur Greenwood, then leader of the Labour Party, to urge Labour support 
for the required reconstruction legislation. Astor enclosed a copy of his letter to the 
Times and urged Greenwood not to ‘leave it to the old reactionary Tories like myself 
to advocate public ownership of the land!’431  Astor also encouraged the Mayors of 
the other blitzed cities to involve their local press and MPs in the campaign as well, 
especially as he felt the latter were not doing enough to underline the plight of blitzed 
cities and the urgent need for planning legislation.432 It is notable that the MPs for 
Bristol and Exeter were almost silent on the matter of blitzed city reconstruction in 
parliament, leaving it to Nancy Astor and Leslie Hore-Belisha (MP for Devonport) to 
raise the issue in debate.433 It is also evident that Astor used his political 
connections to secure meetings between key ministerial figures and representatives 
of both the blitzed cities and the AMC, as there is correspondence between Astor, 
Pepler and William Morrison (Minister of Town and Country Planning from 1943) 
discussing the deputations and potential dates for meeting.434  
 
Astor’s feeling that reconstruction was too important to be divided by political 
affiliation was echoed by the councils of the three South Western cities and by the 
blitzed cities more generally. The early support for replanning and reconstruction 
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was surprisingly cohesive across party lines within the local authorities, with the 
general feeling being that reconstruction needed to be handled carefully and with an 
eye to the future.435 Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth were predominantly Conservative 
prior to 1945 with Conservative-led councils, but despite some concerns about the 
potential cost of reconstruction, the general consensus was that replanning was 
necessary and desirable. This is reflected in the correspondence between Astor and 
the Mayors of Bristol and Exeter, who echo Astor’s anxiety over the slow progress of 
legislation.436  
Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester, which all declined to sign Astor’s 
letter to the Times, do not appear to have been politically motivated in their 
reluctance to join Astor’s campaign, but instead were motivated by the planning 
needs of each city. Birmingham, a predominantly Conservative city prior to 1945, 
had a long history of extensive civic remodelling and as such had a staff 
experienced in dealing with central government on planning matters. The City 
Engineer, Herbert Manzoni, sat on many of the wartime government’s reconstruction 
committees as an advisor and therefore had direct access to the relevant ministers 
to press for legislative change.437 Manchester was a predominantly Labour city, but 
the City Council declined to support Astor’s campaign as they felt the legislative 
changes proposed by Astor would not serve Manchester’s post-war needs. 438 The 
Council also stated that such matters were best left to organisations such as the 
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AMC, who they felt had more influence than individual councils as they represented 
local authorities as a whole.439  
However, the correspondence between Astor and the Secretary of the AMC, 
Harry Pritchard, suggests that the AMC found Astor’s influence and involvement 
useful in getting their voice heard within the relevant ministries. Astor’s personal 
acquaintance with the Minister of Town and Country Planning, William Morrison, was 
advantageous to the AMC as it helped to secure a meeting with the Ministry 
regarding legislation. Astor wrote personally to Morrison ahead of the AMC sending 
their request for a meeting to help smooth the path.440 Astor also represented the 
AMC at the eventual meeting, along with Lord Latham of the London County Council 
and Sir Miles Mitchell.441 They were supported by council members from the 
affected cities, including Exeter.  
 
The correspondence between the other blitzed cities and Astor further demonstrates 
the lack of political division or ideology in reconstruction planning at the local level. 
The remaining blitzed cities wrote to support Astor’s campaign, stressing the 
importance of a legislative framework to allow their plans to be brought to fruition.442 
The cities were of mixed political backgrounds, but the majority were Conservative-
led prior to 1945. Without conducting a full-scale investigation into the local tensions 
at Council level, it is not possible to fully explore this aspect of reconstruction here, 
but a general overview of the blitzed cities suggests that prior to the passing of the 
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1944 Act, blitzed cities were generally united across party lines for the need for 
comprehensive reconstruction plans.  
 
This cross-party attitude toward reconstruction challenges another accepted 
reconstruction narrative, that radical reconstruction plans were the product of Labour 
councils, while the more modest plans were produced by Conservative councils. 
This is partly due to the work of Nick Tiratsoo on Coventry, a city which produced 
one of the most radical and applauded plans for post-war reconstruction under the 
leadership of a Labour council.443 The city retained a Labour-led council throughout 
the post-war period, cementing the idea of radical reconstruction plans being 
synonymous with Labour leadership. However, Plymouth’s plan has been 
acknowledged as being just as radical, yet this was produced under a Conservative-
led council. Likewise, the plans for Bristol and Exeter were also produced under 
Conservative leadership.  
This aspect of reconstruction planning has been overlooked, as the majority 
of reconstruction plans were produced under pre-war local leadership, which was 
often Conservative. The initial plans for Hull, Portsmouth and Southampton were 
created under such Conservative administrations, with Portsmouth remaining 
Conservative post-1945.444 This coupled with the continuity of planning aims from 
the interwar period, such as the planning of new roads fit for modern transport, 
demonstrates that reconstruction plans were not the product of a particular political 
ideology, but of circumstance and necessity. City councils did see the war damage 
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as an opportunity to tackle their urban problems, and produced a surprising level of 
consensus across the political landscape on this issue. It is notable that the major 
concern across all three South Western councils was the swift reinstatement of 
traders, but on a new city plan which would benefit the whole city and its citizens.445 
Beyond city centre reconstruction, the provision of housing was the foremost 
concern, with little of the wrangling over housing types and provision for the poorest 
which was sometimes found in interwar schemes. This picture began to change after 
1945, but the economic constraints placed on reconstruction account for far more of 
the changes to reconstruction plans than political ideology. The lack of political 
division in campaigning for new legislation to facilitate reconstruction plans further 
reinforces this point.  
 
Astor’s campaign for a speedy legislative answer to the plight of blitzed cities and 
the work of the blitzed cities themselves in this respect also helps to negate the idea 
that local authorities prevaricated over reconstruction. This idea is most frequently 
found in the local histories of blitzed cities, such as Todd Gray’s Exeter in the 1940s, 
but can also be found in the wider reconstruction literature.446 The long delay 
between destruction and reconstruction is attributed to disorganisation on the part of 
local authorities and a reluctance to assist blitzed traders for their own ends. The 
traders in Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all requested to rebuild immediately or, failing 
this, to be allowed to erect temporary premises. The requests were taken seriously 
by the City Councils, who applied on behalf of blitzed traders to the Board of Trade 
for permission to build. In all instances permission was denied as, understandably, it 
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was felt that rebuilding during the war would be unwise as there was no guarantee 
the air war was over.447 Temporary buildings were also restricted under 1941 
government building regulations, which required a licence for all building work over a 
value of £100 in order to direct all possible resources to the war effort.448 As such, 
councils, and therefore traders, were refused permission to build. Blitzed cities were 
instead encouraged to begin reconstruction plans, with the promise that legislation 
and finance would be forthcoming for such rebuilding. By the time of Astor’s 
campaign, blitzed cities had been waiting for two and a half years for such legislation 
and were getting increasingly impatient. Astor’s campaign brought blitzed cities 
together to apply pressure to government as a group, while individual councils 
continued their own efforts to speed the process.  
 
In addition to the work done by figures such as Astor and the councils of blitzed 
cities, some individuals also tried to use their own knowledge and connections to 
influence and hasten planning legislation. The Exeter solicitor, and former city 
Mayor, Henry Michelmore is one such example, with his correspondence with the 
Ministry of Works and Planning (later Town and Country Planning) demonstrating 
that, despite appearances, the Ministry did take into consideration the ideas 
presented by such outside bodies. Michelmore was acquainted with Sir Spencer 
Portal, uncle of Lord Wyndam Portal who was Minister of Works and Planning 
between 1942 and 1943. Through Spencer Portal, Michelmore wrote to the Minister 
with a series of proposals for new planning legislation to deal with the problem of 
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blitzed cities.449 Michelmore’s proposals generated some interest within the Ministry 
and were thoroughly discussed and considered, as was a suggested draft bill which 
Michelmore later supplied to the Ministry.450 Some of Michelmore’s suggestions, 
such as the valuation of blitzed property against the 1910 land tax valuations, were 
swiftly dismissed as impractical, but others, such as the suggestion of acquired land 
being held on a fee farm rent rather than a lease, were debated for some time.451  
Michelmore was evidently aware of the Uthwatt report and supported the idea 
of all blitzed land being vested in the local authority to make reconstruction a simple 
process.452 He therefore offers us a further insight into the political narrative of 
reconstruction as Michelmore represented the traditional professional class in 
provincial England.  
 
Michelmore was a solicitor, public school educated with connections in the upper-
middle classes and had served Exeter as city Mayor on two occasions.453 As such 
he represented what could be considered the traditional Conservative element of 
society, and yet Michelmore supported the idea of comprehensive reconstruction 
and the public ownership of blitzed land. His suggestion of the land being held on a 
fee farm rent basis could be considered to demonstrate the Conservative, property-
owning element of this class, as such a basis gave the occupier rights similar to 
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freeholders but without outright ownership of the land. However, Michelmore 
suggested this as a way of avoiding the uncertainty that he felt leasehold occupation 
gave, particularly in the last years of a lease.454 Michelmore’s correspondence 
therefore gives further evidence that reconstruction did not divide neatly along 
tradition political or class lines.  
The consideration that the Ministry gave to Michelmore’s proposals is 
surprising in its thoroughness, with both the initial suggestions and the draft bill 
investigated paragraph by paragraph for feasibility and practicality.455 This suggests 
that the Ministry were prepared to consider outside opinions from individuals who 
could be considered knowledgeable on land and planning matters in order to deal 
with the difficult issue of legislation. This again demonstrates that reconstruction 
planning was not a top-down process as has been suggested, but was open to ideas 
and input from groups outside the planning profession and government.  
 
Impact of the 1944 Town and Country Planning Act  
 
The long-awaited Town and Country Planning Act was passed in November 1944 
and  gave blitzed cities a planning framework for implementing their plans, but the 
Act caused controversy owing to the lack of financial provisions for reconstruction 
within it. 456 The Act provided no finance for physical rebuilding beyond the existing 
war damage compensation scheme, provided by the War Damage Acts, and also 
contained clauses which would effectively change land tenure from a freehold to 
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leasehold basis where plans were undertaken. It was this latter clause which drove 
much of the discontent and opposition to replanning.  
 
The idea of local authorities acquiring all of the blitzed land in order to replan 
effectively had been supported by traders and property owners from 1941, as it was 
recognised as a practical way of dealing with a complex matter.457 Blitzed land could 
be replanned and new sites allocated to blitzed traders suitable for their expected 
post-war needs. However, this support rested on the expectation that the land would 
be sold back to the original owners at the end of the process, so that they would 
again have the freehold.  The 1944 Act prohibited the sale of land back to the 
original owners, therefore only allowing leasehold tenure in replanned city 
centres.458 The second principle was that of mobile compensation payments. It had 
been widely anticipated that one of the types of compensation payment available, 
the Cost of Works payment, would be made ‘mobile’, i.e. that it could be claimed if 
an owner was required to move to a new site under a reconstruction scheme.459 The 
1944 act did not allow for this, reducing the already restricted finance options for 
reconstruction even further. The financial basis for reconstruction and the change of 
land tenure created by 1944 Town and Country Planning Act led to the backlash 
against planning seen from 1944 onwards. Land ownership and reconstruction 
finance became the defining factors in rebuilding the blitzed cities, as these factors 
eventually dictated who rebuilt the city centres and how plans were executed.  
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However, the importance of both the legislative and financial aspects of 
reconstruction have not been fully explored current reconstruction literature. The 
problems with finance for reconstruction have been alluded to by many researchers, 
including the influential Tiratsoo, Hasegawa and Larkham, but mostly in terms of the 
impact on rateable value in cities and the impact of this on reconstruction styles.460 
The choice of architecture and materials is frequently attributed to the problems of 
post-war finance, as seen in Tait and While’s work on Exeter, but the mechanisms of 
compensation and finance for rebuilding have not been fully unpacked.461 The 
exceptions to this are Hasegawa’s work on the decline of radical planning, and the 
work of Catherine Flinn.462 Flinn fully acknowledges the financial constraints placed 
on blitzed cities and their impact, and in particular noted how the decision not to 
provide public funding for blitzed city reconstruction led to the emergence of 
development companies and the involvement of insurance companies in 
reconstruction work.463 The role of development and finance companies will be more 
fully explored in the following chapters. 
 
The restrictions on war damage compensation payments had been recognised as a 
potential problem while the legislation was being drafted, particularly as the 
compensation available under the War Damage Acts was deliberately quite 
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minimal.464 The whole intention of the scheme was that any property owner would 
not gain or lose from war damage, but would have the same value of property as 
they had in 1939.  
 
The scheme was never intended to insure property in the traditional sense, being 
intended to compensate the owner for loss of value or the cost of repairs, not for a 
replacement building at current prices.465 The system was designed to ensure that 
property owners ended the war with the same value in property as they started it 
with. Compensation values were therefore based on the value of property at 31 
March 1939 to negate any potential increase or loss of land and property value due 
to the war. The calculation for compensation worked thus: The total amount that 
could be claimed was the value of the building and site in March 1939 minus the 
value of the site if it was sold in its damaged state. The difference between the two 
values made the maximum amount that could be claimed. When this was sum was 
added to the site value, the owner would have the same total amount of value as in 
March 1939. This was known as the Value Payment.  
Claims for repairs could be made up to the amount of the Value Payment, 
with some adjustment for the rises in the price of materials and labour (a figure was 
eventually settled on of up to 66.75% of the Value Payment in 1942); this was a Cost 
of Works payment.466 If the building was considered a total loss – i.e the cost of 
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repair would be more than the Value Payment – then owners could only claim the 
Value Payment.  
The Cost of Works payment also had certain conditions attached to it: the 
building had to be put back to its exact 1939 state, it had to be on the same site and 
it could not be redesigned as a new building.467 There was a small amount of leeway 
with these stipulations, but if any major changes were proposed then the owner 
would forfeit their Cost of Works payment for a Value payment. Owners were 
allowed to make minor adjustments and improvements to their buildings if they were 
repairing them, but only if repairing the building to its 1939 state would require 
building back in obsolescence or deterioration.468 Some allowance was made for 
shifting a building to allow for town planning - for example if a building needed to be 
moved backwards in order to widen a road - but the War Damage Act did not allow 
for Cost of Works payments to be ‘mobile’, i.e. for the payment to be made if the 
property had to move from its original site. 469 The clause was inserted to prevent 
property owners from rebuilding their premises on a more valuable site and therefore 
profiting from the war.470 However, as the replanning of city centres got underway, it 
became obvious that many owners would have to move due to changes in city 
centre layouts. 
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 It was recognised by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning’s Advisory Panel 
on the Redevelopment of City Centres that the compensation stipulations regarding 
sites would be problematic for replanning. The Advisory Panel recommended in 
1944 that in such circumstances the Cost of Works payment should be made 
mobile.471 When an owner had to move sites due to replanning, their eligibility for 
Cost of Works would follow them to the new site, as they had not chosen to move 
and were not therefore trying to profit from building on a potentially more valuable 
site. In these situations Cost of Works could also be applied to a new building, as it 
was not the choice of the owner to build anew, but the requirement of the plan. The 
Advisory Panel evidently expected that this would be written into any new legislation 
relating to town planning and physical reconstruction as mobile payments are 
repeatedly referred to in the memoranda and reports produced by them.472  
 
Additionally, many of the surviving documents indicate that a Cost of Works payment 
could be applied even when a building had been totally destroyed.473 Presumably an 
owner would still be eligible if the cost of rebuilding was less than the Value Payment 
amount, as in this case the building would not be classified as a total loss. This is 
certainly what many of the blitzed traders in the South Western cities expected and it 
is certainly the interpretation of the Act to be found amongst the Advisory Panel’s 
records. It is evident from the correspondence between traders, local authorities and 
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the Ministries involved that property owners viewed the Cost of Works payment as 
more valuable and useful than the Value Payment, and were therefore angry and 
disappointed when the legislation made no concession to site changes enforced by 
replanning.474  
 
Although both the Advisory Panel and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning 
expected Cost of Works to become mobile, this was not the expectation of the 
Treasury. It is clear that from their point of view the War Damage Act was not 
intended to finance physical reconstruction in its entirety. The compensation was 
intended to cover repairs and ensure that no property owner actually lost money 
through war damage, but it was well understood that the amounts available might 
not cover the reinstatement of destroyed buildings.475  
Correspondence between the members of the Advisory Panel regarding the 
final wording of their report reveals that the Panel came under pressure from the 
Treasury to remove mention of mobile Cost of Works payments.476 The report was 
due to be released after the 1944 Act was passed and would have contradicted the 
Act’s stipulation that the payments could not be made mobile. Members of the panel 
were concerned that the complete omission of their recommendation would give the 
impression that they had not fully considered the financial implications of 
reconstruction, while the Treasury did not want any suggestion that the terms of the 
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payments could be changed.477 This demonstrates very clearly that the decisions 
regarding finance were driven by the Treasury, who viewed the question of finance 
very differently to the Ministry, the Panel and the blitzed cities themselves. 
 
The Treasury presumed that the potential financial gap between the available 
compensation and the cost of rebuilding would be borne by property owners 
themselves. The Treasury also viewed the value of property differently to either 
owners or the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. The land and its associated 
rent and rateable value were considered the greatest part of property value, with the 
building being only a small part of the property value. The land value would remain 
intact, including potential rent and rate values because even if the building was a 
total loss, the site would still be desirable for future businesses. The Treasury 
assumed that if replanning forced an owner to move sites, their site value would 
remain intact, as the removal of retail or business districts would also move site 
values to the new location. The Treasury felt that in this sense an owner would retain 
the greater part of the value of their property, and therefore the compensation for the 
bricks and mortar was a minimal feature of the value.478  
The Treasury also saw reconstruction as a potential outlet for the worrying 
level of liquidity they foresaw in the post-war economy, with war savings and tax 
credits building up large amounts of capital for individuals, particularly business and 
property owners.479 The investment of these liquid assets into new buildings would 
help solve the potential problem of inflation caused by the scarcity of consumer 
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goods. With consumer goods severely restricted through rationing, inflation was a 
major challenge facing the economy post-war as the public had accumulated 
savings at a greater rate than in peacetime. Some of these savings had been 
absorbed through government investment drives, such as war bonds, but there were 
still very high levels of savings being held by individuals. If the restrictions on 
consumer spending were lifted too quickly, inflation would follow as individuals tried 
to buy scarce goods, forcing the prices up in the process.480 It was already agreed 
by 1942 that rationing and restrictions on consumer spending should remain in place 
for the immediate post-war period in order to avert this possibility.481 Without a 
consumer outlet for spending, it was hoped that some of these liquid assets would 
be redirected to capital investment, and that as such property owners would be 
happy to invest in new buildings.  
 
What the Treasury overlooked was the proposed change to land ownership in city 
centres, which made their concept of site value flawed. The 1944 Act allowed local 
authorities to acquire blitzed land in order to replan, but prohibited the sale of blitzed 
land back to the original owners once replanning had been achieved.482 This meant 
that in future all city centre sites would be held on a leasehold basis, not freehold. In 
future traders would not own their sites and would not therefore have the land value, 
nor would they benefit from any increases in land values created by reconstruction. 
They would also be paying ground rent on the sites, which would reduce or negate 
any potential rental income which might be obtained from sub-letting part or all of the 
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building. Therefore investing money into new buildings became less attractive for the 
smaller property owners as they would have lost the greater part of their site value. 
Added to the decision not to provide any other finance for reconstruction beyond the 
war damage compensation, many smaller traders and owners felt cheated and 
aggrieved by the proposals. 
 
The Treasury had reason to be cautious about committing to finance for blitzed city 
reconstruction.  The War Aims Committee had identified other areas of 
reconstruction and commissioned approximately fifty-two different reports by July 
1942, covering demobilisation, social security, trade and economy, housing needs, 
education, industry, transport and utilities. 483  
There were questions of finance within these investigations, particularly in 
terms of the demobilisation of industry. It was recognised that many factories would 
need to retool and reinvest in capital goods post-war, either because their existing 
machinery would be worn out or because their machines had been geared to war 
production.484 Finance would need to be provided for this task, and quickly. There 
were further reconstruction needs related to industry and the economy, such as 
transport, energy and agriculture. The transport question was particularly important, 
as it was recognised that a complete overhaul of existing systems was likely to be 
needed to ensure the maximum efficiency of the nation. Planning for these sectors 
included the building of a network of ‘motor roads’, which became the motorway 
network, and the complete regeneration of the railways.485 The latter were already 
suffering from a lack of investment prior to the outbreak of war, so it was expected 
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that the railways would require major investment post-war.486  If industry were to 
recover and make progress over its interwar output, a better electricity supply 
network would also be needed. Prior to the outbreak of war, the electricity network in 
Britain was still piecemeal, with production and distribution being handled by dozens 
of small companies and local authorities.487 It was proposed that electricity 
production and distribution should be nationalised and brought under the control of 
regional electricity boards. This would also allow for the systematic expansion of the 
network so that it would eventually reach all parts of the country.488 Again, this would 
require significant government funding. Finally, agriculture would need direction and 
support to ensure that the nation’s food supply remained reliable and plentiful. In 
particular, it was considered important that food imports should be kept at a 
minimum post-war in order to keep a favourable balance of payments and to allow 
for the importing of raw materials needed in industry.489  
When set against all of these issues, the question of finance for blitzed cities 
became a minor one and the position of the Treasury with regard to compensation 
and capital finance becomes more understandable.  
 
The financial provisions of the 1944 Act fuelled discontent and anxiety over 
rebuilding, which accounts for much of the growing hostility towards reconstruction 
seen in each city after the release of each plan. This shift of opinion can be most 
clearly seen in Plymouth, where the tone of comments about the plan began to 
change in the autumn of 1944, with an increasing number of people voicing 
concerns at the potential cost of the plan and suggesting alternatives. A number of 
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councillors were amongst these voices and a motion was put forward in early 
December 1944 to create a second, less radical, plan. The Conservative councillor 
of Mutley Ward, Harry Taylor, motioned for the preparation of an alternative plan 
based on the existing street pattern ‘with improvements such as widening certain 
throughfares and splaying corners...to make it easier for general traffic and 
pedestrians’.490 The motion was seconded by another Conservative councillor, H.G 
Damerell of the Nelson ward. However, the motion was roundly defeated, with only 
four members voting in favour of it.491  
 
There was evidently some support for the suggestion of a less radical and more 
economical plan, as correspondence in the Western Morning News appeared in the 
wake of the council meeting supporting Harry Taylor’s view. One writer praised the 
councillor for having an eye on economy and speed in rebuilding rather than the 
‘extravagant planning and wasteful spending’ which he felt the Plan for Plymouth 
exemplified.492 This was one of a number of similar letters which were received by 
the paper which supported the idea of a simplified plan and questioned the cost of 
rebuilding.  
Plymouth’s traders were also concerned at the lack of funding for 
reconstruction. It became one of the most discussed points of the Act and 
Plymouth’s traders were unconvinced that a better settlement could be reached. As 
a result traders expressed increasing concern over the proposals to redesign the city 
centre streets, which would force them to move sites and thus deprive them of their 
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cost of works payments.493 Traders and trade groups, such as the Chambers of 
Commerce, in all three cities had initially been supportive of proposals to put all city 
centre land under one ownership in order to replan effectively, but this support 
drained away between 1944 and 1948 with the passing of the 1944 and 1947 Town 
and Country Planning Acts.494  
 
In Exeter, where the Phoenix was released after the act had been passed, there was 
more initial concern expressed amongst Councillors at the cost of rebuilding 
according to the plan and how this cost would be met than in Bristol or Plymouth.495 
One councillor is recorded as saying that Germany should be made to fund the 
reconstruction of blitzed cities, which appears to be the only time such a view was 
recorded in the South Western cities but demonstrates the depth of feeling regarding 
reconstruction and compensation.496 It is also noticeable that hostility from blitzed 
traders to replanning was expressed more quickly than in Plymouth in the wake of its 
plan.  
A similar pattern can be found in other blitzed cities, with the early plans such 
as those of Coventry following the same model of initial enthusiasm followed by 
discontent once the 1944 legislation had been passed.497 . Calls for plans which 
required traders to leave their original site to be abandoned were seen in many 
blitzed cities and some, such as Southampton and Hull, did abandon much of their 
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post-war plan as a result.498 In Plymouth there appears to have been support for the 
actual replanning scheme, but there was concern that the compensation clauses 
would drive out the smaller independent traders from the city centre. The financial 
problems of reconstruction were therefore the subject of the majority of objections to 
replanning in the city.499 In Exeter a similar attitude was evident with regard to the 
smaller trader, but Exeter’s traders seem to have taken the lack of financial 
provisions for rebuilding as a personal insult, with many exclamations about how a 
city of Exeter’s calibre must not be left at the mercy of development companies or 
multiple traders.500  
 
The clause in the 1944 Act which prohibited the sale of land back to the original 
owners is particularly important, as this entirely changed the basis of reconstruction. 
Owners and traders had been supportive of the plan to temporarily put city centre 
land under single ownership in order to simplify replanning, since they would be able 
to buy back their sites at the end of the process. The Treasury’s assessment of the 
value of a site was essentially right, with owners placing the greatest value on the 
freehold of a site. Once this was removed, property owners felt they had lost the 
greatest part of their site value and were reluctant to invest in a site they would not 
ultimately own. For trader-owners, building on a leasehold site reduced the value of 
their building significantly, as they were now paying ground rent on the site and 
would be disadvantaged by increases in the rent and rateable value. This problem 
became particularly apparent in the public enquiries held into city centre plans, with 
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financial hardship and the loss of freeholds making up the bulk of objections to the 
three cities’ plans.  
 
Public Inquiries and the Decline of Planning Enthusiasm 
 
The anger of traders and property owners over the provisions of the 1944 Act 
became very obvious when the plans of each city underwent a public enquiry in 
1946. The existing literature sometimes suggests that the public enquiries into each 
plan were forced by opposition from traders and property owners to the plans and 
are often used to demonstrate the ‘top-down’ nature of post-war planning.501 
However, public enquiries were compulsory in all cases of replanning where it 
was the intention of the local authority to acquire city centre land via compulsory 
purchase.  The enquiries ensured that all objections and concerns regarding 
replanning and compulsory purchase were heard and addressed by an outside 
body.502 Enquiries also had to be held for each compulsory purchase order used 
within a city, which meant that some cities, such as Plymouth, actually underwent 
multiple enquiries. Plymouth City Council used a series of compulsory purchase 
orders across the late 1940s and 1950s in order to redevelop large parts of the city, 
and for each one a public enquiry had to be held.503 Likewise Bristol underwent 
further public enquiries in 1947 and 1949 for city centre compulsory purchase 
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orders, although this was partly due to ongoing disputes with the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning.504 
 
Blitzed cities also had to produce a Declaratory Area Order, outlining the total area 
of land they wished to acquire for city centre reconstruction, which was scrutinised 
by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning. It was the enquiries for this overall 
land requirement and initial compulsory purchase orders which have attracted the 
most interest from researchers, as they often reveal the tensions and difficulties in 
rebuilding blitzed cities. Unfortunately, the first three days of Bristol’s ten-day 
enquiry, which covered the controversial Wine Street/Castle Street area, were not 
deposited with the Bristol Record Office and it has proved difficult to uncover their 
contents. Likewise, the local copies of the Plymouth enquiry report into Area No.1 
are missing from the Plymouth and West Devon Record Office, although the enquiry 
report covering the rest of the central area is available. As a result it has been 
necessary to piece together the form of the enquiries from local news reports and 
the remaining documents. These still reveal the local tensions and objections to the 
plans. Exeter’s enquiry report, however, was deposited in its entirety and evidently 
follows the same form as the other enquiries, giving us a full working document with 
which to examine the enquiry process. 
 
The enquiries in the three cities were heard between April and July 1946, and were 
overseen by an Inspector who represented the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning. It was the Inspector’s job not only to preside over and direct the enquiry, 
but to compile a report and evidence of the objections for the Ministry. The same 
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Inspector, Mr H.G Warren, oversaw all three of the south-western enquiries and it is 
also notable that it was generally the same team of Counsels who represented the 
objectors at each enquiry.505 It appears that this was deliberate in order to provide 
continuity between the enquiries and created a pool of knowledge and experience 
amongst inspector and counsels. As the Inspector was responsible for compiling the 
enquiry reports, this would also have allowed them to observe the similarities in 
objections and problems in each city, which in turn could inform the actions of the 
Ministry.   
 
There are many similarities between the objections and arguments forwarded at 
each enquiry, with the majority of objections raised in each city connected to land 
ownership. In addition to this, many objections were raised against the terms of 
compensation under the Town and Country Planning Act 1944. However, as the 
terms of compensation and land ownership were ascribed by the legislation, neither 
the local authorities nor the Ministry had any influence over these matters and the 
objections had to be disregarded. It was made clear to the objectors that a change in 
legislation would be required to adjust the terms set out in the 1944 act and this was 
a matter for government, not a public enquiry.  
This undoubtedly fuelled the growing bad feeling between traders, property 
owners and the local authorities. Traders and property owners were beginning to 
feel that they were being cheated by the authorities and that replanning was a way 
to deprive private enterprise of assets under a Socialist agenda.506 That many local 
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authorities applied to buy very large areas of land under compulsory purchase 
orders helped to fuel this suspicion, as it seemed that local authorities were trying to 
acquire more land than traders and property owners felt was necessary for repairing 
war damaged areas.507  
 
This point was raised at all three of the public enquiries, with the Counsels 
suggesting that the 1944 Act was being misused and misinterpreted by the local 
authorities in order to fulfil their own agendas. It was argued that the 1944 Act was 
not a town planning act in the same way that previous ones were, such as the 1932 
planning act, and it was instead only designed for dealing with areas of war damage. 
The cities were therefore considered to be overstepping the powers of the act in 
trying to acquire large areas of land for replanning, as the land was not all war 
damaged.508  
This argument was often forwarded on behalf of property owners who wished 
to be excluded from the Declaratory Orders in order to retain their freehold, 
particularly when the property in question was either undamaged or only partially 
damaged. This point was very vocally made at the Bristol enquiry, where the 
extremely large Declaratory Order of 771 acres made by the Council was viewed 
very much as a land-grab.  
 
The financial aspects of reconstruction form another major strand of the enquiries. 
Although the problem of compensation had to be excluded from the enquiries, it still 
loomed large over the proceedings. The majority of objectors wished to have their 
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property excluded from the Declaratory Orders and CPOs. This reflected the two 
major financial grievances over reconstruction plans – the loss of freeholds and the 
problem of the Cost of Works payments. The major objection amongst traders was 
to the loss of their freeholds under the 1944 Act, which prevented the resale of 
freeholds back to traders, except under ‘exceptional circumstances’, with many 
being reluctant to rebuild on leasehold sites.509 It was this loss of assets which 
property owners objected to, and many requested to be ‘left out’ of the CPO, 
claiming the retention of their freehold would not affect the overall plan. This 
particular type of objection is most clearly seen in Exeter where the City Council 
applied only to buy war damaged areas. 
 
The question of the broader reconstruction costs and how they were to be borne 
was raised at all three enquiries but was particularly pronounced at Plymouth. Along 
with the loss of freeholds, the cost to the local authorities of purchasing land and 
how this would be met was a significant concern.510 It was understood that local 
authorities would take loans in order to purchase the required land and the major 
concern was how the debts would be serviced. The potential impact on ratepayers 
was of greatest concern, as it was assumed that large increases in rates would be 
necessary to service the loans. The cost of acquiring land for reconstruction 
therefore became a significant point of conflict between local authorities and 
property owners, something which is particularly well demonstrated through the 
Plymouth enquiry. 
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Plymouth was the first city, nationally as well as within the South West, to undergo a 
public enquiry into its plan. The enquiry was held over five days between the 30 April 
and 4 May 1946 and examined both the overall declaratory order for the city centre 
and the initial compulsory purchase order. The declaratory order for Plymouth 
covered 178 acres of land in the central part of the city, while the initial compulsory 
purchase order was for 36 acres in the heart of the old shopping district. The City 
Council received over five hundred objections; 322 in connection with the 
Declaratory Order and 183 to the Compulsory Purchase Order.511 Many of these 
objections were to the financial aspects of reconstruction, particularly the problem of 
immobile Cost of Works payments, and therefore had to be disregarded by the 
enquiry. This in itself caused bad feeling with the blitzed traders, particularly after it 
was ruled that the City Council did not need to present financial estimates for the 
cost of replanning and rebuilding as outlined by the Plan for Plymouth.512 The 
Inspector, Mr Warren, ruled that it was not reasonable to expect the City Council to 
have accurate figures for the cost of acquiring land at such an early stage and the 
purpose of the enquiry was to test the overall quality of the plan.  As such, he did not 
think that figures for the cost of acquisition need be presented by the Council.  
 
Traders and property owners felt that this was a deliberate move by the City Council 
to suppress the true cost of rebuilding. The Counsels for the objectors stated that as 
it was the ratepayers and taxpayers who would be bearing the cost, the figures were 
a vital part of the enquiry process and without them, the legal basis of the enquiry 
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and any decisions stemming from it were in question.513 The feeling amongst 
property owners was that they were being made to shoulder all the financial burden 
of reconstruction without gaining any benefits, as they would lose their freeholds, be 
responsible for the cost of rebuilding and be responsible for the cost of losing their 
freeholds (and their Cost of Works payments) through the paying of the higher rates 
necessary for servicing the land loans.514 The benefits of a better laid-out city and 
better transport links were not seen as benefits by the affected property owners, as 
they would not gain through the potential increases in site values which such 
improvements might create. The argument that no individual should benefit from war 
damage through increased site values was not appreciated; all property owners 
could see was that they were paying and everyone else was benefitting.  
 
The Counsels threatened to take the Plymouth case to the High Court if matters of 
cost were completely excluded from the enquiry, stating that the Minister for Town 
and Country Planning was acting in a ‘quasi-judicial’ capacity and was therefore 
required not to accept any evidence which had not been submitted to the public.515 
The Counsels went on to suggest that the CPO would therefore be invalid under 
British law. This point came about because the City Council admitted to having 
prepared estimates for the cost of reconstruction, which had been submitted to the 
Ministry but had not been submitted to the enquiry.516  As Plymouth was the first of 
all the blitzed cities to undergo the enquiry process, there was a concern that this 
was also setting a precedent in terms of procedure. Ultimately, figures for the cost of 
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reconstruction were allowed to be requested and presented at the subsequent 
enquiries in Bristol and Exeter.517 This is one example of the benefit of using the 
same Inspector and Counsels for all enquiries, as it led to the formulation of a ‘best 
practice’ with regard to the presentation of estimates on reconstruction costs.  
This combined with the problems with war damage compensation created a 
hard knot of opposition to the Declaratory Order and CPO. The Town Clerk, Colin 
Campbell, explained under cross examination by the objectors Counsels that 
Plymouth City Council were continuing to press the government for a better financial 
package and would continue to do so.518 This was also the line taken by other local 
councils at their public enquiries and reflects both the dissatisfaction with the 1944 
Act and the determination of local authorities to secure a better financial package for 
reconstruction.  
 
The remaining objections to the Plan for Plymouth were about property ownership 
and new sites for displaced businesses. In Plymouth a number of objections were 
heard with regard to buildings which would require demolition in order to lay out the 
planned new road scheme, with suggestions that many of the new roads were not 
required or did not need to be so wide. A number of objectors suggested that the 
new road or road improvement affecting their property would not be required as the 
other proposed road changes would reduce the traffic flow on their street. Property 
owners in Notte Street and The Crescent put forward objections along these lines, 
stating that the new road system around the main city centre would render the road 
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alterations affecting their property unnecessary.519 The Town Clerk pointed out that 
even the Ministry of Transport had agreed the importance of the road plans in 
question. The implication was that as the Ministry would be providing much of the 
funding for roads, they would not agree to unnecessary works.520  
Although similar types of objections were heard in the other cities, it is this 
example from Plymouth which best demonstrates the tension between the personal 
and the public spheres in reconstruction. Very few of these traders or property 
owners actively objected to the Plan for Plymouth as a whole; they only objected to 
the part affecting them and the potential personal cost. The taking of property under 
CPO was seen as an attack on the sanctity of personal property, particularly when 
the property in question was undamaged, and a step toward the nationalisation of all 
land and property. The loss of property under a CPO was also a very personal 
matter, as regardless it was the enforced loss of a home or business and all that it 
represented to the owner. In such circumstances, it was difficult for individuals to 
look at a city plan objectively and see it as a whole, with its projections of future 
need and usage and its emphasis on the collective rather than individual good. The 
loss of such property under CPO added to the growing discontent with 
reconstruction planning.  
 
Similar objections were particularly prominent at Bristol’s enquiry, which was the 
next of the three cities and also the longest at ten days. The enquiry was held 
between the 13 and 25 June 1946 and examined the concerns of over three hundred 
objectors to the reconstruction plan. The City Council was applying for a Declaratory 
Order for 771 acres, one of the largest Declaratory Orders made by a blitzed city, 
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and intended to acquire all of the land at once under a single CPO.521 The size of 
the Declaratory Area alarmed many property owners, as the actual acreage of 
severe war damage was estimated to be only 67 acres, and the Declaratory Order 
was viewed as a land-grab by the City Council. Property owners argued that the 
1944 Act did not cover such a large purchase of land, which constituted a complete 
town plan rather than the repair of war damage.522 This is of course exactly what all 
of the plans forwarded by blitzed cities were – comprehensive town plans. The local 
authorities had been instructed to plan in such terms and embraced the opportunity 
to deal with a multitude of urban problems with one blow. Evidently property owners 
supported this idea only up to the point where it affected them directly, as 
demonstrated at Plymouth.  
 
In Bristol, the Broadmead plan had never carried general support amongst traders or 
property owners, and the public enquiry only underlined this. Virtually all of the 
objectors wished to be excluded from the plan, to retain their freehold and to be 
allowed to rebuild and continue trading on the same site; allowing this would have 
made any kind of replanning impossible.523 Even the proposed new roads and 
zoning for industry ran against similar opposition, as industrial concerns based in the 
centre of Bristol stated that they should be allowed to remain as Bristol was a 
‘commercial city’ and retailers should not be given priority over industry.524 The 
industries in question, such as the Bristol Brewery, stated that they alone had 
                                                          
521 Western Daily Press, ‘£26,0000 for New Centre Sites: Disclosed at Bristol inquiry’, 13 June 1946. 
522 Western Daily Press, ‘£26,000,000 for centre sites’, 13 June 1946. 
523 Western Daily Press, ‘£26,000,000 for centre sites’, 13 June 1946; BRO, 38129/3 City and County 
of Bristol: Town and Country Planning Act 1944 Central Areas Application for a Declaratory Order 
under Section 1, ‘Proceedings at a Public Local Inquiry held at the Central Hall, Old Market Street, 
Bristol, on 17th June 1946 (fourth day)’; ‘Proceedings at a Public Local Inquiry held at...Bristol on 
Tuesday 18th June 1946 (fifth day)’. 
524 Western Daily Press, ‘Draft Plan for Rebuilding Bristol – Letters to the Editor: Industry’ 18 May 
1944; ‘Should Bristol Shopping Centre be on Old Site?’ 15 June 1946. 
190 
 
created Bristol’s prosperity and therefore they should have priority to remain and 
build new premises over retail concerns. In return, retailers presented the same 
argument, but on the basis that any change to the retail pattern of Bristol would ruin 
the city financially, and therefore no changes should be made.525 The suggested 
road changes ran into trouble for similar reasons, as traders of all types felt that 
changes would reduce passing trade and the prosperity of Bristol.  
 
Although these arguments were presented most forcefully at Bristol’s enquiry, they 
can also be found in the Plymouth and Exeter enquiries. As Exeter’s war damage 
was concentrated in the very centre of the city, the Declaratory Order was for a 
much smaller amount of land, all of which had sustained war damage. As such it 
was very difficult to argue that the 1944 Act was being misused. Instead the 
emphasis was on the loss of freehold and the potential damage to trade and 
prosperity that this would cause.526 As Plymouth’s plan involved laying out afresh the 
shopping area, creating new roads and heavily zoning the city centre, the argument 
about the purpose of the 1944 Act was again invoked, with the loss of freeholds and 
the amount of land the city wished to acquire at the heart of the arguments.527 Bristol 
City Council’s defence against this accusation was that the war damage in Bristol 
was wide-spread and the intention was not only to deal with this, but to replan the 
entire city centre along modern lines.528  
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As already indicated, this did nothing to soothe the objectors with the purpose of the 
1944 act instead being questioned. It was suggested by the Counsel that the City 
Council had no right to execute a comprehensive replanning scheme under the 1944 
act and were instead stretching the act for its own purposes. The City Council 
pointed to the provision within the 1944 act to deal with areas of blight ‘adjacent or 
contingent’ with the war damaged areas. As Bristol’s damage was widespread, this 
clause allowed for the type of land purchase and replanning which the Council was 
trying to effect.  
 
Exeter’s enquiry followed swiftly after Bristol’s, being held between 9 and 13 July 
1946. As Exeter’s damage was much more centralised than that of either Plymouth 
or Bristol, the City Council was requesting a much smaller area under the 
Declaratory Order at 76 acres, which would be covered by two separate CPOs.529 
The plan attracted 121 objections, all similar in nature to those seen in the other 
South Western cites. As with Plymouth and Bristol, the majority were connected with 
either compensation or the loss of freeholds. There were also some concerns at the 
size of sites and the positioning of service roads, as some traders wanted deeper 
sites. These objections were given careful consideration, with Sharp agreeing that 
the lines of the service roads could be altered to give larger sites.530 This was 
incorporated into the later plans, demonstrating that trader concerns were taken 
seriously and did result in some changes to plans.  
It is notable that the tone of the Exeter objectors seems more acrimonious 
than that seen in the other cities, with a much greater sense of indignation at the City 
Council’s proposals to acquire land. It is also notable that there was more 
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representation of the independent traders rather than the multiple stores, banks and 
insurance companies, suggesting that city centre property in Exeter was mostly in 
the hands of individuals rather than large companies, a conclusion reinforced by the 
group of independent traders represented by Mr J H Scott Henderson, a counsel 
present at all three enquiries, who requested to be allowed to rebuild their sites as a 
block.531  
 
The traders had all been situated on the north side of the High Street and produced 
a plan to rebuild this part of the street, but only on the condition that they retain their 
freeholds. In return for retaining their freeholds, they stated that they would give the 
Council ‘the most valuable part of the sites’, i.e. the frontages, to allow for road 
widening.532 The traders in question interpreted ‘replanning’ to mean merely 
widening roads to try to alleviate traffic congestion, rather than a more 
comprehensive city improvement scheme. This interpretation led to what they saw 
as the generous offer of the land which had formed the frontage of their sites for 
road widening. The Town Clerk, Cyril Newman, responded to the traders’ plan by 
stating that if they had made such an offer to the Council when it was trying to effect 
road-widening during the interwar period ‘the Council would have expired in 
shock’.533 Newman went on to declare that the Council could not allow islands of 
freehold land within the replanned area and therefore the traders’ suggestion could 
not be accepted.  
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The suggestion of this group of traders demonstrates how keenly felt the loss of 
freeholds under the terms of the 1944 Act was by property owners, particularly as it 
was felt that those who had suffered war damage were being penalised for 
something beyond their control. The root of this was that many property owners who 
had escaped war damage were unaffected by reconstruction plans, and would 
therefore retain their freeholds and escape the burden of rebuilding their properties. 
In Exeter the very heart of the city centre around the Cathedral had escaped 
damage, which meant that property owners in that area not only still had their 
original premises but could also continue to enjoy their freeholds. Those on the edge 
of the CPO area felt this was a particular injustice – for the sake of a few yards they 
lost everything.534  
The same argument was also forwarded at the Plymouth enquiry, with 
particular reference to the hardship caused by the application of war damage 
compensation in reconstruction areas.535 In some ways Bristol City Council took the 
most pragmatic approach to this problem by applying for a Declaratory Order which 
covered the entire area they wished to replan, therefore ensuring that everyone 
would hold their property on a leasehold basis regardless of whether they had 
suffered war damage. As described, this instead led to the accusations of 
overstepping their remit in terms of reconstruction, with the loss of freeholds felt 
every bit as bitterly as in Exeter.  
 
The suggestion does, however, raise some interesting questions with regard to the 
methods of reconstruction. The decision by the majority of local authorities to 
acquire city centre land in order to replan and rebuild in a comprehensive and 
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coherent way was practical in many respects. Virtually all blitzed cities had pre-
existing problems with traffic congestion, narrow streets, overcrowding and the 
location of industries, and the need to rebuild post-war offered an opportunity to 
tackle these problems as a whole. As city centres were usually a tangle of 
ownerships and leaseholds, it seemed practical to put all the land and property 
under single ownership rather than trying to deal piecemeal with each individual site 
and its claims. 
The piecemeal method had been the only one available interwar and had 
proved tortuous in terms of making changes to city centres. Against this practicality 
were the claims of property owners, who were understandably aggrieved to be 
forced to sell their freeholds, particularly when traders and property owners who had 
not suffered war damage often had both their property and their freehold left intact. 
The suggestion by the Exeter traders that they should work together to produce a 
block of buildings, which they were prepared to build according to the Councils 
suggested designs, offered an alternative vision. Would it have been possible to 
encourage all blitzed traders and property owners within a proposed reconstruction 
area to follow a similar method? Could similar groups be created for each street and 
each area within the blitzed city, who built together to a design put forward by the 
local authority, with street lines adjusted to create a better street pattern?  
It is tempting to say that this could have been effected and local authorities 
should have tried harder to work on such as basis, which would have maintained 
private property interests and would not have required local authorities to take large 
loans to buy out city centre freeholds. It may also have solved some of the 
compensation problems facing property owners, as such a method might not have 
required the complete removal of individuals from their sites, allowing them to claim 
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Cost of Works payments. It is possible that such a method might have worked in a 
small city like Exeter, particularly as the proposed new road system went around the 
city centre rather than through it and therefore did not require a complete replanning 
of the existing street pattern. There would have been some problems with sites 
which occupied the main crossroads of the city (then known as London Inn Square) 
as this area did require some reorganisation to allow for a better flow of traffic, but 
the majority of sites on the main shopping streets could have been left intact, 
particularly after changes to the road plans were made by the Ministry of Transport. 
However, it is doubtful that such a method could have been used in Bristol or 
Plymouth, which presented rather different problems.  
 
Plymouth had a particularly difficult street pattern in terms of modern traffic, as the 
streets were narrow and provided no definite thoroughfare across the city centre.536 
New roads were the most practical way of tackling this problem, particularly when 
the projected increases in motor traffic were taken into account. In addition to this, 
the city’s central wards of Vintry, Drake, St Peter’s and St Andrew’s were 
acknowledged to be severely overcrowded in terms of housing, and the replanning 
of the city centre offered the chance to alleviate this problem.537 The decision of the 
Admiralty to expand Devonport Dockyard also created an additional problem, as the 
shopping district of Devonport would require resiting as a result.538 Abercrombie and 
Paton Watson’s Plan for Plymouth took all of these elements into account in its 
redesigning of the city, and it would have been extremely difficult to solve these 
problems without this redesign. Attempting to carry out such a replanning and 
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reconstruction effort without the land being under single ownership would have been 
almost impossible with so many competing interests involved. All of the enquiries 
demonstrate that individual property owners were only really interested in 
reconstruction and replanning as far as it affected them directly, and would therefore 
have been extremely difficult to persuade to act in the common interest of the city 
without the use of a CPO.  
In Bristol such a method would have solved the objections to the city centre 
plan, as it would have left the shopping centre on its original site at Wine 
Street/Castle Street. Bristol traders were particularly unhappy at having to leave the 
old shopping district and spent some time trying to produce a suitable alternative 
plan. However, during the consultation stages of planning, the City Council found 
that the majority of traders wanted additional space in order to expand their 
premises. In addition to this, the fire service had recommended greater fire breaks 
between buildings. In order to provide these two things, more space was required, 
which led to the decision to move the shopping centre. As with Plymouth, it would 
have been possible to rebuild on the old street pattern, but it was not practical in 
terms of future needs for retail space.  
 
With regard to the objections based on compensation and land ownership, allowing 
traders to group together and build blocks of buildings would have solved this issue. 
However, there were other possible ways of alleviating these problems beyond 
leaving the city centres unplanned. The compensation issue was partially solved by 
central government in 1947, when the values used for the compulsory purchase of 
property and the level of compensation was adjusted to current prices instead of the 
1939 value. It had originally been expected that land and property values would be 
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decreased by the war rather than increased, which was the other factor in choosing 
the 1939 value; it would ensure that property owners did not suffer if values were 
depressed by the war. However, land and property values actually increased, and it 
was eventually agreed that it would therefore be sensible to use current values. This 
decision helped to solve some of the objections to the compensation clauses but did 
not initially solve the problem of immobile Cost of Works payments. The objections 
based on this factor are interesting in other respects, as they suggest that the 
compensation system had more flexibility than initially suggested. It also raises 
some questions about the cost of building. 
 
 In theory the Cost of Works payment could only be claimed to repair a building, not 
in cases where it was considered a ‘total loss’. The latter was defined as when 
repairs would exceed the total of the Value Payment (which was calculated against 
the difference between the value of the building in 1939 and its value if sold in its 
damaged state), which was presumed to also include cases where the building 
required complete rebuilding.539 
 However, there are numerous cases in the three cities that suggest that the 
Cost of Works payment could be claimed when the building had been totally 
destroyed, presumably indicating that the cost of rebuilding was considered to be 
less than the total of the Value Payment. Yet property owners consistently 
complained that the Value Payment would not be enough to rebuild and clamoured 
for the Cost of Works payment to be allowed to be paid when they had to move 
sites.540 There was some adjustment in the Cost of Works to allow for the increase 
in material costs, but this does not entirely explain why the Cost of Works was 
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considered to be so much more valuable. This is particularly notable once the values 
are adjusted to current prices from the 1939 value, as property owners would 
receive the current value of their property if it was sold on the open market in its 
undamaged state. Despite the adjusted values, which would have resulted in much 
higher payments being made to owners, they continued to call for the Cost of Works 
payment to be made available as the amounts being paid were not enough to cover 
rebuilding. This suggests that either owners did not fully understand how Cost of 
Works was meant to operate and assumed that it was an unlimited payment against 
the literal cost of building anew, or that owners consistently overstated the cost of 
rebuilding in an attempt to secure more compensation. It is not at all clear which was 
operating, and the available data has so far proved inconclusive on this matter. This 
would most definitely warrant additional research in the future to further untangle 
how compensation and finance for reconstruction were operating. 
 
The question of land tenure also requires some scrutiny. The suggested leasehold 
system was deeply unpopular with property owners, who felt that a leasehold 
property was much less valuable to them than a freehold property. It was the larger 
multiple traders and finance companies who saw the value in holding leasehold 
property, as it formed part of a portfolio of similar property which they were able to 
profit from. It is not obvious why the government decided to prevent the sale of land 
back to the former owners, but the most likely reason is to prevent individuals from 
profiting by the war. It was assumed that replanning in town centres would increase 
land values through improved amenity and there was concern that individuals would 
profit from this increased value. The clauses within the 1944 Act which prevented 
the sale of sites back to owners and the Cost of Works payments from becoming 
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mobile were attempts to prevent individuals from profiting from work funded by 
public money. Central government (wartime coalition and post-war Labour) and local 
authorities alike felt that it should be the public who benefitted from the spending of 
public money, not private property owners.541  
 
There was however, an alternative system which could have been employed if the 
object was indeed to keep increased land values in the public sphere. The Exeter 
solicitor who corresponded with the Ministry, Henry Michelmore, had suggested that 
a fee farm rent be used rather than a leasehold.542 It is likely that this would have 
satisfied all parties, as it gave the holder all the rights of a freehold but retained the 
ownership in different hands. This would have allowed the local authority to retain 
the ownership, and therefore ultimate control of the land and its value, while giving 
the former owners the security that they felt leasehold did not supply. The 
suggestion was given serious consideration by the Ministry who also felt that it would 
potentially solve the insecurities caused by leasehold tenure.543 However, after this 
initial interest, the use of the fee farm rent does not appear again as a serious 
alternative to leasehold tenure. It is unclear why the idea was not pursued or 
suggested to local authorities as an alternative to leasehold tenure. This may be 
linked to the Treasury influence on reconstruction, as Treasury funds would help 
support the purchase of land by local authorities. As such, the Treasury may have 
felt that leasehold tenure allowed local authorities better control over public assets 
and may have vetoed the use of fee farm rents as a result.  
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The drafting and passing of the Town and Country Planning Act 1944 marks a 
turning point in reconstruction history. The Act had a long and difficult journey onto 
the statute books as the issues at stake were complex and controversial. The 
decision not to pass a comprehensive planning bill, but to just tackle the problem of 
war damage reflected this, as it avoided the difficult questions of land ownership and 
rights. However, this made the Act a half-measure and it did not fully tackle the 
problems which blitzed cities were facing. As a result, it caused a split between 
property owners and local authorities over reconstruction and created a decline in 
support for reconstruction plans.  
 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1944 was a disappointment to the blitzed cities, 
as it provided no finance for rebuilding beyond the existing war damage 
compensation and loans for the purchase of lands. Additionally it did not make Cost 
of Works compensation ‘mobile’, denying blitzed traders the type of compensation 
they thought was the most useful. The Act also prohibited the sale of sites back to 
owners at the end of the reconstruction process, thus depriving blitzed traders and 
property owners of their freeholds. The combination of these factors resulted in the 
decline of enthusiasm and support for reconstruction plans, as traders and property 
owners felt they were bearing an unreasonable cost with little reward. This is 
demonstrated through the public enquiries, as the majority of objections were to the 
loss of freeholds rather than to the plans as a whole. Property owners in Plymouth 
and Exeter were generally supportive of the idea of replanning the cities, which 
would remove the problems of the past, but wanted their own property excluded 
201 
 
from the declaratory order areas and the compulsory purchase orders. In all cases 
they stated that the exclusion of their property would not affect the overall plan, 
which demonstrates how separate the concepts of reconstruction and private 
property were to the objectors. The exclusion of all of the properties in question 
would have rendered the reconstruction plans impossible, but this could not be seen 
by the objectors who were only thinking in terms of how the plan affected them 
directly. In this sense the objections to reconstruction plans and the general decline 
in planning enthusiasm had little to do with the city plans themselves, instead being 
the product of poor legislation and individual self-interest in property terms. 
 Bristol was the only exception to this, as the Broadmead plan did not carry 
wide support. This was still partially due to property ownership and compensation 
issues, as traders were unhappy at being moved from their original sites for the 
same reasons as traders in Exeter and Plymouth; the loss of freeholds and Cost of 
Works payments. However, there were other concerns and objections to the 
Broadmead plan, including the possibility of flooding on the site and the poor quality 
of the subsoil for building, which added to the hostility of traders to the plan.  
 
The 1944 Act can therefore be seen as the root of the decline in support for 
reconstruction plans in blitzed cities, providing neither the financial support nor 
legislative tools promised to the cities in 1941 and 1942.  This marks the beginning 
of serious retrenchment on the part of central government in terms of blitzed city 
reconstruction, with the reasons for this course of action becoming apparent during 
1945 and 1946. The state of the British economy post-war directed spending away 
from blitzed city reconstruction, as will be discussed in Chapter Four. The 1944 Act 
marks the beginning of this retrenchment, as it became apparent that government 
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investment would be badly needed in other sectors of the economy which would 




Chapter 4 - Economic Constraints 1946-1950 
 
By the end of 1946 frustration was mounting in the three cities at the lack of progress 
in reconstruction. The public enquiries into the three cities plans had brought a 
certain amount of acceptance, if not support, for the plans amongst property owners 
and traders, and all were keen to see a start made on building. However, Britain’s 
precarious economic position throughout the late 1940s saw reconstruction of city 
centres become a low priority for central government and as a result blitzed cities 
faced an increasing number of obstacles and constraints. Materials and finance were 
strictly controlled by central government, with no allocations made to blitzed cites for 
city centre reconstruction until 1949, and then only token amounts.  
The cities faced increasing pressure from the Ministry of Town and Country 
planning to change and curtail their plans, with Bristol in particular finding Ministry 
support wavering in the face of economic pressures. In addition to this, new 
regulations regarding standing property and transport spending forced changes to 
some aspects of the plans, most notably in Exeter. The constraints placed on the 
cities by central government were not always obvious to property owners and 
traders, leading to conflict and further pressure to alter plans in order to rebuild more 
quickly.  
Against this background of conflict and constraint, some reconstruction work was 
progressing in other sectors, most notably housing. However, the pace of building 
could not match demand and the councils found themselves under fire from within, 
as political opponents saw an opportunity to attack the leadership in the three cities. 
At the same time, the progress in housing antagonised some city centre property 
owners and traders, who saw the progress in housing as an indication that materials 
and labour were freely available but were being withheld from them.  
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In 1947 new planning legislation was implemented, with the passing of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1947, which superseded much of the 1944 Act. This changed 
some of the planning principles that the three cities had been working under and also 
changed the basis of compensation to blitzed traders. The new legislation gave the 
three cities a wider range of tools for planning and reconstruction, but did cause 
some problems, most notably for Bristol, owing to new rules on the acquisition of 
land. The Act also required that all local planning authorities review the development 
needs of their area and produce a local plan, which meant that the blitzed cities had 
to review and extend their existing plans. Despite these obstacles, the three cities 
managed to secure compulsory purchase orders for city centre land, negotiate leases 
for sites and make a start on city centre reconstruction by 1949.  
 
Beginnings, Delays and Economic Constraints 
 
The immediate post-war years were characterised by a series of economic crises that 
severely restricted the nation’s attempts to rebuild, both economically and physically. 
The sudden end to the war in the Far East in August 1945, and the termination of the 
Lend-Lease agreement that came with this victory, left the economy reeling and 
disrupted the planned demobilisation of men and industry. Materials and labour were 
in short supply during the latter part of 1945 and 1946, with both restricted and 
directed by the Board of Trade. Building licences remained in place throughout the 
1940s to restrict building to the areas of greatest need, while separate licences were 
also required for restricted materials such as timber and steel. Further economic 
crises in 1947 and 1949, plus the rearmament programme necessitated by the 
Korean War, ensured that these restrictions remained in place into the next decade, 
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while continued shortages of building labour compounded the problems. The 
economic problems meant that city centre reconstruction was a low priority for central 
government in the first years of peace. The nation was spectacularly in debt and had 
been forced to divest itself of many of its assets by the United States government 
before it would extend assistance.544 There were also outstanding debts to 
Commonwealth nations who had been extended credit for war goods.  The nation’s 
non-war industry and its export market had been reduced during the war in order to 
concentrate on the war effort. As a result exports in 1945 were only 30% of the 1939 
level.545 Capital investment had generally been suspended during the war which, 
combined with war damage and the emphasis on war production, had left the 
nation’s infrastructure and industry in a poor state by August 1945.  
The government’s priorities were therefore to increase exports as quickly as 
possible in order to restore the nation’s fortunes and to invest in projects and 
infrastructure which would aid this. From the point of view of physical reconstruction, 
this meant that building work was restricted to industrial building and housing. 
Commercial buildings of other types, such as retail and office space, were not 
considered economic priorities, and therefore the rebuilding of bomb damaged town 
centres would have to wait.546  
 
At the end of hostilities in 1945, the restrictions on building work were not an 
immediate concern for blitzed cities. Only a few, such as Plymouth and Coventry, had 
completed their initial planning and all still had to go through the process of public 
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enquiries and  negotiating the purchase of the city centre land. Once the process of 
enquiries and land purchases had been undertaken, sites would have to be 
allocated, leases drawn up and the designs for new buildings submitted to local 
authorities. The initial restrictions on building were not, therefore, a major concern to 
blitzed cities as it was acknowledged that they would not be in a position to begin 
rebuilding for another eighteen months at least.  
In addition to this, it was recognised that the building industry and its 
subsidiary industries would need time to re-establish themselves. Labour and 
materials would be in short supply until demobilisation of both service personnel and 
industry was complete, which would act as a brake on building regardless.547 The 
nation still required large amounts of first-aid repair and building work to make 
houses habitable and restore industrial premises to a functional state, which would 
absorb much of the available building labour and materials. Although the building of 
retail and commercial buildings was prohibited, these other types of building were 
allowed to progress during 1945 and 1946.548 In most towns, the progress of housing 
would have been the most obvious symbol of the post-war reconstruction that had 
been promised. 
 
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all made good progress in housing between 1945 and 
1947. The advanced planning and site preparation undertaken in the three cities prior 
to the end of the war, as described in chapter two, had allowed a swift start in house 
building post-war. The cities were also in receipt of the prefabricated bungalows 
provided by the Temporary Housing Programme, which provided over 156,000 
bungalows to blitzed cities nationally in order to help house those whose homes had 
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been destroyed.549 These bungalows provided the fastest completion rate in the early 
post-war years, with Plymouth alone having completed 1,062 by December 1946.550  
Permanent house completions were also high in the three cities, with around 
3,000 houses completed by the end of 1947.551 However, this rate of completion 
could not keep up with demand, as the combination of war damage, the high rate of 
family creation and the wartime hiatus in building created a severe housing shortage. 
In 1945 the three cities had a collective housing waiting list of around eighteen 
thousand, rising to just over thirty-four thousand by 1947, dwarfing the housing 
completions.552 The slower-than-expected rate of housing completions reflected the 
immediate post-war shortages of labour and materials, which restricted building. The 
government had left in place the building licence system established during war in 
order to conserve and direct scarce resources, which meant that all work over £100 
required a government licence to proceed. Without a licence, it was not possible to 
obtain labour, materials or finance to build. City centre reconstruction was not 
considered a priority and as such no licences were approved for such building until 
much later. Despite the problems of labour and materials, the overall rate of 
construction of new municipal houses post-war far outstripped the construction rate 
seen immediately post-First World War, with 354, 188 permanent houses built 
nationally by 1948.553  
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The shortages of labour and materials were initially due to the transition between a 
wartime and peacetime economy. Labour was a particular problem in 1945 and 1946 
due to the number of men who had not yet been demobilised.554 In addition to this, 
those skilled in the building trades were in short supply more generally and worked 
under the direction of the Board of Trade. Bristol demonstrates both of these 
problems, with it being reported that the city had around half of the number of pre-war 
building operatives in 1945, while some 1,800 men had been allocated to building 
work in other cities.555 Building firms awarded tenders for priority housing work could 
apply for their workers to be released by the Board of Trade back to their home city, 
but there was no guarantee that the request would be granted. All three South 
Western cities used prisoner of war labour to help alleviate the labour shortage, with 
German and Italian labourers working on housing sites and infrastructure projects 
such as roads.556  
 
Labour continued to be a problem until the end of the decade, as the economic crisis 
of 1947 led to the redirection of labour away from areas considered non-essential to 
the nation’s economic recovery, including the construction industry.557 Originally the 
labour shortages were not expected to continue beyond the first years of peace, as it 
was expected that the demobilisation and post-demobilisation training of service 
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personnel would swell the labour force, particularly in the construction industry.558 
Instead some of this labour was directed to export industries, prolonging the labour 
shortage and retarding the reconstruction process.  
These shortages of labour were emphasised by all three cities applying to the 
Board of Trade for additional labour as ‘Areas of Special Need’. The cities had been 
declared ‘Areas of Special Need’ for housing in 1946 due to their ‘exceptional war 
damage’, giving them priority for materials and labour for housing.559 The MP for 
Plymouth Drake, Hubert Medland, enquired in March 1947 whether the South 
Western cities could apply for assistance from the Ministry of Works mobile labour 
force to ease the situation.560 At that stage the cities were denied this option, but after 
a deputation to the minister in May 1947 were granted an additional 500 men across 
the three cities to allow for more house building. 561 This ‘flying squad’ of additional 
labour demonstrates just how short of suitably trained operatives the country was, as 
this small number of men was all that could be spared to an area which was 
acknowledged to have serious housing difficulties. As such, labour for all types of 
building remained in short supply until the end of the decade, slowing all types of 
building work and adding to the frustrations of blitzed cities.  
 
In addition to the labour shortages, materials for building were also in short supply 
with timber and steel proving particularly problematic. Steel was an important export 
product and was being directed to these markets rather than towards building.562 
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Wood presented the opposite problem, as much of Britain’s timber needs were met 
through imports. At a time of great financial difficulties, imports were limited as much 
as possible in order to save precious dollars and resources, which meant wood for 
building was in short supply.563 Therefore any building system which could reduce 
the use of these two products was to be welcomed. The use of non-traditional, 
prefabricated methods of building was heavily encouraged by the government as a 
result.564 This also had the added benefit of easing the shortage of skilled building 
labour, as non-traditional houses could be built by unskilled labour. It became 
common practice to insist that local authorities accept a quota of non-traditional 
houses as part of their housing allocation in order to try to speed up construction.565 
In addition to saving skilled labour and traditional building materials, these methods 
could utilise waste materials from other industries and absorb some over-produced 
materials from war industries, such as aluminium.566 In the South West, the Cornish 
Unit system was a prime example of the former, making use of china clay waste to 
produce concrete.  
 
Although the shortage of labour was acknowledged by blitzed traders and property 
owners, the shortage of building materials was viewed as an excuse for delaying 
rebuilding by some, as demonstrated by a number of Exeter traders. The Chamber of 
Commerce attacked the City Council over the lack of progress in city centre building, 
stating that materials and labour were available but they were prevented from starting 
building by the lack of licences. 567 This view appears to have been circulating 
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amongst some citizens and political groups, with attacks on the licensing system 
appearing regularly across all local press outlets. A letter from the Ratepayers 
Association of Bristol again suggests that the licensing system was seen as way for 
local authorities to deliberately block building, particularly by private enterprise, rather 
than as a rationing system for materials.568 
 
Accusations that local authorities were lacking in drive and were deliberately 
dragging their feet over reconstruction also begin to circulate in this period, 
particularly in relation to the building of temporary shops. Alongside the accusations 
regarding building licences, the Exeter Chamber of Commerce also claimed that 
‘places like Bristol could get it done. It made them think that Exeter was behind the 
times as regards to drive’.569 However, at this stage Bristol City Council were still 
wrangling with the MTCP over their compulsory purchase orders and had not made 
any kind of start on building at all. A Plymouth Conservative councillor, Mr E. S 
Leatherby, made a similar claim with regard to rebuilding, stating that Exeter was 
building shops in brick while Plymouth was still proposing to erect temporary shops of 
concrete. He ‘could not understand why Exeter could build houses and shops of brick 
and cement’ while Plymouth could not.570 As demonstrated by the Exeter Chamber of 
Commerce, Exeter was not building brick shops. The city had applied for temporary 
shops in late 1946, but they were not approved by the MTCP until January 1948, 
leaving Exeter in the same position as Plymouth during this time.571 
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 The general complaints about the slow pace of building, both in housing and 
central areas, across all groups from traders to councillors demonstrates a surprising 
level of ignorance about the economic situation which was causing the shortages of 
materials and labour. There appears to have been little understanding of the export 
drive that was directing goods away from home markets, including building materials, 
and the opposite need to conserve imports.  
 
1946 had proved to be a more stable economic year than 1945, with the steady 
demobilisation of men and industry yielding increases in industrial output and 
exports. The loss of Lend-Lease assistance was tempered by the USA extending a 
line of credit to the UK on reasonably generous terms. This, combined with a loan 
from Canada, helped the UK to import the goods it needed in terms of food and raw 
materials, which in turn helped to stabilise the economy.572  
However, 1947 saw a fresh crisis. As part of the terms of the financial 
agreement with the USA, the UK was expected to make sterling fully convertible by 
July 1947. 573 With the dollar area being the main source of goods and raw materials 
for the war-ravaged areas, there was a shortage of dollars in many economies. In 
contrast, a number of nations held a surplus of sterling as a result of the war. The 
end product was a run on the UKs dollar reserves once sterling was made fully 
convertible, causing serious problems with the nation’s ability to pay for imported 
goods. Convertibility was suspended within a month and the nation’s imports had to 
be slashed to save dollars, while exports needed to increase rapidly in order to 
restore equilibrium to the balance of payments.574 In addition to this, the loans 
                                                          
572 For detailed breakdown see Cairncross, Years of Recovery, chapter 5 ‘The American Loan’ pp.88-
120 ; Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, p.194. 
573 Pollard, Ibid p.194. 
574 Cairncross, The Years of Recovery, pp.141-142. 
213 
 
extended by the USA and Canada were running out, and the nation was not yet in a 
position to fully support itself. A programme of extensive cuts was proposed in 
August 1947, which slashed import expenditure, curtailed labour movement and 
restricted both private and public investment.575  
 
The impact of this on reconstruction was the further rationing of materials essential to 
building, such as steel and timber. House building was restricted for several years 
from 1947, with even building with non-traditional systems limited, and priority given 
to housing for rural and industrial areas.576 The former was partially connected to the 
need to reduce exports, as agriculture was heavily encouraged and supported to 
produce higher yields in order to save on imports. Providing housing for agricultural 
workers therefore became a priority, along with housing for those involved in the 
major industries, such as steel, coal and manufactures such as cars.577 The 
restrictions on labour saw all labour for essential industries allocated via labour 
exchanges, while reductions in manpower were effected in economic sectors 
considered ‘non-essential’, including housing and energy.578  
The reductions in building labour and the direction of all building resources to 
specific areas of housing and industrial building further insured that city centre 
reconstruction remained on hold, conserving labour, materials, investment and 
spending in the process. The seriousness of the situation was impressed on local 
authorities at the Town and Country Planning Conference in October 1947, when the 
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Treasury stated that city centre reconstruction was ‘a luxury and labour must be 
reserved for other work’.579 As such, local authorities were advised to ‘use the crisis 
and hiatus in work it brought’ to finalise plans, begin negotiating leases for sites and 
prioritise groundwork so that building could begin directly once the economic 
situation eased. 580 
 
Despite this rather bleak national picture, traders repeatedly blamed local 
authorities for the slow pace of city centre reconstruction, believing that it was local 
authorities rather than the Board of Trade that were refusing building licences. The 
economic situation was widely publicised through both the national and local press, 
making it difficult to understand why traders had not grasped the root of the problem. 
It could be argued that the economic composition of the three cities contributed to 
this disconnect, as they were not manufacturing bases for principal export products. 
As such, the three cities could be considered as out of touch with the situation.  
However, Bristol City Council initiated an export drive in the city by compiling a 
prospectus of exporting firms for potential markets in the Americas and undamaged 
European markets, demonstrating awareness of the situation. In Exeter, a firm of 
stationers, Wheaton’s, wrote a letter to the Board of Trade via the City Council 
highlighting its own small export trade. Wheaton’s hoped that in doing this materials 
and investment would be made available for city centre reconstruction, as they stated 
that many small firms had similar export trades and could aid the national export 
drive if given the opportunity.581 Certainly some traders did understand the situation, 
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as the Exeter firm of Bruford’s demonstrated with a letter to the Express and Echo. 
The owners had questioned Exeter City Council with regard to the current 
reconstruction situation and established that the delays regarding building licenses 
were due to the Board of Trade, not the Council. They also highlighted the export 
drive and its absorption of materials such as steel away from rebuilding projects as 
the reason for the refusals. Like Wheaton’s, Bruford’s also alluded to the contribution 
that small firms could make to the nation’s wealth if allowed to rebuild.582  
By the end of 1948 the complaints about building licences and the lack of 
materials were being directed toward the government, suggesting that eventually an 
understanding of the situation was reached. By this time the allocation of sites and 
negotiation of leases was also well underway, which may have helped to reassure 
traders that they would be able to build again in the near future. The battles which the 
three city councils went through with the MTCP with regard to compulsory purchase 
orders and the wider plans may also have helped to underline the impact with the 
national economic situation had on reconstruction.  
 
The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act and the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning 
 
The economic crisis of 1947 and its impact saw the advice to blitzed cities remain 
unchanged; ‘continue your planning for reconstruction, so that a start might be made 
as soon as possible’.583 Blitzed cities were still trying to acquire the land required for 
reconstruction and found a change in the planning legislation and the economic crisis 
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of 1947 creating obstructions to this. The three cities also suffered objections to their 
plans from the MTCP, despite previous support for them, and had difficulty gaining 
approval for them. Additionally, other aspects of their plans fell victim to the economic 
constraints, as the Ministry of Transport refused to fund some road plans, while new 
government guidelines prevented the demolition of some standing property. 
However, there were some advances, with the 1947 Act providing a better framework 
for planning and changed the basis of compensation to property owners, easing 
some problems in this direction.  
 
 Blitzed cities had been promised a more complete reform of planning legislation 
since the passing of the 1944 Act. The 1944 Act had provided a framework for 
dealing with war damage, but was acknowledged as only addressing some of the 
problems facing local authorities.584 The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act 
provided the reform of planning law which had been promised since the release of 
the Uthwatt Report in 1942. The major change it enacted was the revoking of 
development rights for land owners. Under the previous planning acts, land owners 
were free to develop their land however they saw fit, with exceptions only being in 
place for urban areas and those within planning schemes.585 The 1947 act dissolved 
this right and made all land subject to planning permission.  
The previous right to claim compensation when a planning application was 
turned down was also dissolved with this clause, relieving local authorities of one of 
the main financial and logistical burdens of previous planning acts.586 A fund of £300 
million was provided to compensate land owners for the loss of their development 
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rights and the development value of their land. The present development value of 
land was to be assessed and compensation paid for the loss of this value, with all 
claims to be handled by a new Central Land Board.587 Compensation would no 
longer be paid when planning permission was refused, lifting one of the heaviest 
burdens on local authorities, and a development charge had to be paid on all 
developments.  
 
The 1947 Act also required all planning authorities to produce development plans for 
their area which would review and set out future development needs, such as 
housing and roads, and proposals for meeting those needs. The Act simplified the 
planning landscape by making county councils and county boroughs solely 
responsible for planning. This reduced the number of planning authorities in Britain 
from 1441 to 145 as the smaller district and town councils lost their planning powers. 
In order to maintain the input from these smaller councils, the Act allowed the county 
planning authorities to devolve some planning powers to the smaller district councils. 
However, only the county planning authorities were able to raise funds for replanning 
and redevelopment and all schemes still had to be approved by the Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning (MTCP). Joint authorities could also still be formed, as had 
been possible under the interwar planning acts, to allow for co-operative planning 
schemes across county borders.588  
 
The Act gave local authorities wider powers of compulsory purchase as it allowed 
them to designate land required for development within the next ten years. Local 
authorities could also purchase larger amounts of land, as they were no longer 
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required to purchase just land ‘in an area of comprehensive development’, but also 
any other land the authority had earmarked for a particular purpose to ensure its 
development according to the plan.589 In addition to the wider powers of purchase, 
local authorities were extended a number of other powers to control land and building 
use. They could issue orders to desist development in order to protect landscapes, 
buildings and natural features and could also order the discontinuation of existing 
uses for buildings.590 They were now empowered to order the demolition or alteration 
of any building on planning grounds, a clause which later caused some controversy 
when local authorities began demolishing standing property in order to build new 
road systems in the late 1950s and 1960s.591  
 
A small but significant change was to public enquiries. Under the new Act, property 
owners had the right to request a public enquiry into any planning application which 
affected their property and the Minister of Town and Country Planning was obliged to 
hold the enquiry before confirming the planning order.592 This differed from the 1944 
Act which had made public enquiries mandatory for any planning scheme which 
required the compulsory purchase of land.593 Within the existing planning literature 
the major public enquiries into post-war reconstruction plans are sometimes referred 
to as being ‘forced’ by traders and property owners or being a ‘highly choreographed’ 
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public show.594 Articles appearing in the local press about traders calling for public 
enquiries, which can be found in the Exeter and Bristol papers, appear to support this 
view.595 However, the major public enquiries into post-war reconstruction plans were 
held prior to the 1947 Act coming into force in July 1948 and the enquiries were 
instead held under the requirements of the 1944 Act. This is a subtle difference, but it 
does change the emphasis of the narrative of reconstruction. Within the traditional 
narrative, reconstruction plans were unpopular and forced upon a reluctant public 
with little consultation. The enquiries are held up as evidence of this, as traders and 
property owners had to ‘force’ an enquiry to have their views heard.596 This was not 
the case for the majority of post-war reconstruction plans as the requirement for a 
public enquiry was written into the 1944 Act.  Instead the local authority had to open 
up their schemes to scrutiny and objections to ensure that the views of all interested 
parties were heard and evaluated. This moved the narrative from one of ‘top down’ 
planners to a more inclusive and consultative process.  
 
The 1947 Act also made better financial provisions for compulsory purchase of land, 
with loan relief grants of up to 90% of the loan charges made available to local 
authorities for the first five years of the loan and reduced relief for a further five 
years.597 The dissolving of development rights also meant that the ‘development 
value’ of land was removed, which had the effect of steadying land prices as land 
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would be sold at the ‘current use value’.598 As the inflation of land values through 
‘development value’ would be neutralized, the Treasury was more comfortable with 
providing grants for land as planning would no longer cause a spike in land values.  
The 1947 Act also changed the basis of compensation to blitzed property 
owners, allowing local authorities to acquire land and property at the current market 
value, rather than the 1939 value. Where a local plan required the compulsory 
acquisition of land, property could be acquired at market value, which was assessed 
as if the property was undamaged. In these circumstances a ‘Converted Value 
Payment’ was made, where the Value Payment which had been due to the property 
owner was diverted to the local authority to partially compensate them for the cost of 
purchase.599 This tackled the grievance voiced by so many property owners that the 
1939 standard did not reflect the increase in land values in the intervening years and 
partially solved the problem of the discrepancy between the Cost of Works and Value 
Payments. It did not entirely solve the problem, as some property owners still felt that 
they should have been entitled to Cost of Works payments and were unhappy at the 
terms of leases being offered. Exeter provides an example of the problems with local 
authorities still faced, with one trader who was due a payment of £45,000 for their 
site stating that with that money he would ‘leave the city and so would any trader who 
would not put money into a leasehold property’.600 The payment of market value did 
not guarantee that traders would be willing to rebuild on new sites.   
 
The 1947 Act represented a radical shift in both planning and property legislation, 
with all subsequent planning legislation taking its cue from the principles of the 1947 
Act. The questions of land ownership and land values had been under consideration 
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since the mid-nineteenth century, particularly by the Liberals, as land represented the 
basis of much wealth and income which went virtually untaxed. Land taxes of varying 
sorts were under discussion from the 1880s onwards and the question of land values 
and ownership continued throughout the interwar period. 601 Both the Liberal and 
Labour parties had pursued ideas about land taxes during the interwar period, with 
the Labour party eventually advocating the nationalisation of land.602 
  
The absolute rights of landowners over development had caused a myriad of 
problems with urban sprawl and industrial development throughout the interwar 
period, which were only partially solved by the various planning acts of the period. As 
discussed in Chapter One, landowners could develop their land however they saw fit, 
regardless of the suitability of the development or the needs of the area. The 
planning acts of the interwar years had not solved this problem, as development was 
only restricted where a planning scheme was in operation; outside of the schemes 
boundaries, there were no restrictions on development. The 1935 Restriction of 
Ribbon Development Act had attempted to curb urban sprawl outside of planning 
schemes, but again only tackled part of the problem. In addition to this, local 
authorities were also liable to pay compensation to a landowner when development 
was refused. This onerous burden on local authorities made them reluctant to restrict 
development even where they could. The 1947 Act removed all of these problems by 
dissolving development rights and removing the right to compensation when planning 
permission was refused. This represented a major shift in the way land ownership 
was viewed, as property rights had been seen as sacrosanct; an Englishman had 
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complete liberty over his property.   The removal of this complete liberty represented 
a shift away from individualism towards land as a public commodity, to be used and 
developed according to the public good. This may well have been seen as the first 
step towards both land nationalisation and the dissolving of private property, 
particularly as the Labour Party manifesto of 1945 stated that the party believed in 
land nationalisation and would work toward this aim. The 1947 Act with its wider 
powers of public acquisition of land and stance of the Labour Party with its 
programme of nationalisation for industry and transport would have reinforced the 
fears of property owners and traders.  
 
A further clause of the 1947 Act levied a development, or ‘betterment’ charge on all 
land development. This charge was set at 100% of the increase in value stemming 
from development and was again considered a radical step. The idea of the 
development charge was not new, with the Land Tax of 1910 representing an early 
attempt to tax increases in land value, but had not been seriously pursued since. The 
betterment charge was intended to insure that the public benefitted from the 
increases in land values produced by development, but was considered a 
disincentive to develop, with the National Federation of Property Owners stating it 
was ‘the greatest ever deterrent to the development of building and industry’.603  
However, the Central Land Board noted that after initial difficulties, the system 
worked well and producing a good return. The development charge was also not 
applicable to building undertaken in reconstruction zones resulting from war damage, 
and was not therefore applicable to any of the reconstruction undertaken in the three 
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cities.604 Despite this, the reconstruction and the restrictions placed on building by 
central government and the 1947 Act were viewed as an attack on private property 
and enterprise, as expressed by some traders and property owners in the three 
cities.  
 
The changes brought in by the 1947 Act caused some problems for blitzed cities in 
terms of acquiring land. Initially the three cities had applied for permission to buy land 
under the 1944 Act, but all actually acquired it under the 1947 Act. The differences 
between the two acts, such as the right to acquire blitzed land and the right to 
acquire land for planning purposes, sometimes caused conflict between the Councils 
and the MTCP. The economic problems of 1947 caused further conflict, particularly in 
Bristol, as the MTCP came under pressure from the Treasury to curtail land 
purchases. As a result, the three cities found themselves having to defend their plans 
afresh to the Ministry and parts of all three plans were cut as cost-saving measures.  
Despite the public enquiries being held in the spring and early summer of 
1946, the three cities did not know whether their declaratory areas for land, or their 
plans as a whole, would be approved by the MTCP. The reluctance of the MTCP to 
approve plans and to grant CPOs helped delay the commencement of reconstruction 
work in all blitzed cities, with objections being raised to most plans from mid-1946 
onwards. This often came as a surprise to the blitzed cities, as prior to this the MTCP 
had been supportive of the majority of plans. Plymouth and Bristol were both subject 
to Ministry objections and their plans were not officially approved until 1947, and 
even then reluctantly. The cities also seem to have been caught between the MTCP 
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and the Treasury, which was applying pressure on the MTCP to reduce the cost of 
reconstruction by not approving CPOs.  
 
The three cities had all applied for Declaratory Area Orders in 1945 and 1946, 
outlining the land required for their reconstruction schemes. The public enquiries of 
1946 had examined both the plans and the Orders to test whether the land requested 
was necessary to the plans, and that the plans were fit for purpose. Both Exeter and 
Plymouth were granted their full Declaratory Areas Orders, while Bristol had its 
Declaratory Area cut by around a third.605  
Bristol City Council had applied for a very large Declaratory Area Order of 771 
acres, plus two CPOs for central areas land. The Declaratory Area covered nearly 
the whole of the centre of the city, on the basis that the war damage was widespread, 
and this had led to accusations from traders and property owners that the City 
Council was effecting a ‘land grab’, as they felt that the Act did not allow for such a 
large area of land to be bought. They suggested that only 67 acres of land in the very 
heart of the city could be considered ‘blitzed’ and that only these should be acquired. 
606  The MTCP trod a middle line, upholding the objection that not all of the land 
applied for was war damaged and consenting to only around a third of the original 
Declaratory Order.607 The areas excluded from the orders were considered not to be 
‘areas of extensive war damage’ and therefore were not subject to the process laid 
out in the 1944 Act, with the Ministry suggested that the Council could apply for the 
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rest of the land under the forthcoming 1947 Act.608 The CPOs became an ongoing 
problem for the City Council as they attempted to convince the MTCP of the 
necessity of the whole application being granted in order to carry out their plans. The 
main reason the City Council was anxious to acquire all the land for their proposed 
city centre reconstruction plan was trader opposition to the Broadmead scheme. 
Traders had made it clear that they would only accept the plan to move the shopping 
centre to Broadmead and convert the current shopping area to a civic centre if the 
scheme was carried out as a whole.609 They were not prepared to see a piecemeal 
scheme which would result in traders having to move sites to then see their original 
site returned to retail purposes. The 1947 Act would allow the Council to acquire all 
the land needed for the whole reconstruction scheme as the Act made provision for 
local authorities to acquire all the land required for planning purposes as laid out in a 
comprehensive development plan.610  
However, the Act contained the stipulation that land thus earmarked must be 
acquired within ten years of the plan being adopted. This particular clause was 
interpreted by the MTCP to mean that land must be acquired and developed within 
ten years, which put blitzed cities like Bristol in a difficult position. The Treasury and 
the MTCP made it clear to Bristol that they thought it unlikely that blitzed cities would 
be able to rebuild within the next eight years, and therefore the use of the 1947 Act to 
acquire land for reconstruction was impossible.611 Bristol may have been an unusual 
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case, but the city does highlight the problems that blitzed cities faced with planning 
legislation and the attitude of the MTCP throughout the 1940s.  
 
The granting of the Declaratory Areas was only the first step toward rebuilding, with 
Compulsory Purchase Orders needing to be granted to allow the acquisition of land. 
The three cities had applied for the first of these in mid-1946 and had all hoped to 
see them granted swiftly once the MTCP had made its decisions on the Declaratory 
Areas. However, the process of granting CPOs was far from smooth, with all three 
cities encountering objections from the Ministry to their overall plans. As both 
Plymouth and Bristol had originally been praised by the Ministry for their plans, and 
thought they had their support, this came as a shock. In Exeter’s case, the objections 
were to specific aspects of the plans rather that the overall vision for the city, which 
made revisions simpler. Throughout 1947 the three cities worked to have their plans 
approved by the MTCP, a process which slowed reconstruction and frustrated the 
councils and citizens alike.  
 
Plymouth was the first city nationally to have its plan approved in August 1947, 
sixteen months after the public enquiry of 1946. The MTCP had internally raised 
concerns about the Plan for Plymouth in April 1946, shortly before the city’s public 
enquiry had been held.612 The timing of the objections suggests that it may have 
been a review of the plan ahead of the enquiry which first aroused concern at the 
scope, and cost, of the Plan for Plymouth. The enquiry did not allay those fears, as 
the MTCP and the Ministry of Transport called a meeting with Plymouth City Council 
in December 1946 to discuss concerns about the road layouts and the size of the 
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shopping centre. The Ministry of Transport was unhappy with the proposed road 
width of 175 feet for the new north-south axis road, which they felt was excessive, 
while the MTCP felt that the Council had over-allocated land for shopping purposes. 
Both of these concerns were also raised by local trade groups and the reduction in 
road widths has previously been attributed to their objections. 613 The supposed over-
allocation of the shopping district had been raised at the public enquiry, but the need 
to re-site businesses from the Devonport shopping district due to the expansion of 
the Dockyard had been overlooked.614 The two Ministries continued to raise these 
objections well into 1947 before eventually approving the plan in August 1947 after 
the City Council had agreed to narrow the north-south axis road.  
 
The approval was similar to that which was later given to Bristol, in that it was worded 
more as an acceptance that the Council could proceed as it wished, despite the 
Ministry’s misgivings and better judgement. The long period of objections and the 
reluctant approval of the plan was at odds with the MTCPs approval of the first two of 
Plymouth’s CPOs, which were approved in October 1946, ten months before the 
Ministry approved the plan.615 It is unclear why they chose to allow Plymouth to 
proceed with the compulsory purchase of land, only to object to the plan itself two 
months later. There is some suggestion, however, that the Ministry was coming 
under pressure from other government departments to curtail or delay reconstruction, 
as they began regularly to raise objections to reconstruction plans from the end of 
1946. The case of Bristol demonstrates this more clearly, as there the Council 
specifically attributes the objections to their plan to the Treasury.  
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Bristol found itself in a similar situation to Plymouth, with the MTCP suddenly raising 
objections to their plan in December 1946 and curtailing the declaratory order to a 
third of the land requested.616 Prior to this, the Minister himself, Lewis Silkin, had 
indicated that the Ministry was satisfied with Bristol’s plan and they would be given 
permission to proceed shortly, so the sudden change in attitude came as a shock to 
the Council.617 At a meeting between Council and MTCP representatives on 10th 
February 1947, the Ministry indicated a number of aspects of Bristol’s plan it was 
unhappy with, many of which were similar in character to those raised at Plymouth. 
The Ministry of Transport was unhappy with the road proposals, while the MTCP 
objected to the relocation of the shopping centre and the proposed redevelopment of 
Wine Street as a Civic Centre. As with Plymouth, the MTCP felt that the Council had 
over-allocated land for retail use, and the Broadmead area was unnecessary as a 
result.618 At the same time, the Ministry indicated that they were not prepared to allow 
the purchase of large parcels of land by Bristol City Council, as they felt that the land 
could not be developed in the near future, and therefore the Council did not need to 
acquire it.619  
This ran against the Council’s interpretation of the 1944 Act and the previous 
Ministry advice of ‘plan boldly’, which had suggested that councils should acquire city 
centre land in one parcel in order to undertake comprehensive rather than piecemeal 
reconstruction. Bristol City Council felt that the Ministry’s attitude was forcing them 
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back to the piecemeal solution, something which was further underlined in April 1947 
when their CPO application for land at Bedminster for a trading estate was also 
severely curtailed from 22 to 5 acres.620 This would restrict the planned relocation 
and expansion of some of Bristol’s industries from the city centre, which in turn would 
have an impact on the relocation of the shopping centre to Broadmead. As with 
Plymouth, the Ministry stated in March 1947 that they would not raise any further 
objections to the Broadmead plan if the city was determined to execute it.621 
However, the MTCP was still unhappy with the Councils proposed use of the Wine 
Street area and insisted on two further public enquiries into the CPOs for the area, 
preventing any progress until 1949.622  
 
The Planning and Reconstruction Committee ascribed the Ministry’s change in 
attitude toward planning to Treasury pressure; 
 “It seemed evident that Treasury interests rather than planning interests were 
going to control any action that could be taken locally in the immediate future, and 
that because of this there would be no great enthusiasm at the London level to 
approve any plan for the central area at this stage, but rather to play a delaying 
action by raising point after point, each involving further research, further plans and 
further discussion”623 
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This position was further underlined in July 1947, when the Planning and 
Reconstruction Committee again emphasised the Treasury involvement in refusing 
the city’s CPOs and proposed plans.624 The Treasury was responsible for the loans 
which were available to blitzed cities for purchasing land for reconstruction. More 
importantly, blitzed cities were also entitled to relief on the interest for the first ten 
years of the loan, which the Treasury bore the cost of. It seems that as a result the 
Treasury was reluctant to see large CPOs granted to blitzed cities owing to the cost. 
The refusal to allow large CPOs or a CPO for land which could not be developed 
quickly was a partial solution to this problem. Bristol had initially been denied the 
CPO for the blitzed land at Wine Street, as the proposed civic buildings would not be 
approved for many years. As such it was judged as land which could not be 
developed within ten years, was therefore non-essential to the city plan and did not 
need to be acquired at the present time.  
By restricting what local authorities could acquire to ‘manageable’ pieces of 
land which were capable of development within ten years, the Treasury could restrict 
its expenditure on loans and loan relief. This curtailment of expenditure was part of 
the wider economic picture and reflected the worsening financial and economic 
climate of Britain from 1947. The delays in granting CPOs were part of the reduction 
in spending seen from August 1947, as without a CPO local authorities could not 
acquire city centre land and building could not progress. 
 
The MTCP and the Ministry of Transport also raised objections to specific aspects of 
the reconstruction plans, with features of all three plans falling to the axe of 
government spending. In addition to cost-cutting measures, new restrictions on 
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building and the demolition of standing property came into effect in 1947 which stated 
that no building less than 30 years old which was still capable of use could be 
demolished.625 At the same time the demolition of housing capable of use was 
prohibited, as the housing crisis was still acute and cuts to labour and spending were 
reducing the completion rate of new houses.  
This shift in policy created problems for all three cities and changed aspects of 
their plans, with only Plymouth’s plan remaining mostly intact.  The line of Exeter’s 
new pedestrian way had to be altered due to the Exeter Co-Operative Building on the 
corner of Paris Street and High Street which fell within the 30 year rule, having been 
built in 1937.626 The building blocked the end of the proposed pedestrian way and 
prevented it from opening out onto a proposed new city square. The retention of this 
building has previously been attributed to the Co-Operative pressuring the City 
Council, but the records reveal that it had to be retained under the new guidelines.627 
Likewise in Plymouth a car showroom and the Odeon cinema both had to be retained 
as they were less than 30 years old, altering the plan around them. The car 
showroom was eventually marooned in a car park.628 The offices of the Western 
Morning News also had to be incorporated into the new plan, altering the building line 
of New George Street.629   
                                                          
625 DHC, 5895 City Architects Papers, Box 22 Dr Schwartz’s report & CARS File No.1 – Central Areas 
Reconstruction: ‘Report of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning Conference on Reconstruction 
Problems, 23rd and 24th October 1947’, p.4. 
626 Devon & Exeter Institution, Exeter Co-Operative and Industrial Society Limited, ‘Souvenir of the 
New Central Premises, opened June 19th 1937’,  
627 Tait and While, ‘Exeter and the Question of Thomas Sharp’s Physical Legacy’, p.82 ; DHC, Exeter 
City Council Minutes: Planning Committee, 22 June 1948. 
628 BBC ‘Help Building Tell its Story’, 2 December 2009 - 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/devon/hi/people_and_places/history/newsid_8390000/8390393.stm 
accessed on 25/5/2018. 
629 PWDRO, 1673/12 Plymouth Reconstruction File: Compulsory Purchase Order No.2 1946-1947: 
Letter from the District Valuer to the Inland Revenue re draft compulsory purchase order no.2, 15 
August 1946; ‘Town and Country Planning Act 1944: Public inquiry...into the Plymouth Corporation’s 
application for confirmation of a compulsory purchase order affecting certain lands in the area 
declared by the Minister by the City of Plymouth (City Centre) Declaratory Order 1946 to be subject to 
compulsory purchase’, p.2.  
232 
 
In Bristol, the decision not to approve the full CPO for the proposed 
Bedminster trading estate may also have been due to the new demolition rules, as 
the site included housing. Bristol City Council had earmarked the houses for slum 
clearance, but the MTCP stated that the houses were fit for habitation and should not 
be demolished.630 This decision slightly pre-dates the restrictions on demolition, so 
cannot be directly attributed to them, but the concern about housing shortages 
certainly appears to have been a factor and the Ministry may have been acting in 
accordance with Ministry of Health advice ahead of the new restrictions. 
 
Roads were often the most prominent victim of government retrenchment due to the 
large subsidies for road building provided by Ministry of Transport. The focus on 
industrial reconstruction meant that railway and trunk road improvement were more 
of a priority than city ring roads, as an improved national transport system was a 
benefit to industry and economy in a way urban roads were not.631 As a result, road 
plans were often pruned to make them cheaper to build and maintain.  
Exeter’s proposed city-centre bypass was the victim of Ministry cuts to road 
expenditure, with the route for the bypass proving too technical and expensive. 
Sharp’s bypass route around the northern side of the city centre ran along a steep 
valley next to the London and South Western Railway lines into Central Station, 
where it would dip under Queen Street, and continue steeply down to the river to join 
the major river crossing.632 The route would have involved building tunnels, 
demolishing much standing property and creating several major interchanges. The 
                                                          
630 WDP ‘Another Bristol Plan Cut’, 13 June 1947; M/BCC/PREC/1/2 Planning and Reconstruction 
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233 
 
City Engineer initially expressed some disquiet over the proposed route, which he felt 
would be difficult to build and costly to maintain, and he redesigned some aspects of 
it in 1946.633 The Ministry of Transport was cautiously supportive of the scheme, but 
also expressed concern at the cost and difficulty of the proposed route.634 They 
suggested an alternative route to the south of the city centre utilising the existing 
street of Southernhay, which would be easier and cheaper to develop. However, 
Southernhay was the largest remaining Georgian part of the city and the City Council 
was keen to preserve it. They identified an area of undeveloped land behind 
Southernhay which had been protected from development by a planning scheme pre-
war, and suggested an alternative route through it to the Ministry, who accepted it.635  
The need to save money and resources was ultimately the main driver in re-
routing the bypass, with the new route also rendering a proposed new square 
superfluous in the Ministry’s opinion. The square was originally designed as a traffic 
interchange for the bypass; without the bypass the Ministry felt that a simple 
crossroads would suffice and refused to pay for the square. 636  As a result, two major 
features of the Sharp plan, the square and the northern bypass, were removed. The 
changes to Bristol and Plymouth’s road plans were often indirectly achieved via the 
refusal of CPOs for the necessary land, but still achieved the aim of reducing costs.  
 
The restrictions on demolishing buildings and on expenditure also altered the three 
cities’ proposals for public and civic buildings. The development of theatres, public 
halls and civic buildings was not permitted until the late 1950s, and then only under 
                                                          
633 DHC, Exeter City Council Replanning Committee Minutes January 1943-December 1946, 18 
February 1946; 20 February 1946; 25 February 1946. 
634 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes: Planning Committee Special Meeting – Inner By-Pass Road, 10 
February 1949.  
635 DHC, 5871 City Planning Officers Files Box 1: ‘Report of the Proposed Inner By-Pass Road’, 
February 1949, p.6. 
636 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes: Planning Committee, 26 July 1949. 
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special circumstances. Plans for new theatres featured in both Exeter and Plymouth’s 
plans, while the revised plan for the Wine Street area in Bristol included a new 
swimming pool and library. All three cities proposed new public halls for concerts and 
public meetings, and Bristol and Exeter also wanted to build new museums. The 
restrictions on spending ensured that none of these buildings emerged in the post-
war era, with many of the plans dropped entirely. Exeter’s theatre plan was a further 
victim of the revised bypass route, as the original northern route would have 
necessitated the demolition of the existing Theatre Royal. The new southern route 
spared the existing building, but ensured that the new theatre was not forthcoming. In 
all three cities the demolition of property was hotly debated, with objections to the 
demolition of standing property coming from local people as well as being contested 
by government.637 It was, however, the restrictions on demolition that ensured that 
some buildings remained standing and ensured that the new public buildings could 
be refused on both cost and current provision grounds.  
 
The economic crises of the late 1940s were therefore the main factor in changes to 
city centre reconstruction plans and the long delays in starting building. The 
Treasury’s need to restrict expenditure made them reluctant to see CPOs granted in 
blitzed cities, which stalled the progress of reconstruction. Likewise, the same need 
saw the Ministry of Transport refuse permission for road schemes, resulting in 
significant changes to reconstruction plans. Similar issues to those of Bristol and 
Exeter were seen in Southampton, Portsmouth, Coventry and Hull, were objections 
to road schemes and refusals of CPOs similarly curtailed or changed plans.638  At the 
same time, restrictions on labour and materials meant that even if blitzed cities had 
                                                          
637 Western Morning News, ‘Stop Demolitions and Get on With Building’ 2 December 1947. 
638 Hasegawa, ‘Attitude of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning Towards Blitzed Cities in 1940s 
Britain’, pp.273-278; Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and Labour politics, pp.37-38. 
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their plans and CPOs approved, they were still unable to obtain the necessary 
resources to begin building.  
 
Negotiation of Leases and the Commencement of Building 
 
The process of allocating sites and negotiating leases was sometimes fraught, as 
there were still difficulties with finance for building and the setting of rents for sites. 
The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act had revised the values at which local 
authorities could acquire property to current market levels, but there was still no 
additional financial aid for rebuilding. There had also been no revision of the 
compensation payments, as owners still could not claim a Cost of Works payment if 
they were forced to move sites. The bitterness felt at the loss of freeholds was still 
present, with the payment of current values little comfort to property owners.639  
The leases themselves caused some bad feeling, as local authorities were 
required to set ground rents at current market values which some traders and trade 
groups felt added insult to injury. Traders had initially been led to believe that those 
affected by bombing would be afforded a low rent in recognition of their suffering, so 
the combination of market-level rents and leasehold tenure caused some anger as 
blitzed traders felt they were bearing an unreasonable financial burden in 
reconstruction.640  In Exeter, the immediate commencement of rent payments once a 
lease was completed caused particular bad feeling as lessees would be unable to 
build in the foreseeable future. As such, they were paying rent on sites which were 
                                                          
639 Western Morning News, ‘Shop Rents Grievance at Exeter’, 7 December 1948. 
640 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 – Central Areas Reconstruction Group1 1948-1950, 
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not producing an income.641 The City Council explained that it too was paying 
charges on unproductive sites, as they were liable for loan repayments as soon as 
they site was acquired, not when it became productive; the argument was not 
appreciated.642  
 
Despite the difficulties of finance and rents, leases for the major city centre sites were 
agreed by 1949 in Exeter and Plymouth and by 1950 in Bristol. Building work 
commenced in Plymouth in 1947 and in Exeter in 1949 with the laying of the new 
streets. The end of 1949 also saw the first small allocations of building materials to 
blitzed cities, and the erection of new buildings began in earnest in 1950. Bristol was 
slightly slower off the mark, owing to the ongoing problems with MTCP objections to 
their plans, but building commenced in 1951. All three cities also built and let 
temporary shops prior to 1950, providing much-needed retail accommodation in the 
city centres.  
 
The allocation of sites had been discussed since the blitz in all three cities, with 
traders wanting assurances that they would be offered sites close to their original 
ones.643 In Bristol this was not possible with the shifting of the shopping centre to 
Broadmead, but Plymouth and Exeter City Councils attempted to meet this request 
as far as possible.  
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Western Morning News, ‘Replanning Plymouth’ 30 January 1942. 
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In Exeter this was more easily achieved, as the street pattern was not hugely 
altered and traders could be kept within the vicinity of their original site. Exeter City 
Council’s experiences in negotiating sites and leases demonstrate many of the 
problems which local authorities faced and the ways in which they were handled. The 
city also challenges some of the accepted narratives regarding the place of multiple 
stores and finance companies in reconstruction. There is a perception that city centre 
leases were only affordable for ‘big business’ as the larger concerns were prepared 
to pay high rents in order to secure prime sites, forcing rents beyond the means of 
the smaller traders.644 This narrative has evidently arisen from the predominance of 
national concerns as eventual builders of reconstructed cities, which gives the 
impression that multiples and finance companies dominated the new city centres. 
However, the actual process of offering sites to potential lessees and the shift in 
tenure seen in all city centres post-war present a different view.  
 
All three cities kept a record of which businesses were bombed out and set out to 
accommodate all such businesses within their new city centres. They also surveyed 
blitzed traders about their post-war needs, although not all traders responded, and an 
initial site plans was drawn up in against the stated space requirements. Since many 
traders had stated that they would require bigger sites post-war, the new city centres 
took account of this, hence the expanded centres and the decision to move Bristol’s 
shopping area to Broadmead. The three cities also gave blitzed traders priority in site 
allocations, with pre-war city traders getting next priority for any vacant or refused 
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sites, and incoming firms only being offered sites once all existing traders had been 
dealt with.  
Exeter drew up such an allocation plan in 1946 ahead of the public enquiry 
and evidently circulated it to the blitzed traders, as traders knew where they were to 
be offered sites under the new city centre layout. 645  The banks, Marks and Spencer, 
the traders on the north side of the High Street and several local department stores 
all lodged objections based on the proposed sites, concerned at proposed ‘zoning’ of 
business as well as the loss of their freehold sites.646 The High Street traders had put 
forward their own plan for rebuilding as a group in order to preserve their freeholds, 
but the traders in this group also felt that the sites offered were not large enough for 
their needs. Other concerns were the proposed grouping of businesses, the 
prominence of sites and the proximity to pre-war sites.647 Exeter City Council took 
these concerns seriously and traders were offered other sites which might better suit 
their needs. This proved to be an ongoing process as changes were made to the site 
plan over the whole lifespan of the reconstruction process. 
 
The Council was also careful to keep the promise made to blitzed traders that they 
would be offered sites close to their former location as far as was possible.648 
Traders were free to turn down the offered sites if they felt they were not suitable and 
the Council would try to find a more suitable site within the replanned city. One such 
example was the Devon and Somerset Stores, which had traded on the north side of 
the High Street pre-war. The City Council offered them a site close to their original 
                                                          
645 DHC, Report of a local public enquiry held at the Guildhall, Exeter, on Wednsday 10th July 1946, 
p.40.  
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location, but Devon and Somerset Stores turned it down as they did not wish to 
construct a new building on a leasehold site, stating that it was too expensive to do 
so.649 The Stores stated that they wanted to find new freehold premises and 
therefore would not require Exeter City Council to find them an alternative site. Sites 
which were turned down in this way were then offered to another blitzed trader and if 
a lessee could not be found from the pool of blitzed traders, it was offered to other 
businesses which were looking to relocate, a process repeated in Bristol and 
Plymouth.  
Many blitzed traders, like the Devon and Somerset Stores, did not want to 
build their own premises, but were happy to rent a shop built by another company. 
The local firms of Bruford’s and Wheaton’s were two such examples, both of which 
had also occupied sites on the north side of the High Street. In this case, two large 
firms, Lloyd’s Bank and Burton’s, were found who were willing to build additional 
shops to let as well as their own premises and these were offered to Bruford’s and 
Wheaton’s.650 This pattern was repeated along the High Street, with large firms 
becoming responsible for erecting ‘groups’ of new buildings along the street, with the 
additional shops let to smaller firms. This building of additional shops to let by large 
firms, for those who either could not afford to build, or preferred not to, was repeated 
in all three cities. 
 
A similar process was undertaken in Plymouth and Bristol, although in these cities 
the changes to the shopping centres meant that different methods had to be 
employed in positioning businesses within the site plans. Plymouth found a novel way 
                                                          
649 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 – Central Areas Reconstruction Group1 1948-1950, 
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650 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950, 
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of allocating sites to traders in the new layout, which would echo the attempts to keep 
existing communities together during the slum clearances of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The City Council allocated sites based on the location of whole streets in the old city. 
As such, those who had been located in George Street were allocated sites together 
in New George Street, while those who had been on Bedford Street were allocated 
sites in on Royal Parade and so on.651 This pattern was repeated across the whole of 
the new street layout, with some changes made for ‘anchor’ stores.652  The ‘anchor’ 
stores were generally the larger multiple traders, such as Woolworths, and the major 
department stores, such as Spooner’s. These were offered large sites on major 
intersections or on strategic central sites on the main streets, with the aim that they 
would act as a draw for shoppers, bringing footfall onto streets and ensuring that the 
other businesses would be given exposure as a result.653  
 
Bristol City Council took a similar approach with ‘anchor’ stores, but did not use the 
same method of allocation on a ‘street by street’ basis. Instead they allocated more 
according to complementary business types, grouping together similar types of 
shops.654 This approach in itself is interesting, as blitzed cities often ‘zoned’ for use, 
including for different types of retail, in their original plans. Exeter’s plan also had 
similar types of business grouped together, with banks and insurance companies 
‘zoned’ away from the main High Street to keep it just for retail purposes.655 Sharp 
had recommended that Sidwell Street be reserved for multiple traders and 
department stores, as he thought that they would want large sites and felt that these 
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could best be created there, while small sites for specialist traders could be created 
in the new pedestrian way. The removal of such zoning in many post-war plans has 
been attributed to trader pressure, for example with Exeter’s Sidwell Street zoning 
which stores such as Marks and Spencer and the local department stores of Bobby’s 
and Colson’s had been unhappy with.656 Tait and While attributed the dropping of the 
multiple trader proposal to the need to appease such firms because their trade was 
considered vital to the city’s future prosperity and rateable value.657 However, zoning 
was in fact another victim of government guidelines, with blitzed cities advised not to 
heavily zone the new centres according to use.658 The Sidwell Street proposal was 
dropped, and heavy zoning elsewhere was relaxed in Exeter’s plan as a result. The 
survival of such use zoning in Bristol is therefore interesting, as it suggests that there 
was some flexibility in the MTCP guidelines. It is not clear how zonings were 
regulated, but Bristol’s use of them offers a window for further research into how the 
allocation of sites was decided upon and controlled, furthering our understanding of 
how city centres were shaped in the post-war era.  
 
The allocation of sites was usually the more difficult aspect of the process, as there 
were many factors which could affect how a business thought of a site. The proximity 
of rivals, proximity to their former site, footfall, visibility to passing trade, size and 
traffic all played a part in defining how desirable a site was for a business. Once 
these aspects could be reasonably satisfied, the signing of the lease appears to have 
been mostly a matter of formality. However, Exeter does provide some examples of 
additional difficulties that a local authority could face in terms of settling leases. The 
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City Council had great difficulty with some of its potential tenants, most notably 
Burton’s and Lloyd’s Bank, who made repeated objections to both sites and the 
terms of the leases. To a lesser extent, Barclay’s Bank and Bobby’s, a department 
store, also proved tricky to deal with, but for different reasons.  
Burton’s and Lloyd’s Bank proved to be extremely difficult to deal with and 
repeatedly tried to derail Exeter’s replanning scheme for their own ends; they were 
later found to be colluding with each other in order to do so.659 There is some 
evidence that many local authorities found Burton’s difficult to deal with as they were 
keen to press their own specific architectural branding onto Britain’s high streets.660 
The firm had its own in-house architects and had created a specific architectural style 
for the stores during the interwar period. References to the poor taste and style of 
this architecture can be found in both local and national records and as a result local 
authorities were keen to control what Burton’s built in their city centres.661 In contrast, 
relations with Lloyd’s appear to have been fairly amicable in other cities compared 
with Exeter. There is some minor evidence that this reflects the level of autonomy 
which regional managers were given by Lloyd’s, as the difficulties in rebuilding 
presented by the Exeter manager do not appear to be repeated in either Bristol or 
Plymouth.662   
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The initial problems were connected to the terms of the 1944 Act and the 
compensation available to blitzed traders. Both Burton’s and Lloyd’s were reluctant to 
move from their original sites as they would lose the right to Cost of Works payments 
and would lose their freeholds.  Lloyd’s also cited the expense of building new 
strongrooms on a new site. This complaint was taken up by Barclays Bank as well, 
which had also been offered a different site. The two banks argued that new 
strongrooms would require a lot of steel, which was in short supply, and therefore it 
was wasteful to move the two banks and make them build new strongrooms.663 In the 
case of Barclays, not moving the bank would have changed the lines of several 
streets and upset a large portion of the reconstruction plan. The junction which the 
two banks sat on opposite corners of was acknowledged as dangerous for traffic and 
pedestrians pre-war. The relaying of the street was partially to relieve this problem, 
making the City Council reluctant to grant permission for the banks to stay on their 
pre-war sites. 664   
 
Burton’s also wished to retain their original site on compensation and ownership 
grounds, going as far as offering to buy back their original site from the Council in 
1950 for the sum of £5000, a much lower price than Exeter City Council paid for it in 
1946.665 The main reason Burton’s wanted the freehold was to put the site outside 
the control of the Council, as with so many other traders. This would allow them to 
build according to their own architectural branding rather than the design prescribed 
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by the City Council under the reconstruction scheme.666 The City Council were not 
willing to contemplate such as arrangement, as it would set a precedent and could 
act as a catalyst for the unravelling of the plan.667  
 
All three firms lodged complaints with the MTCP, requesting that section 19 of the 
1944 planning act be invoked which allowed the MTCP to force local authorities to 
allow property owners to return to their sites.668  The MTCP ruled that Exeter City 
Council’s plans were reasonable and the traffic basis of changing the street layout 
was ‘perfectly sound’.669 Barclay’s accepted the MTCPs judgement and accepted the 
offered site from Exeter City Council. Lloyd’s and Burton’s continued to fight both the 
MTCP and the City Council in a battle which took nearly two years to resolve, lodging 
further complains over the terms of the leases and the rent levels. Additionally, 
Burton’s also rejected the City Council’s building brief for their new building, as they 
firm was unhappy at having to provide basements in the additional shops they had 
agreed to build to let.  
 
The three-year battle over sites, leases and design were evidently designed to try to 
wear the Council down and capitulate to their demands, but the Council stood firm. 
The support of the MTCP helped, particularly when it was noted that Burton’s and 
                                                          
666 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950, 
Letter from Burtons to Town Clerk re disposals, 18 March 1950; Letter from Burton’s to Town Clerk re 
disposals, 30 March 1950. 
667 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950: 
Handwritten notes re architectural control and Burtons, n.d, c.July 1949. 
668 DHC, 5895 City Architects Papers, Box 22 - File No.1 C.A.R.S: Letter from Blaise Gillie of MTCP to 




Lloyd’s had lodged very similar objections with the MTCP to the allocated site and 
lease and were thought to be colluding with one another. 670  
Both of the objections were thrown out by the MTCP on the grounds that the 
Council had met its obligations under both section 19, subsection 6 of the 1944 Act 
and sections 82 and 83 of the 1947 Act to provide suitable accommodation and 
neither firm had been unfairly treated.671 The two firms reluctantly accepted the 
offered leases and began their plans for new buildings. Both firms had agreed also to 
build additional shops to let, but had proved so difficult to deal with that several of the 
potential tenants had turned down the offered leases and took alternative 
premises.672  
 
The difficulties that Exeter experienced with Lloyd’s and Burton’s demonstrate the 
pressure which firms applied to local authorities in attempts to have plans changed to 
their advantage. In Exeter the City Council held firm and protected the plans from 
such attack. The attitude of the MTCP aided rather than hindered them on these 
occasions, with the reasoning behind the plans and site allocations being agreed as 
reasonable and sensible. Not all blitzed cities felt able to do this, with the pressure to 
return city centres to profit and rateable value leading some to capitulate to pressure 
or jettison plans. Portsmouth and Hull both abandoned their original post-war plans 
                                                          
670 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950, 
Notes of Meeting between estate manager of Mssrs M Burton Ltd and Mr Shears of Messrs Healy and 
Baker and the Deputy Town clerk, Consultant Estate Surveyor & Estate Surveyor, Central Areas 
Reconstruction Scheme – Disposals: Messrs Montague Burton Ltd 24 February 1950. 
671 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950, 
Notes of Meeting between estate manager of Mssrs M Burton Ltd and Mr Shears of Messrs Healy and 
Baker and the Deputy Town clerk, Consultant Estate Surveyor & Estate Surveyor, Central Areas 
Reconstruction Scheme – Disposals: Messrs Montague Burton Ltd 24 February 1950; Notes of 
Meeting between...Lloyds Bank Ltd and Deputy Town Clerk, Consultant Estate Surveyor, Estate 
Surveyor and Mr Risdon, 27 February 1950 . 
672 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950: 
Letter from Wheaton’s to Estate Surveyors Office re site allocation, 30 March 1950; Letter from Lloyd’s 
Bank to Town Clerk re Bruford’s site allocation, 12 July 1950. 
246 
 
due to the need to create rateable value and the pressure of traders to be allowed to 
build as they pleased.673 Exeter’s experience also demonstrates the depth of feeling 
which the loss of freeholds could inspire in property owners. The loss of freeholds not 
only represented a financial loss to some traders, but also a loss of autonomy. 
Property owners were expected to follow local authority guidelines for their new 
buildings and could be refused permission to build if they did not comply.674 The loss 
of freeholds also meant that property owners now had to pay ground rent, and rent 
disputes appear to have been common amongst blitzed cities more generally.675  
 
Exeter’s experience also demonstrates that the process was very much reliant on the 
attitude of the traders in order to run smoothly. Where traders were willing to work 
with the Council, the negotiation of leases was straightforward, as seen with Group 2 
and 3 on Exeter’s High Street. These groups were leased to several big concerns – 
Pearl Assurance, Commercial Union, Westminster Bank and Marks and Spencer – 
who all built shops to let as well as their own premises. The negotiating of the leases 
for both these large firms, and the smaller businesses which later rented shops from 
them, was refreshingly simple because the firms in question were happy to be flexible 
and work within the guidelines provided by Exeter City Council.676 These particular 
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groups were the first to start building work and Marks and Spencer was the first new 
store to open in 1951.677  
 
The idea of ‘big business’ dominating post-war reconstruction stems partly from firms 
such as these, who were the major builders post-war in blitzed cities, plus later 
development which built on the system conceived post-war. It is in the period covered 
by this chapter that the leaders in physical rebuilding became apparent, as those who 
were keen to take on the responsibility of building tended to be the same groups in 
each blitzed cities. The main problem with the shift from freehold to leasehold tenure 
was that smaller property owners and traders could not view a leasehold building as 
having the same investment value as a freehold building. This made them reluctant 
to rebuild under the new system as they felt the value of their site was in the freehold 
and the ownership of the land rather than the rental potential of a building. As a 
result, there were few independent traders who chose to build their own premises 
under the leasehold system. There were some who did choose to do this, most 
notably in Plymouth with the major department stores of Dingles, Spooner’s and the 
Co-Operative Society.678 In Bristol a similar pattern was seen, with Lewis’s 
department store choosing to build new premises rather than rent them, 
demonstrating that reconstruction was not the preserve of multiple stores or national 
finance companies. The process with these traders appears to have been smooth, 
particularly again in the case of Plymouth as the sites allocated were close to pre-war 
sites and neighbours.679   
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The reluctance of small traders to build is understandable when considered 
from their point of view, as they viewed the leasehold system as essentially charging 
them to trade through the rent payable on the site. Even if their property was 
mortgaged prior to the war, the payments were going towards the overall ownership 
of the site which was an asset in its own right. 680  Those who took on the 
responsibility of building in blitzed cities tended to be companies who could view a 
leasehold building as long-term asset; the insurance companies, banks, multiple 
traders and development companies. To them the building was an asset, even on a 
leasehold tenure, because it would provide long-term rental income and was often 
part of a portfolio of similar property.681  
 
As already stated above, and briefly explored in the previous chapter, the leasehold 
tenure offered by local authorities was unattractive to many property owners and 
independent traders. The problem of the ‘1939 standard’ in compensation and 
purchasing of sites added to the problem, as many traders and owners stated that 
the money they were to receive was not enough to cover the construction of a new 
building, and the leasehold tenure made investment in bricks and mortar unattractive 
to many.682 The changes of the 1947 planning act which allowed acquisition at 
current market value helped to ease this situation a little, but traders and property 
owners were still unable to claim Cost of Works compensation which they felt they 
were entitled to. As such, the smaller traders were either reluctant or unable to build 
and it fell to ‘big business’ to take on the burden.  
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Certainly there were cases of real hardship amongst blitzed traders, 
particularly for the very small businesses who had rented rather than owned their 
sites because the rents for the new shops do appear to have been pegged too high 
for many of them.683 The majority of these smaller traders indicated to Councils that 
they wished to let premises rather than build their own, which in Exeter led to the 
allocation of Princesshay for such businesses.684 It has originally been assumed that 
local authorities would use direct labour to build such shops, as this was initially the 
approach taken in Coventry. Coventry had initially intended to build much of the new 
shopping centre itself, so that it would own both the sites and the buildings, and it 
was assumed that this model would be followed everywhere.685 Instead many of the 
blocks of shops for letting to small independent traders were built by specialist 
companies, leading to the emergence of the development company. The role of 
development companies, finance companies and multiple traders in reconstruction is 
explored in more depth in Chapter Five, but as demonstrated here, they filled a 
specific niche in the reconstruction of blitzed cities.   
 
Rebuilding in central areas did start in small ways during the period 1947 to 1950, 
with the laying of the new central roads in Plymouth and Exeter and the first 
allocations of steel and investment in 1949. Plymouth started work on the new main 
streets in the city centre, which would later be named Royal Parade and Armada 
Way, in 1947. The City Council had requested permission from the MTCP to start the 
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work ahead of a planned visit by the King and Queen in 1947, intending that they 
Royal couple would be able to view the new layout and the city could dedicate Royal 
Parade to them. They were not actually given permission to proceed but started the 
work anyway, deciding to present the MTCP with a fait accompli rather than not have 
anything for their Royal visitors to view.686 This is another example of Plymouth’s 
determination to keep to their plan, as they had barely just received permission to 
proceed with their plan at all when they took this action. Royal Parade was the first 
street to be built in the city as a result of this early action, with the first buildings 
underway by 1950. The city also benefitted from the largest allocation of steel and 
investment due to their advanced plans and initial infrastructure work, being allocated 
750 tons of steel in 1949.687 Plymouth was later allocated a further 1,142 tons as a 
result of other blitzed cities not being in a position to use the steel they had been 
allocated.688  
 
Exeter started its street work in 1949 with work on Bedford Street and what would 
become Princesshay. As in Plymouth, the work was done ahead of a Royal visit; in 
this case Princess Elizabeth. The Princess unveiled a commemorative plaque 
marking the beginning of the reconstruction work in October 1949 and the new 
pedestrian way was named Princesshay in her honour. Despite the early work in 
laying out this area, Princesshay itself was not completed until 1958. Instead, building 
work started with the Pearl Assurance building on the north side of the High Street. 
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As in Plymouth, the city received early allocations of steel and investment in 1949, 
receiving the fifth largest allocation amongst blitzed cities at 450 tons.689  
 
The steel allocations made to blitzed cities were acknowledged within central 
government as token amounts designed to improve morale. The steel allocations 
were tiny compared to the needs of the cities, with it being noted that the amounts 
allocated were not enough to fully complete any one building. The investment 
allocations were similarly small, causing concern and anger amongst traders. Both 
Lloyd’s Bank and Burton’s in Exeter were deeply unhappy at the small allocations, 
protesting that as they were on a waiting list for licences they may have to wait up to 
six years to be allowed to start rebuilding.690 Lloyd’s cited the projected cost of their 
project, £220,000, against the investment allocation of £50,000 made to the city as 
evidence of this.691  However, the firms had misunderstood the nature of the 
allocations, assuming that they would be given in their entirety to an individual firm to 
cover all the building requirements in materials and investment. Instead the 
allocations were given to cities as a whole to be shared amongst firms, with the 
intention that they would allow some work to begin on foundation works for a few 
buildings. As the work progressed, further allocations would be shared in a similar 
way, allowing work to continue and allowing more firms to make a start on building.  
Blitzed cities were promised larger allocations for 1950 to allow more building 
to start, but the 1949 allocations proved to be something of a false dawn as in 1949 a 
further economic crisis developed. The problems with convertibility experienced in 
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1947 had highlighted the weaknesses of sterling, eventually causing a major 
devaluation of the pound in 1949 in an attempt to curb the loss of dollars and 
promote exports. The ongoing problems with dollar reserves and the cost of imports 
led to the continued restriction of building materials, with restrictions on 
reconstruction reaching into the 1950s. The devaluation of the pound caused 
concern in blitzed cities as it was recognised that it was likely to push up building 
costs and would therefore increase the reluctance of many traders to build. The 
increased costs were attributed to imported materials such as timber and zinc, 
because the devaluation would increase their price.692 The growing threat of the 
Korean War also contributed to the continued restrictions on materials as resources 
were directed toward re-armament rather than building projects.  
 
In addition to the restrictions on materials, the government also restricted private 
investment in retail, leisure and office building. The allocations of investment made to 
blitzed cities were not allocations of public money for reconstruction, but the amount 
of private spending which was allowed for reconstruction projects. This move 
appears to have been an attempt to ensure that investment was directed to 
manufacturing and related capital investment, which was seen as more beneficial to 
the national economic position. It was also a tool to keep consumer spending in the 
UK in check, as the high levels of liquidity in the economy meant that inflation was an 
ever-present threat. By controlling the stream of consumer goods throughout the 
1940s, the possibility of inflation driven by consumers pushing up prices of scarce 
goods through demand and a plentiful money supply was reduced. This concern was 
discussed during the war in central government and appears to be the driver behind 
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the continued restrictions on both building materials and investment for the 
reconstruction of city centres.693 If there were few shops and also a restricted number 
of goods to buy, inflation would be kept in check. In addition to this, there was the 
possibility that the excess money in the economy, the result of war savings, would be 
invested in manufacturing businesses rather than retail business. As a result of these 
measures, blitzed cities saw their allocations of steel and investment constrained well 
into the 1950s, preventing reconstruction from proceeding quickly.  
 
Local Politics and Reconstruction 
 
The influence of political ideology on reconstruction plans has previously been 
thought of as a straightforward right-conservative/left-radical split, with Labour-led 
cities such as Plymouth and Coventry producing more radical plans than their 
Conservative cousins, such as Portsmouth and Exeter. Chapters Two and Three 
demonstrated that this picture is misleading, as the Plan for Plymouth was produced 
under the wartime Conservative council, while Exeter’s plan was both produced and 
executed under a Conservative council. Political affiliation also had little influence on 
the speed of building, with both house-building and city centre reconstruction 
constrained by the lack of building materials and labour. Where the political influence 
on reconstruction is strongest is the politicisation of reconstruction as a right/left issue 
by the Conservative and Liberal parties. The two parties used the economic 
constraints placed on reconstruction as a tool for attacking the Labour party and its 
policies. This had led to the impression that the slow pace of building post-war was 
due to the Socialist ideology of the Labour party rather than the economic crises 
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faced by the nation.694 The roots of this assumption can be found in the attitudes of 
those who represented the political right in the post war years: Conservative 
councillors and candidates, the Ratepayers Associations and business owners.  
Housing in particular became a politicised issue, something especially 
noticeable in the local press for Plymouth, with the Conservatives keen to attack the 
Labour government’s approach to reconstruction, and housing in particular. Although 
building was progressing faster than it had after the First World War, the demand for 
housing was also much greater. Many of those on the housing waiting lists had lost 
their homes in the early years of the war, and the wait to be re-housed was becoming 
intolerable. Housing progress was therefore perceived to be slow and the restrictions 
on building became increasingly difficult to defend.  Almost all house building until 
1952 was municipal, with only limited numbers of private houses for sale being built. 
The restrictions on private building were put in place as part of the more general 
restrictions on materials and labour, with the intention being to direct scarce 
resources towards the greatest areas of need.695 As it was predominantly working 
class housing which had been destroyed by bomb damage, owing to its proximity to 
town centres and industrial areas, it was recognised that housing for this group was 
of the highest priority. This may have given Conservative MPs and councillors some 
additional ammunition against their Labour counterparts, as they could claim a bias in 
building as the working classes were also likely to be Labour voters.  
 
The restrictions on private building were also seen as an attack on private enterprise 
and property, a stance taken up by some blitzed traders and property owners in 
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relation to city centre rebuilding as well.696 It should be noted, however, that although 
the houses themselves were built for local authorities, the work was undertaken by 
local, private building firms.697 Direct labour by councils was rare even after 1945, 
with only a handful of local authorities choosing to take this route. Coventry was one 
such council and the decision to use direct labour was partially a reflection of the 
strongly Labour council. However, Coventry also had serious problems with attracting 
and retaining building labour in the city, as there were plentiful jobs in the 
manufacturing sector, which also paid better than construction.698 This may have 
partially influenced their decision to use direct labour, as it gave them better control 
over working conditions and pay which may have helped to minimise labour losses to 
other sectors. The complaint from builders in the three South Western cities was the 
lack of more lucrative private building than a lack of building contracts.  
The complaints of building companies extended into the area of restrictions on 
materials as well as the licensing system. The refusal of the Board of Trade to 
approve licenses for private building, citing the scarcity of materials, led to builders 
claiming that building materials were plentiful and that this was a government ploy to 
deprive them of business.  This claim, plus the rate of house building, fed the 
discontent of blitzed traders.  
 
The arguments over the speed of building and the restriction of private building 
provide the main area of political division and dissent in reconstruction. The 
restrictions on materials and labour were seen by some on the right as a deliberate 
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policy by the Labour government to squeeze private enterprise. The apparent 
availability of materials for building fuelled this position, as seen with the arguments 
of blitzed traders. Candidates and councillors for the Conservative and Liberal parties 
positioned themselves on the side of private enterprise and the freeing of controls. It 
is notable that candidates for both parties used the housing and reconstruction 
struggles as campaign platforms for local elections. Norman Watt, the 1946 Liberal 
candidate for the Plymouth Mutley ward, summed up the Labour councils policy as 
‘destroying private enterprise instead of getting the maximum amount of houses in 
the shortest possible time’. He went on to state that the Liberal policy would be to put 
housing ahead of ‘party dogma’ and use all methods available to build.699  In the 
same year, the Conservative candidates also attacked the slow pace and building 
and particularly criticised the use of temporary housing on the basis of cost.700  
 
Cost of building was a complaint common to both housing and city centre 
reconstruction.  Conservative and Liberal councillors frequently attacked the potential 
cost of city centre reconstruction and the rising cost of house-building. The main 
concern was the potential rate-burden on citizens, as it was understood that 
government grants would not cover the full cost of building. The councillors who 
called for simpler reconstruction plans were generally doing so with an eye on costs, 
as had been seen in Plymouth with the calls for a simplified plan in 1944.   
The cost of housing was also a major concern, as costs rose steadily in the 
post-war years due to the shortages of materials and labour. The use of non-
traditional housing came in for criticism as the cost of these houses was often higher 
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than building traditional houses. However, councils received a subsidy from the 
government for each house to ease the burden.  
 
The potential rises in rates were to some extent a class issue as much as a political 
one, as ratepayers of the middle class considered themselves to be paying for 
luxuries for the working class with no benefit to themselves. The perceived attack on 
private enterprise further embittered the argument, as it could be viewed as a class 
attack by the Labour party. The emergence of the Ratepayers Association in Exeter 
as a political party demonstrates how delicate a situation many councils found 
themselves in, trying to balance the needs of the working classes with the demands 
of the ratepaying middle classes who considered themselves to be ‘footing the bill’ for 
those of a lower social status. Although local authorities received grants for housing, 
and for the provision of some other extended services such as the expanded 
education system, it was still expected that they would raise money via the rates to 
meet some costs, such as the servicing of loans for building land. The increasing rate 
burden had been a bone of contention since the interwar period and the expansion of 
local authority responsibility in housing and welfare.701  
The rate burden fell heaviest on the ‘middling sort’ within the middle classes, 
who resented having to pay for the improvement of the working classes – or to be 
more exact, they resented having to pay for what they considered luxurious facilities 
far above what was required. This situation continued post-war and represented one 
of the biggest conflicts between the Labour and Conservative factions of the local 
authorities in the three cities. The Conservative councillors were very aware that 
many of their supporters would be in the group who wanted to see a decreased rate 
                                                          
701 Western Morning News, ‘Correspondence: Economy Essential’, 10 February 1921; Western Daily 
Press, ‘Property Owners Criticise Council Houses’, 28 March 1930. 
258 
 
bill rather than a rising one to pay for social services and housing.702 Arguments over 
rate levels spilled over into the reconstruction argument, as many of the smaller 
traders were those who resented the increasing rate bills. It is notable that in 
Plymouth and Exeter increases to the rates were met with anger and the assertion 
that the rate bills were extortionate and far in excess of those found in other cities. In 
both cases the average city rate bill was actually far lower than in many other blitzed 
cities.703 The rate argument was often brought into city centre reconstruction 
arguments, as traders demanded to know what they were paying rates for if 
rebuilding was not possible. The role of rates in house building and the consistent 
output of houses may have added to the impression amongst traders that city centre 
reconstruction was being deliberately blocked by local authorities. 
 
The Conservative attacks on Labour’s housing policies reflected growing middle-
class dissent over Labour’s approach to both governance and reconstruction 
throughout the 1940s. This dissent is not always explicit amongst property owners 
and traders in the blitzed cities, but the growth of other movements and evidence of 
dissent over Labour policies outside reconstruction demonstrate this feeling. The 
emergence of the Housewives League demonstrated the frustration and anxiety felt 
by women at the continued restrictions on consumer goods and food, as they 
demonstrated against rationing and consumer restrictions.704 This movement was 
mostly middle-class and reflected the loss of class status as much as the wearying 
effect of rationing on the housewife. The League was not especially active in Devon, 
with neither Exeter or Plymouth having branches of the League, although one was 
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set up in Teignmouth.705 Bristol, a city which housed both the very poor and the very 
wealthy, saw a more active women’s movement in contrast, with the setting up of 
several branches of the League.706  
The Housewives’ League represented a more general anxiety amongst the 
middle classes at the potential loss of status, both economic and personal, under the 
Labour government. The policies that Labour were pursuing suggested that they 
were working toward their stated aims of nationalising land and industry, with the 
nationalisation of coal and the proposed nationalisation of haulage reinforcing this 
perception.707 For blitzed traders and property owners, the terms of the 1944 and 
1947 planning acts with their restrictions on the resale of freeholds back to the 
original owners would have suggested that Labour was looking to restrict private 
property in the long term. That this had been a stated aim during the interwar period 
would have only exacerbated this feeling, and the nationalisation of some industries 
would have reinforced the idea that the restrictions on reconstruction were the 
beginnings of a full attack on private enterprise.708 Although not explicitly stated by 
traders in their concerns and complaints over reconstruction, the general unease 
demonstrated by many over reconstruction policy suggests that this perception may 
have been at its root.  
 
The political element of reconstruction was therefore not a straightforward left/right 
split over the plans themselves, but a way for the opposition parties to attack the 
Labour party and its policies. The constant message throughout the late 1940s was 
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that Labour was failing on reconstruction by curtailing private enterprise and poorly 
directing resources. There was also the suggestion that resources for building were 
available, but were being withheld deliberately. The progress of other aspects of 
reconstruction, such as the implementation of the National Insurance scheme, the 
creation of the NHS and the nationalisation of some industries, further fuelled the 
concept that money was being squandered and private enterprise strangled for the 
sake of a socialist dream. City reconstruction plans were caught in the middle of this 
political argument, and became symbols of right and left thinking in reconstruction.  
 
Conclusions 
The economic crises of the late 1940s emerge as the main reason for the slow pace 
of reconstruction in the three cities. The need to conserve materials essential to 
building left the building licence system in place until the 1954, with licences initially 
restricted to housing and building work which was considered of economic benefit.  
The latter category included businesses which could aid the export drive or reduce 
imports, which retail goods were not considered a major part of. Instead materials 
and labour were directed toward the major manufacturing industries, including 
vehicles, steel and chemicals. As a result, blitzed traders and property owners were 
unable to obtain licences to build, preventing central areas reconstruction work from 
progressing.  
 Labour shortages and their attendant restrictions further exacerbated the 
problem, with building labour also directed to housing and export industries ahead of 
retail and leisure building. The policy of reducing labour in non-essential industries, 
including the building industry, from August 1947 in order to direct labour toward 
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export-supporting industries further reduced the available labour force for building, 
with even house-building suffering as a result.  
 
The directing of labour and materials to essential building work gave the impression 
to some blitzed traders and property owners that resources for building were 
available, but were being withheld from them. Although this can be seen in Exeter, 
where traders did indeed suggest that the City Council was deliberately withholding 
building licences from them, there is less evidence of this type of dissent in the other 
two cities. It is also noticeable that there is not as much demand for the dropping of 
the reconstruction plans on this basis as in other cities such as Hull and Portsmouth. 
Traders in these cities felt that it was the complicated nature of the reconstruction 
plans that was to blame for the delays in rebuilding, as the plans would require large 
amounts of scarce building material. The relaying of streets would also require much 
labour, whereas if the original street patterns were used, this would not need to be 
done. As a result, the City Councils in these cities came under pressure to drop or 
significantly alter their reconstruction plans. . The economic problems of the late 
1940s were therefore directly responsible for the slow pace of building and the 
erosion of support for reconstruction plans in some cities.  
However, this loss of support is not repeated in the three cities, where support 
for reconstruction plans remained fairly solid. Instead there was much frustration at 
the slow pace of progress, which progress in other areas such as housing 
underlined. The shortages of labour for even these essential works, and the resultant 
use of PoW labour and ‘flying squads’ of additional labour, were well known, and 
seem to have initially contributed to the continued support for reconstruction plans 
since it was understood that the labour shortages were due to the post-war economic 
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difficulties of 1945 and 1946. The later crises of 1947 and 1949 saw an increased 
impatience with central government and local authorities amongst blitzed traders who 
do not seem to have fully appreciated the seriousness of the situation. This may be 
due to the press coverage of Britain’s post-war export drive and a weak 
understanding of the problems which the economy was facing, as suggested by the 
letter from Exeter firm Bruford’s to the local paper. That the firm felt the need to 
explain the situation via the press to their fellow traders suggests that the situation 
was poorly understood in Exeter at least. The coverage of the export drive during the 
first years of peace may have given the impression that the economy should have 
been well on the way to recovery by 1947, so the dollar crisis and the resultant need 
to make savings on imports and expenditure may not have made sense to traders 
while exports were still well above pre-war levels.   
 
The support for reconstruction plans was not universal, with property owners still 
unhappy at the loss of their freeholds. Bristol in particular had struggled to find a 
suitable scheme which would carry majority support amongst the blitzed traders and 
property owners, as the Broadmead proposal was not supported by all. The park 
proposal for the Wine Street area was dropped after traders indicated that they would 
support the Broadmead plan only if the Wine Street area was used for another 
purpose. The proposed civic centre carried enough support to make the Broadmead 
plan viable, but the continued delays in reconstruction and the problems with Bristol’s 
CPOs threatened this support. Traders were only prepared to support Broadmead if 
the whole plan was carried through, including the civic centre. The MTCPs refusal to 
grant a CPO for this area in 1947 threatened to collapse the whole plan, as traders 
would not support the Broadmead move unless there was a guarantee that the Wine 
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Street area would not return to retail use. It was felt that only Bristol City Council’s 
acquisition of the site and the approval of the civic centre plan could guarantee this. 
Bristol’s experience highlights how crucial the support of the MTCP was to 
reconstruction plans being carried through and how easily plans were altered or 
blocked without this support. 
 The need to save money again appears as the main reason behind the 
MTCPs reticence in granting CPOs and approving plans, as the Treasury was 
seeking to limit expenditure on grants to blitzed cities. The three cities had all 
enjoyed the support of the MTCP for their plans prior to the public enquiries of 1946, 
but the changing economic situation and the full financial implications of their 
reconstruction plans changed this. It came as a shock to both Bristol and Plymouth to 
have this support withdrawn, with only Exeter’s plan being approved with minimal 
fuss. As Exeter’s plan did not involve such radical changes to street layouts or such a 
large acquisition of land, the MTCP was prepared to grant the whole of their 
Declaratory Area Order and the CPOs as the cost would not be great. The size and 
scale of Bristol and Plymouth’s plans in contrast caused some anxiety as they would 
require large amounts of investment to execute, and as such had to be pruned by the 
Ministry.  
 
The need to save money forced other changes to the plans of the three cities, some 
of which have previously been attributed to trader pressure or the interference of 
specific types of businesses, such as the multiple traders. However, on closer 
examination the changes were instead required by the MTCP and the Ministry of 
Transport on the grounds of cost. The changed route of Exeter’s bypass was one 
such example, which altered both the road plans and the plans for new civic and 
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leisure buildings. In all three cities plans for new cultural buildings, such as theatres 
and museums, were postponed indefinitely on the grounds of cost. Allocations of 
investment, materials and labour were not permitted for such building, resulting in the 
museum plans of Exeter and Bristol being dropped entirely and Plymouth’s new 
theatre not emerging for another thirty years. The changing rules on demolition of 
standing property saw other features of the plans changed, as buildings which had 
been earmarked for demolition now had to be retained. It some cases, such as the 
retention of the Co-Operative Society building in Exeter, these decisions have been 
attributed to the power of multiple traders, who were thought to have pressured local 
councils into changing plans and retaining buildings. A better understanding of the 
economic pressures being placed on the MTCP, and by extension local authorities, 
demonstrates that this was rarely the case, with other factors instead dictating what 
was retained and changed.  
 
These pressures were an ongoing factor in reconstruction, with shortages of 
materials and investment stretching into the 1950s and dictating how reconstruction 
was undertaken. The effect of these restrictions on building and the achievements of 
the three cities despite them will be examined in Chapter Five. Despite the 
challenges they faced, the three cities achieved much in terms of house building and 
once city centre rebuilding was allowed to start, they made swift progress despite the 




Chapter 5 – 1950-55: Glimmers of Hope 
 
The 1950s finally saw the physical reconstruction of blitzed city centres, although the 
pace of building was slow. Many blitzed cities, and also those which had suffered 
some war damage but not enough to be designated as ‘blitzed’, were still unable to 
rebuild fully, with reconstruction projects continuing well into the next decade and 
sometimes beyond. Cultural and leisure buildings, such as Plymouth’s new Theatre 
Royal, were often the last aspects of the plans to be built as a result; work on 
Plymouth’s theatre did not begin until 1978.709 The main controls on city centre 
building remained the economic constraints on capital investment and materials 
imposed by central government. These were slowly lifted for other sectors of 
construction, such as housing and industry, but building for retail, office space and 
leisure facilities remained tightly controlled until 1954 when the building licence 
system was finally removed.710 The change in government in 1951 from Labour to 
Conservative did see some changes in investment policy, but blitzed cities still very 
much remained the Cinderella of economic policy.  
  In addition to this, cities experienced some restrictions through planning 
legislation and infrastructure investment. The requirement of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1947 for all planning authorities to produce a development plan meant 
that all local authorities were expected to attend to the potential development of their 
areas.711 It was stipulated that development plans had to be produced within five 
years of the Act, which meant that blitzed cities often had to resubmit plans; Exeter 
and Plymouth both resubmitted their plans for approval between 1950 and 1953.  
Some blitzed cities did find that changes had to be made to their original plans due 
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to the 1947 Act, as some county boroughs acquired additional planning 
responsibilities due to the consolidation of planning authorities. Investment in 
infrastructure, such as roads, remained under the control of the Ministry of Transport 
which was expected to direct investment towards projects which would assist the 
export market and economic growth, which meant that urban roads often sat a long 
way down the list of priorities. Regardless of this rather gloomy backdrop, blitzed 
cities did make a start on city centre rebuilding, with the first shops being completed 
in the three South Western cities by 1955. House building was given a boost by the 
incoming Conservative government of 1951, which pledged to increase housing 
output to 300,000 houses per year.712 The three cities saw an increase in housing 
output as a result, with the first moves towards the use of high-rise construction 
systems made during this period.  
 
Blitzed City Reconstruction and the Investment Programme Committee 
 
1949 had seen the first token allocations of steel and investment to the blitzed cities, 
allowing a small start to be made by those cities whose plans were well developed.  
Plymouth had benefitted from one of the largest initial allocations with 750 tons of 
steel, with Exeter receiving 450 tons and Bristol 390.713 The allocations reflected 
how advanced a city’s plans were, explaining why Bristol received the smallest 
allocation despite being the largest of the three cities. The 1949 allocations gave 
hope to the blitzed cities that they would be allowed increasing allocations of steel 
and investment in the subsequent years, finally allowing reconstruction to begin in 
earnest. This hope was particularly boosted in Plymouth with extra allocations of 
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steel being made to the city, so that it eventually received 1,892 of the 5,500 tons of 
steel allocated to blitzed cities in 1949.714 The city’s advanced plans meant that it 
was able to absorb the steel which had been earmarked for other blitzed cities when 
they were unable to use it. The example of Plymouth undoubtedly encouraged the 
other South Western cities to press forward with their preparations as it appeared 
that materials and investment would now be available for those cities that were in a 
position to begin building.  
 
Unfortunately, the 1949 allocations were something of a false dawn, with investment 
in blitzed city reconstruction stalling in 1950 and increasing only by small amounts in 
the following years. 1950 saw the beginning of a programme of cuts to spending and 
investment allocations by central government, as it sought to cut costs in the wake of 
the 1949 crisis and direct investment toward the export trades. The massive 
rearmament programme provoked by the Korean War also saw spending and 
investment slashed in other sectors in order to meet the costs of the programme.715 
Blitzed city reconstruction was not considered a priority compared with the demands 
of rearmament and exports, and therefore allocations of essential materials, such as 
steel, remained very small in the first years of the decade.   
The expectations in blitzed cities that larger allocations of investment and 
materials would be forthcoming in 1950 were bitterly disappointed. Reconstruction 
was essentially halted in March 1950 with the announcement that only £500,000 of 
investment would be allowed on reconstruction projects, and that this would be 
shared between only seven of the nineteen blitzed cities. Bristol, Exeter and 
Plymouth were all included within this list, demonstrating that their plans were 
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considered to be well advanced.716 Plymouth and Bristol received an allocation of 
£100,000 each while Exeter received only £50,000.717 The allocations were made 
with the caveat that further allocations might be made later in the year, depending on 
the performance of the economy and the speed with which the cities started building 
work. To put the size of the allocations into perspective, the chairman of Plymouth’s 
Reconstruction Committee, Sir Clifford Tozer, stated in January 1950 that there were 
twenty firms ready to begin construction work in the city centre. Tozer estimated that 
the projects would require £2.25million of investment and around 5,000 tons of 
steel.718 This figure was almost equal to the entire allocation of investment for blitzed 
cities for 1949/50, which eventually totalled £2.3million.719  
 
Blitzed city reconstruction continued to come under pressure between 1951 and 
1953 as the Treasury consistently tried to avoid making allocations for reconstruction 
and sought to cut the allocations which were made to blitzed cities.  Despite this, the 
amount of investment and steel available for city centre reconstruction did increase 
year on year, if only by small amounts. The amount allocated to blitzed cities in 1951 
was £3.5million, £4.5million in 1952 and £4.4million in 1953.720 1954 represented 
the loosening of controls on city centre reconstruction, with a larger programme of 
£6million announced for that year.721 Even so, allocations to blitzed cities were 
absolutely miniscule compared with the overall investment programmes set out for 
Britain during the early 1950s. Investment was controlled in the period 1947-1953 by 
the Investment Programme Committee (later renamed the Investment Policy 
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Committee by the 1951 Conservative government), a sub-committee of the steering 
committees on economic development.722 The Investment Programme Committee 
(IPC hereafter) was established as an expert committee with no particular 
departmental affiliation, which was meant to produce neutrality and prevent bias in 
the allocation of investment and resources. The Committee members were drawn 
from a variety of Ministries, including the Ministry of Works and the Board of Trade, 
but the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning were not 
represented. This meant that the majority of building projects, from housing to retail, 
were left without a direct voice to make the case for investment in these areas.723  
 
The IPC had the remit of controlling investment in order to keep prices and the 
pound stable and create a favourable balance of payments.724 The Committee was 
therefore responsible for allocating materials and resources across the whole 
economy and controlled investment spending of all types, including private 
investment. The economy was divided into a series of categories and allocations for 
investment, public spending and resources were made to each category for the 
relevant ministers to utilize. The investment allocations were separate from 
government spending allocations as they referred to private investment by firms or 
individuals, not government spending.  The IPC not only controlled public spending, 
but also controlled private investment in capital projects, with the intention of 
channelling private investment into the projects which would most benefit the 
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balance of payments.725 The sums ‘allocated’ to blitzed cities therefore represented 
the total amount of money which private firms and individuals were allowed to invest 
in rebuilding in each year; no government funds were given for rebuilding. 
Additionally, businesses were prevented from raising capital via stock issue by the 
Capital Investment Committee, which restricted new securities issues to less than 
£50,000.726 This committee also regulated business loans, with loans over £50,000 
referred to the Capital Investment Committee for approval. These measures were 
intended to ‘deny new funds to enterprises supplying inessential goods to the home 
market’, into which category blitzed traders were considered to fall, further restricting 
investment in reconstruction.727  
Blitzed city reconstruction was included in the ‘Miscellaneous’ category for 
investment, which had a lower priority for allocations than categories such as 
‘Production’ (including agriculture and industry) and ‘Social Services’ (including 
health and housing), which when combined with the more general investment 
restrictions left reconstruction somewhere near the bottom of the priorities list.728 As 
a result the amount of investment allocated to blitzed cities consistently amounted to 
less than 1% of the total investment programme, even once the worst restrictions 
were lifted.729 It is also evident from the surviving documents that the Treasury 
agreed with the IPC and considered blitzed city reconstruction to be a very low 
priority, which made the task of representing the cities extremely difficult for the 
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planning ministries.730 The IPC itself operated within a shroud of secrecy, with its 
existence and role not being known outside of ministerial circles; even parts of the 
Civil Service were unaware of its existence.731 This added to the woes of the 
planning ministry as it was essentially a go-between for the local authorities and 
MP’s of blitzed cities who did not know about this added layer of bureaucracy within 
the national economy.  
 
The Ministry of Town and Country Planning, which became the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government in 1951, fought hard to present the case of blitzed cities and 
secure increased allocations for 1951-1953, presenting a series of projections for 
spending which required an allocation of at least £7million of investment funds.732 
However, the Treasury and IPC continued to view city centre reconstruction as a low 
priority for investment. Interestingly, the Treasury hid behind the use of large 
developers in blitzed cities as a reason for not allocating much from the Investment 
Programme for rebuilding blitzed cities. They stated that city centre building was 
merely ‘the building of shops and offices’ and that ‘In the main it is a matter of 
allowing the big concerns like Woolworths, Marks and Spencer and Ravensefts to 
put up large buildings. From the point of view of national interest this work is far from 
essential’.733  
The suggestion was that city centre work was not important because it was 
‘only’ the big retail companies who wished to build; the work was therefore 
inconsequential. What this disregards was that the ‘big concerns’ were generally 
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building not just for themselves but for the smaller businesses as well. It also 
glosses over the fact that this situation arose because the Treasury had been 
unwilling to adjust the terms of the Cost of Works payments to allow for those 
displaced by town planning schemes to still claim the payments. The situation that 
this refusal created was well understood in government circles, including the 
Treasury, but despite it being acknowledged that this would lead to hardship 
amongst the smaller independent trader there was a total refusal to change the Cost 
of Works regulations.734 What the Treasury and IPC attitude also demonstrates is 
that the restrictions faced by blitzed cities were part of a widespread policy to 
essentially block blitzed city reconstruction for an undefined period of time.  
 
It is not entirely clear why the Treasury and the Investment Policy Committee wanted 
to restrict city centre investment so completely. Some reasons for restricting 
allocations to blitzed cities were straightforward and practical, as demonstrated by a 
memo from the Chancellor in 1952 stating that materials and investment are to be 
diverted from city reconstruction to housing and industry. The new Conservative 
government had made an election pledge to boost housing output to 300,000 
houses per year, so the diversion of materials to this purpose was entirely 
practical.735 Likewise, the diversion of investment and materials to industrial building 
was intended to boost output and keep unemployment low.  
However, the next part of the memo states that ‘If building resources are 
available in the blitzed towns, they should be diverted to other more essential 
purposes within the main programmes, in the same area’ which sends a rather 
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different message.736 This was a more deliberate policy of removing resources 
which could be made available to city centre reconstruction and redirecting them, 
regardless of the state of those other sectors. In the three South Western cities, 
house building had progressed at a steady rate throughout the 1940s and early 
1950s. Bristol, Plymouth and Exeter all sat comfortably within the top ten local 
authorities in terms of housing completions throughout this period, with Plymouth 
and Bristol both making good use of non-traditional building methods to boost 
output.737 The waiting lists for housing were still large in the three cities but the 
progress being made in house building was now sending the message that the 
problem was being tackled.  The lack of progress in city centre building was, 
however, becoming a source of increasing anger amongst both traders and 
citizens.738 
 
Although the reasons behind the reluctance to allow city centre rebuilding are not 
explicit in the surviving documents, an examination of the wider economic policies of 
the immediate post-war governments helps our understanding of this stance. A 
Treasury memo from the early part of the war regarding the impact of the blitz on 
consumer goods gives an early indication of the policy that the Treasury followed 
throughout the post-war period. The memo stated that the contraction of trade and 
the destruction of so many shops caused by the war might induce people not spend 
their money on ‘fripperies’ but instead invest in government stock.739 Likewise the 
assertion in a 1942 document that traders, property owners and individuals should, 
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and would, invest their war savings in rebuilding their property suggests that the 
Treasury viewed investment rather than consumer spending as the only sensible 
policy.740 There was certainly a very deliberate policy by both the Labour and 
Conservative governments to restrict consumer goods in the post war era as a form 
of anti-inflationary control. As already stated in Chapter 3, there was widespread 
concern within government that the boom and bust cycle seen post-1918 would be 
repeated. The maintenance of rationing was one method of controlling consumer 
spending and insuring that the liquidity which had built up during the war years did 
not result in spiralling prices and inflation.  
 
The wider policy of restricting investment and controlling materials was a further 
method to control this problem. The intention was to push resources towards export 
goods which in turn would create a favourable balance of payments, increase 
Britain’s reserves and wealth and help pay for the import of some essential 
materials.  By restricting investment in retail property and leisure facilities, 
investment could be directed toward export goods.741 Presumably the attitude seen 
in wartime of trying to push people to invest in war bonds rather than buying 
consumer goods was also at work here; by restricting access to consumer goods, 
people might decide to invest instead. At the same time, diverting consumer goods 
away from home markets to export markets would help to boost exports.742  
It is therefore possible that leaving the blitzed city centres in their ruined state 
was viewed as a method of directing goods to the export markets without actually 
having to further restrict consumer goods. The restricted shopping facilities provided 
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by temporary shops and make-shift premises limited the potential outlets for 
consumer goods in the home market, effectively reducing home demand and 
allowing for a diversion of consumer goods to export markets. It is not explicit that 
this was the reason that rebuilding blitzed city centres, or in fact any development in 
retail property, was given an exceedingly low priority but within the wider economic 
policy of the era it is a possibility. Investment in goods and industries which would 
benefit the export trade was given a freer rein, but was still directed and controlled 
by central government according to what would produce the best national 
outcome.743 Ironically this restriction on consumer goods and capital investment 
probably hindered Britain’s growth at the expense of a steady balance of payments 
and rate of sterling, as the latter helped to keep the price of British exports high thus 
depressing economic growth.744  
 
The restrictions on investment and materials put the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning, and later the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, under a lot of 
strain. The MTCP acted as the intermediary for local authorities and the departments 
responsible for making allocations for reconstruction and development projects. 
However, the Ministry itself had no direct input or control over how resources were 
allocated as it had no representation on the Investment Policy Committee, despite its 
role overseeing housing and city centre reconstruction. This left the Ministry in a 
difficult position as it had to deal with the increasing impatience of the local 
authorities, and the traders they represented, regarding the lack of progress in city 
centre building without actually being able to change the situation. Local authorities, 
traders and property owners, as well as their representative organisations such as 
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the Association of Municipal Corporations and the Chambers of Commerce, 
petitioned the MTCP for action on city centre rebuilding, believing the Ministry to be 
ultimately responsible for allocating resources.745  
In the South West, Bristol City Council made representations to the MTCP 
and its successor, the HLG in October 1950 and November 1952 to request larger 
allocations of materials and investment for reconstruction, with Exeter doing likewise 
in April of the same year.746 The frustration of the MTCP comes across clearly in 
some of the surviving documents as they continually try to placate the local 
authorities while pressing an unwilling Treasury and Board of Trade for equitable 
treatment for city centre reconstruction. It is also evident that the Ministry was keen 
for these departments to make clear their role in denying blitzed cities the resources 
to rebuild and the reasons behind this.747 It was hoped that this would reduce the 
strain put on the relationship between the Ministry and local authorities and reduce 
the number of deputations, meetings and petitions that the Ministry had to deal with. 
The Treasury was not prepared to do this, stating that it was the role and 
responsibility of the MTCP to deal with such matters, not the Treasury, and as the 
Chancellor had not historically justified his budgetary position over reconstructions, 
no precedent should be set now.748  
 
This lack of clarity from the Treasury as to why blitzed city reconstruction was not 
considered a priority was a major reason for the increasing discontent and anger 
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amongst blitzed traders at the slow pace of progress and led to increasing pressure 
on local authorities to abandon plans. The first allocations of materials in 1949 and 
1950 did help to allay some of the opposition to replanning as progress could 
actually be seen, but in some cities the opposition to replanning continued as it was 
still believed that rebuilding without a plan would be faster. Considering the political 
attitude toward city centre reconstruction, especially as the restrictions were on 
private investment, and the continuing restriction of building through the licence 
system, it is clear that the relinquishing of planning would not have made a 
difference to the pace of building. Hull and Portsmouth provide us with two examples 
of the abandonment of planning and demonstrate that building was no faster than in 
cities which kept to their plan.  Pre-existing problems were often built back into the 
urban fabric, such as Hull’s city-centre level crossing system and the resulting traffic 
problems it created.749   
 
Progress and Architectural Control  
 
Considering the obstacles put in the path of blitzed cities, the three cities made 
remarkable progress in rebuilding after 1950. Plymouth saw its first major new store 
open in 1951 in the form of local department store Dingles, making it the first 
completed store of its kind in Britain.750 Exeter also saw the opening of its first new 
shops on the High Street in March of the same year in a block built by Pearl 
Assurance.751 The first major store opened in November 1951, when Marks and 
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Spencer opened the doors of its new High Street store.752 Bristol lagged slightly 
behind, owing to the complications which the Broadmead plan had experienced, but 
the city still had a number of stores well underway by the end of 1951. By the end of 
1952 Broadmead had nine completed stores, again mostly built by the multiple 
traders and national finance companies such as Woolworths and Pearl 
Assurance.753 Construction progressed rapidly throughout the period to 1955, with 
much of the rebuilding of the major streets and shopping areas completed in all 
three cities.  
 
The battles which the three cities had faced over site leases were not the only point 
of conflict with traders and developers. Architectural control and treatment of the 
new buildings became another field of conflict as traders and developers fought to 
be allowed to rebuild as they wished, rather than to a design created by the local 
authorities. The issue of architectural control also highlights the roles of consultant 
planners, architects and municipal technical staffs within post-war reconstruction.  
 
The accepted narrative of reconstruction puts the figure of the ‘planner’, whether 
consultant or municipal, at the centre of reconstruction and usually attributes 
architectural choices to this individual or group.754 With the dislike which much mid-
Twentieth century architecture invokes, the idea that poor design was the fault of 
self-interested individuals with little interest or concern for the tastes of the masses 
has certain appeal. A secondary narrative of ‘big business’ bullying local authorities 
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into accepting their badly designed and cheaply constructed buildings in order to 
rebuild as quickly as possible often runs underneath this idea of the planner-as-
architect.755  
Post-war architecture tends to attract the labels of ‘cheap’, ‘thrown-up’ and 
‘concrete’, regardless of what is actually on the ground, with the terms becoming 
short-hand for any rebuilt city centre. It is slowly being realised that these particular 
narratives are massive generalisations and that reconstruction architecture is both a 
distinct style in itself and was often designed and built with care and attention to 
detail.756  
 
The architectural style of post-war cities was rarely prescribed by consultant 
planners, as demonstrated by Exeter and Plymouth. Neither Sharp nor Abercrombie 
decided the architectural style of the new cities which would rise from the rubble, 
contenting themselves with merely making suggestions about how this question 
might be settled. Sharp suggested that a suitable style for Exeter would be one 
which echoed the Georgian parts of the city, reflecting his own architectural 
preferences. Sharp was a great admirer of both Georgian architecture and planning, 
particularly praising the Georgian streetscape as the pinnacle of urban form.757 He 
praised Exeter’s Georgian buildings in Exeter Phoenix and suggested a modern 
interpretation of the style partly as recognition of this architectural heritage and as a 
way of blending the old and new areas of the city.758  
                                                          
755 Lynsey Hanley, Estate: An Intimate History (2010), p.120-121; Catherine Flinn, ‘Overlooked 
Constraints: The rebuilding of blitzed city centres in Britain 1945-1955’ (unpublished MA thesis, 
Oxford, 2007), pp.50 & 58. 
756 John Grindrod, Concretopia; A journey around the rebuilding of postwar Britain (Brecon, 2013), 
pp.122-123; Owen Hatherley, A New Kind of Bleak: Journeys through urban Britain (London: Verso, 
2012), p. 138. 
757 Sharp, English Panorama  (London: Dent & Sons, 1936), p.47 
758 Sharp, Exeter Phoenix, pp.109-110. 
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Georgian architecture had enjoyed a revival in the interwar period, with the 
formation of the Georgian Group and a new appreciation of the simple style of 
Georgian and Regency building. This had mixed with the influence of Scandinavian 
architecture to produce a stripped back Neo-Georgian style which had become 
prevalent for civic buildings of all types. Bristol City Council had chosen this style for 
their new Council House and Exeter’s new City Library had received a similar 
treatment. As explored in the first chapter, a form of Neo-Georgian architecture had 
also enjoyed popularity amongst local authorities for their municipal housing projects 
and can be seen in the interwar estates of all three South Western cities. 
 
Abercrombie took a similar approach in Plymouth, suggesting a Beaux-arts style for 
Plymouth but stopping short of actually prescribing this for the city. The intention was 
to produce a Continental feel to the city centre, reflecting its proximity to the sea and 
its position in the far south of the nation. The wide boulevard-style streets and simple 
but imposing buildings were intended to produce a spacious, bright feel in the new 
city centre, mixing the twin roles of business and leisure centre that the city was 
seen to fulfil.759  
This style was not so widely adopted in Britain, being seen as a Modernist 
style more suited to European nations or the big cities of the United States than 
Britain.760 Modernism and its architectural cousins had not enjoyed much popularity 
in Britain, with the style mostly being kept to a handful of buildings, such as the De 
La Warr Pavllion in Bexhill-on-Sea, and a small number of private houses in the 
interwar period. Plymouth was the only city to completely embrace such an 
                                                          
759 Abercrombie and Paton Watson, A Plan for Plymouth, p.77; Western Morning News, ‘Plymouth of 
the Old Sea Dogs to be Preserved’, 27 April 1944. 
760 Grindrod, Concretopia, p.107 
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approach post-war, although Modernist-inspired designs slowly became more 
prevalent throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
The suggestions of both Sharp and Abercrombie were acted upon by the relevant 
councils, who decided to follow their suggestions. Bristol City Council chose a similar 
style to Exeter’s Neo-Georgian styling, reflecting the popularity and prevalence of 
this style just prior to the outbreak of war. The simple brick buildings of the 
immediate post-war years tend to be dismissed as the produce of austerity and the 
attendant shortages of materials and money, but were in fact a conscious choice for 
many towns and cities. The style tapped into the idea of good design speaking for 
itself, rather than needing the ornamentations so beloved by the architects of 
Victorian and Edwardian Britain. The style was to be a symbol of the ‘brave new 
Britain’ emerging from the war; good designs and policies whose simplicity and 
inclusiveness were their own decoration. Buildings of this type can be found in 
virtually all blitzed cities, with certain motifs and features repeated in each location - 
the corner plot with an oblique angled frontage, the curved fronted buildings (often 
forming a ‘circus’ or framing another feature), the stone dressings and large regular 
windows which bring a unity to post-war architecture and demonstrate it is a style in 
its own right.761 Even the more Modernist-inspired Plymouth uses such motifs, with 
the curved frontages being particularly prominent in a city which embraced civic 
fountains like no other in Britain.  
 
The three cities architectural choices were therefore those of the City Councils rather 
than being dictated by their consultant planners. Sharp had no influence over 
                                                          
761 See Appendices D, E and F for examples of such features in the three cities.  
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Exeter’s rebuilding beyond the drawing up of the plan, as his services were not 
retained by the city beyond the completion of the plan. Abercrombie was retained by 
Plymouth City Council until 1947 and did advise on the execution of the plan. 
However, his contract expired before building began, making his influence minimal 
compared with that of the later architectural advisors to the city. The architectural 
choices of the cities were influenced by the pre-war architectural movements and the 
move away from the heavy architectural styles of the Victorian and Edwardian eras. 
The building designs were inspired by the past in Exeter and Bristol, echoing the 
Georgian portions of the city, and by the future in Plymouth.   
 
Work in Exeter and Plymouth progressed particularly quickly, thanks to the detailed 
plans produced by both cities and the reasonably swift completion of lease 
agreements for sites. The two cities also exercised good architectural control over 
the building designs and city layout, which aided the construction process by making 
their expectations clear to the firms undertaking building. This could save time in the 
long-run, as firms had clear instructions for their in-house architects to follow, which 
meant that designs required less in the way of alterations to fit with city visions. The 
two cities took different approaches to this aspect of reconstruction, with Exeter’s 
approach being particularly novel, but both demonstrate how blitzed cities were able 
to keep control over their plans against business interference and Treasury cuts.  
Bristol did not have such good control over the city’s architecture and as such 
the finished buildings were not so harmonious as in Exeter or Plymouth, with 
differing styles and roof lines in blocks of buildings.762  The issue of architectural 
control has become significant in all reconstruction literature, from planning history to 
                                                          
762 See Appendix D, figs.11-12, 14 & 16 for examples 
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architectural criticism, as the prominent role of multiple stores and development 
companies in rebuilding blitzed cities is thought to have compromised the 
architecture, particularly where no supervising architect was appointed to oversee 
the work. Even where co-ordinating architects were employed, such as in Plymouth, 
there is some criticism that the process compromised the quality of design, as 
referred to by Essex and Brayshay.763 However, the two cities did have more control 
over the designs than is acknowledged, particularly in Exeter.  
 
Exeter City Council did not employ an external architect to design the city centre 
buildings, with firms instead using their own in-house architects to produce building 
designs. This approach has led to some criticism of the process, as it has been 
assumed that the Council therefore had little control over the design of buildings. 
Tait and While refer to the ‘piecemeal’ approach to Exeter’s architecture, which led 
to criticisms of a ‘bland, anywhere’ design. 764 However, all the firms building in 
Exeter received a building brief from the City Architect laying out the design 
principles for each group of buildings, to which their in-house architects were 
expected to adhere. This brief was written into the site leases, meaning that the 
acceptance of the lease was also the acceptance of the City Architect’s design. The 
building designs produced by the firms’ architects against this brief had to be 
submitted to the City Architect for approval before building could commence, 
ensuring architectural harmony and conformity across the rebuilt area.765 This 
process gave Exeter City Council particularly strong architectural control and created 
a more uniform end product than in the other South Western cities. It also saved the 
                                                          
763 Essex & Brayshay, ‘Vision, Vested Interests and Pragmatism’, pp.432-433. 
764 Tait and While, ‘Exeter and Thomas Sharp’s Legacy’, pp. 87, 92. 
765 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1, 2 & 3 1948-
1950; Exeter City Council Minutes; See Appendix F for photographs of rebuilt centre. 
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city the expense of employing a co-ordinating architect, as the City Architect and his 
staff could oversee the process more easily and did not have to spend time 
redesigning buildings, as seen in Plymouth. If a firm did not conform to the design 
brief, the City Architect’s staff just had to refer them to their lease agreement, where 
it was set out.   
 
Regardless, some firms did try to impose their own architectural brands on Exeter, 
most notably Burton’s. Alongside the long-running dispute over sites and leases 
described in Chapter Four, Burton’s were also involved in a long dispute over the 
architectural treatment of their new building. Burton’s was keen to use its own in-
house style for the new building, which, in common with many other cities, Exeter 
City Council was keen to avoid.766 As the building brief had been written into the 
lease, the City Council was able to overcome the objections by stating that if 
Burton’s continued to refuse to fit the brief, the Council would consider it a refusal of 
the lease and offer the site to another firm.767 They did make some concessions to 
Burton’s objections, reducing a set-back on the upper floors of the building and 
agreeing that Burton’s did not need to build complete basements for the adjoining 
shops to let, but were able to keep the overall design intact.768  
The construction of Ravenseft’s Group 11 on the High Street further 
demonstrates the efficiency of the lease-design system. Ravenseft were also 
unhappy about the design brief they’d been supplied with, which demanded a zig-zig 
detailing to the first floor and decorative stone relief panels to break up the frontages 
                                                          
766 DHC, 5896 City Architect’s Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950, 
Notes re elevation control for Burtons, undated c.1949;   
767 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 – Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1, 2 & 3 1948-
1950: Letter from Town Clerk to Burton’s re architectural treatment and lease, 1 July 1948. 
768 DHC, 5896 City Architect’s Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1, 2 & 3 1948-
1950: Letter from City Architect to Burton’s re facade set-back, 5 March 1949; Letter from Burton’s to 
City architect re facade set-back, 28 March 1949. 
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of the block. Furthermore, the City Council had stipulated to Ravenseft a specific 
local brick-type that they wished the company to use. The bricks were more 
expensive than other more readily available types, much to Ravenseft’s 
disgruntlement, and the company spent some time trying to persuade the City 
Council to drop the use of the local bricks.769 Ravenseft went as far as to write to the 
MTCP to complain about the Council’s demands, but were told by the Ministry that 
they must comply.  
A further row with Ravenseft began as their buildings neared completion in 
1953 and the questions were raised regarding the decorative stone panels and the 
ongoing maintenance of an arcade connecting the High Street and Princesshay. The 
development company was reluctant to go to the expense of providing the stone 
decorations and were adamant that the maintenance of the arcade (including 
provision of lighting) was the Council’s responsibility rather than theirs as 
leaseholders.770 Both battles were won by the Council, who demonstrated that both 
issues were included in the lease agreement.771 Ravenseft passed the cost of the 
stone decorations onto their tenants, persuading them to provide the decorations as 
a way of branding the buildings and advertising their businesses.772  
 
Ravenseft also built much of Princesshay, which was constructed in a simple brick 
style with arcading in front of some of the shops to provide protection from the 
elements. These buildings appear to have been constructed without conflict and 
                                                          
769 DHC, 5898 City Architect’s Papers, Box 25, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 9, 10 & 11: Letter 
from Fewster & Partners to F.P.W Maynard re architectural treatment of group 11, 27 November 1952. 
770 DHC, 5898 City Architect’s Papers, Box 25, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 9, 10 & 11: Memo 
to Town Clerk re group 11 maintenance, 23 January 1953. 
771 See figs. 78 &79 for disputed detailing and arcades. 
772 DHC, 5898 City Architect’s Papers, Box 25, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 9, 10 & 11: Copy 
of minute sheet, 13 April 1953; These decorative panels are not present on the buildings today and 
don’t appear to have ever been provided by the original tenants. 
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were completed by 1957. The difficulties with both Burton’s and Ravenseft 
demonstrate the level of control which Exeter City Council had over the building 
designs. The decision to write the design briefs into the leases avoided the 
weakening of design as firms were unable to pressure the Council into accepting 
their own designs. As seen with Burton’s, if a firm tried to pressure the Council into 
changing the design, the Council could refer to the terms of the lease and the 
consequences of not complying with them. The method also saved the Council the 
effort of designing and redesigning all the buildings, instead leaving it to the firms 
architects to undertake this work.  
 
The north side of Exeter’s High Street was the first area to be completed. Burton’s, 
Lloyd’s Bank, Westminster Bank, Pearl Assurance, Commercial Union and Marks 
and Spencer undertook the building of these groups, with the majority of firms 
working harmoniously with the City Council. 773 The groups built by the insurance 
companies, banks and Burton’s were the first to be erected, with all buildings 
finished by 1953. Away from the High Street, work was beginning in Sidwell Street, 
Fore Street, Bedford Street and on the new pedestrian way of Princesshay.774 
Bedford Street was home to Exeter’s investment banks, Martin’s Bank and the 
Devon and Exeter Savings Bank. Banks of this type received allocations for 
rebuilding from a separate fund to general reconstruction work, which enabled these 
                                                          
773 DHC, 5895 City Architect’s Papers, Box 22, Dr Schwartz’s Report and CARS: Planning Committee 
Officers Conference No.4, 7 June, 1949; Memorandum from Mr Redfern to City Architect re situation 
with sketch plans and discussions with lessees in central areas, 31 August 1949; See also 5896 City 
Architect’s Papers, Box 23, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1, 2 & 3 and 5897 City Architect’s 
Papers, Box 24, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8.  
774 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes: Planning Committee, 26 September 1950,  24 October 1950; 
Express & Echo, ‘Building the New Exeter’, 24 December 1952; ‘Building Licences for 7 Projects in 
Business Centre of Exeter’, 17 June 1953 
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firms to rebuild very quickly.775 The two banks also built some additional premises 
for other businesses, mostly in the form of office space, and created the first part of 
the new Bedford Street. Other buildings earmarked for this area, including the Post 
Office, took far longer to complete with the new Post Office not becoming 
operational until 1958.  
The south side of the High Street and the parallel section of Princesshay were 
started in 1951, with development company Ravenseft taking the lead with its High 
Street buildings.776 The buildings on the north side of the High Street were slightly 
more ornamental than those on the south side, with a distinct Neo-Georgian styling 
in the windows and stone dressings of the buildings. The oblique building angles of 
the Westminster Bank and Marks and Spencer buildings provided some relief from 
the terraced design, while the detailing on the Pearl Assurance and Commercial 
Union buildings ensured that there was not monotony in the designs.777 The south 
side of the High Street was simpler, but retained the same Neo-Georgian style with 
its regular windows and stone dressings. The oblique angles were repeated again at 
the corners of Bedford Street and Eastgate, again providing relief to the regular 
facades.778 The building on the corner of Bedford Street, Group 8,  has a distinctly 
Art Deco feel, as does the facade facing onto Catherine Street, demonstrating that 
there were other influences at work beyond the Georgian.779  
 
                                                          
775 DHC, 5898 City Architect’s Papers, Box 25, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 9, 10 & 11: Letter 
from the MTCP Regional Controller to Town Clerk re trustee savings banks 30 December 1949; Letter 
from A.E Watson to R. M Challice re steel allocations for banks, 3 January 1950; Letter from Devon & 
Exeter Savings Bank Actuary to R.M Challice re steel allocations, 4 January 1950.  
776 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes; Western Morning News, ‘The Main Street Scene is Changing’, 4 
August 1951. 
777 See Appendix F, figs. 59, 60 & 72. 
778 See Appendix F, figs. 58, 63 & 67. 
779 See Appendix E, fig. 67. 
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Plymouth’s progress was even swifter than Exeter’s in rebuilding, with the south side 
of Royal Parade, Old Town Street, Armada Way and New George Street all 
completed by 1955.780 The buildings were all of a high quality, faced in Portland 
Stone and built in a Beaux Arts style with a nod toward the Modernist school of 
architecture. Plymouth has particularly suffered from the ‘concrete’ tag given to so 
much post-war building owing to the colour of the stone used, but concrete was 
rarely used in the city’s reconstruction; stone is the dominant material.781 Some of 
the buildings constructed in the later phases of reconstruction after 1955, such as 
the former Drake Circus precinct, were indeed concrete and it is probable that this 
gave the impression that the whole city centre was built in such a way.782 As in 
Exeter the use of decorative panels and oblique angles add interest to the terraced 
facades. Plymouth also features a number of buildings with curving facades, 
reminiscent of the Georgian crescent, which help to break up the blocks of buildings 
and avoid monotony.783  
The building of Armada Way opened up the proposed vista from North Hill to 
the Hoe, creating what has been described as ‘the last great monumental street in 
Britain’.784 The objections to the width of this new monumental boulevard lodged by 
traders and the Ministry of Transport were overcome by narrowing the street to 100 
feet, which kept the planned vista and ‘gateway’ to the city, but helped overcome the 
                                                          
780 Gould, Plymouth, pp.15-35. 
781 Hatherley, A New Kind of Bleak, p.180; This tag only occasionally appears in the literature but is a 
kind of ‘received wisdom’ amongst local people. The assertion that Plymouth is built of concrete has 
been observed by the author when giving talks to local groups and when participating in the Word 
Machine’s oral history project ‘The War in Plymouth: Destruction and A New Beginning’ (see 
http://thewordmachine.org/portfolio-item/the-war-in-plymouth/).  
782 Plymouth Live (Plymouth Herald), ‘The Golden Years When Tesco, John Conway, Arcadia and 
Foto First Ruled Drake Circus’,6 March 2018 - https://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/news/history/golden-
years-tesco-john-conway-1271155, accessed on 25/5/2018. See Appendix E, fig.45 for example.  
783 See Appendix E, fig.32 for example. 
784 Hatherley, A New Kind of Bleak, p.180. 
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traders fears that it would create a barrier for shoppers across the middle of the new 
city centre.785  
 
Plymouth City Council did not use the same device of writing the design briefs into 
their site leases, which meant that they did not have quite the same architectural 
control over the new buildings as Exeter City Council. Instead Plymouth City Council 
employed an external architect, William Crabtree, to oversee the construction 
process and ensure that all building designs were harmonious and 
complementary.786  
Crabtree was recommended by Abercrombie as one of his protégées, 
demonstrating one of the few pieces of influence Abercrombie had over the finished 
architecture of the city. Crabtree quickly found the job overwhelming as he had to 
deal with the in-house architects of each firm separately and try to impose some sort 
of architectural unity across the various firms. He spent a lot of time re-designing the 
submitted buildings himself to the general brief provided by the City Council but still 
found it difficult to ensure that all designs were complementary.787 Most notable was 
the slight clash of the designs for Plymouth’s first flagship store, Dingles, and the 
Pearl Assurance building on the opposite side of Armada Way. The two buildings 
were very much ‘anchor’ sites, sitting on the junction of the two major new roads of 
Armada Way and Royal Parade and still dominate the street scene in this part of the 
city today. The two buildings are complementary in that they are both of a Beaux 
Arts design and are faced in Portland stone, but the emphasis of the Pearl building is 
                                                          
785 Gould, Plymouth, pp.14-15; Essex & Brayshay, ‘Planning the Reconstruction of War-Damaged 
Plymouth 1941-1961’, p.159; 
786 Gould, Plymouth, p.14; Western Morning News, ‘Good Progress Towards Rebuilding Plymouth’, 2 
July 1949; ‘250 Houses at Efford’, 29 November 1945. 
787 Essex & Brayshay, ‘Vision, Vested Interest and Pragmatism’, Planning Perspectives,  
290 
 
vertical while the Dingles building emphasis was horizontal.788 While not immediately 
obvious to the casual observer, this oversight was noted by architects and the 
architectural press at the time and still creates a jarring note for those schooled in 
architectural design today.789  
Interestingly, both buildings were designed by the same architectural firm of 
Burnet, Tait and Lorne, which was heavily involved with the rebuilding of Plymouth. 
Thomas Tait was appointed to Crabtree’s architectural committee and had a role in 
approving the designs submitted for reconstruction.790 Tait’s influence can be seen 
in the buildings occupying the plots from the junction of Armada Way and Royal 
Parade to the junction of Royal Parade and Old Town Street, which took their cue 
from Tait’s work and recommendations. Tait was also responsible for another 
building in this block, the Royal Assurance building on Royal Parade. This influence 
of Thomas Tait and the firm Tait, Burnet and Lorne is claimed to have created ‘the 
grandest ensemble of early ‘fifties buildings in the country’.791   
 
Crabtree and his architectural committee did not find their task easy and had to fight 
battles with a number of the multiple stores, who wanted to use their own particular 
architectural ‘brand’ rather than conforming to the ideas set out by the City Council. 
Most notable was Burton’s which, as in Exeter, fought a long battle with the City 
Council to be allowed to use their standard building design. The ongoing struggle led 
to delays in Burton’s commencing building work and very much echoed the 
problems seen in Exeter.792 It also seems that Burton’s took a similar line to that 
                                                          
788 See Appendix E, fig.26. 
789 Ibid; Gill, Plymouth: A new history;  
790 Jeremy Gould, ‘Architecture in Devon 1910-1958’ in Sam Smiles (ed.) Going Modern and Being 
British; Art, architecture and design in Devon (Exeter: Intellect, 1998), p.31. 
791 Ibid, p.31; See Appendix E, figs.26 & 29. 
792 Gill, Plymouth: A new history, p.204. 
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seen in Exeter over the building of proper basements in their new building. Exeter 
City Council had warned Burton’s that the basement levels of the buildings which 
had formerly occupied their site pre-war had only been roughly filled in with blitz 
rubble and must be properly filled even if the firm insisted on not creating basements 
of their own. The City Council was evidently concerned that Burton’s would build 
straight over the top, potentially leaving a void space underneath the building. It 
seems they might have been right to worry about this, as it appears that this was 
done in Plymouth. When the site occupied by the 1950’s Burton building was 
levelled for the redevelopment of Drake Circus in 2004, a bulldozer fell into a void 
space underneath the building, suggesting that Burton’s had not checked the 
soundness of the basement level before building.793  
 
Bristol’s progress in rebuilding was a little slower than that of Exeter and Plymouth 
and the city had rather weak control over rebuilding compared with the other cities. 
The long battle over the location of the shopping centre delayed the process of 
allocating sites and leases, which meant that the city was not quite so advanced in 
its preparation for building as Plymouth or Exeter. The result was a slower pace of 
building for the first two years of reconstruction, as site negotiations were still 
ongoing. However, the city did make up ground after 1953 with much of the first 
phase of Broadmead competed by the end of 1954.794 
 Bristol did not employ an architect to oversee the reconstruction designs, as 
Plymouth did, nor did they write the design briefs into the lease as Exeter did. 
Instead the design process was much more piecemeal with the City Architect 
                                                          
793 This incident is remembered locally, including by the author, but as yet a newspaper reference has 
proved elusive. 
794 John V Punter, Design Control in Bristol 1940-1990 (Bristol: Redcliffe Press, 1990), p.36. 
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dealing with each firm and its in-house architects separately.795 The result was a 
much less coherent overall design as the City Council was unable to withstand the 
pressure from the building firms to accept their building designs. Rather than hold up 
building further, the city accepted designs which were not quite as they would have 
liked, which produced a rather less polished aesthetic finish than in the other two 
cities. The City Architect generally managed to get firms to agree to certain finishes, 
such as the uniform Portland stone facing of the Horsefair and the brick and stone 
finish of Broadmead, and Merchant Street, which gives some unity to the 
buildings.796  
However, the City Council found that it was not well placed to withstand the 
demands of some firms to use their own architectural brand, such as those used by 
Woolworths, Marks and Spence and, inevitably, Burton’s. 797  Bristol appears to be 
the only city of the three where Burton’s won their battle to be allowed to use their 
standard building design, although they evidently agreed to the City Architect’s 
stipulations on finish, using a Portland stone facing. Woolworths also used a 
standard design for their store on Horsefair, although the City Council did manage to 
prevent them from erecting their standard red hoardings on the building. Signage 
was the only other area where the city was able to exert any real control, with firms 
agreeing to forego their usual signage in favour of more discrete signs.798  
 
                                                          
795 BRO, M/BCC/PREC/1/6 Bristol City Council Planning and Reconstruction Committee Minutes 31st 
May 1950 – 2nd May 1951: Minute No.115 ‘Central Shopping Area. Dorothy Perkins’, 28 June 1950; 
Minute No.166 ‘Central Shopping Area. Lease to Montague Burton’s’ and Minute No.167 ‘Central 
Shopping Area. Lease to Marks and Spencer’, 12 July 1950; Punter, Design Control in Bristol, pp.36-
38. 
796 See Appendix D, figs.6, 8,9 & 10. 
797 Punter, Design Control in Bristol, pp.36-37. 
798 Punter, Design Control in Bristol, pp. 36 & 38. 
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The work in the three cities was surprisingly free of the objections and complaints 
from traders and property owners which had so dominated the planning discussions 
of the 1940s. However, this can mostly be attributed to the resignation of traders to 
the leasehold system which came into being with reconstruction. By 1950 it was 
evident that no further assistance for reconstruction would be forthcoming from 
central government and that reconstruction would have to be undertaken at personal 
cost. The alternative was to accept a lease for a shop built by one of the banks, 
multiple traders or finance companies, which many blitzed traders chose to do.799 
The complaints about rents did trickle on into the 1950s, but again many traders 
reluctantly accepted the new status quo in order to continue trading.800  
 
This situation becomes very obvious when the building work in the three cities is 
examined. Virtually all of the construction work was undertaken by large firms, with 
only a handful of independent firms appearing in the lists. The finance companies, in 
the form of the major insurance companies, dominated the scene as they both built 
and financed the bulk of the new premises. Pearl Assurance, Commercial Union and 
Norwich Union all built premises for themselves plus additional shops to let in all 
three cities.801 In addition to this, these companies often provided the finance for 
developers and multiple traders to build as well. In particular Pearl Assurance 
                                                          
799 DHC, 5896 City Architect’s Papers, Box 23, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950: 
Memorandum re Lloyd’s tenants, 1 & 6 November 1950; Central Areas Committee minutes 9 April 
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800 DHC, 5898 City Architect’s Papers, Box 25, Central Areas Reconstruction Group 10 1948-
1950:Letter from  Bobby’s & Co to City Estate Surveyor re sites, 17 May 1950; 5898 City Architect’s 
Papers, Box 25 Central Areas Reconstruction Group 11 1949-1952: Letter from W.H Julian (Pearl 
Assurance) to City Estate Surveyor  re block 11, 17 December 1951. 
801 Land Securities Archive (LSA), Box 14277, Ravenseft Properties Ltd Minutes 1946-1951: Mortgage 
Agreement between Norwich Union and Ravenseft for Plymouth property, Old Town Street, 29 March 
1951; DHC, 5895, City Architect’s Papers Box 22: Dr Schwartz’s Report and CARS, File No.3 Central 
Areas Reconstruction 1949: Central Areas Subcommittee Estate Surveyor’s Report, 7 June 1949; 
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1951 – 29 April 1953: Minute no.554, Central Shopping Area – Disposal of sites to development 
corporations, 9 January 1952; Western Morning News, ‘Good Progress Towards Rebuilding 
Plymouth’, 2 July 1949; ‘Plymouth City Centre Nears Completion’ 9 April 1949. 
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provided the finance for the major development company of the post-war era, 
Ravenseft.802 Multiple traders such as Marks and Spencer, Burton and Woolworths 
also appear regularly as the builders of additional shops to let, as do the major 
banks.803 The banks also had further interests in blitzed city centres as they too 
provided additional finance to other firms. It is notable that Barclays and its sister 
bank, Martins Bank, provided the financial services to Pearl Assurance and by 
extension Ravenseft, making their interests in Britain’s rebuilt High Streets 
extensive.804  
 
The development company was essentially a post-war phenomenon as the 
opportunities presented by the reconstruction of blitzed cities became apparent. 
Within the records of all three of the South Western cities a company called 
Ravenseft appears as a post-war developer. Indeed, the name is common as the 
developer of blocks of shop units in most of Britain’s major towns and cities; the firm 
is known today as Land Securities.  Land Securities started as a conglomeration of 
small property developers, including Ravenseft, who specialised in buying or leasing 
bomb sites for redevelopment. Ravenseft eventually became the retail arm of Land 
Securities, with a sister company dealing in industrial and other commercial building. 
The companies were generally financed by the major insurance companies, such as 
Pearl Assurance and Legal and General, and used their built assets to secure 
                                                          
802 LSA, Box 14277, Ravenseft Properties Ltd Minutes 1946-1951: Mortgage Agreement between 
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803 DHC, 5896 City Architects Papers, Box 23 - Central Areas Reconstruction Group 1 1948-1950, 
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further finance for further building.805 The model was extremely successful and 
became the method for much of the city centre redevelopment seen in Britain since 
the Second World War. 
 
The founders of Ravenseft spotted the potential gains to be made by building in 
blitzed cities after working with Coventry City Council on a block of shops. 
Approaches were made to Plymouth and Exeter City Councils in quick succession 
and the firm went on to build in Hull and Bristol as well as working on the New 
Towns of Harlow and Basildon, amongst others.806  The model of leasing land from 
local authorities and building shops to let was profitable for companies like 
Ravenseft, eventually leading to the property boom of the 1960s.807 Major 
developers such as Arndale emerged from the model created by the post-war 
developers, working with local authorities to redevelop city centres and areas of 
‘blighted’ land.  
As scandals began to emerge and the public became uneasy with the big 
developers, the narrative of ‘big business’ dominating post-war reconstruction and 
Britain’s city centres emerged.808 What had begun as necessity due to post-war 
economic constraints became a standard development model, creating the 
perception that the immediate post-war years of reconstruction had been a period of  
deliberate consolidation on the High Street by the major multiple retailers and 
development companies.  
                                                          
805 LSA, Box 00014249, Minute Book of Legal & General (Exeter) Ltd 1958-1973; Box 14277 Ranuc 
Properties Ltd Minute book 1952-1955; Box 14277 Ravenseft Properties Ltd Minutes 1946-1961. 
806 LSA, Box 14277 Ravenseft Properties Ltd Minutes 1946-1961, 29 March 1951; DHC, 5895, 
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corporations, 9 January 1952. 
807 Oliver Marriot, The Property Boom (London, 1967), pp.74-81 
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This pattern of ‘big business’ taking on the bricks and mortar aspects of 
reconstruction is the foundation of the idea that the multiple retailers and national 
firms pushed out the ‘little man’ and the independent trader in rebuilt city centres.809 
Reconstruction plans are seen as the tool which allowed them to do this, along with 
the weakness of local authorities who, as we have seen, were painted as 
capitulating to the pressure applied by ‘big business’.810 While it is undoubtedly the 
case that city centre rebuilding was mostly undertaken by multiples and finance 
companies, it is obvious that this situation arose for a variety of reasons.  
 
The independent local firms which did rebuild were all department stores, many of 
whom were later absorbed into national chains such as Debenhams and House of 
Fraser. In Exeter only Colson’s rebuilt in the immediate post-war period.811 Likewise, 
Bristol’s major independent department store, Lewis’s, took what would today be 
called an ‘anchor’ site in the new Broadmead shopping centre, apparently the only 
local firm to do so.812 In contrast Plymouth saw several of its pre-war department 
stores accept sites and rebuild. Dingle’s, Popham’s, Spooner’s and the local Co-
Operative department store, Derry’s, all built prominent new stores on Royal 
Parade.813 The dearth of smaller firms actually rebuilding demonstrates just how 
much of an unattractive proposition the leasehold system was to independent 
traders. Although the building itself would remain an asset, firms were not prepared 
to take the risk of speculating against an uncertain return.  
                                                          
809 Hubbard, Faire & Lilley, ‘Contesting the Modern City’, p.39. 
810 Tait & While, Exeter and the Question of Sharp’s Physical Legacy’, pp.82; Essex & Brayshay, 
‘Planning the Reconstruction of War-Damaged Plymouth’, p.159.  
811 DHC, 5895 City Architect’s Papers, Box 22, Dr Schwartz’s Report and CARS, File No.3: 
Memorandum from the City Planning Officer to the City Architect re 36 &37 High Street, 18 November 
1949; Express & Echo, ‘Two More Previews of the New Exeter’, 13 March  1950. 
812 Jenner, ‘The Origins of Broadmead Shopping Centre’ in Post-War Bristol 1945-1965: Twenty Years 
that Changed the City’ (Bristol Historical Society, 2000), p.19. 
813 Jeremy Gould, ‘Architecture in Devon 1910-1958’, p.31 
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This lack of local traders undertaking building work has been interpreted as a 
deliberate campaign by the multiple traders to squeeze out their smaller rivals, but 
an examination of the trade directories for pre- and post-war shopping districts show 
that the firms in question did not disappear.814 Although the smaller traders did not 
build their own premises, the majority remained trading in the three cities but in 
rented premises.  
This continuity is best demonstrated in Exeter, where the shopping district 
was very compact, making it simple to trace the movements of the city’s businesses. 
Of the 28 firms placed in Group 1 on the north side of the High Street in 1953, 6 had 
been located there pre-war and 12 had been trading on different sites in the city, 
making ten newcomers.815 It is notable that the majority of these new firms were not 
multiple retailers, but the administrative arms of manufacturing companies who let 
office spaces above the new shops. The retailers which let shops in this group were 
a mixture of local and national concerns, with only two new multiple retailers taking 
units. If one examines the make-up of that part of the High Street pre-war, it was 
occupied by 27 firms.816 Out of the 21 firms which did not return to their former sites 
post-war, 14 can be found still trading in central Exeter in 1954, leaving only 7 
unaccounted for.817 The records do not survive to tell us the fate of these firms, but 
some Exeter firms did consider moving to nearby towns to continue trading after the 
blitz.818 The records for Exeter City Council do suggest that some former city centre 
traders decided to open new businesses on the city’s housing estates rather than 
                                                          
814 Kelly’s Directory of Plymouth and District 1939 (London: Kelly’s Directories, 1939); Kelly’s Directory 
of Plymouth and District 1955 (London: Kelly’s Directories, 1955); Kelly’s Directory of Bristol 1939 
(London: Kelly’s Directories, 1939); Kelly’s Directory of Bristol 1956 (London: Kelly’s Directories, 
1956): Besley’s Directory of Exeter and Suburbs 1941 (Exeter: Besley & Copp, 1940); Besley’s 
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815 Besley’s Directory of Exeter 1953; Besley’s Directory of Exeter 1954 
816 Besley’s Directory of Exeter 1941 
817 Besley’s Directory of Exeter 1953; Besley’s Directory of Exeter 1954 
818 Western Morning News, ‘Shop Rents Grievance at Exeter’, 7 December 1948. 
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continue with their former city centre trade, especially those specialising in 
‘domestic’ trades such as tobacconists and grocers, which may account for some of 
the missing firms.819 Others may have closed as part of the official contraction of 
trade seen in 1942 and chose not to begin trading again post-war.820 This pattern is 
repeated across the city centre, with only a small number of firms vanishing between 
the destruction of the city in 1942 and its reconstruction in the early 1950s.821  
 
A similar pattern can be found in both Bristol and Plymouth, suggesting that the 
major changes we do see on Britain’s high street’s was not the product of 
reconstruction.822 Tracing Exeter’s pre-war firms in the post-war era, it is notable that 
the major collapse of the independent stores begins much later in the 1960’s and 
1970’s as the chain store became more fashionable.823 It was not so much the 
actions of the multiple trader in reconstruction which led to the demise of so many 
local independent traders, as the change in shopping habits that led Britain’s 
consumers to seek the branded product and the multiple store. This particular 
aspect of Britain’s consumer habits and their impact on businesses and the High 
Street is beyond the scope of this thesis, but is an area that demands a more 
thorough examination than it has so far attracted.  
 
The use of development and finance companies did, however, change the way in 
which city centre development was undertaken, as the model used for reconstructing 
blitzed cities has become the major method for urban redevelopment projects. All 
                                                          
819 DHC, 5878 City Architect’s Papers, Box 5, Aluminium Bungalows, BISF houses, Shops on Housing 
Estates: Shops on Housing Estates 1945-1948 
820 In 1942 the government sought to contract domestic trade in order to redirect resources to the war 
effort. Firms willing to close for the duration of war were offered compensation.  
821 Besley’s Directory of Exeter 1941, 1950-1956. 
822 Kelly’s Directory of Plymouth 1939, 1950-56; Kelly’s Directory of Bristol 1939, 1951-53. 
823 Kelly’s Directory of Exeter 1956-1973. 
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three cities have seen the redevelopment of some of the post-war building since 
2004, with Princesshay in Exeter, Cabot Circus (formerly part of Broadmead) in 
Bristol and Drake Circus in Plymouth being redeveloped into new shopping centres. 
In all cases the sites were leased to a major development company which undertook 
the building and then let the units to other firms, just as was done post-war. 
Interestingly, the development companies were often the decedents of the post-war 
development companies, with both the Princesshay and Cabot Circus 
redevelopments being undertaken by Land Securities, the parent company of 
Ravenseft.824  
 
The method of leasing land from local authorities and then either selling or letting the 
resultant buildings proved extremely profitable and was replicated in other building 
sectors, such as office building, throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The banks and 
insurance companies which financed the work of the development companies also 
saw the potential profits to be made from such projects and continued to finance 
development projects. The office boom in London, as admirably documented by 
Oliver Marriot in The Property Boom, created a new breed of property millionaires 
and helped to establish a plethora of development companies which built many of 
Britain’s best-known shopping and business districts.825 The Arndale Centre, Centre 
Point, Birmingham’s Bull Ring and the original Elephant and Castle were all the 
product of such development companies and demonstrate the impact which the 
                                                          
824 BBC News, ‘Princesshay Opening’, 7 September 2007 - 
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method of land purchase and lease to developers produced by reconstruction had 
on Britain’s urban fabric.826  
 
Outside the City Centre  
 
Beyond the central areas rebuilding, progress was also being made in both industrial 
building and housing. Housing had always received a priority status and had 
progressed at a steady pace throughout the 1940s. However, the pace was not as 
fast as either the government or the public had envisaged, and the Labour 
government came under increasing fire from the Opposition on housing progress. 
The economic crises of the late 1940s and the severe winter of 1947 had both 
slowed housing progress, making Labour’s housing programme more the victim of 
circumstance rather than a lack of will. Despite these setbacks, the Labour 
government still oversaw the building of approximately 900,000 houses between 
1945 and 1951.827 
 
 Unfortunately demand outstripped supply and the Conservative government sought 
to capitalise on this, making an election pledge to build 300,000 houses per year.828 
This pledge helped them to win the 1951 election and led to a housing drive to 
ensure that the pledge was met. 1952 did not see the 300,000 target being met, but 
did see the machinery which would see its achievement put in place. A new housing 
bill was passed that created more generous subsidies for house building and 
methods were sought to reduce the use of still-scarce steel and softwood in house 
building. The latter involved the extension of non-traditional building methods, the 
                                                          
826 Ibid, chapters 6 and 14.  
827 John Burnett, A Social History of Housing, p.277. 
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restriction of flat building and the reduction of housing standards in terms of size to 
save on materials. The reductions in space standards were sold as ‘the people’s 
house’ – a simplified house plan which would provide unfussy, solid homes for 
working Britain.829  
Although ‘the people’s house’ was a Conservative concept, the foundations of 
the idea had been laid under the Labour government, with local authorities already 
being told in 1950 to make more use of terraced houses to save materials and costs. 
Local authorities were also advised to change house designs to create further 
savings, with lower ceilings being recommended as a method for this.830 The 
housing output of Britain in 1953 exceeded the target, with 319,000 houses built and 
1954 saw an extraordinary 348,000 houses completed.831 The majority of these 
houses were still municipal houses with only a small amount of private building 
allowed. After 1954 the private building sector was unshackled as materials and 
investment became easier to obtain, aiding the process of providing new homes.  
 
Within the three cities the impact of the Conservative housing drive can be seen, 
particularly in terms of the use of non-traditional housing in Plymouth and Bristol. All 
local authorities were expected to take a quota of non-traditional houses as part of 
their housing requests, which provoked mixed responses amongst the various local 
authorities. Exeter always viewed the quota as an imposition and comments about 
non-traditional houses being ‘foisted’ on the city can be found in the Council minutes 
and newspaper reports.832 The city frequently haggled with the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government over their housing quotas in an attempt to reduce the number 
                                                          
829 Jones, ‘This is Magnificent; 300,000 houses a year’, Contemporary British History, p.111-112. 
830 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes, Housing Committee, 24 October 1950. 
831 Burnett, A Social History of Housing, p.277. 
832 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes: Housing Committee, 27 April 1948; Western Morning News, 
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of non-traditional houses. The Housing Committee stated that they had not found the 
non-traditional houses any quicker to build than traditional houses and that they 
were frequently more expensive to build as well.833 Occasionally the Ministry 
relented and allowed them to swap some non-traditional houses for traditional, if 
local supplies of materials allowed. More often than not the city was told in no 
uncertain terms that it had to accept the houses or receive a reduced quota.834 The 
later phases of the housing estates demonstrate the increased use of non-traditional 
houses with a number of types present, particularly the locally produced Cornish 
Unit and the British Iron and Steel Federation (BISF) house.  
 
Exeter’s reluctance to use the non-traditional houses stemmed from the experience 
of building with an Orlit pre-cast concrete system on the Pinhoe estate.835 The city 
had utilised a similar system on one of its interwar estates, with the building of 200 
Laings easiform houses, and had found them cost-effective and simple to build.836 
As a result Exeter was happy to experiment with a non-traditional system in the early 
years after the war. Unfortunately the Orlit system proved particularly troublesome, 
with the moulds for the precast sections frequently producing poor results and the 
concrete taking a long time to dry.837 The houses took far longer to build than 
traditional houses as a result, making the city reluctant to use other non-traditional 
systems.  
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Non-traditional building also tended to cause tensions with the building trade, 
who saw the use of non-traditional building methods as an attack on their skilled 
profession, and Exeter saw a number of strikes by building operatives throughout 
the 1940s and early1950s.838 In contrast Bristol and Plymouth used non-traditional 
methods extensively and were able to boost their housing output as a result. The 
push for increased housing output from 1951 also saw the embracing of flats and 
maisonettes as a housing type. Exeter particularly favoured low-level blocks of three 
stores composed of either six flats or two maisonettes and two flats. These were 
used as a way of providing smaller homes for newly married couples, single people 
and the elderly. In addition to this, Exeter also built a complex for elderly residents at 
the Stoke Hill estate, Toronto House. Toronto House was built from the Lord Mayor’s 
Air Raid Relief fund to house elderly citizens who had lost their homes to the blitz.839 
The complex won awards for innovation, as did the housing estate it was placed 
on.840  
 
Bristol used a mixture of pre-cast concrete systems, most notably Woolaway, Unity 
and Easiform as well as the BISF system. The Lockleaze and Lawrence Weston 
estates were built with a high proportion of non-traditional houses of this type and 
allowed the city to expand its housing stock at a fast pace.841 Bristol also used flats 
more extensively than either Exeter or Plymouth, producing designs for large inner-
                                                          
838 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes: Housing Committee, 28 January 1947; Express & Echo, 
‘Council Discusses Types of House’, 28 April 1948.  
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city complexes and a number of point-blocks in the early 1950s.842 The use of flats 
was generally discouraged by the Conservative government as a way of conserving 
materials like steel, but they were permitted for inner-city housing. Bristol City 
Council put forward the use of flats for the central areas in 1949 and 1950 as a way 
of controlling urban sprawl. The high housing density at the centre of the city was 
translating into huge suburban estates and the city was keen to avoid perpetuating 
this as a housing model.843 The experience of its huge interwar estates, particularly 
Knowle West, had made the city wary of having huge ‘one class’ estates, which it 
found difficult to manage.  
There were also concerns about the distance which workers would have to 
travel to reach their jobs in the city centre, which made the building of some city 
centre housing all the more desirable.844 The Redcliff area had been earmarked 
under the City Council’s post-war plan for housing for ‘key workers’ and plans were 
made to built complexes of flats in this area. Similar complexes were built in the St 
Philip’s area and the city later embraced the use of point blocks as a housing 
solution for its more densely populated areas.845   
 
Plymouth had made use of non-traditional houses from the start, with extensive use 
of the Easiform pre-cast concrete system, the BISF system and the local Cornish 
Unit system.846 Virtually all of the Whitleigh estate was built with non-traditional 
houses, as was much of the Honicknowle and Ham estates. The city continued to 
use non-traditional building methods on its later 1960s estates at Eggbuckland and 
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Southway, demonstrating that the City Council found the non-tradition methods more 
satisfactory than Exeter City Council had. The city did not make as extensive use of 
flats as Bristol had, but the low-rise systems seen in Exeter could also be found in 
parts of the city.847 Like Bristol, Plymouth’s Housing Committee used flats for inner-
city building in an effort to provide housing close to workplaces. Flats were common 
in the wards which had suffered the worst overcrowding during the interwar period, 
such as Vintry and St Peters, as a way of alleviating overcrowding and keeping 
workforces close to their employment.848 The city did later make use of point blocks 
in the Devonport area, but these were not common with a total of three point blocks 
built in the early 1960s.  
 
The estates of the three cities were all built along ‘neighbourhood unit’ lines which 
sought to produce self-contained communities grouped around schools and 
amenities. These amenities lagged behind house building, particularly the shops and 
leisure facilities, as they did not receive the same priority as the houses for materials 
and labour.849 Licences for shops on housing estates began to be approved from 
1950, although progress in this area was still slow. The majority of shopping parades 
on post-war estates were built as lock-up shop units with dwellings above as this 
made the most efficient use of the space.850 Although it is not explicit in the surviving 
documents, it is also possible that including flats and maisonettes in the shop plans 
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made it easier to gain approval as it was adding to the housing drive and pushing up 
the figures for completed dwellings. 
 
 School building was one of the few areas where swift progress was made, 
particularly in terms of primary schools. Education was allocated a fairly generous 
budget in order to deliver the 1944 Education Act, with its extension of secondary 
education and division between the primary and secondary levels of education. New 
schools were required for the provision of the envisaged tripartite system of 
grammar, technical and secondary modern schools along with the division of 
education into primary (5-11) and secondary (11-15) schools in place of the old 
elementary schools. Neighbourhood planning called for local primary schools to 
serve the new estates, plus the provision of secondary schools which would serve 
more than one estate.851 Plymouth serves as a particularly good example of the 
speed of this type of building, with both secondary and primary schools built and 
operational on the Honicknowle, Ham, Whitleigh and Efford estates by 1953.852  
 
Other community facilities, such as churches, community centres, libraries and pubs, 
did not emerge as quickly. The provision of churches was not the direct 
responsibility of the local authority but the diocesan authority for each city. City 
Councils set aside plots of land for churches on their estates, but it was the 
responsibility of the church authorities themselves to build the new churches.853 It is 
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notable that many post-war estates had churches of different denominations 
demonstrating both sensitivity to the religious make-up of each city and a concern 
for the spiritual wellbeing of the new estate dwellers. This feature is present even on 
some fairly small estates, such as the Pinhoe estate in Exeter. This was provided 
with a Catholic church, St Bernadette’s, despite being an estate of only 300 
houses.854 The estate was attached to the village of Whipton, which already had a 
Church of England church and a Baptist chapel, and as such no further churches 
were built on the actual estate. Despite this, the estate of Whipton Barton, which was 
only separated from Whipton and the Pinhoe estate by a main road, was provided 
with a new Church of England church, St Boniface, and a Methodist church.  
Evidently there was more concern about the spiritual wellbeing of the 
residents of this area compared with some of the other Exeter estates, as Countess 
Wear was not provided with a full-time church. Land was set aside on the estate for 
a church, but this was not built; instead a chapel was incorporated into the 
community centre building.855 No other churches of any denomination were built on 
the estate, which is rather puzzling when compared with the generous provision of 
religious buildings in the Whipton area. Similar provision can be found on the post-
war estates of both Bristol and Plymouth. Buildings for other religions were not 
provided, but it should be noted that Plymouth and Exeter did not have very diverse 
populations in the post-war period.856  
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Further community facilities such as pubs and community centres were built, but 
often did not appear until the late 1950s when building restrictions on all types of 
building were finally lifted. The provision of pubs was less pressing on some of the 
Plymouth and Exeter estates, as they were frequently attached to existing residential 
areas which already had such facilities. In Plymouth it had been a deliberate 
decision by Abercrombie and Paton Watson to attach many of their new estates to 
existing hamlets or estates in order to help create a sense of identity and 
community.857 This also meant that existing facilities, such as pubs, could also be 
incorporated into the new communities. A similar pattern can be found in Exeter, 
with the Countess Wear and Pinhoe/Whipton Barton estates benefitting from existing 
pubs.  
The provision of cultural facilities like libraries and cinemas was often written 
into the plans for post-war estates, but these were not always forthcoming.858 Bristol 
performed the best in terms of library provision, with an eventual network of 28 
branch libraries in the city.859 The city evidently encouraged libraries on its estates, 
as the interwar estates were generally provided with libraries prior to 1939. However, 
the provision of libraries for the post-war estates took more time and the majority 
were built after 1960. Plymouth also provided its estates with libraries, although like 
Bristol these were built after 1960 with the new estates instead being served by a 
mobile library in the early years.860 Exeter relied almost entirely on mobile services, 
with branch libraries not being provided to the estates at all. Some branch libraries 
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were eventually opened on the outskirts of the city during the 1960s.861 The plans for 
cinemas were dropped from virtually all estates, particularly as by the time such 
building could be considered, cinema going was suffering from the increasing 
popularity and availability of television. The growing popularity and access to 
television is underlined by the number of requests received by Exeter City Council 
from tenants during the early 1950s to be allowed to connect the property to 
rediffusion services.862 
 
Overall the three cities did achieve their aim of building communities rather than just 
housing estates. The new areas were provided with the majority of facilities 
envisaged in the plans of the 1940s, although it did take some time to put all of these 
in place. What makes these estates stand out compared with their interwar 
counterparts and the private building of the mid-twentieth century is the attention 
paid to such facilities, which were often missing in the interwar estates. Likewise, 
privately built estates from the 1960s and 1970s also frequently lacked the service 
provision of their municipal counterparts. Exeter’s estates were particularly notable 
for their careful layout, which sought to maintain the garden city ideals of the 
interwar period while using a less formal style of architecture and layout. The heavy 
use of traditional building methods added to the general charm of these estates, 
which were noted by the architectural community for their quality.863  
The estates of Plymouth and Bristol sometimes lost some of the potential 
attractiveness owing to the heavy use of non-traditional houses and it is sometimes 
evident that the layouts were designed more for ease of building than aesthetic 
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effect. Parts of Plymouth’s Honicknowle and Whitleigh estates were built with the 
same type of very wide, straight roads which were seen in the interwar estates, 
which can give them a rather austere feel. However, the use of non-traditional 
housing did allow the cities to build quickly and demonstrated that such methods 
could produce well-designed and generally pleasing houses. Their importance was 
in the normalising of such building methods, which were set to dominate the 1960s 
and 1970s. Wimpey in particular put the non-traditional house to great use with the 
pioneering of its ‘no fines’ concrete systems, used extensively by Coventry City 
Council.864 The Wimpey method allowed the firm not only to build large numbers of 
houses for the public sector, but also for the private sector, making the company one 
of Britain’s best-known house builders. The use of non-traditional houses for 
municipal housing allowed for innovation in building design and paved the way for 
the adoption of such methods on a massive scale in private and commercial 
building.  
 
Reception of the New Cities  
 
As the long-promised new cities began to take shape, opinions on the architecture 
and design started to flow. The reactions of the general public to the new city 
centres are quite difficult to judge as there are few sources which give a full picture 
of how citizens felt about them. 
The opinions of the architectural and planning professions are easier gauge 
as views on the reconstructed cities appeared in both the professional press and the 
wider media. The reception of the newly built city centres was mixed, with the choice 
                                                          
864 Tiratsoo, Reconstruction, Affluence and Labour Politics, p.74. 
311 
 
of architecture in particular often quickly drawing criticism. To some extent this 
reflect a growing trend toward Modernist architecture in Britain post-war, which 
meant that to the eyes of newly qualified architects the buildings of Bristol’s 
Broadmead, Plymouth and Exeter were already outdated and old-fashioned as they 
went up. The few opinions from citizens which can be found suggest that, at least at 
first, the public reaction was positive and the new buildings were well thought of. 
Plymouth in particular drew praise from visitors and citizens who appreciated the 
expression of modern planning ideas and building design that the new city centre 
displayed. Plymouth’s buildings were certainly the most Modern-inspired in terms of 
their architecture, although they also owed much to the American Beaux Arts 
movement of the early twentieth century. In contrast, Bristol seems to have been the 
least satisfactory of the three reconstructed cities, with criticism being drawn from all 
quarters with regard to architecture, planning and the decision to move the shopping 
centre.  
 
The buildings of all three cities drew criticism for their architecture almost 
immediately, with condemnation in histories of all three cities published in the mid to 
late 1950s.865 In addition to this, Exeter and Bristol found themselves under fire from 
architectural critics in the national newspapers; Plymouth was partially spared this 
owing to its radical approach to replanning which captured the imaginations of the 
critics.  
Bryan Little’s The City and County of Bristol, published in 1954, stated that 
the buildings of the new Broadmead were ‘of a fearfully banal tameness and 
moreover combine to present a discordant jumble of mutually unmannerly 
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elevation’.866 Little felt that they reflected the cautious nature of the big firms which 
had built them and found little to praise in their external appearance. Only one 
building, the Dolcis shoe store, drew praise from Little, although his description of it 
as ‘challenging’ could also be interpreted as damning with faint praise. In fact Little 
wasn’t alone in his appreciation of this particular building, as a local architect also 
noted the Dolcis store as being one of the few of bold design at Broadmead.867  
The national press skirted around the issue of Broadmead’s architecture, 
choosing instead to focus on the level of trade in the new centre and the efficiency 
the new road systems would bring to the city.868 Rather more damning was a piece 
in the Manchester Guardian which focussed on the wartime losses of the city and 
the City Council’s failure to better preserve the surviving fabric of the old city. The 
new parts of the city are described as having ‘blankly virtuous facades’, rather 
echoing Bryan Little’s assessment of the architecture as tame; the closest the piece 
comes to praise is in describing Broadmead as ‘tactful’.869 More recent accounts of 
the reconstructed city centre are also critical of the architecture, with the lack of 
architectural control by the Council blamed for the centre’s poor design.  
 
Bristol also suffered from a tendency to drop planning schemes before they were 
completed and embark on entirely new ones at regular intervals, resulting in the 
‘jumble’ of buildings and styles described by Little. Owen Hatherley’s A New Kind of 
Bleak highlights this tendency and its effect on the city to the present day. Hatherley 
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is as scathing of the Broadmead architecture as the contemporary voices and very 
much places the blame for this on the lack of architectural control.870  
The level of trade described by the Times and the Financial Times certainly 
demonstrates the popularity of Broadmead with shoppers who, despite the blitzed 
traders’ claims that they ‘would not go’ to the new centre, appear to have been eager 
to sample the new shops.871 This is a pattern repeated in all three cities, as 
shoppers deprived of goods and choice for so long wasted no time in resuming their 
pre-war consumer habits.  
 
The housing and industrial estates come in for higher praise, with Little in particular 
praising the housing estates. He praises schools built at Lockleaze and Southmead 
as particularly fine examples of modern technique, especially the ‘really fine theatre 
hall’ of the latter.872 There is some indication of Little’s architectural sensibilities in 
his comments on the complexes of flats under construction in the city, with a fifteen 
storey block being praised as ‘of most architectural interest’.873 Little reflects the 
sensibilities of many commentators on the reconstructed cities in that his tastes 
appear to be Modern, and therefore they find little to praise in the new cities of the 
early 1950s. 
 
Exeter also suffered from criticism of its new architecture, with one particularly 
damning piece in the Architects’ Journal from 1952 standing out above the others. 
The writer stated that the ‘the designs tend to lack conviction and please few’ as 
they did not follow a Modernist plan nor were they a pastiche or recreation of past 
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styles.874 This assessment seems particularly unfair as the city had deliberately 
chosen a Neo-Classical style of building in order to echo some of the older parts of 
the city. The Architects’ Journal did praise the city for the speed of rebuilding 
however and also had praise for the design of Princesshay. A response to this piece 
was featured in the Express and Echo several days later, stating that the citizens of 
the city would be disappointed to discover that their new city was not ‘the last thing 
in Modernity’ but was really ‘architecturally old-fashioned’.875 As the new buildings 
had been well-received locally, this comment seems particularly apt.  
The Echo itself continued to praise the new city centre, with later articles 
describing the buildings as ‘handsome up-to-date new shops’; evidently the opinion 
of outsider architectural critics were to be ignored.876 The Times featured an article 
on the city centre a month later in September 1952 which was rather warmer about 
the rebuilt city overall, but still critical of the architectural choices made. The Times 
correspondent felt that Exonians might have preferred either a complete rebuilding 
of the Georgian city or ‘a bold essay in open replanning’ rather than the compromise 
they felt the rebuilding had become.877  
 
Histories such as W.G Hoskins Two Thousand Years in Exeter continued this lament 
for the lost city and the decision to build afresh rather than rebuild the former city.878 
The removal of some standing buildings in order to execute the road plans came in 
for particular criticism from Hoskins and he became active within the newly-created 
Exeter Civic Society in an attempt to protect other buildings from the same fate. 
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Hoskins later stood as a local councillor to further this work when the 
redevelopments of the 1960s began.879  
Exeter’s attention to detail in terms of architectural control, however, appears to 
have been vindicated as the city was not accused of having weak architectural 
control over the new city centre. The uniformity and harmony of the High Street 
design was commented on by the Times article.880 
 
Plymouth found general praise for its bold approach to reconstruction, with the city 
centre praised as a fine example of modern planning. Crispin Gill particularly praised 
the plan in his 1979 history of the city, noting that the city had been built with few 
departures from the 1943 plan.881 This is the element which makes Plymouth stand 
out amongst the blitzed cities as it was one of the few which actually built according 
to the original plan. The City Council was remarkable in weathering the criticisms 
and delays faced in rebuilding and producing a city centre which looked like the 
drawings found in A Plan for Plymouth. This is all the more noteworthy when set 
against the financial problems surrounding reconstruction and the fact that the 
Chamber of Commerce continued to contest the plan until 1953.882 The latter point is 
interesting when it is considered that the major Plymouth department stores all 
supported the reconstruction, and even built their own stores in some cases. As with 
Bristol, the footfall in the new centre vindicated the City Council’s choices, but this 
could not allay the bitterness felt by some traders at the loss of their freehold sites.  
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The early 1950s were a period of swift progress for the blitzed cities, with city centre 
reconstruction finally allowed to begin in earnest. As controls on building were lifted, 
housing was also able to progress with alacrity, with the new communities around 
the three cities taking shape. In addition to housing, community facilities such as 
schools and churches also began to be built, giving the new communities a focus. 
Yet this progress was still being hampered by government restrictions on materials 
and investment, making the speed with which the first shops of the new city centres 
were erected all the more remarkable.  
 
The influence of the Investment Programmes Committee on reconstruction has only 
recently begun to be acknowledged. The IPC’s policies for economic development 
and its power to restrict investment make it the most influential body on city centre 
reconstruction. Through the IPC the building licence system restricted what could be 
built, with priority reserved for industries that benefited the export market. As such, 
IPC policy helped to ensure that blitzed cities could not rebuild for half a decade 
after the end of the war. The exposure of the workings of this committee changes 
the narrative of reconstruction, as the long period between Blitz and rebuilding had 
been attributed to the prevarication of local authorities. However, the restrictions of 
the IPC demonstrate that local authorities, and even the MTCP, had little influence 
over the pace of reconstruction. Allocations made to blitzed cities were deliberately 
kept small, with priority given to virtually all other areas of building ahead of blitzed 
cities. In addition to controlling materials, such as steel, the IPC also controlled 
private investment in building. This further restricted reconstruction, as even the 
businesses with the money to proceed, such as the multiple stores and investment 
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companies, could not spend freely. These restrictions demonstrate that even if 
blitzed cities had abandoned their plans and allowed rebuilding along old lines, 
rebuilding would not have progressed any faster as the constraints on building were 
not due to reconstruction plans but government economic policy. The pace of 
building in cities such as Portsmouth, where the reconstruction plan was virtually 
abandoned, demonstrates this point, as building progressed no faster than in the 
three cities.883  
 
Despite these restrictions, the three South Western cities still started rebuilding their 
city centres in earnest in 1950 and 1951, with the first stores in Exeter and Plymouth 
finished by the end of the latter year. The cities were also able to retain architectural 
control, with the designs for the buildings a deliberate choice rather than a necessity 
produced by austerity. Exeter’s ingenious use of architectural briefs written into the 
leases demonstrates just how closely local authorities could control their post-war 
architecture. It also demonstrates that the apparent lack of a supervising architect 
did not mean that a local authority had weak architectural control, as this could be 
exercised by other means. At present it is not known whether any other blitzed city 
employed such a method for controlling building and this is an area which would 
benefit from further research. Certainly the methods used by Bristol, Plymouth and 
other blitzed cities, such as Southampton and Coventry suggest that few other local 
authorities took this approach. Plymouth retained architectural control through the 
use of a supervising architect, but this still occasionally produced minor architectural 
oversights. Bristol had the loosest control of the three cities, but still managed to 
retain some harmony in the Broadmead centre with through the use of materials. 
                                                          
883 Junichi Hasegawa, ‘The Reconstruction of Portsmouth in the 1940s’, Contemporary British History, 
14/1 (2000), pp.45-62.  
318 
 
The three cities demonstrate that the assumption that ‘big business’ was able to 
dictate the architectural finish of the rebuild cities is inaccurate at best. Some 
businesses, notably Burton’s, did attempt to force their own architectural brand onto 
the three cities, but the controls in place meant that the cities were mostly able to 
resist such pressures. Bristol was the only exception to this, and it could be that the 
long delays in starting rebuilding were a factor in their capitulation to some trader 
demands. The wrangling with the MTCP delayed reconstruction and it may be that 
Bristol City Council was unwilling to become involved in long disputes with traders 
over building designs and further delay building.  
The presence of ‘big business’ as a reconstruction force was considerable 
however, with the majority of reconstruction work being undertaken by the finance 
companies, multiple traders and the newly emerging development companies. The 
reasons for this dominance in reconstruction were explored in Chapter’s Three and 
Four, but the significance of their involvement becomes clear in the period covered 
by this chapter. The process of leasing sites and using the buildings to generate an 
income became the model for city centre development for the rest of the twentieth 
century, stemming from the post-war reconstruction of blitzed cities. The restrictions 
on materials and investment gave these companies their opportunity, with 
companies such as Land Securities still having large stakes in blitzed cities. The 
changes in land tenure and Britain’s post-war economic policy, with its attendant 
restrictions on the reconstruction process, changed the face of development and 
ownership in the cities. It also allowed construction companies such as Laing and 
McAlpine to become a major force in post-war Britain, as these firms conceived and 
developed new building systems which were utilised in both domestic and industrial 
building, including city centres. The development of non-traditional houses and their 
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utilisation on the municipal estates of cities like Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth led to 
their refinement and acceptance. The private estates of the late 1950s and 1960s 
used such systems, with Wimpey being the best known. Without the need to save 
materials and build large numbers of municipal homes, these systems may not have 
become so established. They allowed the three cities to complete their wartime 
housing plans and remove the slum areas which had existed around the city centres.  
 
The initial reception of the rebuilt city centres does demonstrate the turn in opinion 
which came quickly after 1955. The architecture of Bristol and Exeter was quickly 
thought of as outdated and old fashioned, as the new young architects and 
engineers of the post-war era came to the fore. The City Engineer of Exeter, John 
Brierley, was one such person, stating that the architecture of the 1950s was a 
compromise that pleased no-one.884 The quality of Bristol’s buildings was 
questioned, with the Neo-Georgian style thought of as bland. This description has 
dogged post-war architecture throughout the following decades, with few 
appreciating the understated buildings of the period. The period of Modernism and 
Brutalism which followed, finding its best expressions in the National Theatre, the 
Barbican and numerous educational buildings, was a reaction to this perceived 
blandness. In Plymouth the Civic Centre expressed the move toward a starker, 
bolder architecture, while in Exeter the understated Modernism of the Central Library 
and the interior of St Georges Hall were followed by the bolder vision of Bobby’s 
department store. All of these buildings were building the late 1950s to mid-1960s, 
demonstrating how quickly the buildings of the immediate post-war aesthetic fell out 
of favour. Despite this, they were on the whole well executed with thought and care, 
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especially when the constraints placed on local authorities and those who built for 






‘The last thing in Modernity’? Outcomes and Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out to re-analyse the conventional narrative of post-war 
reconstruction through the experience of the three South Western cities of Bristol, 
Exeter and Plymouth. The reconstruction process had been characterised as top-
down, driven by political ideology and architecturally unappreciated by the citizens of 
blitzed cities. This thesis sought to re-examine these assertions and to assess 
whether the emerging picture of economic constraints played a greater part in the 
process of reconstruction than previously acknowledged. In addition to this, the pre-
war development of planning was examined in each city in order to assess the 
continuity between pre and post-war urban planning in each city and the continuity in 
the political landscape.  This extended view of reconstruction has given an overview 
of urban planning across more than a century, from the earliest public health act of 
1848 to the first wave of city centre reconstruction up to 1955 and demonstrated the 
continuity of urban improvement throughout this period.  
 
Through the study of the three South Western cities, this thesis has demonstrated 
that post-war planning was not a top-down process. The three cities all consulted 
with blitzed traders, property owners and citizens on the future shape of the cities. 
All three cities surveyed trader needs for the post-war city, although traders 
themselves did not always respond, and tried to plan according to the replies. 
Citizens were encouraged to forward their own views and the exhibitions of plans in 
the three cities were used as an opportunity to gather feedback on the proposed 
reconstruction. The assertion that reconstruction plans were the expression of ‘the 
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planners’ will or ‘eye view’ has also been proved to be an exaggeration at best, with 
the consultant planners of Plymouth and Exeter having no input into the actual 
building process.  
The later criticisms of the plans, which have previously been viewed as a 
demonstration of the ‘top-down’ nature of planning, have been traced to the clauses 
within the Town and Country Planning Act 1944 dealing with compensation and land 
ownership. This thesis has demonstrated that the decision not to make the Cost of 
Works payments mobile in cases of replanning was a deciding factor for blitzed 
traders and property owners’ support of reconstruction plans. Likewise, the decision 
not to allow local authorities to sell back land to former owners once replanning was 
complete, instead offering only leasehold tenure for land, diluted support for 
replanning as traders were unwilling to invest in leasehold property. The calls to be 
allowed to rebuild on former sites were due to these two clauses, rather than any 
deficiency in the plans.  
This thesis has also demonstrated that the post-war economic climate of Britain was 
responsible for the slow pace of building, and the further dilution of support for 
replanning as a result, rather than any specific political ideology. The constraints 
placed on blitzed cities in terms of building were directly connected to the economic 
crises of the late 1940s and the subsequent economic policies to drive exports over 
home consumption. The political continuity in terms of local authorities has also 
been unpacked, with the influence of pre-war planning and the continuity of both 
council members and staffs acknowledged. This continuity has previously been 
overlooked, but this thesis has demonstrated that the reconstruction plans of blitzed 
cities were a continuation and evolution of planning ideas and practice gained since 





Continuity between pre and post-war planning 
 
The post-war reconstruction plans of blitzed cities have often been examined in 
isolation with little consideration for planning and urban development during the 
interwar period. Reconstruction plans emerge as stand-alone grand schemes which 
bear little relation to the pre-war conditions in the cities and have been considered 
the expression of a town planners ideal rather than a response to existing problems 
and conditions.885 The examination of the pre-war development of the three South 
Western cities has demonstrated that the post-war reconstruction plans were not just 
a reaction to war damage, but were a continuation of pre-war city development. The 
steady expansion of both public health legislation and concerns over the conditions 
of towns throughout the nineteenth century led to a series of interwar improvement 
and development schemes. Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth all undertook large-scale 
housing projects between 1920 and 1939, building extensive municipal estates to 
house their working class populations. The cities were also embarking on slum 
clearance schemes to tackle the remaining areas of overcrowding and poor housing 
at the outbreak of war in 1939. The impetus for these projects stemmed from the 
pre-1914 reports into the conditions of housing, which in turn had been fuelled by the 
public health and sanitation concerns of the Victorian era. The First World War 
proved a turning point in housing and planning evolution, as the condition of fighting 
men reinforced the need to tackle the causes of poor health amongst the working 
classes. The ‘Homes Fit for Heroes’ campaign combined with the subsidies and 
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legislation of the interwar period gave local authorities the tools they needed to 
tackle such problems in earnest. The alacrity with which all three cities did this 
demonstrates the widespread concern at urban conditions, with the cities making 
good use of the available legislation and funding. Even as the subsidies were 
reduced, the cities did not reduce their housing programmes significantly, but 
pressed forward to produce as many homes as possible. The experiences of the 
interwar years informed the reconstruction plans of the three cities, with lessons 
being learned from the interwar estates. Bristol had found its approach to housing 
was not been as successful as hoped, with the experience of the Knowle West 
estate informing their post-war estate design.886 The Knowle West estate had been 
the largest of the city’s interwar estates and had proved difficult to manage as a 
result. The City Council also felt that such large estates did not provide the social life 
and amenities which residents required, and also presented problems with the 
distances which workers had to travel for their jobs.887 These concerns were fed into 
the post-war housing schemes, with estates planned with full amenities and 
consideration for the proximity of jobs. Similar concerns occupied Exeter and 
Plymouth, with all of the post-war estates designed with the same issues in mind.  
 
The post-war estate design in the three cities also drew on the interwar 
developments in town planning, embracing the concept of ‘neighbourhood units’ as a 
way of tackling the problems of the interwar estates. The estate plans of the Plan for 
Plymouth particularly demonstrate this, with the designs for estates laid out in detail. 
The estates were to be built around amenities such as schools, which would serve a 
specific population. These were not just to be estates, but communities, with Paton 
                                                          




Watson and Abercrombie wherever possible trying to build these new communities 
into existing areas which already had their own identity.888 There was also a concern 
to design estates in a more aesthetically pleasing way, as the interwar estates had 
sometimes verged into the austere, and with a more mixed population in mind. The 
wide streets and Neo-Georgian architecture of the interwar estates was dismissed in 
favour of a more village-like style of layout. The architecture was to be friendlier, 
returning to the Vernacular-inspired buildings which had been used immediately 
either-side of the First World War. Careful attention had also been paid to the wants 
of potential residents, so that upstairs bathrooms, separate toilets, storage space 
and parlours were now standard in all homes. These features had been argued over 
in the inter-war period, with the provision of parlours in particular causing much 
debate. It had become accepted that a parlour was not a luxury, but a necessary 
part of good house design, giving residents a quiet room for study, recuperation, 
business and the receiving of guests. The provision of the other features was the 
product of surveys of existing tenants, who reported what was good, bad and 
indifferent about the houses. Interwar studies of housing more generally had helped 
inform the post-war design of houses, culminating in the 1944 Design of Dwellings 
handbook which laid out the principles of good house design for local authorities.889 
There was an attempt to cater for different classes of resident, with the intention that 
estates would have a range of homes suitable for different age groups and 
incomes.890 In reality the housing shortage of the post-war years meant that the 
emphasis was on three-bedroom family homes, with little else built initially on the 
estates. However, smaller flats and retirement developments were added, 
particularly after the building restrictions were lifted in 1954. Exeter built Toronto 
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House on the Stoke Hill estate for elderly residents, while Plymouth built similar 
developments on its Ernesettle and Whitleigh estates.891  
 
 The planning of estates as ‘communities’ has been criticised as social engineering, 
with the estates viewed as an expression of ‘top down’ planning. The concept of the 
‘planners eye view’ is invoked, with Peter Larkham, Alice Coleman and Lyndsey 
Hanley particularly highlighting this idea.892 However, this concept is partially driven 
by the social problems experienced by municipal estates during the 1970s and 
1980s. It has been assumed that the design of the estates was at fault and that this 
was responsible for creating anti-social behaviour.893  As a result, post-war estates 
have attracted the tags of ‘sink estates’ and ‘dumping grounds’, with the solution 
thought to be the redevelopment of the area.894 Plymouth has seen such 
redevelopment in recent years, with the partial rebuilding of the North Prospect 
estate in an attempt to resolve the issues the area has faced.895 What is overlooked 
in the majority of the literature is the root of the problems the estates faced, which 
was almost always economic rather than architectural. The areas which have gained 
the tag of ‘sink estate’ are almost always those which are worst-placed to withstand 
economic downturns, with residents often those in the most economically vulnerable 
jobs. The design of municipal estates was taken and replicated in privately built and 
owned estates post-war, reaching its peak in the New Towns. These do not suffer 
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from the same level of problems as the municipal estates, as residents are better 
placed to weather economic storms. It is also notable that some developments 
dismissed as intrinsically bad by design, such as Erno Goldfinger’s Trellick Town in 
London, have been rehabilitated by a move into private ownership in recent years.896 
The lesson of the interwar years has not been entirely learned; that single-class 
estates can lead to social problems, and that poverty itself is the root of the majority 
of problems.  
 
It was not just the housing estates of the post-war years which built on the lessons 
and developments of the interwar period. The reconstruction plans of the three cities 
also tackled issues such as traffic congestion, overcrowding of buildings, and poor 
industrial location and provision. All three cities had traffic problems pre-war, with 
each claiming to be the most congested city in the South West. The narrow medieval 
streets of central Bristol were not designed for the volume of traffic they now carried, 
while Plymouth’s difficult cross-city route caused the city streets to jam. Exeter still 
had the main south-west trunk roads coming directly through the city centre, 
although some relief had been obtained by the building of the A30 bypass road in 
the 1930s. However, the majority of traffic still came through the High Street, which 
like Bristol’s narrow streets could not cope with such high traffic volumes. The three 
cities had been creating plans to tackle this issue during the interwar period, with 
plans for new bypass roads and ring roads to carry traffic away from the city centre. 
Bristol’s Temple Way was to be part of a larger road scheme, while Exeter was 
beginning to build bypass roads around the city.897 Plymouth too was looking to 
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create bypass routes, with road schemes which also doubled as work-creation 
projects.898 The road schemes contained in the post-war plans were therefore 
another point of continuity, with the war damage providing the best opportunity to 
relay roads and relieve the traffic problems of the past. Exeter had been trying to 
effect such changes pre-war, with attempts to change the road layout in the city 
centre in order to make junctions and streets safer for both pedestrians and 
drivers.899 This is highlighted with the post-war design of streets such as Bedford 
Street, which was explicitly stated to be in response to the pre-war danger the 
junction had presented. Bristol too had tried to alleviate similar problems pre-war, 
with work on dangerous junctions dating back to the Edwardian era and changes 
made to the junction of Wine Street.900 The road plans of the post-war years were a 
response to these interwar problems, with the opportunity to rebuild anew offering 
the chance to entirely relay streets and alleviate the problems. 
 
The location of industry was also given careful consideration in the post-war plans, 
with new industrial estates created in all three cities under their plans. Bristol was 
keen to see industry moved away from the city centre, as some industries were 
considered a nuisance from the point of view of air pollution and smells. By 
relocating industry, housing conditions and overcrowding could also be tackled more 
effectively, as the new industrial estates could be placed within convenient distance 
of the new housing estates. This would ensure that workers could be better housed, 
but would not have long distances to travel in from the suburbs to work. In Exeter, 
the relocation of the industrial area around the river was intended to allow the 
                                                          
898 PWDRO, 3133, Plymouth City Council, The City of Plymouth Planning Scheme No.1, 1937. 
899 DHC, Exeter City Council Minutes: Housing Committee, Special Meeting - Exeter & District Town 
Planning Area, 28 July 1925 
900 John V Punter, Design Control in Bristol 1940-1990 (Bristol: Redcliffe Press, 1990) pp.23-24. 
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opening up of the riverside as a leisure area. However, as in Bristol, by moving 
industry to a new site further away from the city centre nuisances such as smoke 
could be reduced. The creation of a second industrial area on the east side of the 
city was intended to spread industry across the city, again with the journeys of 
workers in mind. Plymouth’s industrial provision was more limited and reflected the 
reliance of the city on the dockyard as an employer. The planned expansion of the 
dockyard was incorporated into the plan, allowing for new housing and new sites for 
Devonport shops and businesses to be built to house those displaced by the 
Admiralty’s decision. Apart from this, no real changes to Plymouth’s industrial areas 
were planned, with only one new industrial site at Marsh Mills provided. The 
dominance of the dockyard as an employer was expected to continue, so the 
provision of houses and amenities for these employers was considered adequate by 
Paton Watson and Abercrombie.  
 
The post-war plans of the three cities were therefore not just a response to war 
damage, but part of a continuous process of development and planning in the three 
cities. The experience gained in planning during the interwar years was invaluable 
for reconstruction planning, informing how issues such as housing and traffic were 
tackled. By recognising the continuity between pre- and post-war planning, we can 
develop a better understanding of post-war reconstruction plans and their aims. 
Post-war reconstruction plans are often presented as ‘idealist’ and the ‘planners-
eye-view’ of a modern city, but with a longer view we can see the full picture of the 
problems those plans were tackling beyond simple war damage. With this full view, 
the comprehensive nature of post-war reconstruction plans can be fully understood 
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and appreciated as a response to interwar problems as well as war damage, and 
look more practical and less idealised.  
 
The long view also equips us with an appreciation of the development of planning 
and public health legislation, helping us to understand why the post-war planning 
legislation was written as it was. The 1944 and 1947 Acts were not just the response 
to war damage, but were also trying to encompass tools for dealing with the legacy 
of previous attempts to create a planning framework. The previous planning and 
public health acts had attempted to deal with problems such as slums in a non-
compulsory manner which left private property rights intact. This approach had not 
been successful, as it did not tackle the worst problems of housing and neglectful 
landlords, nor did it allow local authorities to tackle other nuisances such as traffic, 
urban sprawl and air pollution effectively. The planning acts of 1944 and 1947 had to 
tackle these problems as well as the immediate problem of war damage. The 
dissolving of the automatic right of landowners to develop land under the 1947 Act, 
and the right of local authorities to compulsorily acquire land for redevelopment 
under both acts, were important steps towards the control of urban problems. Again, 
the current literature on reconstruction does not always acknowledge these issues or 
the complexities and difficulties surrounding land ownership that reconstruction 
planning had to deal with; the long view provides the context we need.  
 
 




The concept of ‘the planners’ and the ‘planners eye-view’ appear regularly in the 
existing literature, with reconstruction planning depicted as a remote process which 
did not engage with local people.901 ‘The planners’ emerge as a somewhat 
amorphous group, without any clear indication of who ‘the planners’ were. It is not 
clear if this term refers to the consultant planners employed by local authorities such 
as Plymouth and Exeter, or if it refers to all local authority staff involved in planning. 
The term tends to suggest the professional planners, but seems to include the City 
Engineers and City Architects that were common to most local authorities as well. 
This group are suggested to have disregarded local opinion in reconstruction 
planning, with plans dismissed as unrealistic and utopian. Peter Larkham suggests 
that the professionally produced plans of cities such as Plymouth and Exeter were 
over-idealised propaganda, intended to swell civic pride and importance.902 Larkham 
also refers to the lack of a ‘professional tendering’ process for appointing consultant 
planners, suggesting that their employment was due to a network of personal 
contacts rather than any open and transparent public process of appointment. The 
insinuation in this is that the consultants employed were part of a closed system 
within which planning took place, making it remote from both the realities of local life 
and public opinion.903 The examples of the three South Western cities demonstrate 
that reconstruction planning was not a top-down process as assumed, with plans 
created in isolation away from ‘real-world’ concerns.  
 
                                                          
901 For example, David Adams, ‘Everyday Experiences of the Modern City: Remembering the post-war 
reconstruction of Birmingham’, Planning Perspectives, 26/2, (2011);  
902 Peter Larkham and Keith D Lilley, ‘Plans, Planners and City Images: Place promotion and civic 
boosterism in British Reconstruction Planning’, Urban History, 30/2, pp.183-205 
903 Peter Larkham, ‘People, Planning and Place: The role of clients and consultants in reconstructing 
post-war Bilston and Dudley’, Town Planning Review, 77/5, 2006, p.557 
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The three cities consulted extensively with interest groups, particularly in Bristol, 
throughout the planning process. Trader groups in all three cities formed their own 
committees for discussing reconstruction and fed their ideas back to the city 
councils’ on a regular basis. In Bristol, the Traders Advisory Committee wished to be 
co-opted onto the council Planning and Reconstruction Committee to ensure full co-
operation with trade bodies, a move which the Council resisted. This could be 
construed as an example of a local authority distancing itself from those who would 
be directly affected by reconstruction, but the decision was made for fear of vested 
interests overtaking the planning process. Up until this point, the Planning and 
Reconstruction Committee and the Traders Advisory Committee had worked closely 
together, but the decision not to co-opt members resulted in the relationship 
breaking down. In Exeter and Plymouth, the various trader groups were content to 
consult with the councils from a distance. Traders were surveyed in all three cities 
about their post-war needs, with the responses informing the eventual reconstruction 
plans. In Bristol and Exeter traders requested larger sites, which were 
accommodated within the plans, demonstrating how the opinions of traders could 
directly influence city plans.  
 In addition to working with trader groups, the three cities also approached 
other interest groups and the general public for ideas and opinions for 
reconstruction. Exeter City Council approached a wide range of city organisations, 
from cultural groups to women’s organisations. Additionally in 1942 and 1943 they 
called for Exonians to put forward their ideas, welcoming complete plans as well as 
general suggestions. Full plans were created by a number of interest groups and at 
least one individual and were considered at a special meeting of the council in May 
1943. In Plymouth, Paton Watson called for citizens to comment on the Plan for 
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Plymouth, stating that it was not up to planners to impose their views on cities. 
Similarly in Bristol, the draft plan presented to the city in 1944 was intended to 
promote the discussion of reconstruction amongst the public. The suggestions and 
opinions sent to the Council after the exhibition were used to refine the plan, with a 
further exhibition of the alternative plans and amendments received by the Council 
also put on display for public scrutiny. 
 
This consultation process may not have quite been as sophisticated as modern 
planning practices, but it did offer citizens and interest groups the opportunity to 
comment upon and influence reconstruction plans. This input was taken seriously, 
with Bristol in particular carefully considering the objections and alternatives to the 
Broadmead plan. The eventual adoption of the Broadmead plan was because they 
could not see a viable alternative, particularly when traders had stated they wanted 
more space post-war. In addition to the direct consultations with citizens and interest 
groups, the plans of the three cities underwent the public enquiry process which 
allowed those affected by the plans to raise objections in a public arena. This 
process of public enquiry is also held up as an example of the ‘top-down’ nature of 
planning, as it has been thought that traders and property owners had to ‘force’ 
enquiries. However, the 1944 Town and Country Planning Act made public enquiries 
obligatory when plans required the acquisition of land by local authorities via 
compulsory purchase. As such, all three plans were subject to automatic public 
enquiries. As stated in Chapter Four, this is a subtle difference to the accepted 
narrative, with the local authorities having to open up their schemes to scrutiny and 
objections to ensure that the views of all interested parties were heard and 
evaluated. However, it moves the narrative from one of ‘top down’ planners to a 
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more inclusive and consultative process. Under the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act, those affected by a planning scheme or compulsory purchase order 
had the right to request a public enquiry, and it appears that it is this clause which 
has created the perception that all public enquiries had to be demanded by 
aggrieved property owners. 
 
The public enquiries themselves have been subject to criticism, with accusations 
that they were controlled by the local authorities in order to suppress objections. This 
accusation has arisen from the grouping of objections by type, which reduced the 
number of objections listed for the enquiries. It has been assumed that this means 
that individuals did not get the chance to present their case, but the transcripts of the 
enquiries demonstrate that everyone had the right to be heard. Instead the grouping 
of the objections was due to the large numbers of similar objections, such as 
objections to property being included in compulsory purchase orders. It was practical 
for these objections to be presented as a whole by one Counsel, with individuals 
coming forward to make their case in support of the overall objection. The enquiry 
process was also overseen by the same set of Counsels and Inspectors, who were 
not directly involved with any of the cities in question, providing neutrality in the 
defence and hearing.  
The consultation undertaken in each city and the requirement to hold a public 
enquiry demonstrates that planning was not simply a top-down process. Instead 
local people were involved with the process and there was a public arena for the 
scrutiny of the plans. Objections and suggestions for alterations were taken 
seriously, with some property being excluded from the Compulsory Purchase Orders 
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as a result of the public enquiries, and changes made to aspects of the plans after 
objections were made.  
 
The suggestion that consultant planners and councillors were remote from local 
people is also debunked when the process of reconstruction is re-examined through 
the three cities. In all three cities there was continuity in the councils between the pre 
and post-war periods. The councils were made up of individuals who were directly 
involved with city life, with many either running their own businesses or coming from 
well-established trading families in each city. In Exeter there was a tradition of civic 
service, with several generations of some families, such as the Michelmores and 
Greenslades, serving on the council. Many councillors are long-serving, being 
consistently re-elected to their seats and serving from the interwar period through to 
the post-war period.904 This gives continuity to the city governance, with the people 
overseeing post-war reconstruction often being those who oversaw the interwar 
development. Alderman Hennessey in Bristol is a good example of this continuity, 
serving on the housing committee both pre and post-war. The involvement of many 
of the councillors in city life also removes the ‘remote’ tag, as these were people who 
were intimately connected with the economic and social life of the cities. It is also 
notable the councillors are derived from all strata of society by the 1920s, with the 
humbler occupations represented as well as the professions.905 As a result, it is hard 
to accuse the councillors of being remote from local life, as they were part of it. They 
were people who would have well understood the challenges facing the cities, the 
difficulties faced in tackling these problems pre-war, and the attitudes of local people 
towards city development. The overall impression is of a process which was far 
                                                          
904 See Appendix C  
905 See Appendices A, B & C 
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more consultative than previously stated, undertaken by local people who were 
actively involved with city life. It also should be noted that where consultant planners 
were used, such as in Exeter and Plymouth, they did not have long-term input into 
the reconstruction process, only being retained for the drawing up of plans. Neither 
Abercrombie nor Sharp had input into the actual rebuilding process, with Sharp’s 
contract terminated in 1946 and Abercrombie’s in 1947. Instead their remit was to 
produce the plan and provide some initial advice and guidance during the public 
enquiry phases. ‘The planners’ therefore had little control over what was actually 
built, with councillors and council staff, such as those of the City Architect’s or City 
Engineer’s office, making those decisions.  
 
The three cities therefore demonstrate that reconstruction was not the top-down 
process which has been supposed, but a far more nuanced process with multiple 
voices and inputs. The consultation with local people was more extensive than 
previously supposed, with the process of consultation and public enquiry 
comparable to modern planning consultations. The compulsion to hold a public 
enquiry under the 1944 act had been overlooked, shifting the narrative as this 
provided a public area for objections and grievances to be heard which local 
authorities were required to respect. The public enquiries of the three cities also 
demonstrate that this was a standardised process, featuring the same team of 
counsels and the same inspector, all of whom were outsiders to the three cities. By 
examining multiple cities in this study, the standardisation of the enquiry process 
becomes apparent; something which could easily have been overlooked in a single-




Economic policy and constraints  
 
One of the principal conclusions of this thesis has been to demonstrate that the 
compensation and land ownership clauses of the Town and Country Planning Act 
1944 were major factors in the opposition to reconstruction plans. War damage 
compensation represented the only government funds available to blitzed traders 
and property owners for rebuilding their property. The format and functioning of 
these payments was misunderstood by traders and property owners from the outset, 
and it continues to be misunderstood today. As set out in Chapters Three and Four, 
war damage compensation was only intended to compensate owners for the loss of 
value to their property caused by war damage and to pay for repairs. It was never 
intended to function as an insurance policy, providing funds for a like for like 
rebuilding of the property. The Cost of Works payment was capped at the difference 
in value between a building in its damaged and undamaged state, as was the Value 
Payment. However, to reflect the changing buildings costs of the post-war era, Cost 
of Works payments were subject to an addition of 66.75%. There was also a clause 
that allowed for a larger payment to be made in some circumstances in order to 
reinstate sound, modern properties. This latter clause appears to have been 
interpreted by traders and property owners as an ‘old for new’ policy on all buildings 
and is probably the root of the confusion over payment types and amounts. 
However, under the 1944 Act, the Cost of Works payment could only be applied if a 
property remained on its original site, and no provision was made for those who 
were displaced by replanning and reconstruction schemes. The decision not to make 
Cost of Works payments ‘mobile’ left many blitzed traders in the position of only 
being able to claim the Value Payment, which they insisted was not enough to be 
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able to rebuild on a new site. The additions to the Value Payment and the eventual 
removal of the 1939 price ceiling were designed to close the gap between the two 
payments and make rebuilding more attractive for blitzed traders and property 
owners. When combined with the loss of freeholds, these amendments could not 
solve the problem.  
 
The loss of freeholds under the 1944 Act was a particularly bitter blow to traders and 
property owners. There is evidence that the traders and main trade bodies in the 
three cities initially supported replanning and the pooling of land ownership in order 
to achieve those aims. It was recognised in the cities that replanning was necessary 
to tackle problems such as traffic congestion, and the most efficient way to achieve 
this was by bringing the land under single ownership and then redistributing the 
sites. It was also accepted that the most appropriate body to take ownership of the 
land was the local authority as it was considered a neutral body. The general 
support for bringing land into single ownership demonstrates that traders and 
property owners were willing to work within this framework for the benefit of the 
whole city.  In Exeter and Plymouth, the reconstruction plans were met with general 
praise when they were released, with opinion only swinging against them once the 
financial position became clear. The combination of war damage, poor 
compensation and the loss of freeholds was too much for many independent traders 
who felt it was an attack on private enterprise. The loss of freeholds was particularly 
keenly felt, as for many smaller traders the freehold represented the greatest part of 
the value of their property. It was also a sign of status, demonstrating their hard work 
in building their business, and representing an asset to pass on to the next 
generation. The initial support for the idea of bringing all city centre property under 
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leasehold control was tied to the idea of the sites being sold back to the lessees at a 
later date. This idea was floated while the method for reconstruction was still being 
worked out by central government and it made the idea of replanning more palatable 
to blitzed traders as the loss of the site would only be temporary. The idea was 
quashed by one of the many government committees considering reconstruction 
prior to drafting of the 1944 act amid concerns that it would allow individuals to profit 
from war damage. The permanent loss of the freeholds started the shift of opinion 
amongst the traders away from replanning and towards the retention of the status 
quo.  
The move to a leasehold tenure is the key to the idea that replanning and 
reconstruction were an attack on private enterprise and the loss of support for 
replanning. A leasehold property just did not have the same value to such traders 
and they could not see at as an investment in the same way as a freehold property. 
This might have been overcome if the cost of building on a leasehold basis had been 
met by the compensation payments, but the combination of having to fund a new 
building which would be held on a leasehold tenure added insult to injury for many of 
the independent traders. Their buildings had been destroyed or damaged through 
events beyond their control and now they were being deprived of both the 
compensation they felt they were entitled to and their property.  
 
The examination of the public inquiries into the plans of the three cities highlights 
just how central the financial argument was to the opponents of the reconstruction 
plans. In all three cities the majority of objections lodged were based on the loss of 
freeholds, the financial provisions for reconstruction and the problems created by 
having to move sites, rather than objections to the actual structure of the plans 
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themselves. Only in Bristol were there specific objections to the shopping centre 
plan as a whole, as the Broadmead site had been prone to flooding in the nineteenth 
century and as a result there were concerns about the suitability of the site.  
 
The concern of traders with regard to compensation and the cost of building are 
understandable and raise some questions about the Treasury’s judgement of the 
situation.  
If the Cost of Works payments had been made mobile, the evidence suggests that 
traders would have been more supportive of reconstruction plans. The decision not 
to make them mobile came from the Treasury amid concerns about the potential 
cost to government of reconstruction. The Treasury also viewed reconstruction very 
differently to blitzed traders in that they assumed that individuals would be prepared 
to invest war savings into a new building, regardless of the tenure of that building or 
the availability of compensation. The Treasury view was that the new building would 
be valuable regardless of its tenure owing to the potential long-term rental income 
and its value in a trading capacity. This view was indeed taken by the larger firms, 
multiple traders and finance companies, but leasehold was an unattractive prospect 
for the smaller traders.  
The Treasury view on building therefore appears as a major error of 
judgement on their part, but it may also have been a more deliberate stance. The 
insistence that blitzed traders would see the value of investing their own savings into 
a new building was one of the reasons for not making the Cost of Works payment 
mobile, which also saved the government money in the long run. The Cost of Works 
payment, with its additions for price inflation, was of a higher value than the Value 
Payment, so restricting these payments offered a way of minimising the government 
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contribution. It may also have been viewed as a disincentive to the major replanning 
projects encouraged in blitzed cities at the beginning of the war, as trader support for 
the reconstruction plans was so clearly tied to the financial and property aspects of 
city centre rebuilding. Some cities, such as Portsmouth and Hull, did drastically 
curtail their reconstruction plans in the face of trader opposition based on the 
financial problems of reconstruction. This too had a monetary benefit to the 
government as it provided the loans for local authorities to acquire city centre land. 
The Treasury stance on personal investment in new buildings and the decision not 
to make Cost of Works payments may therefore have been a deliberate choice in 
order to curtail reconstruction plans and curtail the cost to the government. 
  
The later constraints placed on reconstruction by central government and its 
economic policies are more straightforward in their motives. The constraints placed 
on the allocations of materials and investment were the biggest factors in delaying 
progress in city centre reconstruction. The initial controlling of materials and 
investment was entirely understandable against the background of economic and 
financial crises that characterised the immediate post-war years. The need to 
redirect and rebuild industry in order to move the economy back to a peacetime 
footing and to restart economic growth was immediate and urgent. Without ensuring 
a smooth transition to a peacetime economy there was the risk of the boom and bust 
cycle seen at the end of the First World War repeating itself. The Labour government 
had also taken up the baton of change from the wartime coalition government, which 
had promised reform in heath, education, social welfare and housing. The election 
had been fought on these grounds and progress had to be made in these areas in 
order to demonstrate to the electorate that they were not just hollow promises. There 
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was a very real housing crisis, which understandably needed building materials 
directing towards it and away from city centre rebuilding. The demands of industry, 
education and health were also prioritised above city centre reconstruction and this 
was again understandable against the background of the war and the resultant 
economic hardships. Industry needed to be rebuilt to allow exports to resume, 
bringing valuable funds into a British economy depleted by the war. The expansion 
health and education services were considered in many ways as part of the 
industrial rebuilding, as a healthy population would be more productive and 
expanded education would produce the workers and innovators of the future. It is 
noticeable that the traders of the three cities are fairly muted in their demands to be 
allowed to start rebuilding for the first two years of peace, as there is evidently some 
understanding that housing must take precedence.  
 
From 1947 the clamour to rebuild became much louder, as it is felt that housing and 
industry are receiving too much preference and it is time to start rebuilding Britain’s 
bombed cities  which in turn will help return prosperity to those areas. The 
programmes for housing and industrial building gave the impression that materials 
and investment were freely available for building and were being restricted 
unnecessarily from commercial building via the licence system.  This led to 
increasing unrest amongst blitzed traders over the delays in city centre 
reconstruction from 1947. What is interesting about this unrest is that it was almost 
entirely directed at the local authorities rather than central government, and 
appeared during Britain’s worst post-war economic crisis in 1947. The economic 
problems of the nation were widely reported in both the local and national press, with 
the budget cuts of that year highlighting the difficulties the nation was facing. The 
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control of building by the licence system was intended to conserve materials which 
could then be directed to the export market, such as steel, and reduce the use of 
imported materials, such as wood. This situation was evidently not well understood 
by traders or the public and the restriction of materials were instead interpreted as 
political. The letters of the firms of Bruford’s and Wheaton’s in Exeter demonstrates 
that there was some understanding of both the licensing system and the need for 
export goods, as both firms wrote intelligent and well informed letters with regard to 
this to the local papers and the Board of Trade. The owners of Bruford’s had 
questioned the City Council closely about the reasons for the delays in building and 
the functioning of the licensing system and had reported the answers they received 
to the Express and Echo in a letter. This letter was intended to inform other traders 
and citizens of the city about the problems facing the nation as a whole and how this 
was impacting on reconstruction. Plainly this was not well understood or they would 
not have felt the need to do this.  
 
It seems strange on the surface that in this climate the blitzed traders of the South 
West should decide that the lack of progress in city centre reconstruction was due to 
the prevarication of local authorities rather than the economic crisis. However, turn 
this around and it becomes clear that there were traders who considered the 
reconstruction plans to be extravagant in terms of cost and therefore thought that 
central government would refuse to allow such work in times of austerity. The 
simplification of the plans or their abandonment was therefore thought to be the 
route to starting rebuilding, as it was the sheer cost which was preventing building 
licences being granted. They reasoned that if the proposed rebuilding was cheaper 
and therefore saved scarce resources, building licences were more likely to be 
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granted. This opinion is quite revealing in that it demonstrates that traders, and 
probably by extension the public as a whole, had very little understanding of what 
kind of building was being allowed and why. There is a constant refrain throughout 
the whole post-war period to 1954, when the building licence system was relaxed, 
that building should be deregulated as private enterprise could build better and 
cheaper. However, the building licence system regulated all types of building and the 
majority of commercial and industrial building was undertaken by private enterprise, 
not local authorities. There has been a persistent myth that building licences only 
regulated private building and that all the building was for the public sector through 
direct labour. The majority of house building in the first decade after the war was 
certainly by local authorities, but industrial and commercial building was undertaken 
by the private sector. Virtually all of the rebuilt city centres were constructed by 
private enterprise, with very few cities using direct labour to build commercial 
premises. Only Coventry used direct labour to any great extent, with even the ‘local 
authority’ shops cities such as Exeter built by private enterprise on behalf of the 
council. 
The myth of private enterprise being more efficient and proficient in rebuilding 
can be debunked by Hull and Portsmouth. Both cities capitulated to the demands of 
private enterprise and virtually abandoned their reconstruction plans, allowing firms 
to rebuild on their previous sites with very little control or restriction over what was 
built. Neither city was able to rebuild its centre any faster than the other blitzed cities 
which retained their plans, in fact both cities experienced more delays, and the 
resultant buildings were essentially the same style as those found in all other blitzed 
cities. What makes them notable, particularly in Hull, is that they are poor in design 




The attitude of the Treasury and the IPC toward city centre reconstruction from 1950 
onwards is more difficult to understand. The massive rearmament programme 
prompted by the Korean War certainly accounts for the continued economic caution 
practised by the governments in the early 1950’s. However, the continued neglect of 
the blitzed city programme by the IPC seems to be very deliberate and suggests a 
further agenda. The precise reasons for the continued reluctance of both the IPC 
and the Treasury to allocate any resources to blitzed cities are still very opaque. As 
discussed in Chapters Three to Five, there was a policy of continuing to restrict 
consumer goods in order to help control inflation and to direct resources towards 
export goods. This may still have been the reason for restricting investment and 
materials for blitzed cities in the early 1950’s. Certainly there was an argument for 
continuing to restrict allocations of materials for city centre reconstruction in order to 
expand housing, as the pledge to extend the house building programme was a 
flagship Conservative policy. This does not explain why investment was so severely 
restricted in blitzed city rebuilding throughout the early 1950s. The reconstruction 
programme itself demonstrates that there were any number of private firms waiting 
to invest, with finance companies, development companies and multiple traders all 
prepared to invest in city centre rebuilding. With funds denied to small independent 
traders via the decisions on war damage compensation, these concerns were the 
only ones willing to build and yet the Treasury and the IPC were prepared to gamble 
on them being content to wait indefinitely for building consent. As yet no definitive 
evidence has been produced as to why blitzed cities were so continually denied the 
investment and materials to rebuild, so one can only speculate.  
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It does demonstrate that local authorities were not at fault for the long delays 
in starting rebuilding. The continued denial of investment allocations, and the 
eventual grudging allocation of very small amounts of investment finance, also 
demonstrates that it was not the local authorities’ insistence at following a plan which 
held up reconstruction. The examples of Hull and Portsmouth, as already referred to, 
demonstrate that it was not planning that was the obstruction to reconstruction but 
the continued resistance of the IPC and the Treasury to allocate investment and 
materials.  
 
It is clear in the cases of the three South Western cities that the lack of funding for 
reconstruction had the most influence on the city plans and eventual rebuilding. The 
problems of the war damage compensation left many local independent traders 
unwilling or unable to rebuild their premises. The result was that much of the 
reconstruction work was undertaken by insurance companies, developers and 
multiple traders. This necessity of relying on such large firms to rebuild is the root of 
the idea that reconstruction plans forced smaller traders out of blitzed city centres 
and began the dominance of the multiple trader in our High Streets. As noted in 
chapter five, this is not a particularly accurate picture, as the majority of pre-war 
traders did re-establish themselves in the post-war cities. Many chose to take rented 
premises rather than rebuild for themselves. In Exeter, which had larger areas of 
surviving buildings which retained their freeholds than in the centre of Plymouth or 
Bristol, some blitzed traders chose to buy property in these areas in order to remain 
freeholders. Much of the discontent around reconstruction was therefore the product 
of central government decisions about funding and compensation rather than a 




Political ideology  
  
The political discussions around reconstruction and reconstruction plans take a 
lesser role when set against the importance of economics and finance. The political 
affiliation of a local authority had little impact when finance and materials for 
rebuilding were denied. There are some political elements to other aspects of 
reconstruction as a whole, such as decisions around the provision of services and 
housing, but even this is slightly debatable. Bristol and Plymouth were both Labour-
led in the years after 1945, but make no greater progress than Conservative – led 
Exeter in terms of housing provision (relative to their size as cities). The estate plans 
do not contain any greater provision of services and amenities nor do the house 
designs reflect a difference in ideology. The discussions within the Housing 
Committees do demonstrate where political differences can be found, with 
arguments over the provision of some housing features, such as storage sheds and 
overall floor space, and the speed of construction being set against concerns over 
cost. There is still some divide post-war between Labour councillors and their 
Conservative colleagues over what needed to be provided in working class housing, 
with some Conservative councillors still seeking to provide only the absolute 
minimum standards. Arguments over the cost of housing do feature frequently, 
although not always on party lines. Conservative councillors are more likely to 
question the cost of housing provision as they are highly aware that many of their 
supporters will object to high building costs and large amounts of local authority debt 




The concerns over cost in city centre reconstruction did not divide so neatly along 
party lines. There were dissenters at both ends of the political spectrum who 
opposed the reconstruction plans in the three cities, just as there were supporters of 
all colours. The reasons for dissent fit better with the traditional Labour vs. 
Conservative narrative of reconstruction, with Conservative councillors more likely to 
express concern at the potential cost of reconstruction while their Labour 
counterparts felt that issues such as housing should have priority over city centre 
reconstruction. Support for reconstruction plans, however, was spread evenly across 
the political spectrum as councillors of all political persuasions could see the benefits 
of a comprehensive reconstruction plan. It was recognised that the interwar 
nuisances such as traffic congestion had to be tackled and reconstruction offered an 
ideal opportunity to do so. As many of the councillors and aldermen who 
represented the three cities post-war had also been on their respective councils 
during the interwar period, many of them had experienced the difficulties and 
frustrations of trying to tackle such problems prior to the war. It is notable that 
contemporary newspaper reports record confirmed Conservatives, such as Exeter’s 
Mayor Glave Saunders, stating that ‘cheese paring’ had no place in reconstruction, 
demonstrating that Conservative politics did not necessary result in reactionary 
planning.  
 
Radical, comprehensive plans have been associated with Labour-led councils and 
the Labour government throughout the current reconstruction literature, while the 
less ambitious plans are associated Conservative-led councils. The three South 
Western cities clearly demonstrate that this association is incorrect, as all three city 
plans were drawn up under Conservative-led councils prior to the 1945 election. 
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Even Bristol’s very slow planning process ran ahead of the change of government 
seen in 1945 and the Broadmead plan predates both the Labour-led council of 1945 
and the Labour government. Plymouth is widely acknowledged as one of the most 
ambitious and radical reconstruction plans, yet it was published in 1943 under a 
Conservative council. The active support of the Conservative Viscount Waldorf Astor 
for both the Plan for Plymouth and blitzed city reconstruction has been noted by 
Essex and Brayshay in their work on Plymouth, yet the idea of radical plans being 
the product of Labour administrations still persists. Plymouth did shift from being 
staunchly Conservative to a Labour city with the 1945 election and it could be 
claimed that this change was responsible for the very complete execution of the Plan 
for Plymouth.  
Plymouth did see a high level of trader dissent over the plan and it could be 
suggested that a Labour council was less interested in appeasing traders than a 
Conservative council, as following the plan was to benefit the ordinary citizen rather 
than the private business owner. However, Exeter City Council also pushed hard to 
rebuild according to the Exeter Phoenix plan and yet had remained a Conservative-
led council throughout the post-war period. Exeter City Council had fought hard to 
retain the plan in as complete a form as possible, only making major changes when 
forced to do so by central government. The same determination was seen in Labour-
led Plymouth, suggesting that it was a strong belief in the merits of the 
reconstruction plans rather than political ideology which ensured the plans stayed 
relatively intact. This seems to be very evident in Plymouth, a city which would 
sometimes jump the gun and start new phases of the plan ahead of official approval 
from the relevant ministry. The cities which diluted or abandoned their reconstruction 
plans, such as Southampton, Hull and Portsmouth, were often lacking a council 
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which was prepared to support the original reconstruction plan. Of the three, only 
Portsmouth had a Conservative-led council throughout both the war and the period 
1945-1955. Hull was staunchly Labour throughout the post-war period, while 
Southampton’s political character was rather more mixed with a fairly even split 
between the Labour and Conservative elements. The city did see a swing towards 
the Ratepayer’s Association in the early 1950s, although this appears to be the 
combination of various right-centre groups under the banner of the Ratepayers. The 
mixed political backgrounds of these blitzed cities in addition to the political 
affiliations of the three South Western cities demonstrates that the success and 
scope of a reconstruction plan was not just dependent on the city’s political make-
up. A council which was prepared to support a radical reconstruction plan was 
needed and these came in all political colours.  
 
 
The study of Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth has opened up the understanding of the 
reconstruction process and demonstrated that some of the accepted narratives are 
inaccurate or overstated. The cities also demonstrate that the economic and 
financial elements of reconstruction played a far greater part in the changes and 
challenges to reconstruction plans. The process of planning is revealed as more 
collaborative than previously thought, with the three cities consulting extensively with 
citizens on the reconstruction they would like to see. The political ideology of both 
the Labour government and local councils is demonstrated to play less of a role in 
determining both reconstruction plans and the eventual fabric of the cities compared 
to the economic problems facing the nation post-war. Instead, the stance of the 
Treasury in the face of an unbalanced economy is revealed as the main factor in the 
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delays in rebuilding and the changes to city reconstruction plans. The resultant 
restrictions on both materials and investment were perpetuated by the incoming 
Conservative government in 1951, demonstrating that economic policy was born out 
of necessity rather than ideology. The three cities also demonstrate that the 
continuity between the pre- and post-war eras must be considered if we are to fully 
understand the nature of the reconstruction plans and the urban problems they were 
trying to solve.  
Bristol, Exeter and Plymouth demonstrate that these factors are common 
across all three cities, suggesting that this experience is widespread. The different 
political natures of the councils further demonstrate this, as the colour of a council 
did little to influence the speed or execution of rebuilding. Instead all three cities 
faced the same challenges of restrictions on materials and investment, delaying 
reconstruction. The cities also demonstrate that the complexity of a plan did not 
affect the speed of rebuilding, as Plymouth and Bristol with their complete relaying of 
the street patterns built just as quickly as Exeter, which only made minor alterations 
to its pre-war streets. We can also see a unifying post-war architecture emerging, 
with similar motifs and designs present in all three cities. The consideration given to 
the designs demonstrates that this was a conscious choice, not at style born out of 
necessity. Again the continuity with pre-war building can be seen, demonstrating the 
importance of understanding the evolution of planning and architecture in 
understanding post-war reconstruction.  
 
The three cities have also further unpacked the importance of the Treasury and IPC 
decisions in the emergence of the development company as a builder in city centres. 
The role of development and investment companies in reconstruction has only just 
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begun to be understood, and the researching of this area has particular relevance at 
the current time. The development companies which leased sites from local 
authorities in the post-war era are now the leaders in current city centre 
redevelopment, as seen in Exeter and Bristol over the last decade. The 
redevelopment of city centres under the control of single development companies 
has caused some disquiet, with concerns expressed about the privatisation of 
Britain’s cities.906 It is not understood that the land is still under the ownership of the 
local authority and that the developer is often the same company which has held the 
lease since the 1950s. The full exploration of the post-war development company 
and its role in reconstruction will link the eras of development in our cities and enrich 
our understanding of urban development in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Additionally, the building of both city centres and housing post-war was undertaken 
by construction companies that went on to be the major developers of both 
commercial and domestic buildings, and infrastructure. Ravenseft worked with 
McAlpine, who undertook the actual building work for the company in the majority of 
cities they took leases in. McAlpine went on to become one of the foremost retail 
construction companies, and also worked on a series of infrastructure projects. 
House builders such as Laings provided many of the non-traditional houses used by 
blitzed cities, but also took major contracts such as the building of the Bullring in 
Birmingham. These companies have played an intrinsic part in the construction of 
Britain and their roots can be traced to post-war reconstruction. Therefore this thesis 
also suggests that a major study of their development and projects is well overdue, 
especially as their role is not well understood.   
  
                                                          
906 Guardian, ‘Will Privatisation of UK Cities Rip Out Their Hearts?’, 21 February 2016; Guardian, 
‘Public Spaces in Britain’s Cities Fall into Private Hands’, 11 June 2012; The Week, ‘Why the UK’s 




























Appendix A: Bristol Council Members907 
 
  
                                                          
907 Key to Council Member tables pre/post war: Served pre-war =1; served post-war =2; served both pre and 
post-war = 3 
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Name Party affliation Pre/post war Ward Occupation Years elected/stood 
Ackland, William Herbert Liberal 1 St Pauls Wholesale Stationer 1920, 1923, Stood 1926 
Adams, Gilbert George Labour 1 St George West   1933, 1936 
Allan, George Alton 
Watson Labour 3 Hillfields   
1936, 1949, Stood 1938 
(Clifton), 
Allen, A J Citizen 2 Southville   1947 
Allen, Mrs E E Labour 2 St Philip & Jacob North   1947 
Andrews, Ernest Walter Citizen 1 Clifton South   1931, 1935, 1937 
Anstey, H   1       
Ayles, Walter Henry Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob South Gentleman 1924 
Badock, M A Miss Citizen 2 Durdham   1945 
Bagnall, W Labour 2 St Philip & Jacob South   1949 
Ball, Edward Jennings 
Dr Citizen 1 St Michael 
Medical 
Practitioner 1927, 1930 
Barrow, T P Citizen 2 Knowle, Windmill Hill   
1945 (Knowle), Stood 
1949 (Windmill Hill) 
Barwood, A W Labour 2 Southville   1945 
Baston, Albert Edward Labour 1 Somerset   1936 
Baston, C S Labour 1 Bedminster West   1929, 1931, 1935 
Bateman, Luke Labour 1 Stapleton   1929, 1932, 1935, Stood 1938. 
Bennett, C G T Citizen 1 St James   1932 
Berrill, P C Citizen 2 Redcliff   1950 




Secretary 1926, 1930, 1933 (Ind), 1936 
Bicker, James Frederick Labour 3 St Pauls Fruiterer 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 
Billing, Charles P   1       
Bishop, E S Labour 2 Brislington   1950 
Blackburn, A V Citizen 2 Southville   1949 
Blake, Leonard John Labour 1 Brislington   1937 
Bowden, A Labour 2 St Philip & Jacob North   1949 
Britton, George Bryant Liberal 1 St George East Boot Manufacturer 1920 
Brown, Florence Mills Labour 3 St Philip & Jacob South   1937, 1950 
Brown, John Little Liberal/Citizen 1 St Pauls Friendly Society official 1921, 1924 
Brown, K A L Citizen 3 Horfield   1938, 1947 
Bryant, Walter R Liberal/Citizen 1 Horfield Quarry Owner 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934 
Buckle, E H Citizen 2 Bedminster   1949 
Budgett, Charles 
Theodore Conservative/Citizen 1 Clifton North Merchant 1920, 1923, 1926, 
Bullock, G T Labour 1 Hengrove   1938, 1947 
Burgess, Alfred Whitfield 





1922 (Stapleton), 1926, 
1929  St George East, 
Stood 1925 Stapleton 
Burgess, F J Citizen 1 Eastville   1938, 1947 
Burgess, Ruth Labour 1 Stapleton   1933 
357 
 
Burke, G A Labour 2 Somerset   1950 
Byrt, E W Citizen 2 District   1950 
Byrt, William Henry Coalition/Citizen 1 District Master Cooper 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 1933 
Cann, Percy W Citizen 3 District   1935, 1938, 
Castle, Adam Cottam Conservative/Citizen 1 Redland Solicitor 1920, 1923, 1926 
Cave, E R L Mrs Citizen 2 Durdham   1949 
Chamberlain, A M Mrs Citizen 2 Knowle   1949 
Chamberlain, F G W Citizen 2 Knowle   1945, 1947 
Chivers, J N Citizen 2 St Michael   1950 
Clark, H J Citizen 2 District   1945, 1947 
Clibbens, John Jabez Citizen 1 Redcliff Schoolmaster (r) 1924, 1927 
Clifford, Sidney Citizen 2 Durdham   1950 
Clothier, Frederick 






1920, 1923, 1926, 1929 
Cole, J Labour 2 Hillfields   1938 
Cook, Frederick John 
Mervyn Citizen 3 
Westbury on 
Trym   
1930, 1933, 1936, 1945, 
1949 
Cook, Henry Leonard Labour 3 Bedminster   1937, 1950 
Cook, W Gow Dr Labour 1 Bedminster West 
Physician & 
Surgeon 
1924, Stood 1923 
(Southville) 
Cotterell, H F   1       
Cottle, James Coalition 1 Bedminster West Meat purveyor 1921 
Cottrell, William 
Frederick Citizen 3 District   1936, 1945 
Cox, A J Citizen 2 Redcliff   1947 
Cox, Arthur William Labour 1 Easton Secretary 1926, 1930, 1933, 1936 





1920, 1923, 1926, 1929 
Coxwell, A J Labour 2 Brislington   1945 
Cozens, Ebenezer 
Thomas Labour 1 




1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 
1932, 1935 
Cozens, W G Labour 2 Easton   1947 
Cridland, Henry James Conservative/Citizen 1 St James Wholesale Boot Manufacturer 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929 
Crook, H Citizen 1 Bishopston   1938 
Culverwell, Cyril Tom Citizen 1 Westbury on Trym Gentleman 1924, 1927 
Cunningham, Reginald 
Robert Labour 3 St Augustines   1937, 1950 
Cunningham, Robert 
George Labour 1 
St Philip & 
Jacob South 
Boot & 
Shoemaker 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934 
Curle, John Labour 1 Bedminster East Builder 1923, 1926 
Curtis, William Henry Coalition/Citizen 1 Horfield Baker & confectioner 1921, 1924, 1927 
Dancey, Walter Labour 3 Southville, Windmill Hill   
1929 (Southville), 1945 
(Windmill Hill), 1947 
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Daniel, George Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob South Dealer 1926, 1929 
Dare, J Mrs Labour 2 Hillfields   1950 
Davey, E F Labour 3 Somerset   1938, 1945 
Davies, George E Sir   1       
Davies, R C Citizen 1 Horfield   1932, 1935 
Davies, Walter Sealey Citizen 3 Southville   1936, 1950, Stood 1945 
Despres,  Alfred Victor Labour 1 St Augustines Manufacturer's Agent 
1928, Stood 1923, 
1924, 1938 (both 
Redcliff), 1925, 1931, 
1937 (St Augustine) 
Deverell, M L Mrs Labour 2 Somerset   1945, 1949 
Dixon, Thomas 
Benjamin Citizen 1 Bedminster East 
Physician & 
Surgeon 1924 
Dobson, D P Mrs Citizen 3 Stapleton   1938, 
Donovan, J Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob North   1938 
Dowling, Alfred Liberal 1 Southville Builder 1922, JP 
Downes-Shaw, 
Archibald Havergal Citizen 1 Redcliff   1931, 1934, 1937 
Duggan, A L Citizen 3 Bedminster   1938, 1947 
Dunscombe, Ernest 
John Conservative 1 St Michael Optician 1920, 1923 
Dunster, Ernest Labour 1 Easton Postman 
1925, 1928, 1934, 
Stood 1924, 1931, 1932 
(District), 1933 
(Southville) 
Dyer, E M   1       
Eberle, J Fuller   1       
Evans, Henley S Citizen 1 Clifton North, Durdham   
1929, 1935 (Clifton 
North), 1938 (Durdham) 
Eyles, William Henry Liberal/Citizen 1 Horfield Fruit Merchant 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929 
Farmer, Albert George Citizen 1 Bedminster East, Southville   
1931 (Bedminster East), 
1934, 1937 (Southville) 
Ford, G P C Citizen 2 St James   1945, 1947 
Foweraker, E A Miss Labour 2 Brislington   1945, 1947 
Francombe, James 
Thomas Coalition 1 Redcliff   1921, 
Galsworthy, F S Labour 2 Windmill Hill   1950 
Gane, Philip Endras Liberal/Citizen 1 St James House Furnisher 1922, 1925,1928, 
Gardner, C E L   1       
Gay, R J B Citizen 2 Knowle   1950 
Giles, Mathias Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob North 
Trade Union 
Official 
1925, 1928, 1931, 
Stood 1924 (Stapleton) 




Miners Agent 1922, 1925, 1928, 1933, 1936 Stood 1931 
Gleeson, Kate Annie Labour 3 Hillfields, St George West   
1937 (Hillfields), 1950 
(St George West) 
Goodenough Taylor, L Citizen 1 Clifton South, Clifton   
1929, 1935 (Clifton 
South), 1938 (Clifton) 
Goodson, J J Citizen 2 Durdham   1947 
Griffiths, H R Citizen 1 Westbury on Trym   1929, 1932, 1935, 1938 
Gunning, M L Mrs Citizen 2 Westbury on Trym   1945, 1947 
Habgood, F E C Labour 1 St Augustines   1930 




Maud Miss Citizen 1 Knowle   1936 
Hancock, Edward John Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob South 
'Collector-
Salesman' 1920, 1923 
Harding, E G Labour 3 Redcliff   1929, 1945, Stood 1934 
Harding, F Citizen 2 Westbury on Trym   1945, 1950 
Harris, F M Mrs Labour 2 Bedminster   1945 
Harrison, R N Citizen 1 St James   1935, 1938 
Hartnell, C M Citizen 2 St James   1950 
Hasell, W T P Citizen 2 Bishopston   1945, 1947 
Haskins, Henry Liberal/Citizen 1 District Cycle & Motor Cycle Factor 1922, 1925 
Hawkins, Miss D Labour 2 St Paul   1947 
Hayes, H C Citizen 2 St Michael   1945, 1947 
Hazard, F S Citizen 2 Stapleton   1950 
Heard, Albert George Citizen 1 Westbury on Trym   1931, 1934, 1937 
Hebblethwaite, C Citizen 2 St Augustine   1949 
Hennessey, Henry 
Walter Labour 3 St George West Warehouseman 1921, 1924, 1927, 1934, 
Hennessy, Mary Ann Labour 1 St George West   1937 
Hill, Albert Edward Conservative/Citizen 1 St Michael Valuer & Assessor 1922, 1925, 1928 
Hill, H D Mrs Citizen 2 Bishopston   1945 
Hodder, Clemant Hartley Conservative/Citizen 1 Clifton North Ship Owner/Broker 
1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 
1934, 1937 
Holloway, E Labour 2 St George East   1947 
Horlick, E F Major Citizen 2 Stapleton   1949 
Houghton, Robert Conservative/Citizen 1 St Augustines Cutler & Ironmonger 1922, 1925 
Humphries, Samuel 
Colston Citizen 1 
Central West, 
Stapleton   1930, 1933, 1936 
Humphries, Sidney 
Richard White Sir Conservative 1 
Westbury On 
Trym 
Miller & Corn 
Merchant 1922, 1925, 1928 
Hutchings, Charles G Citizen 1 Central West   1935, 1945? 
Insall, A H   1 Redland   1924 
Inskip, John Hampdon Coalition/Citizen 1 Clifton North Solicitor 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930 
James, Gilbert Sidney Citizen 3 Redcliff   1930, 1933, 1936, Stood 1945 
Jeffries, Thomas Labour 1 Easton   1932, 1935, 1938 
Jenkins, A H Citizen 2 Clifton   1950 
Johnson, G H Labour 1 St Pauls   1938 
Jones, A Labour 2 Avon   1945 
Jones, Dennis Michael Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob South   1933, 1936 
Jones, John Edward Coalition/Citizen 1 St James Builder & contractor 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930 
Jones, Vyvyan Rev Labour 2 Easton   1949 
Jones, W H Labour 2 St George East   1949 
Keel, Charlotte Minnie Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob North   1934, 1937 
Keen, Arthur Percival Liberal/Citizen 1 Somerset Baker & Confectioner 
1920, 1923, 1926, 
Stood 1929 





Knight,  John Henry Labour 3 Horfield   1937, 1950 
Knight, S Labour 2 Avon   1949 
Latimer, William Little 




Broker 1920, 1926 
Leaman, H J Citizen 2 District   1949 
Lee, Henry Robert Citizen 1 Somerset   
1930, 1933 
(Somerset),1937 
(Knowle) Stood 1936 
(Brislington) 
Lewtas, David Citizen 1 Horfield, Bishopston   1930, 1933, 1936 
Light, S C Labour 1 Somerset   1929 
Livermore, Horace 
William Francis Coalition/Citizen 1 St Augustine 
Music Hall 
Proprietor (r) 1921, 1924, 1927 
Lloyd, F A Citizen 2 Stapleton   1947 
Loveless, E F Miss Labour 2 St George East   1950 
Luke, Chrispen Francis 
E Citizen 1 St Michaels Civil Servant (r) 1926, 1929, 1935, 1938 
Lyne, Robert Francis Citizen 3 Central East, St Augustine Barrister 
1924, 1927, 1930, 1933 
(Central East), 1936 (St 
Augustine), 
Maddison, A Labour 2 Windmill Hill   1950 





1923, Stood 1921, 1926 
Makin, Henry William Labour 1 Avon   1937 
Manners, Joseph Labour 1 St Augustines Trade Union Secretary 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 
Mansfield, Reginald 
Clifford Labour 3 St Pauls   1937, 1950 
Marshall-Hall, Frank Citizen 1 Redland Manager 1927, 1930, 1936 
Martin, George Alfred Citizen 1 St James   1931, 1931, 1937 
Martin, Thomas Henry Labour 3 Brislington   1936, 1949 
McArthur, Allan Conservative 1 Central West Iron Merchant 1922 
McGougan, M Citizen 1 St Augustines   1931 
Meade-King, Lilian Miss Citizen 1 Central West 'Spinster' 1928, 1931, 1934 





1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 
1934 
Metcalfe, Frederick 
Evelyn Conservative 1 Central East Solicitor 1920, 1923, 1926 





1920, 1923, 1926, 1929 
Monk, I D Mrs Labour 2 Stapleton   1945, Stood 1949 
Moon, Albert Francis Liberal/Citizen 1 




1922 (St Philip), 1928, 
1931, 1934, 1937 
(District), 
Moore, Frank   1       
Moss, F H Citizen 2 Clifton   1945, 1947 
Mullis, Frederick George Conservative/Citizen 1 Clifton South Coal Merchant 1922, 1925, 1928 
Munslow, W J Labour 2 Windmill Hill   1949 
Nash, P J T Labour 2 St Pauls   1949 
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Neale, Edward Isaac Conservative/Citizen 1 Redcliff Builder & Contractor (r) 1922, 1925 
Newth, Herbert George Liberal/Citizen 1 Stapleton Wholesale Cabinet Maker 1920, 1923, 1926 
Nott, William H Labour 1 St Augustines   1933 
Nunn, Ada Ann Labour 3 Eastville   1937, 1950 
Nutt, Amelia Elizabeth 
Miss Labour 3 Hengrove   1936, 1945, 1949 
Osmond, Albion Victor Coalition 1 Stapleton Autioneer 1921 
Owen, James Labour 1 St Pauls Trade Union Official 1927, 1930, 1933, 1936 
Page, Lionel Dr Coalition/Citizen 1 Central East Physician and surgeon 
1921, 1925, 1928, 
Stood 1924 (St Philip S) 
Page-Wood, Thomas Coalition/Citizen 1 Central West Gunsmith 1921, 1924, 1927 
Palmer, G Citizen 2 Durdham   1949 
Palmer, W S Citizen 2 St James   1945, 1949 
Parish, Frederick Arthur Labour 3 
Redcliff, St 





1928, 1932, 1935, 1938 
(St Philip), Stood 1925, 
1926, 1927, 1931, On 
committees post-war 
Parker, E H Labour 1 St Pauls   1931 
Parker, Edwin Henry Labour 1 St Pauls Trade Union Official 1922, 1925, 1928, 1934 
Parker, J V   1 St Michael   1924 
Parsons, E   1       
Perkins, George Leydon Labour 1 Bedminster East Railway Clerk 1920 
Perrett, Charles Rose Coalition/Citizen 1 Somerset Insurance Agent 1921, 1924, 1927 
Pheysey, Lillian Maude 
Mrs Labour 1 
St Philip & 
Jacob North 
'Married 
woman' 1921, 1924, 1927 
Phippen, Frank Labour 1 Avon   1936 
Pitt, William Alfred Citizen 1 Clifton   1936 




  1934 (Bedminster East), 1937 (Windmill Hill) 
Plum, G Talbot Citizen 1 Central East, St Augustine   
1929, 1935 (Central 
East), 1938 (St 
Augustine) 
Poole, Leslie Joseph Labour 3 Horfield   1936, 1945, 1949 
Pope, S C Labour 1 Somerset   1932, Stood 1935 
Price, Daniel Labour 3 Somerset   1937, 1945 
Priday, H R Labour 2 St Augustines   1945, Stood 1949 
Priscott, John Liberal/Citizen 1 District Commercial Traveller (r) 1923, 1926, 1929 
Proctor, P K Citizen 2 St Michael   1945, 1949 
Pugh, E T Labour 1 Bedminster West   1934 
Pullen, J E Labour 2 Southville   1945, 1947 
Rankin, Howard Liberal 1 St Philip & Jacob North Printer 1922, Stood 1925 
Raymond, Percy Labour 3 Hengrove   1937, 1950 
Reade, R St J Labour 2 Hillfields   1947 
Richards, Ernest 
Brookhouse Conservative/Citizen 1 Redcliff Ironfounder 
1920, 1923, 1926, 
Stood 1929 
Righton, George Ivor Citizen 1 Redland   1931, 1935, 1937 
Roberts, E Citizen 2 Bishopston   1950 
Robinson, Edward Coalition 1 Southville   1921, 
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Robinson, Vivian J Citizen 1 Redcliff   1932, 1935, 1938 
Robinson-White, Edith 
Sarah Mrs Citizen 1 Stapleton Widow 
1924, 1927, 1930, 
Stood 1933, 
Rogers, H E Labour 1 St George East   1935, 1938 
Ross, Vincent James Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob North   1933, 1936 
Rowat, Harold Frederick Labour 3 Eastville   1936, 1945, 1949 
Salmond, P W Citizen 2 St Michael   1945 
Salt, W E Mrs Labour 1 Avon   1938 
Sampson, Frank Ernest Citizen 1 Southville Engineer 1924, 1927, 1930, 1933 
Savory, Ernest Wyman Conservative 1 St Augustines Publisher 1920, 1923 
Scull, W Labour 1 St George West   1935, 1938 
Senington   1       
Shallard, George Labour 1 St George East Printer & Stationer 
1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 
1933, 1936 
Sheppard, Frank Labour 1       
Shirley, Samuel Arthur Conservative 1 Clifton South Provisions Merchant 1920, 1923 
Smith, Arthur Lionel 
Henry Citizen 1 Stapleton Dairyman 
1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, 
1937 
Smith, C H Labour 2 Easton   1950 
Smith, Emily Harriet 
Miss Coalition/Citizen 1 Clifton South   
1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 
1933 
Smith, Robert Conservative/Citizen 1 Easton Baker & Confectioner 1922, 1926, Stood 1925 
Sprackling, Frederick 
Edward Conservative/Citizen 1 Southville Boot Specialist 
1920, 1923, 1926, 
Stood 1929, 1930 
(Bedminster West) 
Stallard, Herbert Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob South Railwayman 1927 
Stamp, F Labour 3 St Augustine, Southville   
1934 (St Augustine), 
1945 (Southville) 
Steadman, Percy Liberal 1 District Wholesale Boot Manufacturer 1920 






Stevenson, L K Citizen 2 Redcliff   1949 
Stockman, M Rev Labour 2 St George West   1949 
Strimer, Helen Labour 2 Avon   1945, 1947, 
Stringer, K E Citizen 2 Bishopston   1949 
Stroud, John Stroud 
Gwyer William Coalition 1 Redland   1921, 
Tambling, Mrs D F E Labour 2 St George West   1947 
Taylor, E Citizen 2 St Augustine   1947 
Thomas, A W Major Labour 2 Redcliff   1945 
Thomas, Arthur Ernest Conservative 1 Central East 




Thomas, T B Labour 2 Somerset   1947 
Thompson, George Labour 1 St Philip & Jacob South Draper 1921 






1931, 1935 (Somerset), 
1938 (Knowle), Stood 
1934 (Bedminster West) 
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Toms, Arthur Cecil 
Kelway Citizen 1 St Michael   1933, 1936 
Tuckett, R C Citizen 1 Easton   1931 
Turner, H G Labour 2 Stapleton   1945 
Twiggs, H J   1       
Underdown, Thomas 





1920, 1923, 1926 
(Bedminster West), 
1932, 1935, 1938 
(Southville) 
Veale, Alfred Joseph Conservative/Citizen 1 Redland Insurance & Financial Agent 1922, 1925, 1928 
Venning, A K Mrs Labour 2 Avon   1945, 1946, 1950 
Vevers, Ethel Mary Citizen 1 Bishopston   1937 
Walker, Horace Coalition/Citizen 1 Easton Chocolate manufacturer 1921, 1924 
Walker, T Citizen 2 Redland   1950 
Wall, Henry  Arthur Citizen 1 St James   1933, 1936 
Waring, W J Labour 2 St Philip & Jacob North   1950 
Weaver, Alfred Henry Labour 1 Bedminster East Shop Manager 1922 
Webber, Frederick 
Arthur Citizen 1 St Michael   1931, 1934, 1937 
Wells, E A Citizen 1 Redland   1929, 1935 
Wheeler, A Citizen 1 Brislington   1938 
White, Frank Ernest Labour 1 Bedminster East Trade Union Official 
1921, 1925, 1928, 
Stood 1924, 1931 
White, Henry Albert Citizen 1 Southville Leather Goods Manufacturer 
1925, 1928, 1931, 
Stood 1924 (Bedminster 
West) 
Wilkins, W F Labour 2 Windmill Hill   1945, 1949 
Wilkins, William Albert Labour 3 St George East   1937 
Willcox, H W M Labour 2 Somerset   1950 





1929, 1932 (Bedminster 
East), 1938 (Windmill 
Hill) 
Williams, G M Miss Citizen 1 Redland   1938, 1947 
Winchester, William 
Albert Labour 1 St George West Photographer 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931 
Wise, Thomas James Liberal/Citizen 1 Somerset 'Purveyor' 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934 
Witty, Featherstone Citizen? 1 Central West Banker 1925 
Woodcock, Herbert 
Charles Coalition 1 St Michael Stockbrocker 1921 
Wright, A J M Citizen 2 Clifton   1945, 1949 
Wright, Wiliam Thomas Citizen 1 Clifton North, Durdham   1933, 1936 
Wroe, Frederick Labour 1 Bedminster East Trade Union Secretary 
1927, 1930, Stood 
1923, 1924, 1925 
(Somerset), 1926, 






















Ward Profession Years elected/stood 
Ackroyd, N Independent 1 St Johns   1929, 1932 
Ackroyde, James 
William Conservative 1 






Agar, F   1       
Allen, Rachel Mrs Labour 1 St Thomas   1927 
Andrews, T.A   1       
Anstey, Alfred   1   Solicitor?   
Aplin, William Henry Liberal 1 St Pauls Accountant 1931, 1934? Stood 1937 
Baker, R V Ratepayer 2 Whipton   1945, 1949 





Eames Liberal 1 Exwick Compositor 
1920, 1921, 
1923, 1926 
Barnes, T G Labour 2 Cowick   1945, Stood 1949 
Beer, William Wallace Conservative 1 St Petrocks Accountant & auditor 
1930, 1933, 
1936? 
Bishop, William Henry 










Bolt, William Henry Independent 1 St Johns Baker 1922, 1925, 1928 
Boon, Albert W Conservative 1 St Sidwells Butcher 1926 
Bovey, Alfred James Labour 2 Wonford Railwayman 1945 













Brock, A.F   1       




Brock, William Liberal 2 St Matthews Furnisher - Brock & Co 
1920, 1921, 
1923 
Brooks, Philip Francis Labour 1 Wonford Railway shunter 1933, 1936 
Browne, Florance 





William Campion Labour 1 St Johns 






Butcher, W.H Labour 2 Polsloe   Stood 1949 
Button, S   1       
Campion, H   1       
Challice, Richard 
Marks Liberal 1       

















Chinn, William George Labour 1 Exwick Railway Inspector 
Stood 
1920,1921 
Clapp, C.R.M   1       
Cole, C   1       
Collard, James Conservative 1 Polsloe Monumental sculptor 
1930, 1933, 
1936 
Collings, R.A.F Labour 2 St Marks   1946 
Collinson, Frederick Conservative 1 Wonford 'Retired' 1930 
Coombes, John Liberal 2 Cowick   1946 




Creasy, Ronald Hay Conservative 2   Army Liet.Col (retired)   
Crosse, Sidney Ernest Conservative 1 Heavitree Solicitor 1928, 1931, 1934 
Davey, F Labour 2 Trinity   1945, Stood 1949 




Daw, Walter George Conservative 2 St Davids Gas engineer 1945, 1949 
Docker, W A Ratepayer 2 Whipton   1946 
Dowell, E S Conservative 2 Trinity   1949 
Down, W H Ratepayer 2 St James   1945, Stood 1949 
Fraser, Donald Beaton Labour 1 Cowick Priest (Free Church) 
Stood 1920, 
1921 




Garnsworthy, T.W   1       
Gater, Harry Conservative 1 St Davids Schoolmaster (retired) 
1930, 1933, 
1936? 
Gater, J G Conservative 2 St Marks   1949 
Gatey, Kenneth   1 St Pauls   1933, 1936? 
Gayton, F.R Labour 1 Exwick   1921 
Gayton, Percy Rufus Liberal 1 Exwick Railwayman   
Gibbs, William Stanley Labour 1 Trinity Clerk 1930, 1933 




Gillingham, H   1       
Glanfield, T   1       
Goddard, K J Mrs Conservative 2 St Leonards   1945 
Greenslade, Gilbert 





Greenslade, W J Liberal/National Liberal 2 St Matthews Coach Co.Owner 1945, 1949 









Guest &  Co) 
1923, 1926, 
1929, 1932 
Hallett, Leonard James Conservative 1 Wonford Solicitor 1927 
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Harding Charles Henry Liberal 1 St Thomas Carpenter 
1922, Stood 
1937 , 1938 
(Wonford) 







Hexter, Percival Facey Conservative 1 Rougemont Auctioneer 1927, 1930, 1933, 1936? 
Heywood, George 
Charles Liberal 1 Cowick Grocer 
1928, 1931, 
1934?,1937 
Hickmott, Arthur Labour 1 Trinity Outfitter (retired) 1928, 
Hill, Charles James 






Hill, Charles William 







Hill, H   1       





Hodge, R M A Mrs Labour 2 Emmanuel   1945, Stood 1949 
Holme, E M Conservative 1 Heavitree   1936 
Hooper, H   1       




Hoskins, Charles Conservative 1 Belmont   1920, 1921 
Hoult, Frederick Conservative 1 Wonford Butcher (retired) 
1920, 1923, 
1926 





Hunt, W.E   1       
Hunt, Walter Tom Ratepayers 1 Belmont Baker & Confectioner 
1922, 1925, 
1931 









Hutton, Charles Ratepayers 1 Polsloe GPO inspector 1921 
Inch, P W Ratepayer 2 Heavitree   1946 
Kelland, Phillip Liberal 1 St Matthews Gentleman   
Kelly, C.B Conservative 1 St Petrocks   1922 
Knapman, Cecil Henry Unionist 1 Rougemont Miller & grain merchant 1921 
Lake, J. H Ellett   ?       
Lake, John Conservative 3 Trinity Engineer 1931, 1934, 1937, 1946 
Lake, Norman J Liberal 1       
Langdon, E J Socialist 1 Exwick   1938, Stood 1936, 1937 
Langmaid, Alfred   1 St Pauls   1932, 1935?, 1938 
Lea, E.C   1       




Lisle, William Richard Conservative 1 Rougemont Jeweller   











Martin, C Liberal 1 Cowick   1936 
Mathew, John Walter 
Wright Ratepayers 1 Heavitree   1921 
Maton, W.C   1       
McGahey, Michael 
John Liberal 1 St Sidwells Solicitor 1922, 
McGahey, R.J Liberal 2 St Matthews   1946, Stood 1945 
Michelmore, William 
Goodwin   2   Solicitor   
Miller, B S Conservative 1 Heavitree   1937 
Miller, Henry Charles Independent 1 St Pauls Licenced Victualler 1930 










Moist   1       
Morgan, Horace G Conservative 1 St Davids   1920, 1921 
Mortimore, H Labour 1 St Matthews   1934?, 1937 
Munro, Hector John Liberal 1 Trinity Dairyman   
Nethercott, J.R   1       




Nichols, M Liberal         
Nicholson, J C Conservative 2 St Loyes   1949 
Norman, Walter 
Thomas Conservative 1 St Sidwells 
Hotelier 
(Bude hotel) 1920, 1921 
Northcott, W R Ratepayer 2 Heavitree   1945, Stood 1949 
Norton, J C Conservative 2 St James   1949 
Oliver, J P   1 St Leonards   1932 
Orchard, John Bailey 
Rowe Conservative 1 Heavitree Hotelier 1924, 1927, 
Orchard, John Geoffrey 





1930,  Stood 
1933, 1945 
Otten, Walter John 





Page, S J Labour 2 Exwick   1946, Stood 1945 
Panter, Samuel 
Charles Ratepayer/Conservative 1 St James Draper 
1921, 1924, 
1927, 1930 
Parish, W G Conservative 2 Emmanual   1949 
Passmore, A J Socialist 1 St Johns   1938 
Passmore, John E Conservative 1 St Davids Schoolmaster (retired 
1923, 1926, 
1929, 1932 
Pearse, J   1       
Pedlar, E Socialist/Labour 3 Wonford   1935, 1938, 1946 
Pedrick, H C Labour 2 St Thomas   1945 
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Phillips, P R Conservative 2 St Thomas   1949 
Picken, H Conservative 2 Heavitree   1949 
Pitts, Arthur Northcote Conservative 1 St Petrocks Wine Merchant 1925 
Pitts, W.J Liberal 1 Trinity   1920, 1923 
Plummer, E.S   1       
Pocknell, G.R   1       
Pollard, Herbert 
Frederick Conservative 3 
Rougemont, 






Powley, A S Conservative 2 Polsloe   1946 
Pring, Tom C Conservative 1       
Priston, Samuel John Conservative 1 Cowick Merchant 1920, 1921 
Pyle, L A Labour 2 St Marks   1945 




Reed, Arthur Conrad 






Reed, Emilie Ward  
Mrs Conservative 1 Rougemont   
1926, 1929, 
1935?, 1938 
Rew, C Labour 2 Exwick   1945, 1949 
Rew, R J Conservative 1 Polsloe   1937 
Richardson, George 






Roberts, Arthur H Liberal 2 St Petrocks Businessman 1945 
Robinson, R R Conservative 2 St James   1946 
Rooks, P F Labour 1 Wonford   1933 
Roper, Arthur Charles   1       
Ross, Charles Josiah   1   Outfitter   
Rowe, Harold C Conservative 1 St James Rowes? 1933, 1936? Stood 1932 
Rowe, J.C Conservative 1 Rougemont Rowe furnishers 1923, 
Rowe, Thomas Bradley Liberal 1 St Pauls Merchant   
Rowsell, P D Independent 2 St Loyes   1945 
Russell, E Labour 2 Exwick   Stood 1945 




Saunders, R Glave Liberal 1 Exwick   1929, 1932, 1935? 
Sawdye, Edward Conservative 1 Rougemont Coal merchant 1922 
Seaton, A.S   1       
Selway, Edward Ratepayer/Conservative 1 Polsloe Engine driver (retired 1924) 1924, 1927 
Seward, J D Conservative 1 Belmont   1935? 1938 




Spensley Conservative 1 St Leonards Solicitor 
1931, 1934?, 
1937 




Smale, W.L.B Independent 1 Trinity   1935, 1938 
Smith, A.R Conservative 1 Heavitree   1935 
























Stocker, John   1       





Tallman, John William Labour 1 Trinity Postman 1921, 1924, 1927 





1930, 1933 (St 
Thomas), 
Stood 1928, 
1929 (St John) 
Templeman, Thomas 




1937, 1938 (St 
James) 
Thomas, Arthur C Conservative 1 Wonford   1932, Stood 1925 (Trinity) 





Thomas, J L Labour 1 Wonford   1937 








Tinkham, Ellen Edith Liberal 1 Cowick   1935, 1938 
Towill, Frederick 
George Unionist/Conservative 1 St Petrocks Jeweller 
1921, 1924, 
1927 
Townsend, William Conservative 1 St Leonards Printer 1922, 1925 









Varwell, H. B   1       
Varwell, James Owen   1       






Vlieland, C.J   1   Doctor   
Walaron, J Liberal 1 St Johns   Stood 1929 St Sidwell 
Ware, Edgar Felix Conservative 1 Heavitree Architect & Surveyor 1920, 1921 
Warne, J G Independent 1 St Davids   1935?, 1938 




Wayland Smith, R   3   Surgeon   








Wheaton, B Ratepayer 2 St James   Stood 1945 
White, Sebastian 
Moreton Conservative 1 Rougemont 
Motor 
industry 1920, 
Whitton, G.W Conservative 1 Wonford/St Loyes   1929, 1946 
Wickham, W.E.G Independent 1 Trinity   1936 
Widgery, Frederick 
John   1       
Willey, Thornton Conservative 1 St Thomas Engineer 1924, Stood 1927 
Williams, Charles 








Wills, William O Ratepayer 1 Belmont Draper 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932 
Wippell, J.H Conservative 2 St Leonards   Stood 1945 
Woodcock, S.W Conservative         
Woodland, C Conservative 2 Rougemont   1945 
Wright, Charles Lee Conservative 1 Rougemont Chartered Surveyor 1924 
Yendell, C   1       
Yeo, Samuel John Conservative/Unionist 1 St Sidwells Garage owner Stood 1921 























Name Party Affliation Pre or Post War Ward etc Profession Years Elected/Stood 
Andrews, 
Ambrose Liberal 1 Mutley Building Contractor (r) 
1926, 1929, Stood in 
1922 (Pennycross), 
1923. Died Oct 1930 
Argall, Joseph 
Stevens Liberal 1 Drake Insurance Manager 
1921, stood in 1924, 
1925 
Artus, Hedley 
Alfred Charles Labour 1 Drake Engine Fitter & Turner 
1926, 1929, Stood in 




Atwill, R Conservative 1 Drake Company Director 1922 
Avery, H Labour 1 Molesworth   1926, 1929, 1932, 1935, 1938 
Axworthy, R F Conservative 1 St Andrews   1933, 1936 
Baker, G Conservative 1 Stoke   1930, 1933, 1936 
Baker, R H Conservative 1 Drake Motor Engineer 1924, 1927, 1930, 1933, 1936 





e 1 Laira 











Independent 1 Mutley 'Spinster' 1921, Stood 1927, JP 
Best, William 
Richard Labour 2 Molesworth Skilled Labourer 1946 
Blakeney, W 
E Conservative 2 Compton   1947 
Blight, Francis 
William Unionist 1 
Mount 
Edgcumbe Iron & Steel Merchant 1921 
Bone, S.F Labour 1 Molesworth   1934, 1937 
Bradley, 
Gordon Neil Labour 2 
Keyham, 
Sutton Solicitor 





Liberal 1 Laira   1928 
Brendon, C E Conservative 1 St Andrews Printer 1925, 1931, 1934 
Broad, Edwin Conservative 2 Stoke Solicitor 1946 
Brock, Ada 
Lilian Mrs Conservative 3 Valletort   1933, 1936, 1945 
Brock, Ernest Conservative 3 Valletort   1930, 1934, 1937, 1946 
Brook, Ernest Conservative 1 Valletort   1928, 1931 
Brown, J H Conservative 1 Sutton Tobacconist 1922 
Brown, J P   1       
Brown, P B Liberal 1 Mutley   1937 
Brown, Walter Conservative 3 Nelson Commissioning Agent 1933, Stood 1945 
Bull, Percy 
George Labour 3 Ford 'Chargeman of Fitters' 
1929, 1946, Stood 
1950 




Labour 1 Molesworth Royal Navy Engineer Lieutenant (r) 
1925, 1928, 1931 
Stood 1923, 
Cantell, W H Conservative 1 Ford Royal Navy Lieutenant (r) 1922, 1927, Stood 1925 
Chapman, F Conservative 2 Drake   1949 
Churchward, 
James Labour 1 Friary Joiner 










Grocer/Wine & Spirit 
merchant 
1922, 1925, 1924 (Mt 
Edgcumbe), 1930 
(Nelson) Stood 1927 
Mt Edgcumbe, 1928 St 
Aubyn, 




E Conservative 1 St Andrews   1937 
Collier, F.J Conservative 1 Nelson   1934, 1937, Stood 1947 Ford, 
Collings, 




Labour 2 Nelson, Ernsettle Married 
1946 (Nelson), 1950 
(Ernsettle) 
Coram, W F Liberal 1 St Aubyn   1929 
Cornish, John 
Lilleycrap Conservative 1 Mutley Auctioneer & Valuer 1923, 1924 
Crimp, A H Conservative 1 Stoke, Royal Navy Engineer-Lieutenant (r) 
1924, 1932, 1935, 
1938, Stood 1929, 
1931 (Molesworth), 
Crowle, Arthur 
Grey Unionist 1 Pennycross Gentleman 1921 
Cummings, G 
W Liberal 1 Keyham   
1932, 1935, 1938, 
Stood 
Damerell, H G Conservative 3 Nelson   1932, 1935, 1947 
Davey, Bessie 
Mrs Labour 2 
Laira, Mount 
Gold Housewife 
1945 (Laira), Stood 










ative 1 St Budeaux   






ative 1 St Budeaux Gentleman 
1921, 1924, 1927, 
1930, 1933, 1936 
Dean, C L Conservative 1 Friary Royal Navy Engineer (r) 1928, 1931, 1934, 1937 
Deans, John 
E Liberal 1 Pennycross   1935, 1938 
Delaforce, G 
R Conservative 2 Laira   1947 
Dodridge, W 
S Liberal 1 Molesworth   1930 








Liberal 1 Laira Schoolmaster/Headmaster  1922, 1925, Stood 1921, 
Earl, E A Conservative 1 Nelson Decorator 1922 
Eastaway, H J Conservative 1 Mount Edgcumbe   1938 
Edgecumbe, 
C G Comm Conservative 2 Trelawney   1950 




Conservative 2 Pennycross Royal Marines Captain (r) 1946 
Folley, J Labour 2 Sutton   1950 
Foot, Hedley 
George Liberal 1 Charles   1932, 1935 
Foot, Isaac Liberal 1 Charles Solicitor 1921 
Ford, Leonard Labour 3 Charles, St Peter Railway Carridge Inspector 
1937 (Charles), 1946, 
1949, 1950 (St Peter) 
Franklin, T H Labour 2 Friary   1950 
Frayer, Arthur 




Labour 1 Charles   1929, 1933 Stood 1932, 1938 
Giles, S A Liberal National 3 St Aubyn   1938, 1947 
Glanville, C E Conservative 2 Drake   1947 




Goldberg, A Conservative 3 Valletort, St Andrews   
1938, 1947 (Valletort), 
1950 (St Andrews) 
Goodman, A Liberal 1 St Aubyn   1930, 1933, 1936 




Conservative 2 St Andrews Shipbroker 1946 
Grant, E R Conservative 1 Molesworth Royal Navy Lieutenant (r) 1922 
Gratton, H 
Mrs Conservative 2 Ford   1950 
Gregory, 
Arthur Helson Labour 1 Charles GWR Ticket Inspector 
1927, 1934, Stood 




Labour 2 Mount Edgcombe Secretary at Dockyard 1945 
Guiness, A F 
G Conservative 1 Charles 'Medical practitioner' 1924 
Hampton, A A 
H Conservative 2 Drake   1949, 1950 
Harding, 
Charles Conservative 1 Compton   1922, 1925 
Harvey, T B Labour 2 Ford   1947 
Hatherley, 
Ernest John Labour 2 Sutton, Friary Plasterer 
1946 (Sutton), 1949 
(Friary) 
Hatherley, J E Liberal National 1 St Budeaux Paymaster Lieutenant  1938, 
Healey, 
Charles Henry Unionist/Independent 1 St Aubyn Gentleman 
1921, Stood 1924, 
1925 
Heath, John Unionist 1 Compton Civil Servant (r) 1921, 1924 
Hellen, J H Conservative 1 Nelson Retired 1925, 1928, 1931 




Labour 2 Charles Fish Fryer 1945 
Hobbs, W H Conservative 2 St Budeaux   1950 
Hodge, Louis  
John Labour/Socialist 3 St Peters Electrical Fitter 
1925, 1928, 1935, 





e 1 St Andrews Draper 
1921, 1924, 1927, 
1930 
Holmes, G P Conservative 1 Compton   1927, 1930, 1933, 1936 
Hornabrook, 
Beta  (Mrs) Liberal 1 St Aubyn 'Married' 
1924, 1927,  Stood 
1921, 
Huddard, E W 
Mrs Conservative 2 Charles   1950 
Huddey, A G Conservative 1 St Andrews   1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 
Hunt, Cecil 
Fitzherbert Labour 2 Compton Admiralty Hall Porter 
1945, Stood 1949, 
1950 
Hurley, W H Conservative 1 Stoke   1937 
Innes, D Mrs Conservative 2 Compton   1950 
Jago, A C Conservative 1 Pennycross   1925, 1928 
Jeffery, T.G.C Conservative 1 Drake   1934 
Jenkin, James Unionist/Conservative 1 Ford Royal Navy Pensioner 1921,1924 
Jolly, H C Labour 1 Sutton   1927, 
Jolly, Minnie 
Mrs Labour 2 Mutley Admiralty Tracer 1945 
Jolly, P A Labour 1 Sutton   1930 
Kelland, F S 
C Labour 1 Valletort   1927, Stood 1930 
Kimber, John Conservative 1 Keyham Motor Engineer 1923 
King, C.S Labour 1 St Peters   1934, 1937 
King, Jack Labour 2 St Budeaux Plumber 1946 




John Conservative 3 Pennycross Decorator 
1927, 1930, 1933, 
1936,  Stood 1945 
Knight, W J Labour 2 Vintry   1945 
Lander, C L 
Dr Labour 1 Stoke Surgeon 1927, 1931, 
Lavelle, E J Liberal 1 St Aubyn   1932, 1935, Stood 1938 
Lawrence 
Spear,  H Liberal 1 Laira   1926 
Leatherby, E 
Stanley Conservative 3 Vintry   
1926, 1929, 1932, 








e 1 Keyham Royal Navy (r) 
1921,1924, 1927, 
Stood 1931 (Ford) 
Leest, A F Conservative 1 Keyham   1936 
Ley, W J Conservative 1 Ford   1926 
Lisborne, 
Arthur Labour 2 Friary Electrician 1945 








Labour 2 Drake Trade Union Official 1945 
Love, Jospeh 
Boyd   1       
Lucas,  
William Woon Liberal 1 Sutton Builder 1921, 1924 
Luckes, R S Conservative 2 Crownhill   1949 
Madge, Philip 
Henry Labour 2 Laira Railway Clerk 1946 
Marshall, J 
(Mrs) Labour 3 Sutton   
1925, 1933 Stood 
1924 (St Andrews) 
Mason, Henry 
George Labour 3 St Peters   1929, 1932, JP 
Matthews, W 
J Conservative 1 Friary   
1927, 1930, Stood 
1933 
Mayne, Arthur 
R Young Liberal 1 St Peters Civil Servant 1931 
McDonald, 
Reginald Conservative 1 Molesworth Solicitor 1923 









1923, 1926, 1933 (Mt 
Edgcumbe), 1949 (St 
Peter), Stood 1922 
(Keyham) 
Miller, William  
Alexander Labour 1 Valletort Electrical Wireman 
1923, 1926, Stood 
1922 (Mt Edgcumbe), 
1933 
Mills, R G Labour 2 St Budeaux   1947, Stood 1950 
Mitchell, R J Liberal 1 Mutley Corn & Flour Merchant 1922, 1928, 1931, 1934 




Unionist 1 Vintry Ice Merchant 1921, 1924 











Moses, J J H Labour 1 Molesworth   1933, 1936, Stood 1930 Molesworth 
Munday, W L   1       
Nash, F David Labour 2 Pennycross Solicitor 1945, Stood 1949 (Peverell) 










e 1 St Peters Army Officer (r) 1921, 1924 




Liberal 2 Mutley Auctioneer & Estate Agent 1946 
Oats, W J Labour 2 Friary   1947 
Oke, Richard 
Runnells Labour 1 Sutton Railway Guard 
1923, 1926, Stood 
1922 
Olden, 




Labour 2 Keyham Electrical Fitter 1946 
O'Shea,E B 
Mrs Labour 1 St Peters   
1927, Stood 1931 
(Pennycross) 
Parker, L S Labour 2 St Peters   1947 
Parker, T E Conservative 1 Valletort Butcher 1924 




Conservative 1 St Andrews Gentlemans Outfitter 1923 
Pascho, P D Conservative 2 Peverell   1950 
Pattison, H M Conservative 2 St Andrews, Mount Gold   1947, 1950 
Paul, Leslie 
Francis Conservative 3 
Vintry, 
Compton Newsagent 
1936 (Vintry), 1949 
(Compton), Stood 
1945, 1946 (Vintry) 
Pearse, A Conservative 1 Mount Edgcumbe   1932, 1935 
Pearse, Isaac   1       




Labour 1 Friary, Sutton Engine Driver 
1924 (Friary), 1945, 
1946 (Sutton), stood 
1921,1927 
Perry, Herbert 





1924, 1932, 1935 
(Valletort), 1945 
(Molesworth), Stood 
1921, 1923, 1927, 
1929, 1938 (Valletort), 
Relation of E.W Perry? 
Pettett, 
Sydney W R Conservative 1 Pennycross Civil Servant 1931, 1934, 1937 
Phillips, H.G Liberal 1 Laira   1934, 1937 
Pillar, James 
Elliot Liberal 1 Pennycross Tailor 





e 1 Nelson House decorator 1921, 1924, 1927 
Pook, W 
Jessie (Mrs) Conservative 3 Mutley   
1927, 1930, 1933, 
1936, Stood 1945 
Poole, J Lieut. 
Comm Conservative 1 Keyham   1930 
Pooley, 
Benjamin Liberal 1 Charles Baker & Confectioner 1922 
Porter, Harry Conservative 3 Mount Edgcumbe   
1925, 1928, 1931, 
1934, 1937, 1947, 
Stood 1945 
Potter, F Conservative 1 St Aubyn   1923, 1926 
Potter, Sidney 
Charles Labour 3 Vintry Hairdresser 1934, 1937, 1946 
Priest, 




Conservative 3 Charles, Crownhill Engineer 
1925, 1928, 1931 
(Charles), 1945 
(Crownhill) 
Prynn, F Conservative 1 Compton   1934, 1937 
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Ray, R.C.C Conservative 1 Drake   1935, 1938 
Reed, Samuel 
Charles Conservative 1 Nelson Tobacconist 
1923, 1926, Stood 
1929 
Reid, H C C Conservative 1 Charles   1930 
Rendle, A H Conservative 1 Valletort Licensed Victualler 1922, Stood 1925 
Renney, 




Liberal 1 St Aubyn   





Liberal 1 St Budeaux Retired Lieutenant 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 




Conservative 1 Drake Dentist 1923, Stood 1927 (St Aubyn) 
Russell, L J L Conservative 2 Crownhill   1949, 1950 
Rutter, W Liberal 1 Keyham   1928 




Conservative 2 Crownhill Lietenant Commander Royal Navy (r) 1946 
Scoble, G S Labour 1 Friary   1925, 1933, 1936 
Scott, E A Conservative 1 Drake   1932 
Slocombe, G 
W Conservative 2 Peverell   1949 
Smith, Robert 
Alfred Conservative 2 St Andrews Draper 1945 




Labour 3 St Peters Civil Servant (r) 1930, 1933, 1936, 1945 
Spear, H L Liberal 1 Charles   1938, Stood 1947 
Stephens, E 
G Labour 3 Nelson   
1929, 1933, 1947 




Soloman Liberal (Leader) 1 Laira   1923 
Stephens, W 
R Conservative 1 St Peters Outfitter 1922 
Strachan, A L National Conservative 1 Charles   1936 
Strawbridge, 




Liberal 1 Friary Physician & Surgeon 
1923, 1926, 1929, 
1932, 1935, 1938, 
Stood 1922 
Tamblin, J Labour 1 Molesworth   1927 
Taylor, A.E Conservative 1 Keyham   1934, 1937 
Taylor, W 
Harry Conservative 3 Mutley   1932, 1935, 1947 
Thatcher, 
A.G.H Conservative 1 Laira   1935, 1938 
Townsend, C 
H Labour 1 Sutton Plumber 1928, 1931, 1937 




Clifford Conservative 1 Stoke Draper 
1922, 1925, 1928, 
1931, 1934 
Treblecock, H 
L Conservative 2 Crownhill   1947 
Tucker, W P Labour 2 St Budeaux   1949 
Viggers,  
Frederick Unionist 2 Stoke Dairy Farmer 1921 
Vosper, 






Liberal 1 Friary Joinery Manufacturer 1921 
Wall, Joseph 
Harry Labour 2 St Aubyn Grocer 1945, Stood 1950 




National Liberal 2 St Aubyn Meat Trader 1946, 1950 
Watkins, T H Labour 2 Efford   1949, 1950 
Webb, A E H Conservative 1 Vintry Coach & Motor Trimmer, Hotelier 
1922, 1925, 1928, 
1931 
Welsford, 
William Henry Unionist 1 Molesworth Civil Servant (r) 1921 
Western, 
William Henry Labour 1 Ford   
Unknown, elected 
Alderman in 1921 
Westlake, 
George Conservative 1 
Mount 




Conservative 2 Mount Edgcumbe Funeral Director 1946 
Wilks, William 
John Labour 2 Nelson Skilled Labourer 1945, 1950 
Williams, H E Labour 1 Sutton   1932, 1935, 1938 
Willliams, G H Labour 1 Vintry Stone Sawyer 1927, Stood 1930, 1931, 1932 
Wingate, 




  1       
Woollcombe, 
J Y Conservative 1       
Wright, 
Edward Henry Labour 3 Ford Civil Servant 
















Appendix D: Bristol Maps and Illustrations 
 
All photographs are copyright of the author  




Figure 1: Pre-war central Bristol (OS 25” County 
Series, sheet 71/6, 1918) 
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Figure 2: Central Bristol, post-blitz (O/S 25” County 
Series, Sheet 71/6, 1944) 
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Figure 3: Post-war central Bristol (O/S 
1:2500National Grid Series, sheet ST5972) 
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Figure 4: Castle Park, Bristol: St Peter’s (ruin) 
represents the centre of the old shopping district of 
Wine Street/Castle Street  
 
Figure 5: Castle Park, Bristol 
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Figure 6: Centre of Broadmead, looking along 
Merchant Street to Horsefair.  
 
Figure 7: Corner of Broadmead and Merchant Street. 




Figure 8: Broadmead, east side 
 
 





Figure 10: Old and new – The Arcade, fitted into the 
new Broadmead. 
 
Figure 11: Entrance to Wesleyan Chapel on 
Broadmead. Note differing building heights to right, 
demonstrating problems with architectural control.  
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Figure 12: Horsefair, east side.  
 
 






Figure 14 & 15: Corner detailing on junction of Broadmead and Union 
Street. The differing treatment demonstrates the lack of architectural 
control.  
 
Figure 16 & 17: Corner detailing on Merchant 
Street/Horsefair and Horsefair/Union Street junctions. 
Note oblique angle common to post-war building.  
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Figure 18: Primark (formerly Lewis’ department 
store), Horsefair. The monumental architecture of 
Horsfair contrasts starkly with the more muted 
classicism of Broadmead.  
 
Figure 19: Marks and Spencer, built in the Neo-









Appendix E: Plymouth Maps and Illustrations 
 
All photographs are copyright of the author 






Figure 20: Pre-war central Plymouth (O/S 25” County 





Figure 21: Post-war central Plymouth (OS 1:12500 





Figure 22: Post-war central Plymouth (OS 1:2500 




Figure 23: Proposed layout and bomb damage (Plan 




Figure 24: Layout for new Plymouth centre (Plan for 










 Figure 26: Armada Way  
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Figure 27: House of Fraser (formerly Dingle’s) on the 
corner of Armada Way and Royal Parade (right-hand 
side) 
 
Figure 28: Pearl Assurance House on the corner of 
Armada Way and Royal Parade (left-hand side) 
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Figure 29: Royal Parade looking towards Derry’s 
Cross 
 






Figure 31: Corner of Royal Parade and Old Town 
Street (St Andrew’s Cross) 
 
Figure 32: Corner of Old Town Street and Exeter 
Street (St Andrew’s Cross). Note similarities with 




Figure 33: Royal Bank of Scotland (formerly 
Westminster Bank), top of Royal Parade. 
 






Figure 35: Old Town Street 
 
 
Figure 36: Opposite side of Old Town Street, looking 
towards St Andrew’s Cross. Note use of palm trees 




Figure 37: New George Street, west side at junction 
with Old Town Street. 
 
 
Figure 38: New George Street, east side at junction 




Figure 39: New George Street, west side, looking 
toward junction with Armada Way.  
 
Figure 40: New George Street, east side, looking 





Figure 41: New George Street, west side, looking 
towards Raleigh Street.  
 
Figure 42: New George Street, east side, below 
junction with Armada Way. Note change of line to 
accommodate pre-war buildings (building with clock 
was Western Morning News offices).  
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Figure 43: Cornwall Street, west side, looking toward 
the new Drake Circus. Note change of materials to 
brick 
 
Figure 44: Cornwall Street, east side, looking toward 




Figure 45: Mayflower Street. The later building was 
not in such good style, using very stark designs and 
materials. The 1970’s Money Centre can be seen in 
the background.  
 
 Figure 46: Pre-war buildings at Derry’s Cross, 
demonstrating the   architectural continuity between 
the two eras. 
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Figure 47: Lloyd’s Bank, Royal Parade. Lloyd’s used 
an unusal teak cladding on their frontage, but kept 
the Neo-Classical styling common to the rest of the 
city.  
 
 Figure 48 & 49: Detailing on Lloyd’s building 
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Figure 50 & 51: Detailing on House of Fraser 
(Dingle’s) building and former Martin’s Bank.  
 
 












Appendix F: Exeter Maps and Illustrations 
 
All photographs copyright of the author 




Figure 54:  Pre-War Central Exeter (OS 25” County 







Figure 55: Post-War Central Exeter (OS 1:2500 




Figure 56: Bomb damage to central areas (Sharp, 




Figure 57: Central Exeter, as replanned by Sharp 
(Exeter Phoenix, p.96) 
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Figure 59: High Street, Exeter, north side (groups 2 & 




Figure 60: High Street, Exeter, north side (group 3, 
built by Westminster Bank) 
 
 
Figure 61: High Street, Exeter, north side (group 4, 




Figure 62: High Street, Exeter, south side (group 11 
& 10, built by Ravenseft and Barclay’s Bank) 
 
Figure 63: High Street, Exeter, south side (group12, 




Figure 64: High Street, north side (group 6, built by 
Boot’s).  
 
Figure 65: High Street, north side, looking toward 
Queen Street junction (group 7, built by County Book 




Figure 66: High Street, south side at junction with 
Bedford Street (group 8) 
 
Figure 67: High Street at junction with Bedford Street 
(group 8). Note Art Deco inspired detailing on oblique 




Figure 68: Beford Street, west side (group 9, built by 
Martin’s Bank and the Exeter Savings Bank). 
 
Figure 69: Bedford Street, west side (group 10, built 





















Figure 70: Princesshay, c.1997, looking west toward 
the Cathedral (groups 14 & 15, built by Ravenseft 
and demolished in 2003) 
 
Figure 71: Princesshay, c.1970, looking east toward 
Eastgate. Memorial plaque unveiled by Princess 




Figure 72:. High Street, north side (group 1, built by 
Curry’s, Burton’s and Lloyd’s Bank). 
 
 
Figure 73: Rest garden behind group 7 in Catherine 
Street. Ruined almshouses and chapel to the left, 
retained as war memorial  
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Figure 74: Pre-war telephone exchange on junction 
of Musgrave Row, Bailey Street and Castle Street. 
Note similarities with post-war Lloyd’s building 
(fig.72) 
Figure 75: Old City Library, Castle Street. The 
continuity between pre- and post-war architecture is 
apparent, with the use of Neo-Classical detailing. 
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Figures 76 & 77: Corporate detailing on Martin’s 
Bank and Barclay’s Bank buildings.  
 
Figure 78 & 79: Disputed detailing on group 11 – the 
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